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ABSTRACT 
In 1897, the Aboriginals Protection Act was passed by the Queensland 
Parliament. The Act provided for the creation of reserves and allowed for the forcible 
removal of Aborigines to reserves. On reserves, inmates were subjected to a wide range 
of controls and disciplinary measures. They were restricted from practicing many 
traditional customs, punished for the most minor infringements of settlement regulations, 
and their children placed in dormitories. Proponents of the system defended such 
measures as necessary for the better care and protection of the state's Aborigines. Some 
research has been undertaken on the reserve system in Queensland and indicates that 
other motives prompted the establishment of reserves. This research, however, has been 
spasmodic and tentative and certainly no consensus yet exists as to the rationale for 
reserves. 
This thesis critically examines the purpose and rationale of the reserve system 
by focusing on the Barambah settlement (later became known as Cherbourg) which was 
established in 1900 in south-east Queensland. The Barambah settlement became the 
model for other settlements and typified how the Act operated. This thesis refutes the 
supposedly humanitarian basis for the reserve system. One of the major functions of the 
settlement was to serve as a place for segregating Aborigines from whites. They were 
forcibly removed to the settlement to be out of sight and out of mind. The removals 
program also functioned as a means of disciplining and controlling inmates once on the 
settlement. Another major function of the settlement was to establish cultural hegemony 
over the inmates. Vigorous attempts were made, on the one hand, to inculcate the 
inmates with the values of white capitalist society, and on the other, to destroy their 
cultural ties and identity. The school and dormitories were the principal means of 
achieving this goal. Ironically, many of the techniques used, particularly in the 
dormitories, were anything but civilised. A third major role of the settlement was to 
serve as a labour depot. Despite supposedly being created to isolate Aborigines from 
whites, inmates were sent out to work as labourers and domestic servants. The settlement 
served as a source of cheap and dependable labour for capital. 
This thesis also explores the physical conditions on the settlement. A basic 
rationale of the reserve system was to provide a place for the preservation and protection 
of Aborigines. Yet the evidence indicates that the settlement did not achieve this aim. 
On the contrary, as a result of neglect and the poor conditions, inmates were more 
susceptible to disease and experienced higher rates of mortality than among the total 
Aboriginal population. 
This analysis shows that the essential nature of Aboriginal-European relations 
remained unchanged from the colonial period. The reserve system did not signal a new 
era of cooperation and more humane treatment as some historians have suggested. 
Importantly, it is argued that the overt and direct violence of the frontier was replaced 
by covert and passive violence. Violence in this latter form permeated the settlement, 
being manifest in the removal program, the incarceration of children in dormitories, the 
denial of cultural expression, and poor health conditions. 
Other issues considered include the reasons why settlements such as Barambah 
did survive and flourish. Previous attempts at establishing reserves were characterised 
by failure. Barambah, however, became a successful institution as a result of a better 
understanding of the techniques of control. The issue of how the settlement was 
perceived from the outside is also addressed. Some commentators have argued that 
settlements served to throw a blanket of forgetfulness over Aborigines. It is argued, 
however, that while valid in a limited sense, awareness of the settlement did exist, both 
in the immediate district and in the wider public. The final major issue examined 
concerns how the inmates responded to the reserve system. Despite the oppressive nature 
of the settlement regime and concerted attempts to destroy their value and belief system, 
inmates maintained a sense of 'otherness' that clearly set then apart from the dominant 
white society. Ironically the reserve system itself helped to promote cultural resilience 
and vitality among the inmates. Inmates adapted to the circumstances and while losing 
some aspects of their culture and identity, forged new identities and cultural forms as 'the 
Barambah mob'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A dumping ground for the lame, the halt and the incorrigible . . . the black criminals 
of the state (J. W. Bleakley, 1913).^ 
Since the establishment of this settlement in 1904, it has been the dumping ground for 
natives of all classes from all parts of the state but principally those whose removal 
from undesirable environments on the fringe of civilisation became necessary for 
disciplinary reasons (J.W. Bleakley, 1934). 
In the early months of 1901, as white Australians were undergoing their rite of 
passage into nationhood, another group of Australians were also participating in a rite of 
passage - but of a quite different kind. In the Burnett district of south-east Queensland, 
remnants of the Wakka Wakka tribe were being rounded up and dumped on a reserve 
on the banks of Barambah Creek. From camps on the fringes of towns and station 
properties, they had been forced onto an Aboriginal settlement established ostensibly for 
their care and protection. For the Wakka Wakka, their 'rite of passage' was not into 
nationhood and independence but into institutionalisation and domination. The two rituals 
were diametrically opposed. Soon after, the Wakka Wakka people were joined by 
similarly dispossCvSsed and displaced tribespeople from throughout the state. This reserve, 
which became known as the Barambah settlement, had its origins in The Aboriginals 
Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act. Enacted by the Queensland 
Parliament in 1897, the legislation was intended to 'make provision for the better 
protection and care of the Aboriginal and Half-caste inhabitants of the colony' by the 
^ QPP (1914) 3: 1028; QPD 125 (1916-17): 2289; George Arncll to Home Secretary, 24 
November 1906, Ay31708 06/13415. 
^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 30 November 1934, OS A A/3699 
34/5048. 
This analogy is derived from Gavin Souter's Lion and Kangaroo: The initiation of Australia 
1901-1919 (Sydney: Collins, 1976), where he compares the rite of passage of white Australians and 
Aranda tribespeople in 1901 (13-54). 
2 
creation of reserves throughout the colony. This policy seemingly marked a watershed 
in Aboriginal-European relations in Queensland. In place of violence, conflict, 
dispossession and exploitation that characterised the treatment of Aborigines in colonial 
Queensland, the legislation seemed to promote humane and considerate policies. 
Early commentators on the 1897 policy and the reserve system such as Bleakley, 
Lockley and Foxcroft gave essentially descriptive accounts its operation. They accepted, 
without criticism, that the rationale for settlements was protection and preservation. They 
did not query the morality of forcibly removing people to reserves or separating children 
from their parents but believed such action was necessary and beneficial. More critical 
appraisals of the reserve system and the 1897 policy however, have been undertaken. 
Rowley, Evans, Loos and Reid have examined the circumstances surrounding the 
formulation of the 1897 policy. Reid saw the policy as a genuine response to the serious 
social problems that had developed among Queensland's Aborigines by the 1890s. He 
argued that 'Meston's scheme was a positive attempt to help Aborigines' and was 
prompted by the failure of previous endeavours to improve their conditions. Reid sought 
to show that Meston's efforts belonged within a tradition of humanitarian concern in 
^ The literature on race relations in colonial Queensland has become quite extensive. Among 
the more important works are Noel Loos, Invasion and Resistance: Aboriginal-European relations on 
the North Queensland Frontier (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982); Ray Evans, 
"The Nigger shall disappear.." Aborigines and Europeans in colonial Queensland,' Exclusion, 
Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in colonial Queensland, ed. R. Evans, K. Saunders 
and K. Cronin (Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1975): Henry Reynolds, The 
Other Side of the Frontier (Townsville: James Cook University, 1981); L.E. Skinner, Police of the 
Pastoral Frontier (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1975); Maurice French, Conflict on the 
Condamine: Aborigines and the European invasion (Toowoomba: Darling Downs Institute of Advanced 
Education Press, 1989); Ray Evans and Jan Walker, "These strangers, where are they going?": 
Aboriginal-European relations in the Eraser Island and Wide Bay region 1770-1905,' Occasional 
Papers in Anthropology No 8, ed. P. Lauer (St. Lucia: Anthropology Museum, 1977), 39-105; Gordon 
Reid, A Nest of Hornets: the massacre of the Eraser family at Hornet Bank station, central Queensland 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
^ J.W. Bleakley, Aborigines of Australia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1%1); EJ.B. Foxcroft, 
Australian Native policy: Its history especially in Victoria (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 
1941); Barbara Lockley, 'Queensland Native Policy,' BA thesis. University of Queensland, 1957. 
3 
Queensland that began with Lutheran missionaries at Moreton Bay in 1837. Reid 
conceded that the rigid system of control and protection which developed later did have 
unfortunate and tragic consequences, but maintained the 'effects of the Act were not as 
bad as the effects of having no protection at all would have been'. CD. Rowley, like 
Reid, argued that the policy was a reaction to the perceived failure of 'the missions to 
carry out the protection of the Aborigines'. The creation of reserves and the deportation 
of Aborigines was based on the 'conviction that there was no other way to avoid 
extermmation'. Rowley was aware of the limitations of policy and the adverse impact 
on Aboriginal people but felt it was essentially motivated by 'humanitarian concern, that 
Q 
It was a genuine effort at protection'. By contrast. Loos and Evans identify quite 
different motives for the establishment of reserves. In Loos' assessment, reserves were 
created as a means by which Queensland could 'decently dispose of its native 
inhabitants'. Evans saw the events not so much as an outburst of charitable sentiment 
but an attempt to silence the critics who had been clamouring for an end to the violence 
and exploitation of Aboriginal people. In formulating the policy, all commentators 
acknowledge the critical role played by Archibald Meston. His influence were evident 
in the drafting of the legislation and in the early stages of implementing the reserve 
system. Thorpe has examined the cultural and social forces that shaped Meston's 
^ Gordon Reid, 'Queensland and the Aboriginal Problem: 1838-1901,' (PhD thesis, Australian 
National University, 1985), 261. 
CD. Rowley, The Destruction of Aboriginal Society (Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 1970), 183-4. 
^ CD. Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1971), 21. 
Noel Loos, Invasion and Resistance: Aboriginal-European relations on the North Queensland 
Frontier (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982), 181. 
^^ Ray Evans, 'European-Aboriginal relations in Queensland: 1880-1910,' BA thesis. University 
of Queensland, 1965, 37. 
ideology and behaviour and how in turn, it was manifest in the legislation and early 
administration of southern reserves. 
As to the policy itself, Rowley has also analysed its principal features and 
outlined subsequent changes up to the mid 1960s. He argued that during this period 
'the practices and the basic legislation formed a consistent and interlocked system'. He 
described some of the restrictions and controls that were placed on inmates but argued 
that the system was based on a 'determined paternalism' and maintained by the 'good 
intentions' of people such as J.W. Bleakley, the Chief Protector from 1913 to 1942. 
Welborn has made a comparative study of policies and political attitudes in Queensland 
and Western Australia between 1897 and 1907. She found similarities between the two 
states but argues that the measures in Queensland were more comprehensive and 
repressive. Evans has examined the main political attitudes towards Aborigines durmg 
the period of Labor government between 1915 and 1957. He found that regardless of 
political persuasion, general indifference existed towards Aboriginal people. Discussion 
was limited to issues of the racial inferiority of Aborigines and the problems of 
miscegenation. King and McHoul have assessed the 1897 policy, not from a traditional 
^^  William Thorpe, 'Archibald Meston and Aboriginal legislation in colonial Queensland,' 
Historical Studies 21 (1984): 52-67. 
^^  Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia, 107, 117-8. Other general surveys of Queensland policy 
include Andrew Markus, 'Under the Act,' The Australians: 1938, eds. P. Spearitt and B. Gammage 
(Sydney: Fairfax, Syme and Wcldon, 1987), 47-53; Christopher Anderson, 'Queensland,' Aboriginal 
land rights: A handbook, ed. Nicolas Peterson (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 
1981), 53-114; Richard Broome, Aboriginal Australians: black responses to white dominance, 1788-
1980. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Ross Fitzgerald, From the Dreaming to 1915: A history of 
Queensland (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 215-20; Dawn May, 'Race Relations 
in Queensland: 1897-1971,' discussion paper. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths into Custody, 
1990. 
^^  Suzanne Welborn, 'Politicians and Aborigines in Queensland and Western Australia: 1897-
1907,' Studies in Western Australian History II (Nedlands: Department of History, University of 
Western Australia, 1978), 18. 
*'* Ray Evans, 'Aborigines,' Labor in Power: The Labor Party and Government in Queensland 
1915-1957, eds. DJ. Murphy, R.B. Joyce and CA. Hughes (St. Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1980), 330-354. 
historical perspective but by subjecting the Act and related documents to discourse 
analysis. Despite this different approach, they nevertheless rely on the work of other 
historians and reach similar conclusions about the nature of the reserve system. In their 
view, it was characterised by 'a Benthamite technology of surveillance, control, 
incarceration and normalisation'. As to how the Act was implemented and administered, 
Jeremy Long had provided brief accounts of the development of government settlements 
in Queensland including Cherbourg, Woorabinda and Palm Island as part of a survey of 
17 institutional communities in eastern Australia. Other studies include May's overview 
of Palm Island settlement in the 1930s, Blake's account of the short-lived Aboriginal 
Girls Home in Brisbane, Smith's analysis of the early years of Yarrabah mission, Thorpe's 
work on Deebing Creek and Purga, and Evans and Walker's analysis of Bogimbah 
settlement on Eraser Island. Also of relevance is Huggins' study of female Aboriginal 
18 
domestic servants between the wars. Another dimension of the reserve system is 
provided by those who experienced life on settlements and missions. The writings and 
^^  D.A. King, and A.W. McHoul, The discursive production of the Queensland Aborigine as 
subject: Meston's proposal, 1895,' Social Analysis 19 (1986): 22-39. 
^^  ibid., 28. 
^^  Jeremy Long, Aboriginal Settlements: A survey of institutional communities in eastern Australia 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), 91-136. 
*^  Dawn May, 'Punishment Place,' The Australians: 1938 eds. P. Spearitt and B. Gammage 
(Sydney: Fairfax, Syme and Wcldon, 1987), 95-103; Thom Blake, 'Excluded, Exploited, Exhibited: 
Aborigines in Brisbane 1897-1910,' Brisbane: Aboriginal Alien Ethnic, ed. R. Fisher (Brisbane: 
Brisbane History Group, 1987), 49-58; Paul Smith, 'Yarrabah, 1892-1910,' BA thesis, James Cook 
University, 1981; William Thorpe, 'Archibald Meston and the Aborigines: Ideology and Practice, 
1870-1970,' BA thesis. University of Queensland, 1978; Ray Evans, A Permanent Precedent': 
Dispossession, Social Control and the Eraser Island Reserve and Mission 1897-1904, St. Lucia: 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Studies Unit, University of Queensland, 1991; Evans and 
Walker, 'Aboriginal-European relations in the Fraser Island and Wide Bay region,'; Jackie Huggins, 
'"Firing On in the Mind": Aboriginal Women Domestic Servants in the Inter-War Years,' Hecate 12 
(1987): 5-23. 
accounts, for example, Kennedy, Thaiday, Rosser, Roughsey and Thompson cannot be 
overlooked in any analysis of the conduct of Aboriginal policy. 
Together, these studies provide some understanding of the administration of 
Aboriginal policy in Queensland in the first decades of the twentieth century. Some 
issues have been explored more than others - in particular, the political context and 
attitudes have been well canva.ssed. Several works examine to what extent the creation 
of settlements was motivated by humanitarian concern, suggesting instead they were 
established primarily as a means of control and reform, to isolate the socially 
unacceptable. Other works have explored, tentatively at least, the removals program, 
health conditions and the use of inmate labour both on and off the settlements. As to 
individual settlements, little work has been undertaken on the history of the government 
administered settlements. Concerning the Barambah settlement, or as it became known 
Cherbourg, apart from an earlier study by Tennant Kelly, most attention has focused on 
Mamie Kennedy, Bom a half-caste (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 
1985); Willie Thaiday, Under the Act (Townsville: N.Q. Black Publishing Co., 1981); Bill Rosser, 
Dreamtime Nightmares (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1985); Elsie Roughsey, 
An Aboriginal Mother tells of the old and the new (Fitzroy: McPhee Gribble, 1984); Judy Thompson, 
ed.. Reaching Back: Queensland Aboriginal People recall early days at Yarrabah Mission (Canberra: 
Aboriginal Studies Press, 1989). For briefer accounts see Cecil Fisher, 'Cherbourg,' The Australians: 
1938, eds. P. Spearitt and B. Gammage (Sydney: Fairfax, Syme and Wcldon, 1987), 84-8; Bowman 
Johnson, 'Growing up in Queensland,' Aboriginal History 11 (1987): 77-81; Ettie Meredith, 'Talking 
with Auntie Ettie,' Social Alternatives 7.1 (1988): 22-24; Janey Arnold, 'Apartheid in Queensland,' 
Young Socialist July 1976: 8; June Bond, 'The other tribe of Cherbourg (Kabi-Kabi),' Social 
Alternatives 7.1 (1988): 44-46. 
^^ The history of missions in Queensland have been examined more extensively than government 
settlements. The more significant studies include: Athol Chase, 'Which way now: tradition, continuity 
and changes in a north Queensland Aboriginal community,' PhD thesis. University of Queensland, 
1980 [Lockhart River]; D. Craig, The social impact of the State on an Aboriginal reserve in 
Queensland, Australia,' PhD thesis. University of California, Berkeley, 1979 [Yarrabah]; Jan Roberts, 
ed. The Mapoon Story, 3 vols (Fitzroy: International Development Action, 1975 [Mapoonj; 
Christopher Anderson, 'The political and economic basis of Kuku-Yalangi social history,' PhD thesis, 
University of Queensland, 1984 [Wujalwujal]; David Trigger, 'Doomadgce: A study of power relations 
and social action in a North Australian Aboriginal settlement,' PhD thesis. University of Queensland, 
1985 [Doomadgee]; Kay Evans, 'Marie Yamba, Bloomfield and Hope Vale: the Lutheran Missions 
to the North Queensland Aborigines, 1886-1905,' Queensland Heritage 2.6 (1972): 26-35. 
71 
more recent administrative practices and social patterns. Clearly, the studies that have 
been undertaken of the re.serve system raise issues that invite further examination. 
Significant questions about the conduct of Aboriginal policy remain unanswered or at best 
have been addressed in a spasmodic or sketchy manner. 
One of the more obvious issues that remains unresolved is that of the motives 
for the establishment of the reserves and their functions. Was there a genuine and real 
desire to 'do something for the fast disappearing races', to provide as J.W. Bleakley 
suggested, a 'sanctuary for the distressed'r Or did the system grow out of a desire to 
exercise greater of control over Aboriginal peoples, a need to exploit more systematically 
their labour, a concern to establish cultural hegemony more effectively, and fears about 
the contamination of 'white blood' from miscegenation? Did the policy mark a 
watershed, a new order in Aboriginal-European relations, or did attitudes remain 
substantially unchanged? Were reserves an extended exercise in 'philanthropic 
pretence"r A second issue concerns the realpolitik of the reserve system, of everyday 
life on the settlement. Regardless of how oppressive, or conversely, how benevolent or 
^^  Caroline Tennant Kelly, 'Tribes on Cherbourg settlement, Queensland,' Oceania (1935) 5: 
461-473. More recent studies have included A-K Eckermann, 'Contact: an ethnographic analysis of 
three Aboriginal communities including a comparative and cross cultural examination of value 
orientation,' MA thesis. University of Queensland, 1973; Gerald Guthrie, 'Aboriginal attitudes to 
Migration: Cherbourg settlement, Queensland,' MSocSc thesis. University of New England, 1975; 
Gerald Guthrie, 'Images of Aborigines,' Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 13 (1977): 
69-75; Gerald Guthrie, 'Authority at Cherbourg,' Occasional Papers in Anthropology No 6, ed. P. 
Lauer (St. Lucia: Anthropology Museum, 1977), 1-12; Peter Koepping, 'The Limitations of Network 
Analysis for the Study of Value Systems: The Case of an Aboriginal Community in Queensland,' 
Sociologus 33 (1983): 97-131; Peter Koepping, 'How to remain human in an asylum - some field-
notes from Cherbourg Aboriginal settlement in Queensland,' Occasional Papers in Anthropology No 
6, ed. P. Lauer (St. Lucia: Anthropology Museum, 1977), 28-47; Peter Koepping, 'Cultural pattern 
on an Aboriginal settlement in Queensland,' Aborigines and change: Australia in the '70s, ed. R. M. 
Berndt (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1977), 159-76; Colin Tatz, 'Queensland's 
Aborigines: Natural Justice and the Rule of Law,' Australian Quarterly September 1963: 33-49; Betty 
Watts, 'Some Determinants of the Academic Progress of Aboriginal Adolescent Girls,' PhD thesis. 
University of Queensland, 1970. 
^^  B\eak\ey, Aborigines of Australia, 195. 
^ The phrase is from Conrad's Heart of Darkness (Bruce Harness, ed., Conrad's Heart of 
Darkness and the Critics [San Francisco; Wadsmonth, 1960], 20). 
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charitable an act of Parliament may seem, it is crucial to assess how the policy was 
translated into practice. Were conditions as draconian as some writers have suggested, 
or was the settlement regime more benign in practice; or indeed more repressive than has 
been suggested? One frequently stated reason for the creation of reserves was that they 
were necessary to prevent the extinction of the Aboriginal race. But how successful were 
reserves in improving health conditions for Aboriginal people? Another question concerns 
the 'success' of reserves established under the Aboriginal Protection Act compared with 
previous attempts. What factors contributed to their survival? Was it more competent 
management, greater cooperation by Aboriginal people or better techniques of surveillance 
and control? Another aspect that demands closer examination is the removals program. 
How important was the capacity to remove people forcibly from fringe camps, station 
properties and traditional lands, in the overall development of the reserve system? Also, 
what was the impact on Aboriginal culture and society and how did Aboriginal people 
respond to their incarceration on reserves? Were they hapless victims who succumbing 
readily to the settlement discipline or did inmates vigorously resist whenever possible? 
A further question is: were the attempts to reform and normalise the inmates by 
inculcating them with white capitalist values successful or did they maintain a sense of 
otherness and cultural distinctiveness? The reserve system must also be examined in the 
context of wider political and social developments. How did it relate to other institutions 
of reform and control in the state? How did Aboriginal policy and practice in 
Queensland during the era of segregation compared with development in other states? 
These issues are examined in the following chapters by focussing on Barambah 
settlement. It was one of the first settlements created under the 1897 legislation and 
exemplified how the policy was implemented. In chapter one, the early development of 
the settlement is discussed with attention being given to the reasons for its growth and 
survival. The subject of chapter two is the removals program. It is argued the removals 
process not only helped to populate the settlement but played a critical role in maintaining 
discipline and order. The third chapter discusses the staff who were appointed to the 
settlement - how they were selected and how effectively they managed the institution. 
The raison d'etre of the settlement is the subject of chapters four, five and six; chapter 
four focuses on the measures used to reform and discipline the inmates, chapter five 
assesses whether the settlement succeeded in improving inmates' health and arresting the 
decline of the Aboriginal population, and chapter six examines how inmates' labour was 
utilised both on and off the settlement. How the settlement was perceived from the 
outside is discu.ssed in chapter seven. The eighth chapter centres on how the inmates 
responded to the settlement regime. It explores the dynamics of cultural resilience and 
vitality and how the inmates maintained a distinctive identity. 
This thesis is limited primarily to the period 1900 to 1940. The late 1930s and 
early 1940s saw a number of changes in Aboriginal policy and practice. New legislation. 
The Aboriginals Preservation and Protection Act was passed in 1939. Although it 
continued many policies from the previous legislation, it signalled a departure from the 
segregationist policies and saw and the beginning of the assimilationist era. 
Terminology 
In 1932 the name of the settlement was changed from Barambah to Cherbourg. 
The reason for the change is unclear. One interpretation was that the nearby Barambah 
station was continually receiving mail and other commodities destined for the settlement, 
and vice versa, Barambah settlement was receiving materials for Barambah station. To 
avoid this confusion, the decision was made to rename the settlement after the parish in 
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which it was located. '^* Another tradition suggests the change occurred on the instigation 
of the local MLA who disliked the name of his electorate, Barambah, also being u.scd for 
an Aboriginal settlement. Regardless of the reasons for the change, the replacement of 
an Aboriginal name with one of French origins was ironic yet symbolised the attempted 
deconstruction of Aboriginal culture. For continuity in the text, wherever possible 
Barambah rather than Cherbourg is referred to even when the immediate context relates 
to the period after 1932. 
Other terms that have problematic usage are Aborigines and Aboriginal. During 
the last decade, the terms Koori and Murri have gained currency among Aboriginal 
people in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland. As Eve Fesl has rightly observed 
in her recent thesis on the politics of language, the words Aborigine and Aboriginal 
themselves have been part of the process of oppression. She argues that Aborigine is 
a noun that refers to the indigenous people of any country and denies particular national 
25 
clan groups what she calls 'a named identity'. While accepting in principle the validity 
of this argument, there is nevertheless still a difficulty in finding an appropriate 
alternative. The logical choice is Murri, yet not all Aboriginal Queenslanders accept that 
term itself. Furthermore, there appears to be a growing preference by some to call 
them.selves after their own clan or tribal group. For example, Stradbroke Island people 
26 
prefer to be known as Nunukal. Certainly there is no universal agreement among 
Cherbourg or former Cherbourg residents as to how they identify themselves. Some 
use the term Murri, others Aboriginal. It seems presumptuous therefore for an non-
Aboriginal to use yet another label. The terms Aborigine and Aboriginal are used 
'^^ Barambah-Cherbourg 1904-79 (1979), 20. 
^ Age, 25 May 1989. 
^^  Denis Walker, 'Human Rights - the final solution,' unpublished paper, 1988, 4. 
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throughout this thesis, not to imply any indigenous people but those peoples who have 
occupied the Australian continent for 40,000 years and more. 
The terms reserve, settlement, and mission are often used interchangeably 
but throughout this thesis are used more precisely. The term reserve is used to refer 
to an area of land set aside for the purposes of either an Aboriginal settlement or 
mission. Settlement refers to a reserve administered by the government and mission to 
a reserve managed by church or charitable societies. 
n 
CHAPTER ONE 
A COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL UNDERTAKING? 
The genesis and early development of Barambah settlement 
The first government settlement known as Barambah seemed at last to promise a 
measure of" success after the numerous failures in past attempts of the kind (J.W. 
Bleakley).^ 
In 1895 the former politician, journalist, businessman and self proclaimed expert 
on Aborigines, Archibald Meston submitted a 'carefully considered plan' to the Home 
Secretary for the improvement and preservation of Queensland's Aborigines. In outlining 
his proposals, Meston first gave an overview of previous attempts, not only in 
Queensland but al.so in the other colonies, to improve and protect the Aboriginal race. 
He described the various reserves that had been established by missionaries and other 
philanthropic minded individuals. In Meston's view, from the earliest attempts by 
Threlkeld at Port Macquarie, these reserves or missions had been distinguished by failure. 
The dismal record of reserves, however, did not prompt Meston to explore alternative 
approaches to arrest the decline of the Aboriginal race or conclude that the system of 
reserves was fundamentally flawed. Rather, he argued that the concept of reserves was 
sound and strongly urged the government to establish two reserves in Queensland, one 
in the south and the another in the north. 
In evaluating why reserves had failed, Meston argued that a major problem was 
the lack of effective management and control. Missionaries almost invariably did not 
pos.sess the necessary personal attributes for dealing with Aborigines and he felt that 
trying to inculcate Christian values was a waste of time and effort. By concentrating on 
* J.W. B\cak\cy, Aborigines of Australia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961), 189. 
^ Archibald Meston, Queensland Aboriginals: Proposed System for their Improvement and 
Preservation (Brisbane: Government Printer, 1895), 25-6. 
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saving the race by religion, basic measures of control and discipline were overlooked. 
Aborigines needed to be taught basic skills to make reserves self-supporting, not to be 
indoctrinated with a religion whose 'theological niceties and doctrines had divided some 
of the greatest thinkers of the human race'. Another major difficulty was that reserves 
had failed to isolate Aborigines from contact with whites. As they had so often been 
'created in settled districts or in localities where settlement soon followed and absorbed 
them'. Aborigines had remained exposed to vices and diseases from which they were in 
need of protection. Thus Meston believed reserves needed to be located where 
Aborigines could be completely isolated from contact with whites. 
Following the publication of his 'proposed scheme', Meston was asked by the 
Home Secretary to inspect and report on the various mission stations throughout the 
colony. In his report, Meston again showed little enthusiasm for the work undertaken 
by missionaries and he reiterated the importance of complete isolation of Aborigines from 
whites. He highlighted the general lack of progress on the six missions to support his 
claims that the government should establish and maintain reserves. On this occasion he 
advocated that three reserves be created; one in the south, another in central Queensland 
and a third in the north. Apart from this report, Meston also submitted to the 
government an outline of a proposed Act for the protection of Aborigines. 
Meston's recommendations were far reaching and represented a dramatic 
departure from previous approaches to Aboriginal welfare. Whereas previously in 
Queensland and other colonies, governments had only been involved in the care and 
^ ibid., 25. 
'' Archibald Meston, 'Report on the Aboriginals of Queensland,' Queensland Votes & 
Proceedings (1896) 4: 723-36. 
^ A. Meston to W.H. Ryder, 23 August 1897, QSA COL/140 97/10750. 
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protection of Aborigines in an indirect manner, Meston advocated the direct involvement 
of the state. He had little regard for the system which operated in New South Wales and 
Victoria where Protection Boards had been established. These boards, he felt, lacked the 
necessary powers to deal effectively with the problems they faced. Meston urged that 
the government adopt stringent measures for dealing with Aborigines and called for the 
appointment of a Chief Protector who would be answerable only to the Home Secret-
ary. Meston also stressed that it was essential for the government to have the power to 
remove 'all or any Queensland Aborigines or children of Aboriginal mothers' to a 
reserve. 
When the Queensland Parliament finally enacted legislation for the 'better 
protection and care of the Aboriginal and Half-caste inhabitants of the colony' in late 
1897, Meston's influence was evident. Although the Act dealt with issues such as the 
supplying of opium to Aborigines, the control of labour, and the appointment of 
protectors, the centrepiece of the Act was the creation of reserves. The Act did not 
specifically state who were to manage reserves, but during debate on the Bill the Home 
Secretary indicated that the government was to be actively involved in the administr-
ation of reserves. Indeed, the government had begun to implement this new policy even 
before the Act was passed. In February 1897, Meston had opened a reserve on Fraser 
Island with a group of fifty-one Aborigines from Maryborough. With the establishment 
of this reserve, Meston no doubt believed this was the beginning of his grand plan of 
three strategically situated reserves along the coast where all Aborigines could be 
relocated. Yet these hopes were short-lived. Within three years the settlement had 
became plagued with problems and such an administrative nightmare that the govern-
^ ibid. 
•^  QPD 78 (1897): 1540. 
IS 
ment transfered control to the Anglican Board of Mission. The government's failure 
to manage a reserve effectively at its first attempt suggested that despite the limitations 
of the approach adopted by missionaries, they were more suited to the task than the 
government. 
Within a decade of the Fraser Island debacle, however, the Chief Protector was 
describing the government controlled settlement at Barambah as a 'completely successful 
undertaking'. This was a bold claim. He did not merely assert that the settlement had 
'survived' but that it was prospering and fulfilling the intentions of the government. 
Given that previously most had failed within the first few years, the first decade of the 
Barambah settlement was obviously a crucial period in its history. In this chapter, our 
attention is focused on three basic issues. First, why did Barambah survive when so 
many previous endeavours had ended in failure? What were the conditions that 
contributed to its survival and growth? Secondly, how valid were the Chief Protector's 
claims that the settlement was a complete success? Thirdly, how important was the 
success or at least the perception of success in the development of the reserve system 
in Queensland? 
The rest of this chapter is in two parts. The first examines the settlement's 
genesis and early development under guidance of the missionary W.J. Thompson. The 
second section focuses on the early period of the government control. 
* Ray Evans and Jan Walker, '"These strangers, where are they going?": Aboriginal-European 
relations in the Fraser Island and Wide Bay region 1770-1905,' Occasional Papers in Anthropology 
No 8, ed. P. Lauer (St Lucia: Anthropology Museum, 1977), 74-91. 
^ QPP (1910) 3: 977. 
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The Thompson era: 1899-1904 
Ironically, the reserve which became known as the 'mother of government 
settlements in Queensland' began, not as a government initiative, but as a modest 
enterprise by a self-effacing missionary, William John Thompson. Thompson had 
migrated to Queensland in the mid 1880s from New South Wales and settled in the South 
Burnett town of Nanango. Unlike others who had been drawn to the district by the 
call of the land, he found little inspiration in Arcadian pursuits. Instead his heart and 
mind were fixed on more ethereal endeavours. As a dedicated member of the Salvation 
Army, Thompson saw his purpose in life as cultivating the souls of men rather than the 
soil of the earth. With the rank of Lieutenant he fearlessly preached on the street 
corners of Nanango under the 'blood and fire' banner and, in typical Salvation Army 
tradition, Thompson's energies were directed to those most in need of 'rescuing from the 
devil'. In Nanango, the group who had unquestionably succumbed more than any other 
to the devil's depredations were the blacks living on the fringe of the town. 
Thompson's response to this problem, which he defined as 'going completely to 
the devil', was the removal of the local blacks from their present surroundings. As 
long as they had ready access to the 'demon drink' and the women were vulnerable to 
sexual exploitation, the problem would remain. Accordingly, Thompson wrote to the 
Home Secretary in June 1899 outlining the plight of the local Aborigines and his 
^^ D. Thompson, Capella, personal communication, 21 February 1985. 
^^  J.E. Murphy and E.W. Easton, Wilderness to Wealth (Brisbane: Smith & Patterson, 1950), 
391. 
12 WJ. Thompson to P. Robertson, 19 October 1903, QSA A/8792 12. 
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suggestions for a solution to the problem. He asked that land be set aside in the 
Nanango district where he could set up a Mission, even suggesting a suitable location. 
Thompson possibly thought that since the passage of the Aboriginal Protection 
Act, the government would view his request favourably. He quickly learnt, however, as 
far as Aboriginal policy was concerned, there was a large gap between promise and 
practice. The Home Secretary replied by saying that significant portions of the land 
Thompson had in mind had already been earmarked for selection and so it 'would render 
the site unsuitable for the purposes in view'. The Home Secretary did not venture to 
offer a reason why the site was unsuitable but given the criticism the government had 
already faced three years earlier over the reserve at Durundur, the locating of a reserve 
for Aborigines in the midst of a new selection was to be avoided at all costs. Despite 
the rhetoric about caring for and protecting the colonies' indigenous inhabitants, the 
government's agenda ranked the needs of selectors far ahead of Aborigines. The Home 
Secretary attempted to dissuade Thompson further by pointing out that the Durundur 
17 
reserve was to be upgraded and could well fulfil the needs of the Nanango blacks. 
Thompson was undeterred by this initial setback. Convinced of the need for a 
local reserve, he looked elsewhere for suitable land and rallied local support. Because 
most land in the immediate vicinity of Nanango was either taken up or set aside for 
selection, Thompson was forced to look further afield and he eventually located a vacant 
1^  WJ. Thompson to Home Secretary, 18 June 1899, QSA HOM/B3, 'T'. 
I'* WJ. Thompson to Home Secretary, 11 September 1899, QSA HOM/B3 'T'. 
1^  Under Secretary, Home Department to WJ. Thompson, 10 October 1899, QSA COL/G138 
950. 
1^  Daily Telegraph, 27 October 1897. 
1"^  Under Secretary, Home Department to WJ. Thompson, 10 October 1899, QSA COL/G138 
950. 
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1280 acre block twenty-five miles to the north. Without investigating thoroughly the 
suitability of the site TTiompson asked that the block be designated a reserve for 
18 
Aboriginal purposes. As the block was surrounded by the large pastoral holdings of 
Mondure and Barambah, the Government had little reason to suspect any local opposition 
to the move. The block was proclaimed a reserve on 24 March 1900. Thompson was 
also successful in mobilising local support for an Aboriginal Mission in the district. In 
November 1899 the Burnett Aboriginal Protection Society was formed with Rev Bailey 
20 
as chairman and Thompson as secretary. When informed of this venture, the Home 
Secretary said that the government was willing to support the Society in its endeavours 
with a grant of £100 as long as it could raise an equal amount. Also, as soon as a 
21 
suitable school building was erected, the government promised to provide a teacher. 
Unfortunately for Thompson, his vision and enthusiasm for an Aboriginal 
Mission was not matched by the other members of the Society. Less than six months 
after the Society had been formed, support had dissipated to the extent that Thompson 
was compelled to write to the government suggesting that the management and conduct 
of the mission be solely in his hands. The idea of a 'private mission', run by an 
individual and an.swerable to no one else, was not without precedent. 'Maloga ' , run by 
Daniel Mathews in Victoria, and 'Warangesda ' , established by John Gribble, were two 
23 
notable examples of Aboriginal missions initially started as private ventures. The 
1* Home Secretary to WJ. Thompson, 14 March 1900, QSA COL/G144 322. 
1^  QGG 73 (1900): 957. 
2° WJ. Thompson to Home Secretary, QSA HOM/B3 'T'. 
21 Under Secretary, Home Department to WJ. Thompson, 20 February 1900, QSA COL/G143 
590. 
22 WJ. Thompson to Home Secretary, 2 April 1900, QSA HOM/B5 T . 
2^  Jeremy Long, Aboriginal Settlements: A survey of institutional communities in eastern 
Australia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), 24-26. 
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Home Secretary was not impressed by this proposal and informed Thompson: 'Experience 
has shown that this Station can be best managed by local Committees or by recogni.scd 
religious organisations subsidised by the Government'. Undeterred, TTiompson looked 
elsewhere for a sponsor. The Ipswich Aboriginal Protection Society had been operating 
a mission at Deebing Creek since 1892 and seemed well suited for the task. Thomp.son 
approached the Society about overseeing a new mission in the Burnett district and to his 
25 delight they agreed. With land and sponsor, the fulfilment of Thompson's dream 
seemed imminent; but more difficulties lay ahead. 
After some members of the Ipswich committee inspected the land that had been 
set aside, they, concluded it was not suited for the purpose. Apart for being too small, 
its water supply was also not adequate. Given the problems that had already been 
encountered in obtaining the block, the committee was hesitant to ask for another. 
Fortuitously, the Home Secretary had also decided that the block was unsuitable but for 
a quite different reason. The Railways department required a portion of the block for 
27 the planned Kilkivan to Kingaroy line. Just as the needs of selectors ranked higher 
than that of Aborigines in the demand for land, so did that of railways. Consequently, 
the Home Secretary had little hesitation in revoking the reserve and asked the committee 
to look elsewhere. Less than three miles from the original reserve, was a 7000 acre 
block that was part of the Cherbourg occupation licence held by the Moore Bros of 
Barambah Station (see figure 1.1). Following representations from the Lands department. 
309. 
2'* Under Secretary, Home Department to WJ. Thompson, 9 June 1900, QSA COL/G147 365. 
2^  Under Secretary, Home Department to Rev P. Robertson, 14 August 1900, QSA COL/G149 
2^  ibid. 
2^  Railway Commissioner to Home Secretary, 27 September 1900, QSA A/8788 13. 
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the Moore Bros agreed to forego their lease prematurely. Their motives were not 
entirely altruistic. As they used Aboriginal labour extensively on their property, they 
no doubt saw the new mission as a source of cheap, accessible labour. The only 
concern the Moore Bros had was that their stock were liable to be disturbed if 'a large 
number of blacks [were] allowed to roam about at their own free will ' . 
The block was demonstrably superior to the previous one. It was bounded on 
three sides by creeks and was six times the size. The owners of Barambah Station 
believed the block was well chosen. They told the Home Secretary: 
The land applied for is the pick of the block, the balance being inferior, some 
portions useless stony ridges and parts inaccessible. The whole is covered 
with scrub, dense wattle, or undergrowth of some description. 
We may add that the land and the locality applied for is more suitable that 
previously granted in as much there is a never failing supply of water. There 
are holes in Barambah that would float a moderately sized ship and besides 
the natives will have plenty of fishing. 
The new reserve was gazetted on 23 February 1901 and Thompson began to persuade 
Aborigines throughout the district to set up camp there. But this campaign met with 
little success for when Thompson finally moved into the reserve, 'only a few local blacks 
32 
and some from Nanango ' bothered to join him - hardly a promising beginning. 
The fortunes of the Barambah mission however, were significantly boosted when 
the Home Secretary decided to transfer a number of inmates from the Durundur 
2^  Moore Bros to Under Secretary, Department of Lands, 8 November 1900, JOL OM.AK/3/2, 
94. 
2^  The wage ledger for Barambah station for the period reveals thirty-eight out of a total of 
122 employees, that is almost one-third, were Aboriginal (JOL OM.AKyiO/5). 
•^ Moore Bros to Under Secretary, Department of Lands, 8 November 1900, JOL OM.AK/3/2, 
94. 
*^ ibid. 
32 QGG 75 (1901): 485; QPP (1902) 1: 1175. 
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Figure 1.1 Land Tenure - Barambah Creek area in early 1900s 
22 
settlement. In June 1900, Durundur was reopened with the removal by Archibald Meston 
of sixty blacks from western Queensland. This move prompted a hostile reaction by 
local white residents who, fearing for their safety, petitioned the government to remove 
the reserve. In response, the Home Secretary said he understood the apprehensions of 
the residents but did intend closing Durundur down as no matter where a reserve was 
established, there would be protests. To alleviate some of their concerns, however, he 
-1-3 
decided to send some of the inmates elsewhere. In May 1901, the Durundur 
Superintendent, Harold Meston (Archibald's son) took forty blacks to the new mi.ssion 
in the Burnett district. Along the way they were joined by thirty-three others from 
Kilkivan. On arrival, Harold Meston was astonished at the conditions on the mission. 
He discovered the Superintendent and his family living in a tent and that the stores were 
kept in a slab hut roofed with grass. No preparations had been made for the Durundur 
contingent and they were forced to sleep in the open until crude shelters could be 
erected. It did not surprise Harold Meston then, when he returned to Durundur to be 
informed that one woman who had left in perfect health had died soon after arrival. 
If Thompson had faced enough difficulties in establishing the mission, more were 
to follow. One problem was the opposition of other residents in the district. When the 
mission first commenced, both Thompson and the government had reason to believe that 
opposition from others in the area would be minimal. Apart from being situated in a 
relatively sparsely populated area, the owners of Barambah station who were the closest 
neighbours to the mission, had willingly conceded part of their occupation licence and 
had informed the committee that they were 'interested in adjoining the settlement'. The 
33 Brisbane Courier, 8 June 1900. 
^ A. Meston to Home Secretary, 7 August 1901, QSA COL/144 01/12484. 
35 I. Moore to Rev P. Robertson, 13 November 1900, JOL OM.AK/3/2, 99. 
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cordial, relationship did not last long. Soon after the Mission opened, the committee 
proposed stocking the reserve with 100 head of cattle. This proposal greatly disturbed 
the Moore Bros who feared that the cattle would bring ticks into what had previously 
been a 'clean' area. The Barambah owners, in informing the Committee of their 
objections, also took the opportunity to complain about potential problems arising from 
'if: 
'the blacks not being kept under proper control'. More outright opposition came from 
other landholders. Alleging that the mission blacks had interfered with their stock, 
Messrs Jones and Simpson, occupants of blocks to the north of the Barambah mi.ssion, 
asked the Home Secretary to move it elsewhere. Such sentiments were the beginn-
ing of a long history of opposition by local residents to the presence of an Aboriginal 
reserve in the district. 
Apart from criticism about the mission itself, Thompson also had to deal with 
complaints about his competence as Superintendent. Indeed, less than two months after 
he had arrived on Barambah, Archibald Meston the Southern Protector of Aboriginals 
38 
wrote to the Home Secretary questioning Thompson's fitness for the position. As 
Thompson was not a government appointee the only action the Home Secretary could 
take was to raise the issue with the Ipswich committee. Thompson's competence was 
also questioned in other quarters. In July 1902, the Home Secretary received a complaint 
from a Dr Kane about Thompson. Kane was the Medical Officer who accompanied the 
construction gang on the Kilkivan-Kingaroy railway line. When the camp was situated 
near the mission, Kane noticed the poor physical condition of certain blacks which he 
36 Moore Bros to Rev. P. Robertson 22 March 1901, JOL OM.AKy3/2, 297. 
3"^  Under Secretary, Home Department to G. Simpson, 27 July 1901, QSA COL/G160 418. 
3^  A. Meston to Home Secretary, 30 May 1901, QSA HOM/B7 'Aboriginal Protectors'. Such 
questioning by Meston was by no means unusual as he seemed to have disapproved almost universally 
of everyone involved in the care of Aborigines in the state. For.example, Meston was constantly 
critical of the Female Protector of Aboriginals as well as the Matron of the Aboriginal Girls Home 
(A. Meston to Under Secretary, Home Department, 25 April 1901, QSA COL/145 01/4766). 
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attributed to Thomp-son's ineptitude.^ Again, the Home Secretary was limited to raising 
the issue of Thompson's suitability with the Ipswich Committee. 
Although it was seen as a threat by outsiders, the mission itself felt assailed by 
those outside. In particular, when the workers constructing the railway line were camped 
just three miles away from the mission, Thompson felt most uneasy. The presence of so 
many men and the availability of alcohol threatened to undermine the very raison d'etre 
of the mission. In Thompson's mind, his task was to keep his charges away from the 
corrupting influences of white society, particularly the 'demon drink'. The construction 
workers also troubled Thompson in the manner in which they came onto the reserve to 
cut timber for sleepers. Although permission had been granted for such entry, he became 
greatly annoyed that they did not inform him when they were doing so. Later, when the 
railway line was completed, Thompson complained to the Railways Department about the 
illegal entry of maintenance workers onto the reserve. He reminded the Chief Engineer 
that he claimed the right 'to say who shall and shall not enter within its boundaries' and 
felt the workers could cau.se problems that would 'be a serious drawback to the Mission 
work in different ways'. 
Other circumstances conspired to hamper the development of the mission. The 
initial years of the mission coincided with the great 'Federation drought' which was as 
severe in the Burnett district as elsewhere in Australia. In 1902, Mondure property, 
which occupied land to the west of the mission, lost 4000 of its 7000 head of cattle. 
3^  Dr. R. Kane to Home Secretary, 8 July 1902, QSA HOM/B7 'K'. 
'*° W.H. Foote to Home Secretary, 16 September 1902, QSA HOM/B7 'F'. 
^^ WJ. Thompson to Home Secretary, 28 August 1902, QSA HOM/B7 'Missions'. 
'*2 WJ. Thompson to Chief Engineer, Railways Department, 5 June 1904, QSA A/8793 26. 
"^3 Murphy and Easton, Wddemess to Wealth, 199. 
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On the reserve itself, the situation was no less devastating, as Thompson described to the 
committee in Ipswich: 
The cattle are still dying daily we have to pull some from the water along the 
creek that is now putrid with dead cattle. It is the first famine I ever saw and 
I see nothing in front of us but sure and certain famine if rain does not soon 
fall. One lesson Mr Irvins taught me while with him was to eat the wild 
berries, food, bears, etc. I lived on them last week while out shooting and 
came home far better than when I went out. I felt quite indisposed and 
almost prostrated in body through the gloomy aspect of everything going out 
but forgot everything in the bush and came home renewed [sic]. 
Problems such as drought were exacerbated by the meagre financial resources Thomp.son 
had at his disposal. As the committee provided little by way of financial aid, the mission 
was almost solely dependent on Government assistance. In 1901 this amounted to £300 
for 70 residents and in 1904, when the population had almost doubled, only £250 was 
granted. These amounts stand in stark contrast to the allocation of £1500 in 1905 
when the reserve was under Government control. With limited resources, little progress 
was made in improving the living conditions of inmates. The Superintendent himself 
initially lived in a tent while the inmates had to erect their own shelters. This task was 
made more difficult than usual as there was a dire shortage of bark due to extensive 
ringbarking that had occurred on the reserve and in the surrounding district. Winnie 
Cobbo first went to the Mission in 1903 and she recalls: 
When I first went there then, they had no decent house. They lived in old 
bark humpy with blanket and rags and everything like that . . . No 
dormitories - nothing like that. No hospital - nothing. Just a wild camp. 
Yet another problem was food supplies. Because the drought had severely affected the 
44 WJ. Thompson to Rev P. Robertson, 19 October 1903, QSA A/8792, 12. 
^^ QPP (1903) 1: 1175, (1905) 1: 762. 
"^^ W. Roth to Accountant Home Department, 14 February 1906, QSA A/31708 06/2108. 
^'' A. Meston to Home Secretary, 7 August 1901, QSA COL/144 01/12484. 
^ Winnie Cobbo, interview by L Johnson and J. Devitt, 29 May 1980, Foundation for 
Aboriginal and Islander Research Action, Cultural Revitalisation Project, tape 26. 
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availability of 'bush tucker', inmates were dependent primarily on rations which consisted 
of meat, fiour and tea. Given these circumstances, the complaints of the Medical 
Officer accompanying the railway construction gang about the poor physical conditions 
of inmates would have been quite justified. The poor health of the inmates is evident 
in the vital statistics for the period. In 1903, there were seven deaths, including two 
children, in a total population of only 120. 
Despite the constant difficulties, Thompson did manage to commence a school. 
When he first approached the government about establishing the mission, the Home 
Secretary assured him that as soon as a suitable building was constructed, a teacher and 
52 
all necessary requisites would be provided. A school was opened in May 1903 with 
forty pupils, but the 'building'Thompson had erected was hardly conducive to learning. 
It was, according to one pupil, just a 'bark humpy with ground fioor and wooden stools 
53 
around it'. The initial success of the school was short-lived. The teacher. Miss Tapp 
probably found the primitive conditions and low wages too much, and she resigned before 
the year finished. The school was not reopened until July the following year when 
another teacher. Miss Kennett, was appointed. She was paid a mere £26 per annum, an 
amount so meagre given the difficult circumstances that even the Chief Protector thought 
'*^  'Mission Account', Barambah Station Letterbook, JOL OM.AK/3/2, 470. 
^° Under Secretary, Home Department to Dr R. Kane, 8 December 1902, QSA COL/G176 866. 
^^  This figure constitutes a crude death rate of 58 deaths per thousand persons, more than five 
times that for the rest of the Queensland population. Deaths for 1903 - WJ. Thompson to Home 
Secretary, QSA HOM/B8 'Missions'. Settlement population - WJ. Thompson to Chief Engineer, 
Railways Department 5 June 1904, QSA A/8793, 26. Queensland statistics: Queensland Year Book 
1949 (Brisbane: Government Printer, 1949), 61. 
2^ Under Secretary, Home Department to WJ. Thompson, 20 February 1900, QSA COL/G143 
590. 
3^ A.R. Bailey et al., A Social Studies Resource Book (Cherbourg: Cherbourg State School, 
1981), 93-4; Winnie Cobbo, interview, 29 May 1980. 
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it should be increased. 
In the period Thompson was Superintendent, almost no effort was made to 
develop the agricultural or pastoral potential of the reserve. Obviously his task was not 
easy given the hardships of drought and meagre resources. The single improvement 
Thompson did manage was to fence the boundary of the reserve and subdivide it into 
several paddocks - not a very notable achievement considering the size of the potential 
workforce. For most of the time, there were between thirty to forty adult males who 
were capable of working. Yet, Thompson would not have been perturbed about the lack 
of industry or progress. The material development of the mission was not his first 
priority. Nor was he overly committed to making the mission self-sufficient, educating 
the children or inculcating the inmates with capitalistic notions of time, work and 
discipline. Rather, in light of his Salvation Army world view, progress was judged in the 
context of spiritual warfare. Thus Thompson, when he reported on the work of the 
mission, considered it far more important to note how many of his charges had been 
rescued from 'going completely to the devil' than how many acres had been fenced, cattle 
branded or crops sown. 
If TTiompson could be accused of neglecting the physical and social well-being 
of inmates, at least he could not be charged with managing the mission in an 
57 
authoritarian manner or with treating his charges with disdain and contempt. 
^'^ QPP (1905) 1: 762. 
^^  WJ. Thompson to Chief Engineer, Railways Department, 5 June 1904, QSA A/8793 26. 
*^ WJ. Thompson to Rev P. Robertson, 19 October 1903, QSA Ay8792 12. 
en 
Thompson's attitudes towards Aborigines contrasted markedly with the prevailing hostile and 
racist views. His empathy is most clearly revealed in remarks he made to the Chief Engineer of the 
Railways Department in a letter suggesting a name for the new railway siding near the Mission: 
There is every possibility of this very siding growing into an important inland town, therefore 
"we of the stone age of Australia' (I now speak as with the voice of the charges delivered 
into my care) desire that a p)erpetual undecaying, inexpensive monument be reared to our 
honour as a displaced inferior diminishing people . . . We surrender our lands, we give our 
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Thompson, unlike following Superintendents, had no legal authority over the inmates. 
CO 
He was never appointed a Protector of Aboriginals with all its attendant powers. Thus 
his modus operandi had, by necessity, to be gentle persuasion rather than coercion. 
From the few improvements made on the Mission during his time and with the labour 
available, it is obvious Thompson did not force the able bodied men to work five days 
a week as they were later required. Whatever physical energy was expended was more 
to ensure there was enough food to survive rather than in building up a grand self-
supporting enterprise as Meston envisaged. Thompson's laissez-faire attitude was aKso 
evident in the lack of restrictions concerning entering and leaving the mission. 
Obviously, Thompson would have liked all blacks who came to the mission to remain, 
but no attempt was made to restrain them if they wanted to leave. Winnie Cobbo first 
came to the mission with her family from Ban Ban station, a property forty miles to the 
north, in 1903. Her family came voluntarily to see whether the mission environment was 
preferable to station life. After only one month however, they decided the latter was to 
be preferred and returned to the station. 
Thompson's Superintendency came to an abrupt end in September 1904 when 
he was hospitalised for nine months following a horse riding accident. His absence 
hunting grounds, we withhold not our beloved, revered and excellent waters that defy the 
longest-lived droughts of Australia (WJ. Thompson to Chief Engineer, Railways 
Department, 7 March 1903, QSA A/8792 12A). 
Thompson unashamedly identified himself with the 'stone age of Australia'. While no means a unique 
identification to make at the time, it was certainly an exceptional stance to adopt He also understood 
the realities of the dispossession of the blacks from their land. 
Thompson did ask the Home Secretary to appoint him Sub-Protector and Superintendent 
when the Mission was being established (WJ. Thompson to Home Secretary, 2 April 1900, QSA 
HOM/B5 'T). In 1904 the Mission was designated an Industrial School in terms of the Reformatory 
Schools Act 1865 and Thompson was appointed Superintendent of the Barambah Industrial School 
{QGG 82 [1904]: 1424). This appointment gave Thompson legal power only over children who were 
sent to the Mission under the provisions of the Reformatory Schools Act. 
^' Winnie Cobbo, interview, 29 May 1980. 
^ D. Thompson, Capella, personal communication, 21 February 1985. 
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from the mission came at an opportune time for both the government and the Ipswich 
committee. For the committee, overseeing the work of a mission more than 140 miles 
away was always a difficult task. With sufficient problems at the Deebing Creek 
mission, they found it difficult to be enthusiastic about the Barambah mi.ssion. Thus when 
the government suggested the Ipswich committee relinquish control, the committee readily 
agreed. 
The government's motives in taking over the management of Barambah were 
more complex and were related to the circumstances surrounding the Durundur settlement. 
Durundur had a chequered history. It was first opened in 1877 and for a time there were 
more than 200 blacks camped there under the supervision of Rev Duncan McNab. By 
1898 this number had dwindled to twenty. Archibald Meston, in his enthusiasm to 
establish a model settlement at Fraser Island, transferred the remaining Durundur blacks 
there. But when Fraser Island was beset with problems and the government transferred 
control to the Anglican Board of Missions, Durundur once again became an attractive 
proposition. In seeking the Home Secretary's permission to reopen the reserve, he argued 
that it was 'by far the best reserve in Queensland and under effective and systematic 
management could be made a very successful home for Aboriginals'. In June 1900, 
the reserve was reopened when a group of seventy blacks from western Queensland were 
moved there. As mentioned, a number of this group were then sent to Barambah to 
placate local white residents. But Meston, firmly convinced that Durundur was the 
superior location and the local opposition could be ignored, continued to send blacks 
^^  QPP (1905) 1: 765. 
2^ A. Meston to Home Secretary, 24 November 1896, QSA COL/140 96/15515. 
3^ A. Meston to Home Secretary, 18 April 1898, QSA COL/140 98/5120. 
^ A. Meston to Home Secretary, 27 June 1900, QSA COL/144 00/9675. 
^^  Brisbane Courier, 8 June 1900. 
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there. In 1902, he ordered the removal of thirty-two blacks from Barcaldine, fourteen 
from Rockhampton and twelve from Keppel Island to Durundur reserve. 
Meston's plans for Durundur, however, suffered a fatal blow in an unlikely 
manner. In January 1878 the block had been gazetted as an Aboriginal reserve when 
Duncan McNab attempted to establish a mission there. However, when the mission 
faltered the land was declared a reserve for Police purposes in 1885. This being so, 
the full provisions of the Aboriginals Protection Act could not be exercised. When 
Meston became aware of this anomaly, he requested the Home Secretary to re-gazette 
the land, and felt the Police department would not object as a portion could still be 
retained for their purposes. But Meston was mistaken, for the Police Commissioner 
W. Parry-Okeden, who was also the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, did not approve of 
the move and persuaded the Home Secretary not to take any action on the matter. The 
fate of the Durundur site was sealed - it had no future as a permanent Aboriginal 
settlement. 
Despite this decision, there was no haste in closing the settlement down. Indeed, 
it was only when Thompson suffered his accident and the Ipswich committee wanted to 
^ A. Meston to Home Secretary, 13 June 1903, QSA COL/144 03/1524. 
"^^  QGG 36 (1885): 1740. 
^ A. Meston to Under Secretary, Home Department, 9 May 1902, QSA COL/144 02/7598. 
^' ibid. Why Parry-Okeden objected to the move is not known. His opposition seems 
somewhat incongruous with his position as Chief Protector of Aboriginals. It could be that his 
motives were more to do with his rivalry with Meston than any rational or objective judgement as 
to the suitability of the land for an Aboriginal reserve. Both men claimed to be 'experts' on 
Aboriginal affairs; both wrote reports for the Government on the 'Aboriginal problem' but differed 
quite sharply in their proposed solutions. In particular, Meston called for the abolition of the Native 
Police while Parry-Okeden argued for its retention. Both men played a part in the drafting of the 
1897 legislation, each claiming to be the principal architect. For Parry-Okeden's assertion that he 
was the principal architect of the legislation, see W.E. Perry, A Son of Australia: Memories of W.E. 
Parry-Okeden (Brisbane: Watson & Ferguson, 1928), 282. Meston's claims are stated in various 
places including his 'Monograph on the Aboriginals' (QSA COL/140 00/3566). 
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relinquish responsibility for the Barambah reserve, that the move was finally made to 
close Durundur. The transfer of the inmates occurred in two stages: one contingent 
consisting of 115 inmates travelled by train while the remaining sixty-one walked to 
70 Barambah. Albert Tronson, who had served as Superintendent at Durundur for four 
71 
years, took charge at Barambah and his wife Mary was appointed Matron. 
What was the legacy of the mission era? During Thompson's superintendency, 
he did not appear to have enjoyed much success in persuading the inmates to renounce 
the devil and enlist in the 'Army'. Perhaps Thompson thought in his own mind that 
even if he failed in his ultimate objective of recruiting 'Christian soldiers, ready to do 
72 
battle with Satan's hosts', he had at least had some success in 'keeping the devil away'. 
In popular accounts of the history of Barambah, Thompson's role in the establishment of 
73 
the reserve is almost entirely ignored. Yet it was because of his persistence and 
determination that an Aboriginal reserve was proclaimed in the Burnett district. Given 
the previous difficulties encountered in finding suitable locations for reserves, this in itself 
was a significant contribution. 
The beginnings of government administration: 1905-10 
When the government took control of the Barambah reserve in March 1905, it 
did so at a time when there was an element of uncertainty and confusion surrounding its 
°^ Tronson, diary, 5 March 1905. 
''^ QPP (1905) 1: 765. 
2^ The theology and world view of the Salvation Army is well summed up in the hymn 'Onward 
Christian Soldiers'. This hymn was in effect the Salvationists' theme song and saw life as essentially 
a battle between good and evil. See Methodist Hymn Book (London: Methodist Conference Office, 
1933), no 822. 
73 Murphy and Easton, Wilderness to Wealth, 276. 
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Aboriginal policy. Since the passage of the Aboriginals Protection Act, the government 
had had a less than distinguished record in managing institutions for the care and 
protection of the state's Aborigines. The settlements at Fraser Island, Durundur and 
Whitula, along with the Girls Home at West End had all encountered problems. Various 
factors led to the failure of these ventures, including poor location, bad management, 
^ A 
inadequate resources, local opposition, and not the least, inmate rebellion and resistance. 
Fraser Island had lasted three years under government control; Whitula reserve in western 
Queensland operated for only a few months; the Girls Home was continually beset with 
administrative difficulties and the plans for Durundur had been thwarted by a legal 
technicality. 
After eight years, the lack of substantial progress, or even evidence of a 
modicum of success, raised doubts as to the appropriateness of the government's 
involvement in managing reserves. Furthermore, when Meston resigned as Southern 
Protector of Aboriginals in 1903, the policy lacked a strong advocate. Indeed, Meston's 
successor, Walter Roth, preferred religious bodies managing reserves rather than the 
75 
government. It was in this environment of uncertainty and confusion that the 
Barambah reserve came under government control. Barambah thus became critical to the 
74 On the establishment of the following institutions and the problems that developed see: 
Bogimbah: Ray Evans and Jan Walker, ' Aboriginal-European relations in the Fraser Island and 
Wide Bay region 1770-1905', 39-105. 
Whitula: A. Meston to Under Secretary, Home Department 13 January 1903, QSA COL/144 
03/1524; also QPP (1905) 1: 769. 
Durundur: A. Meston to Under Secretary, Home Department, 6 June 1900, QSA COL/144 00/8361; 
Daily Telegraph, 27 October 1897; Brisbane Courier, 8 June 1900. 
Aboriginal Girls Home: T. Blake, 'Excluded, Exploited, Exhibited: Aborigines in Brisbane 1897-
1910', Brisbane: Aboriginal Alien Ethnic, ed. R. Fisher (Brisbane: Brisbane History Group, 1987), 49-
58. 
"^5 QPP (1906) 2: 933. 
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Table 1.1 
Income and Expenses 1905-10 
Year 
1905-6 
1906-7 
1907-8 
1908-9 
1909-10 
Operating 
costs 
605 
713 
863 
995 
1400 
Income 
271 
na 
720 
687 
1311 
Percent 
45 
na 
83 
69 
94 
Note: amounts expressed in pounds 
(Source: Expenditure figures - QSA A/26828-34; income - Annual 
reports of the Chief Protector of Aboriginals) 
direction of Queensland's Aboriginal policy. Being the only government settlement in 
the period 1905-10, it became a crucial test of the government's administrative abilities. 
Another debacle would have almost certainly led to the government handing over totally 
the management of reserves to mission societies and protection associations. But no such 
debacle eventuated. Contrary to past endeavours, Barambah not only survived but had 
progressed to the extent that the Chief Protector was asserting it had became a 'most 
7(S 
successful undertaking'. The reasons for making such a claim invite careful 
examination. 
From the outset of the reserve system, an issue of paramount importance was: 
how could it be managed as economically as possible? During debate on the 1897 Act, 
the Home Secretary had been anxious to assure the Parliament that the new system of 
77 
reserves would not be an additional financial burden on the state. Archibald Meston 
firmly believed that the first duty of reserves 'was that they be self-supporting institu-
''^ QPP (1910) 3: 977. 
•'^  QPD 78 (1897): 1540. 
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tions'. One of the key indicators for measuring the progress of a settlement was its 
level of self-sufficiency. Thus, when the Chief Protector described Barambah as a 
success, it was primarily because the settlement appeared to be virtually self-supporting. 
Furthermore, he was confident that the settlement would soon cease to require 
79 government assistance. Over the previous five years, there had been a fourfold 
increase in revenue generated by the settlement from £271 in 1905-6 to £1311 in 1909-
10. This was a notable achievement compared with what had occurred at other 
institutions. But equally important about these figures was that the revenue had been 
growing more rapidly than the operating costs. In 1905-6, the revenue generated 
amounted to 45 percent of costs whereas in 1909-10, it was 94 percent (see table 1.1). 
These figures are somewhat misleading in that the salaries of staff - which amounted to 
£403 in 1909-10 - were not taken into account. Nevertheless, the growth in revenue 
suggested that the settlement was costing less to maintain despite an increase in the 
number of inmates. For the government, this was a refreshing change. In 1904, the 
three institutions then under their direct control, with approximately 250 inmates, cost 
£3000 to maintain. By comparison, Barambah in 1910, with 350 inmates cost a mere 
£100.^ 
Barambah's revenue was derived from three sources; the sale of produce, 
agistment and deductions from the wages of inmates engaged in outside employment. 
While the first two generated only modest income, the principal source of settlement 
81 
revenue was the exploitation of inmate labour. When Albert Tronson assumed duties 
^^  Meston Papers, Fryer Mss F438. 
''^ QPP (1910) 3: 977. 
80 QPP (1905) 1: 772. 
^^  In 1909, income from sale of produce and agistment fees amounted to £79 - a little more 
than 10 percent of the total income {QPP [1910] 2: 977,1011). 
35 
as Superintendent in March 1905, he brought to the position valuable experience of how 
to exploit most profitably the labour of those persons under his control. From the four 
years in charge of Durundur, he discovered that the accepted means of attaining self-
sufficiency - agricultural production - was not viable. Meston had strongly stressed in 
his reports that an important function of reserves would be to teach gardening and 
farming so that they would be 'as far as possible, if not altogether self-supporting'. 
At Durundur, attempts at agriculture met with limited success. Although there was more 
83 
than 2000 acres of apparently good agricultural land, very little was cultivated. In 
1904, for example, a mere six acres was put under production, producing a potato crop 
84 
that returned just £16. With total expenses of more than £1000, income from 
agriculture was insignificant. 
Although one of the principal objectives of reserves was to ensure the strict 
isolation of Aborigines, when Tronson arrived at Durundur in 1901, he found this 
objective being ignored. Out of twenty-six men supposedly confined for 'all time' to the 
settlement, ten were engaged in outside employment. The government condoned such 
a practice because of the perceived benefits. By sending men out to work fewer rations 
were required and hence a reduction in expenditure. In reality, the savings were small 
as most men either returned to the settlement each night or were engaged in contract 
work which meant they were not away from the settlement for any extended period of 
time. Consequently, when Walter Roth became Chief Protector in 1903 he saw the 
possibilities of implementing a scheme whereby every person in employment had to 
*2 Queensland Votes and Proceedings (1896) 4: 763. 
3^ H. Meston to A. Meston, 7 October 1901, QSA COL/144 01/15936. 
^ QPP (1905) 1: 765. 
^^  'Aboriginal Men on Durundur,' QSA COL/144 01/15896. 
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contribute one shilling per week from their wages to the settlement 'to assist in providing 
for his wife if married or for his keep when out of employment'. This tax was 
euphemistically called the 'settlement maintenance levy'. Tronson, with his business 
acumen and entrepreneurial fiair, proved to be the ideal person to administer such a 
scheme. It was immediately successful, netting £216 in the first year of operation. 
Compared with the meagre amount realised from potato growing, the lesson for Tron.son 
was obvious: the exploitation of labour was much more profitable off rather than on the 
reserve. 
With this experience, Tronson on his arrival at Barambah, immediately began 
organising the settlement as a labour depot. Such a move could not have happened at 
a more opportune time and the settlement could not have been in a more convenient 
location. The decade 1900-10 saw a dramatic change in the pattern of land tenure in 
the South Burnett. Resumptions of the large pastoral runs resulted in hundreds of 
agricultural blocks being made available for selection. This development created a 
great demand for cheap labour. Consequently Tron.son and has successor Bertram 
Lipscombe never experienced any difficulty in finding employment for able-bodied men 
and women. Demand always exceeded supply. During his first ten months at Barambah, 
Tronson received applications for labour from more than ninety employers but was only 
on 
able to satisfy just over two-thirds of those requests. In 1907, Bertram Lipscombe 
reported that the services of the boys were in great demand and four years later he 
remarked in his annual report: 'there is no difficulty in securing employment, in fact the 
^ QPP (1905) 1: 765. 
"^^  ibid. 
^ QSA LAN AE/461-3; Murphy and Easton, Wilderness to Wealth, 71-80, 137-52, 208-
13, 244-53. 
^^  Tronson, diary, 1905. 
37 
90 demand greatly exceeds the supply'. The services of male labour was sought 
particularly for scrub clearing, but also for shepherding, shearing, fencing, dairying and 
general farm work. Females were in demand as domestics. Wages ranged from one 
shilling and sixpence per week for boys to one pound per week plus rations for men. 
From each person's wage 20 percent was deducted, but no more than three shillings for 
'settlement maintenance'. 
Although requests for labour came from employers located as far away as 
Charleville in western Queensland and Alpha in central Queensland, the greatest con-
centration of employers was in the immediate vicinity of the settlement. Of the seventy 
persons who used settlement labour in 1905, thirty-six lived within a forty mile radius 
92 
of Barambah. The settlers of the South Burnett benefitted greatly from the presence 
of the settlement in their midst. Local employers were preferred becau.se of fewer 
problems with transport and supervision. Furthermore, less time wasted in travel meant 
more time earning money which in turn increased revenue for the settlement. 
Demand for labour did not of itself guarantee revenue for the settlement. To 
operate a profitable labour depot, the Superintendent had to be an efficient administrator. 
The process of hiring labour involved a number of steps, including receiving and 
answering correspondence, organising rail passes, ensuring agreements were signed, 
maintaining an employment register, and ensuring employers regularly forwarded inmates' 
wages. Both Tronson and Lip.scombe were adept at clerical tasks and seemed at ease 
in the office. The entries in Tronson's diary indicate that of all the duties he was 
^ QPP (1908) 2: 939, (1912) 2: 1016. 
^^  Under Secretary, Home Department to Barton Bros, 2 July 1909, QSA COL/G236 891. 
'2 Tronson, diary, 1905. Of that number, twenty-two selectors were less than twenty miles 
from the settlement. 
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required to perform as Superintendent, he gave priority to the hiring labour. Office 
work was Lipscombe's forte and, according to the Chief Protector, he spent little time in 
outside duties. Because they dealt with requests for labour promptly and efficiently, 
Tronson and Lipscombe established the settlement's reputation as a convenient source of 
cheap labour. By ensuring that as many inmates as possible were out working, they 
maximised the income that could be obtained from the settlement maintenance levies. 
The prospect of self-sufficiency did not alone ensure a secure future for 
Barambah. The settlement also faced the problem of opposition from local residents. 
Past experience taught the government that such protests could not be easily ignored and 
frustrated the development of a settlement or institution. When Archibald Meston was 
looking for a suitable building for a Girls Home in 1899, he encountered great difficulty 
due to the hostility of local residents. As mentioned previously, Woodford residents 
complained on several occasions to the Home Secretary about the Durundur settlement. 
While local opposition was not the primary reason Durundur was closed, it nevertheless 
reminded the government of the difficulties of establishing a settlement in a populated 
settled district. On Barambah itself, there had already been problems with protests from 
local residents during the Thompson era. 
When the Barambah reserve was first gazetted in 1901, it was in the midst of 
a relatively spansely settled area. With the resumption of the large pastoral holdings for 
agricultural blocks, however, the demographic profile of the South Burnett rapidly altered 
93 ibid. 
^^ QPP (1910) 2: 978. In 1910, Lipscombe received 2853 letters, while he despatched a similar 
volume {QPP [1911] 3: 1323). 
^^  A. Meston to Under Secretary, Home Department, 30 October 1899, QSA H0M/B3 Vol 
2, 'M'; A. Meston to Under Secretary, Home Department, 6 June 1900, QSA COL/144 00/8561. 
% Daily Telegraph, 27 October 1897; Brisbane Courier, 8 June 1900. 
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from that of a few pastoralists to hundreds of small selectors, labourers, timber getters, 
and others eager to establish businesses in the newly developing townships of the South 
Burnett. Unlike the pastoralists who had, over time, developed a symbiotic relationship 
with Aborigines, these newcomers reacted adversely to the presence of a large number 
of blacks in the district. The motives for their opposition to the settlement were based 
on fear and greed: the same emotions and desire that characterised white reaction on the 
frontier. As the white population continued to grow as well as the number of inmates, 
local residents were repeatedly complaining to the government about the threats to their 
physical well-being from the settlement or at least some inmates. Complaints were most 
forthcoming when the selectors discovered that a 'criminal or lunatic' had been sent to 
the reserve. When in the latter part of 1906, Billy Buckjumper and Tommy Tomahawk, 
two supposedly 'notorious' criminals, were sent to Barambah, the Murgon Progress 
Association and other residents were quick to protest. They informed the Home Secretary 
of their indignation at the practice of using the settlement as a 'dumping ground for the 
black criminals of the State'. The Association felt that in such a sparsely populated 
97 district, 'the security for settlers was not as it should be'. The Kingaroy Herald was 
more candid: 
The settlers in the locality . . . feel a nervous unrest and a dread that the 
mission may at any moment prove to be a volcano and belch forth evil. This 
feeling is aroused by reason of the inconsiderate and unwise action of the 
authorities in sending notorious and scoundrelly aboriginals [sic] to the mission. 
Tlie fear generated by the settlement was not limited to the possibility of 
physical attacks. Equally threatening and disturbing was the threat of disease spreading 
"^^  G. Arnell to Home Secretary, 24 November 1906, QSA A/31708 06/13415; E. Nutt to Home 
Secretary, 28 November 1906, QSA A/31708 06/13364. The removal of Billy Wilson to Barambah 
in 1909 after being acquitted on a murder charge caused an outcry among Murgon and Wondai 
residents (R. Hodge to Home Secretary, 10 June 1909, QSA A/31708 09/6962). 
98 Kingaroy Herald, 1 December 1906. 
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from the reserve. At a meeting of the Murgon Progress As.sociation, the following 
account of a visit to the .settlement was given: 
I saw six emaciated wretches or rather masses of human corruption there and 
if, at least two of them were not leprosy then I wouldn't like to guess what they 
were. 
Such descriptions, not surprisingly, heightened the anxiety of local residents. The 
Association clearly saw the settlement as a threat to the health and comfort of the local 
community: 
The very water we have to use and drink may even now be contaminated 
with the germs of leprosy or some other equally hideous disease for do not 
these filthy creatures bathe in the creek from where we draw our supplies. 
Besides leprosy and other 'hideous' diseases, venereal disea.se was also regarded as a 
threat. Yet by acknowledging the settlement posed such dangers was an admission that 
the inmates were being exploited for sexual purposes. Indeed, the Murgon Progress 
ASvSociation candidly admitted to the Home Secretary that such activity existed: 
By the intercourse which takes place in a closely settled district such as this 
is between the members and the white population there is a grave danger of 
young people who have not attained a discreet age suffering probably through 
life, owing to such associations. As parents it behoves us to be mindful of 
the danger our growing up sons are running and to do our utmost for their 
protection and safety. 
The net result of these fears was that the residents of the district felt besieged 
by the settlement. No woman or child could sleep at ease for fear of attack by a 
criminal or lunatic. Within the water they drank lurked the germs of hideous diseases 
and their sons' virility was also under attack. The solution to the problem was 
straightforward, the settlement had to go. Only then could 'the feeling of uneasine.ss' be 
^ G. Arnell to Home Secretary, 24 November 1906, QSA A/31708 
06/6962. 
10« ibid. 
°^l L. Barton to Home Secretary, 3 June 1909, QSA A/31708 09/6751. 
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erased.^^^ Yet such a solution had another benefit. The closure of the settlement would 
allow more land to be made available for selection. Local residents had no doubt that if 
the reserve was thrown open for selection the land would be readily 'taken up', situated 
as it was in a 'prosperous and rapidly growing district'. Equally appealing was the 
proximity of a railway and the township of Murgon. Another advantage of making the 
land available for selection was, so the residents argued, that both the government and 
103 
local councils would receive a considerable amount of extra revenue'. 
Motivated by fear and greed, the South Burnett residents mounted a sustained 
campaign to force the closure of the settlement. The government did not dismiss the 
campaign lightly. Between 1908-11, three successive Home Secretaries visited the 
district to inspect the settlement and receive deputations. Given the intensity of the 
protests, it may well have been tempted to relocate the settlement. Yet probably only 
because of the persuasive and compelling arguments of Richard Howard, who served as 
Chief Protector between 1906 and 1913, serious consideration was never given to such 
a move. He exposed the contradictions and fallacies of many of the arguments and 
concerns expressed by the South Burnett residents. On the issue of the danger posed by 
so called 'notorious criminals and lunatics', he maintained that such fears were based on 
'the assumption of what the natives might do if they were free from all restraint'. The 
reality was, Howard argued, that since the settlement had began 'no offence worthy of 
102 
'Deputation to Home Secretary', 3 June 1909, QSA A/31708. 
°^3 South Burnett Progress Association to Home Secretary, 13 December 1907 and 4 May 1908, 
QSA A/31708 07/1395; Kilkivan Shire Council to Home Secretary, 23 May 1909, QSA A/31708 
09/4674; Murgon Progress Association to Home Secretary, 3 June 1909, QSA A/31708 09/6751. 
^^ A.G.C. Hawthorn, the Home Secretary from February to October 1908 visited in May 1908 
('Inspection of Barambah 1st May 1908* QSA A/31708); J.T. Bell served as Home Secretary from 
October 1908 to June 1909 inspected the settlement in June 1909 {Daily Mail, 8 June 1909); J.G. 
Appel, the Home Secretary between June 1909 and February 1915 in March 1911 {Daily Mail, 30 
March 1911). 
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note' had ever been committed by an Aborigine from the reserve.^^^ The Chief 
Protector also felt the i.ssue of the inmates' health was grossly exaggerated. He did not 
deny there were problems, but argued that because just four inmates were suffering from 
syphilis, the settlement could not be regarded as a major health threat to the surrounding 
district. In response, Howard ridiculed the suggestion about the settlement 
contaminating the water supply as 'a fine example of hysterical exaggeration'. The 
supposed source of contamination Howard pointed out were certain sick natives, who 
107 
were in such a poor physical state that they never left the camp. Another spurious 
argument which Howard refuted was the claim that if the reserve was opened up for 
selection, the land would be readily 'taken up'. While acknowledging that some parts 
would be eagerly sought, he maintained that 'the major portion of the Reserve [was] 
108 comprised of high stony ridges, waterless and quite unsuitable for agriculture'. In 
defending the settlement, the Chief Protector had no doubt that the desire to 'deprive the 
109 
Aborigines of their home stemmed from purely mercenary motives'. 
The Chief Protector was not merely content to refute the arguments of local 
residents. He also reminded the government that there was a number of sound reasons 
why the settlement should stay. First, he said that the settlement, instead of being a 
liability to the district, was a 'distinct advantage to new selectors' as evidenced 'by the 
'°^ Chief Protector to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 13 December 1906, QSA 
A/31708 06/13850. 
106 ibid. 
107 ibid. 
1°^  R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 19 May 1908, QSA A/31708 
08/6326. 
^^ R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 30 April 1909, QSA A/31708 
09/4975. 
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number of natives who are employed by them'. Secondly, the settlement was 
practically self-supporting and cost the government little to maintain. Thirdly, as the 
government had already made a substantial investment in buildings and equipment, to 
relocate would be a costly exercise. Relocation, Howard a.sserted, was not the answer. 
It did not matter where an Aboriginal settlement was formed, 'sooner or later the same 
112 
problems would arise and the unfortunate natives be asked to move on'. The fourth 
reason Howard gave for not relocating the settlement was because, in his view, the 
Barambah reserve was not a government reserve in the usual sense but in this case a 
'grant'to the Aborigines. The government, he insisted, had entered into a 'contract'with 
the Aborigines: 
the conditions being they should make it their home and be of good 
behaviour - and they were assured over and over again that so long as these 
conditions were complied with, no interference from others would be 
tolerated, and they would be protected and allowed to hold the place for all 
time.^^^ 
This perception of the formation of the settlement was shared by the inmates. In 1911, 
one resident wrote to the Home Secretary: 
I am just writing a few lines now for the sake of my friends and myself that 
we should not like to be shifted away from here . . . I understood that when 
1'° R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 13 December 1906, QSA A/31708 
06/13850. 
I'l R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 19 May 1908, QSA A/31708 
08/6326. 
112 B/C Howard to Under Secretary on letter Inspector Marrett to Commissioner of Police, 8 
September 1907, QSA A/41547 296S. To support the case for the relocation of the settlement, 
discrete enquiries were made about alternative locations. Without even having inspected the site, a 
Lands Department official suggested a block in the Stanthorpe district. He claimed that although the 
country was poor it abounded with marsupials of all kinds and was 'an ideal out of the way place to 
send them to' (A. Temple to Under Secretary, Lands Department 20 June 1910, OSA A/31708 
10/7643). Chief Protector Howard objected strongly to this proposal. Although he was not 
thoroughly familiar with the district he claimed the climate alone was a disadvantage in view of the 
vulnerability of Aborigines to lung trouble. Howard was also suspicious of the claim of abundant 
game and questioned whether the Barambah people enjoyed hunting for their food as he felt they 
preferred 'to go to work and earn the necessary money to purchase provisions' (R. Howard to J.W. 
Bleakley, 10 July 1910, QSA Ay31708 10/7643). 
113 R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 30 April 1909, QSA A/31708 
09/4975. 
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we first came here from Woodford I understood we were to stay here all our 
life as long as we were well conducted. 
In an era when Aborigines were regarded as having no rights whatsoever, the suggestion 
that the creation of the reserve was not just a benevolent act, but an arrangement where 
both the government and the inmates had certain obligations was both a novel and bold 
proposition. The forcefulness of Howard's arguments left the government with little 
option but to retain Barambah. But the efforts of the South Burnett residents were not 
entirely wasted. Following a deputation from the Wondai Shire Council and the Murgon 
Progress Association in March 1911, the Home Secretary announced the creation of three 
new reserves. He acknowledged 'the introduction of criminal and diseased natives was 
dangerous and unfair' to the district and promised that Barambah would no longer be the 
dumping ground for such persons. 
When taking over the management of the Barambah reserve, the government was 
well aware that a potentially major obstacle to the settlement's success was inmate 
resistance and rebellion. Regardless of how successful the revenue generating measures 
were or how effectively local opposition was quelled, such efforts could be easily 
nullified by discontented and troublesome inmates. From the constant difficulties with 
unrest on Fraser Island and at the Girls Home, the department learnt a salutary lesson. 
Unless a degree of harmony and contentment was present, the institution was doomed 
to fail. Indeed, it was principally because of these problems that the government 
withdrew from the management of Fraser Island and closed the Girls Home at West 
End. From the perspective of the settlement administration, there was no doubt it 
"'' Anon to Home Secretary, 6 February 1910, QSA A/31708 11/3912. 
11^  Daily Mail, 30 March 1911. 
116 In September 1899, Home Secretary Foxton visited Fraser Island and was struck by the 
'fears and superstition ... accompanied by violence that was prevalent among inmates' and 'the deep 
rooted feeling of dissatisfaction and discontent amongst the Aboriginals who had been brought from 
the mainland'. These problems prompted Foxton to ask the Anglican Board of Mission to take over 
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succeeded in minimising unrest and discord at Barambah during the period 1905-10. In 
1906 Superintendent Tronson reported that the general behaviour of the inmates was 
'good . . . taking into consideration that they [had] been u.sed to drink, opium and 
»117 
roaming about townships'. Similar sentiments were echoed by Lip.scombe who noted 
in his 1910 report: 
The conduct of the natives has been good generally. Considering the mixed 
character of the inmates due to the deportation from all quarters . . . it is 
remarkable the percentage of crime is so small. ^ 
Tronson and Lipscombe did not assert however, that the settlement was free of problems. 
They complained about alcohol, gambling, insubordination and fighting but did not regard 
them as unmanageable problems. The perception of a harmonious settlement was 
shared by the Visiting Justice who remarked after a visit that he 'was most agreeably 
surprised and pleased to note the general air of contentment and satisfaction pervading 
120 
amongst the natives'. Surprisingly, these 'official'perceptions were shared to an extent 
by some of the inmates. The inmate quoted earlier who pleaded to the Home Secretary 
to remain on the .settlement, also told the Home Secretary: 
It is a great shame that after all was done on the settlement, that they should 
be driven away now like sheep, just as we are settled down now and trying 
our very best to make our home comfortable. It does not matter what part of 
the country the natives come from they are always quite contented to stay 
management of the reserve. For a full account see Evans and Walker, 'Aboriginal-European 
relations in the Fraser Island and Wide Bay region 1770-1905,' 37-105. On unrest at the Aboriginal 
Girls Home at West End see T.W. Blake, 'Excluded, Exploited, Exhibited: Aborigines in Brisbane 
1897-1910', 49-58. 
11*^  QPP (1906) 2: 933. 
11^  QPP (1911) 3: 1323. 
11' On problems with alcohol see BJ.T. Lipscombe to Chief Protector, 5 April 1907, QSA 
A/41547 296S; gambling - Tronson, diary, 17 August 1905; quarrelling and fighting - BJ.T. 
Lipscombe to Chief Protector, 6 July 1906 and 12 February 1907, QSA POA/Kl. 
12° J. MacDonald to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 16 February 1910, QSA 
A/31708 10/2033. 
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here and make themselves at home. 
Of course, not all inmates necessarily shared these views. The life-histories of most 
inmates was one of successive displacement, from station camp to town fringe, to one 
reserve and then another. They were 'contented to stay' at Barambah, not because of 
any fervent attachment to the place but from the realisation that they did not want to be 
moved once more. 
Soon after the Government took control of Barambah, regulations for 'main-
taining discipline and good order upon a Reserve' were gazetted. The government 
undoubtedly felt that such regulations would overcome the problems encountered at 
Bogimbah and the West End Girls Home. Yet the 'good order and discipline' which 
seems to be evident on Barambah was not due to any diligent application of these 
regulations. The relative absence of di.scord was due principally to the management style 
adopted by Tron.son and Lipscombe. Unlike Fraser Island where 'stern control' was the 
modus operandi, Barambah - in the initial years at least - was managed with a minimum 
of control. Neither Tronson or Lipscombe devoted much time in surveillance of the 
settlement. Tronson's diary for 1905 records a mere ten occasions when he dealt with 
a disciplinary matter, and Lipscombe's predilection for office work allowed him 'little 
123 time in outdoor supervision'. 
121 Anon to Home Secretary, 6 February 1910, QSA A/31708 11/3912. The author of this 
letter was possibly Billy Lake. In 1911, the Governor of Queensland visited the settlement and was 
addressed by Lake is very similar terms to the letter (Bleakley, Aborigines of Australia, 196). Lake 
was a member of the local Wakka Wakka tribe and his apprehension about the settlement been 
moved was as much fear about being removed from his country. 
122 QGG 85 (1905): 1037. 
123 On the few occasions inmates were disciplined, the punishment was quite severe. Jack 
Clancy was jailed for six months for stealing 24 shillings and Jack Flinders received a similar 
punishment for stealing dogs (Tronson, diary, 19 September and 30 October 1905). On Lipscombe's 
preference for office work see R.B. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 8 Septem-
ber 1911, QSA HOM/JllO 13/12934. 
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Table 1.2 
Population 1905-1910 
Year 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
-
-
306 
331 
333 
337 
339 
290 
268 
261 
241 
270 
254 
255 
240 
236 
238 
235 
220 
233 
207 
217 
245 
214 
226 
222 
218 
200 
201 
198 
180 
180 
232 
216 
209 
203 
200 
201 
201 
202 
221 
196 
219 
233 
290 
322 
326 
296 
288 
290 
302 
315 
287 
278 
302 
370 
321 
322 
316 
309 
297 
330 
345 
315 
298 
328 
December 
Annual 
Variation 
250 
98 
250 
72 
246 
66 
274 
74 
370 
92 
387 
90 
(Source: Annual reports of the Chief Protector of Aboriginals 1905 - 1910) 
This lack of oversight gave Barambah inmates a degree of autonomy that was 
not intended by the 1897 legislation. The settlement was not a closed institution where 
the inmates were strictly isolated from whites. Rather, there were few restrictions on 
inmates leaving and entering the settlement. An examination of the data on the monthly 
population during the period 1905-10 indicates there was constant movement on and off 
the reserve (see table 1.2). In 1905 for example, the population fluctuated from a high 
of 339 in July to a low of 241 in November, a variation of 98. The fluctuation in the 
number of inmates is partially explained by the movement to and from outside 
employment. Settlement numbers were usually lowest in the cooler months when 
agricultural work was at its peak. Yet the movement to and from employment does not 
fully explain the changes in the population. 
In the period March 1905 to December 1910, the population increased from 306 
to 387, a net gain of 81. If the total births, deaths and removals are considered, 
however, the net increase was 190 (see table 1.3). By December 1910, the population 
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Table 13 
Vital statistics and removals 1905-1910 
Births 
Removals 
Deaths 
Net Growth 
1905 
11 
35 
30 
16 
1906 
10 
6 
24 
-8 
1907 
10 
31 
22 
19 
1908 
12 
59 
33 
38 
1909 
10 
49 
25 
34 
1910 
14 
105 
28 
91 
Total 
67 
285 
162 
190 
(Source: Annual Reports of Chief Protector of Aboriginals 1905- 1910, Register of Removals, 
Register of Deaths) 
should therefore have been around 496. What happened to these 'extra' 100 inmates? 
This discrepancy was as a result of at least three factors. First, some inmates when 
they went out to work, simply refu.sed to return to the settlement. Indeed, in 1913 when 
Bertram Lipscombe appeared before the South Australian Royal Commission on 
Aborigines, he stated that he had 721 'on the books' although there were only 343 
inmates resident on the settlement at that time. Furthermore, Lipscombe was not 
perturbed that a significant number had ceased to return at all to Barambah. Secondly, 
a number of inmates absconded from the settlement, particularly in the first few months 
of government control. During July and August 1905, Tronson recorded twelve people 
deserting the settlement, and although he did make some effort to effect their return, he 
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was not too perturbed about their departure. As there were several station and town 
camps within 100 miles of Barambah where absconders would have been welcome, 
deserting was not difficult. Also, unlike Fraser Island, the physical barriers to leaving 
were minimal. Yet another group of inmates departed because they were ordered to do 
so by the Superintendent. Despite the policy of isolation, both Tronson and Lipscombe 
instructed troublesome inmates to leave the settlement. In August 1905, Tronson ordered 
12"* Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 78; QPP (1914) 3: 1030. 
12^  Tronson, diary, July and August 1905. 
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a hu.sband and wife to leave for an apparent misdemeanour.^'^" Another example of an 
inmate being ordered to leave was Albert Henry who had achieved fame in playing 
cricket for Queensland. Soon after being removed to Barambah in 1908, the 
Superintendent 'gave him the usual notice to leave the reserve' because he was 'defying 
127 the authorities' and a 'source of trouble'. By ordering the most troublesome and 
disruptive inmates to leave, the Superintendent was able to minimise unrest and 
128 dissatisfaction. Even other inmates, who were not necessarily troublesome but 
dissatisfied with settlement life, were able to leave with little difficulty. Being confined 
to Barambah was not necessarily a permanent condition. Consequently, the settlement 
achieved a degree of harmony that had not been evident in other government managed 
institutions. The irony of such a situation was that inmate unrest and rebellion was not 
solved by any skill on the part of the Superintendent, but by his very laxity. 
Barambah was heralded a 'success' by Chief Protector Howard in 1910 
12Q 
principally becau.se the settlement was almost self-supporting. But such a confident 
claim could not have been made if local opposition had not been effectively countered 
or unrest minimised. Both Tron.son and Lipscombe approached the task of managing the 
settlement not with any religious or philanthropic ideals, but in a decidedly utilitarian 
manner. Their task was to save pounds, not souls. They showed no reluctance about 
jettisoning the policy of 'absolute isolation' and sending inmates off the settlement to 
exploit their labour or to discipline them if they were creating unrest and dissatisfaction. 
126 ibid. 
12"^  Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Superintendent, Yarrabah, 27 August 1908, OSA Transfer 
1227/34 09/2273. Ironically, Henry refused to leave and was subsequently imprisoned for one month 
for being on the settlement without permission. 
12* Of course, once other settlements were established at places such as Taroom and Palm 
Island, troublesome inmates were sent there rather than being told to simply leave the reserve (see 
chapter two). 
129 QPP (1911) 3: 1299. 
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After the debacles of Eraser Island, Whitula, Durundur, and the Aboriginal Girls Home, 
Barambah vindicated the policy of direct state involvement. By comparison with these 
ventures, it was a resounding success. The settlement was evidence that state managed 
institutions were viable. Indeed, the government could boast a better record than any 
missionary organisation or benevolent society. Within five years it had developed an 
institution with 350 inmates to the point where it had become almost self-sufficient, or 
at least was perceived to be so. The impact of this period were far reaching. 
Barambah's success gave the government the incentive to establish more settlements. By 
1911 Taroom was operational and in the same year the government announced plans to 
establish three more settlements: one at Tully river, another on Mornington Island and 
130 
one in the Cape York region. Other states began to turn to Queensland for advice. 
In 1913, the South Australian Royal Commission on Aborigines held sittings in 
131 
Queensland and spent a day on Barambah questioning the staff. On Barambah itself, 
the period 1905-10 was significant not least because it entrenched the function of the 
settlement as a labour depot. Further, when various teething problems had been 
overcome, greater attention could be given to the development of the more substantial 
functions of the settlement. 
130 QPP (1911) 3: 1305. 
131 Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 78-83. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEPORTED AT THE SWEET WILL OF THE GOVERNMENT 
The removals program 
Were the wretched remnants of an illtreated race to be treated as if they were worse 
than criminals? For that was what the Committee was asked to do. Were those 
poor creatures who had been all but exterminated either by bullet or disease by the 
European to be treated in that way and deported from place to place at the sweet 
will of the Government (B.D. Morehead, Queensland Legislative Council, 1901). 
By removing the aboriginal against his will they were virtually denying his right to 
live at all. The Bill made them absolute slaves; they could do nothing without 
protectors, and the protectors could do just as they liked . . . To take them away 
from the bush and put them on distant reserves is everything that is stupid and had 
(John Webber, Queensland Legislative Council, 1901). 
When introducing The Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of 
Opium Bill to the Queensland Parliament in 1897, Home Secretary Tozer remarked that 
he regarded section nine as 'one of the most important in the Bill'. It gave the Minister 
the authority to remove Aborigines to reserves in the district where they were residing. 
Section nine was included on the recommendation of Archibald Meston and was part of 
the package of 'stern measures' he believed were necessary for the effective protection 
of Aborigines. Meston's inspiration for forced removals came, in part, from an 
examination of the American Indian situation. He observed that when reserves were 
established for their benefit, 'they were compelled to go, and were frequently escorted to 
the reserves by bodies of United States Cavalry or Infantry'. Meston also advocated the 
1 QPD 87 (1901): 1254. 
2 ibid., 1144. 
3 QPD 78 (1897): 1629. 
'* The Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897. 
^ A. Meston to W.H. Ryder, 23 August 1897, OSA COL/140 97/10750. 
6 A. Meston to Home Secretary, 27 June 1900, QSA COL/144 00/9625. 
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removal of Aborigines to reserves because in his estimation, one of the fundamental 
reasons for the failure of the nineteenth century missions was their inability to keep their 
charges in strict isolation from whites. Despite Tozer's assertion about the importance 
of section nine, it attracted few comments from other members. Frederick Lord (Stanley) 
cautioned the Home Secretary that 'a great deal of harm was likely to be done if the 
power of enforced removal was too strictly enforced'. J. Boles (Port Curtis) objected 
to removing Aborigines forcibly because he felt 'there were many blacks who had been 
on stations all their life and they would be very uncomfortable if called upon to leave 
o 
them'. The only other comments on removals were offered by M.R. Battersby 
(Moreton) whose electorate contained the Durundur settlement. Battersby was not totally 
opposed to the removal of Aborigines to reserves. He did not mind 'blacks in the 
Moreton district or Wide Bay and Burnett District' being put on Durundur, but did object 
to 'blackfellows being mustered at CunnamuUa, Charleville and other places as you would 
muster sheep and dumped' there. 
How valid were Tozer's claims? Was the power of removal a critical aspect of 
the legislation or only marginal as reflected by the lack of comment? If members of 
"^ QPD 78 (1897): 1629. 
* ibid., 1630. 
In making such remarks Battersby may have misunderstood the Bill. Clause nine only gave 
the power to remove Aborigines within a District to 'any reserve situated within such District'. It 
did not permit western blacks to be dumped at for example, Durundur. Regardless of whether he 
understood the minutiae of the legislation, Battersby correctly anticipated the manner in which the 
removals policy would be pursued. By 1901, Archibald Meston and Walter Roth had deported more 
than 400 Aborigines from all parts of the State to coastal reserves for their 'care and protection'. 
They blithely ignored the provisions of the Act restricting removals to within districts. To legitimise 
the actions of Meston and Roth, the Act was amended in 1901 allowing the removals of Aborigines 
from any jjart of the state to be removed to any reserve {The Aboriginals Protection and Restriction 
of the Sale of Opium Act 1901, s 3). 
I*' When the Act was amended in 1901, there was more opposition to removals as some 
members of Parliament became aware of the impact of such a policy. John Webber, a pastoralist from 
south west Queensland, was totally opposed to the program. He had observed first hand the removals 
of blacks from his area of the state, and was aware of the impact of such a policy. He told 
Parliament that one woman who had been deported from Thargomindah by Archibald Meston went 
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Parliament doubted the Home Secretary's claim that section nine was one of the most 
important in the Bill in 1897, few would have disputed the assertion four decades later. 
By 1939 over 6500 Aborigines had been removed by order of the Minister. The 
removals program became a vital part of the reserve system. The development of major 
settlements in southern, central and northern Queensland could not have been achieved 
without the forced removal of Aborigines from all parts of the state. Yet surprisingly, 
in recent historical commentary on the reserve system, the issue of removals has not been 
the subject of any sustained scrutiny. C D . Rowley, in his volume Outcasts in WJiite 
Australia, devotes a chapter to Queensland policy and practice but the issue of removals 
is limited to two paragraphs. The main purpose of removals, according to Rowley, was 
disciplinary. In his survey of Aboriginal settlements in eastern Australia, Jeremy Long 
discusses the Queensland system in some detail. He provides statistical data on the 
number of removals to each of the government settlements but does not offer any 
12 
rationale for removals except that it was a means of populating the .settlements. 
Andrew Markus, in a brief overview of Aborigines under the Act during the twentieth 
century, makes only a passing reference to the removal of uncontrollable Aborigines to 
reserves. In an unpublished paper, 'Race Relations in Queensland: 1897-1971', Dawn 
May devotes considerable attention to the reserve system including removals. The section 
on removals, however, is primarily confined to describing how the scheme operated. Her 
comments on the purpo.se and function of removals was limited to noting that by the 
'in a state of absolute terror'. A.C. Gregory, the former surveyor and explorer, also openly opposed 
the policy, commenting that 'any attempt to take Aborigines forcibly from their own homes . . . must 
be a failure'. Despite the opposition of Webber, Gregory and others, the removals program was 
already too well established to be abandoned {QPD 87 [1901]: 993-1255). 
11 CD. Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1971), 111. 
12 Jeremy Long, Aboriginal Settlements: A survey of institutional communities in eastern Australia 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), 102-126. 
13 Andrew Markus, 'Under the Act,' The Australians: 1938, ed. P. Spearitt and B. Gammage 
(Sydney: Fairfax, Syme and Wcldon, 1987), 47-53. 
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1920s, removal orders were continually being used to 'modify behaviour'.^"* Gordon 
Rcid's thesis, 'Queensland and the Aboriginal Problem: 1838-1901' discu.sses the 
introduction of the 1897 Act and-the first years of its administration. Reference is made 
to the removals program, but Reid does not attempt any analysis of the underlying 
motives for forcibly removing Aborigines from their land and communities except to 
declare that 'Meston's scheme was a positive help to Aborigines'. One attempt to go 
beyond the merely descriptive is Ray Evans' examination of the Fraser Island settle-
ment. Evans' argues that the removal of Aborigines to this settlement was primarily 
for two purposes. Firstly, it was a means of punishment. The settlement functioned as 
a 'punitive, custodial and potentially correctional institution' as Aboriginal prisoners were 
17 
sent there after serving their sentence. The second function of the removals program 
which Evans highlights was as a means of social exclusion or segregation. The removals 
program allowed the socially unacceptable, the undesirable - that is, those who po.sed a 
threat to the 'orderliness, social utility, hygiene, respectability and ethnic purity of the 
1 o 
dominant white society - to be removed from the social landscape'. Yet Evans, like 
other commentators, does not make any assessment of the pivotal role removals played 
in the overall development of the reserve system. A notable feature of all these studies 
is the absence of any discussion of the impact of the removals program on Aboriginal 
society. Significantly, it is Aboriginal authors such as Kennedy, Thaiday, McKellar and 
I'* Dawn May, 'Race Relations in Queensland: 1897-1971,' discussion paper: Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Deaths into Custody, 1990, 13-19. 
1^  Gordon Reid, 'Queensland and the Aboriginal Problem: 1838-1901,' PhD thesis, Australian 
National University, 1985, 261. 
16 Ray Evans, 'A Permanent Precedent': Deviance, Social Control and the Fraser Island Reserve 
1897-1904 (St. Lucia, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Studies Unit, University of Queensland, 
1991). 
I'' ibid., 19. 
1* ibid., 29,31. 
Rosser who have begun to expose the devastating and tragic effects of removals. 
These accounts suggest that, at least from an Aboriginal perspective, the threat of 
removals created a sen.se of dread and consternation in the lives of Aborigines throughout 
the state. 
These studies leave unresolved the question about the importance of the removals 
policy. The central argument of this chapter is to demonstrate how critical the removals 
campaign was to the development of the settlement. The removals program was much 
more than a means of populating reserves, or of excluding the undesirable, or of punish-
ment. Removals came to be the instrumental means of control and discipline, not only 
in settlements but wherever Aborigines lived and worked. 
The extent of the removals 
In the period 1905-39, a total of 6500 Aborigines were deported to settlements 
and missions throughout the state. Barambah received 25 percent of deportees and, as 
20 
a dumping ground, was surpassed only by Palm Island which received 40 percent. The 
21 Other depots were Taroom/Woorabinda (12 percent) and Yarrabah (9 percent). 
Removals to Barambah began in a comprehensive manner in 1905 and in the following 
thirty-five years, it received a total of 1687 deportees. The influx of Aborigines to the 
1' Marnie Kennedy, Bom a half-caste (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 
1985); Willie Thaiday, Under the Act (Townsville: N.Q. Black Publishing Co., 1981); Hazel McKellar, 
Matya Mundu: a History of the Aboriginal People of south west Queensland, (CunnamuUa: 
CunnamuUa Native Welfare Association, 1984); B. Rosser, Dreamtime Nightmares (Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1985). 
2^^ The data on removals in this chapter was derived from the following sources: 1905, QPP 
(1906) 2: 925-30; 1906, QPP (1907) 2: 1271; 1907, QPP (1908) 3: 935-37; 1908-35, Register of 
Removals; 1936, QSA A/4742; 1937, QSA A/4743; 1938, QSA A/4744; 1939,QSA A/4745. 
21 The remaining 13 percent were sent to other missions and institutions such as prisons and 
asylums. 
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settlement occurred in three major pha.ses (see figure 2.1). The first covered the period 
1905-09 when removals averaged 39 per year. This phase coincided with a general lull 
in removal activity in the state. After the flurry of activity by Meston and Roth between 
1898 and 1904 when an average of ninety-one removals per year occurred, the total 
number of removals in the state fell to fifty-two per year in 1905-09 (see figure 2.2). 
A principal reason for the decline in removals activity was the appointment in 1906 of 
Richard Howard as Chief Protector. Howard was less of an enthusiast for removals than 
either of his predecessors, Meston or Roth. In his initial years as Chief Protector, 
Howard felt 'that the ideal of entirely isolating [Aborigines] from contact with the white 
22 population was not altogether desirable. Howard's view, coupled with the general 
uncertainty in government policy at the time, ensured there was only a modest level of 
removal activity. As the only government settlement during this period, Barambah was 
the major destination for deportees, receiving 72 percent of all removals. The remainder 
were sent to missions such as Deebing Creek and Yarrabah. 
The second phase extended from 1910 to 1920. Over half of all removals to 
Barambah occurred during this decade. Deportations averaged seventy-nine per year, 
more than double the previous phase. Three factors contributed to this increase. First,as 
outlined in the previous chapter, by 1910 Barambah was perceived to be 'a most 
successful undertaking'. This 'success' helped to overcome the hesitancy and uncer-
tainty about the reserve system following the debacles at Fraser Island, Durundur and the 
West End Girls Home in the early 1900s. Barambah demonstrated that large scale 
settlements were possible. The techniques of control and discipline had been sufficiently 
mastered to enable the absorption of a greater number of inmates without any adverse 
effects. The second reason for the upsurge in removals was the appointment of J.W. 
22 QPP (1907) 2: 1263. 
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Figure 2.1 Annual Removals to Barambah 
Bleakley as Chief Protector. Bleakley, although well aware of the Aborigines' affiliation 
to the land, actively promoted the removal to reserves. Throughout his career, he 
constantly maintained that Aborigines should be segregated from whites and placed on 
reserves. He was unashamedly proud of the fact that in his first six years in office, 1207 
Aborigines were sent to settlements and 508 to missions.^^ The third factor contributing 
to the upsurge in removal activity was environmental. During 1915-16, many parts of 
Queensland were affected by a severe drought. Although not on the scale of the great 
'Federation drought'of 1898-1902, this drought did adversely affect Queensland's pastoral 
and agricultural industries. Between 1914-15 and 1915-16, sheep numbers fell 33 
percent, butter production dropped 30 percent, the wheat crop was 70 percent less, and 
the value of meat exports declined from 5.5 million to 2.7 million.^^ The total value 
23 J.W. Bleakley,/16on'gz>iej of Australia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961), 195. 
2** Queensland Year Book 1939 (Brisbane: Government Statistician, 1939), 340-1. 
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P.a 
of Queensland's exports fell from 12.9 million to 8.1 million. This dramatic decline 
in the income of the rural sector resulted in less demand for Aboriginal labour on 
properties and farms. Pastoralists were less willing to maintain and support 'station 
blacks' who in turn found it more difficult to survive on 'bush tucker'. The drought 
coincided with an unprecedented number of removals. In 1915 and 1916, over 1000 
Aborigines were deported to reserves. This peak was mirrored in the numbers sent to 
Barambah which received 158 new inmates in 1915 and another 144 in the following 
year. The impact of drought on a particular region is aptly illustrated by the pattern of 
removals in the Rockhampton district. In the period 1905-1915, ninety-three persons 
were sent from the district to Barambah, an average of eight per year. In 1916, however, 
25 
more that 100 Aborigines were sent to Barambah. This dramatic increase in removals 
from a particular district paralleled events during the previous major drought in 
25 Register of Removals, 1916. 
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Queensland. When Archibald Meston toured south-west Queensland in 1900 and 
removed over seventy blacks to Durundur, the region was in the midst of a devastating 
drought. In his reports of the tour, Meston made constant references to the drought 
conditions and maintained that the only effective means of saving the western blacks from 
'perishing cruelly and rapidly' was to remove them to coastal reserves. 
A feature of this second phase of removals was the removal of larger groups at 
the one time. Prior to 1910 most removals were of individuals or families. Fringe 
camps were moved en masse to settlements. In 1911, soon after the Taroom settlement 
was opened, a group of thirty-three blacks was sent there from Roma. The Hull River 
settlement in north Queensland was started in 1915 when the inhabitants of several fringe 
camps in the Tully region were moved. In 1911 a group of twenty-five Aborigines were 
sent to Barambah from Ayr, while in 1916 a group of fifteen were removed from 
Clermont.^^ 
The third phase, 1921-39 saw a significant decline in the number of deportations 
per year. Although the rate of removals to other centres also declined in this period, the 
decrease was greater at Barambah. The settlement's decline in importance as a 
deportation depot from 1920 onwards is evident in figure 2.2. Whereas in the period 
1905-09 Barambah was the depot for 72 percent of all removals, by the 1930s only 16 
2^  A. Meston to Home Secretary, 26 June 1900, QSA COL/144 00/9625; A. Meston to Under 
Secretary, Home Department, 18 September 1900, QSA COL/145 00/14473. 
2^  Register of Removals 1911, 1916. The group removed from the Ayr district consisted of 
virtually a whole clan represented by the families of Peter and Jenny Hegarty and Frank and Rosie 
Fisher. Members of both these families later played prominent leadership roles on the settlement 
Even today members of the Hegarty and Fisher clan are prominent in Aboriginal organisations in 
southeast Queensland. It could be that because virtually the whole clan was moved, they coped with 
the trauma of removal and adjusted to the settlement regime more effectively than others. Obviously, 
it is an issue that warrants further investigation. 
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percent were sent to Barambah. By comparison, the proportion of deportees sent to Palm 
Island grew from 30 percent in 1915-19 to 67 percent in 1930-34. 
Barambah was the recipient of deportees from all parts of the state. If a list was 
compiled of all the places from where Barambah inmates had been deported, it would 
read like a gazetteer of Queensland. Blacks were removed from the capital, Brisbane; 
from provincial centres such as Toowoomba, Maryborough, Bundaberg, Rockhampton, 
Townsville and Cairns; from rural towns like Roma, Barcaldine, Beaudesert, and 
Clermont; from remote communities such as Boulia, Eulo and Windorah; from obscure 
places like Cooran, Copperfield, Coen; from properties such as Listowel Downs, Bulloo 
Downs and Meteor Downs. The number of removals from the major geographical 
regions in the state is indicated in figure 2.3. Until other settlements were established, 
Barambah received deportees from all regions. With the opening of Taroom in 1911 
however, most deportees from the south-west and Darling Downs were no longer sent 
to Barambah. Similarly, the opening of Hull River settlement (1914) - which was 
transferred to Palm Island in 1918 following a devastating cyclone - reduced the need to 
send deportees from the northern regions to Barambah. With the establishment of these 
settlements, and missions at Mona Mona (1913) and Mornington Island (1914), Barambah 
primarily became the depot for removals from the Wide Bay and central Queensland 
regions. The catchment area of Barambah was reduced again in 1927 when Woorabinda 
settlement was opened. 
On the settlement, the most tangible impact of the removals program was first, 
the size of the population and secondly, the diversity of language groups. Compared with 
previous settlements and missions, Barambah was numerically much larger. A principal 
failure of the nineteenth century missions was the inability to attract Aborigines in any 
significant numbers. Cumeroogunga, for example, a mission on the Victorian and New 
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South Wales border, was established in 1883 and by the turn of the century had only 
200 inhabitants.^^ Barambah by contrast had more than 300 inmates after only five 
years and by 1939 the population was almost 1000. This increase can be solely 
attributed to removals as there was no natural population growth. During the period 
1905-39, deaths exceeded births at an annual rate of twenty-six per thousand.^^ The 
second major consequence of the removals program was the creation of a settlement that 
was culturally heterogeneous. Nineteenth century reserves typically contained only one 
or two language groups. The inhabitants were linguistically and culturally homogenous. 
By comparison, Barambah contained a potpourri of language or 'tribal' groups, with 
almost every linguistic group in the state represented. 
The reasons for removals 
From the outset of the removals program, proponents of the scheme constantly 
maintained that humanitarian considerations were paramount. They insisted the only 
reason for their action was the care and protection of the remnants of a dying race. Yet 
even a most cursory analysis of the Register of Removals - which apart from listing the 
names of those deported, their origin and destination, also contained the reason for 
removal - indicates that the program was not primarily for their benefit or welfare. 
When the reserve system was being established, one of the principal aims of the 
removals process was to ensure the 'absolute isolation' of all Aborigines from whites. 
2* Diane Barwick, 'Corandcrrk and Cumeroogunga: Pioneers and Policy', Opportunity and 
Response: Case Studies in Economic Development, eds. T.S. Epstein and D.H. Penny (London: Hurst, 
1972), 60. 
2^  For detailed papulation statistics, see table 5.1. 
•^  For the language groups represented on Barambah, see figure 8.6. 
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Yet, from the very beginning of the removals campaign, Archibald Meston made it clear 
that not all Aborigines were to be affected, only a particular group. After four years of 
his crusade, Meston acknowledged that he was deporting to reserves 'only those who are 
not employed and those who are roaming about demoralised and are doing no good for 
themselves'. Home Secretary Foxton supported this policy when he told Parliament in 
1901: 'it is the old people and possibly the young ones, with a fair sprinkling of others 
-JO 
of middle age, who ought to be moved to reserves. 
More than one-third of all persons deported to Barambah fell into this category: 
that is, those who were of no economic value or posed a threat to the health and well-
being of the local community. A significant feature of the removals process is that 
despite its widespread and comprehensive nature, only rarely did it result in the removal 
of all Aborigines from a district. For example, between 1913 and 1930, twenty-one 
persons were sent to Barambah from the Clermont district. Yet this action did not result 
in the district being completely 'cleaned up' as ten years later twenty-six Aborigines were 
•J-J 
still living permanently in the district. When a group of nineteen blacks were removed 
from Tongy station 100 miles south of Mitchell in 1929, twelve were adults described 
as 'old and indigent' and the remainder children. Employable adults were noticeably 
absent from the group. The phrase 'old and indigent' was used frequently as the rea.son 
for removal. In the unemployable class, it was the aged who were predominant. 
Aborigines who had spent their working lives on stations were sent to the settlement 
when they could no longer be gainfully employed. In 1936, Charlie Maranoa was sent 
^^  QPD 87 (1901): 1145. 
32 ibid., 226. 
33 Register of Removals, 1913-30; Protector of Aboriginals, Clermont QSA AUD/W41. 
^ Register of Removals, 1929; R.A. Baker to J.W. Bleakley, 4 February 1931, QSA Transfer 
1227/36 31/4586. 
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from Tinnenburra station in south-western Queensland because he was 'too old'. He 
managed however, to live another thirty years after being removed. The sick and d-
isabled were also deported because they were not economically useful. 'Florrie' was 
deported from Cairns to Barambah because she was 'totally blind' and hence had 'no 
means of providing for herself and Bundoo was deported from Duck Creek station when 
he became crippled. 
The sick were also removed if their particular illness was regarded as a threat 
to the health of the white community. The one malady which whites were most sensitive 
about was venereal disease. Any black suspected of this disease was quickly sent to 
Barambah ostensibly 'for treatment' but in reality to prevent contaminating the white 
population. Even when the type of illness an Aborigine might be suffering could not be 
identified, local residents sought to have that person removed to the settlement. On one 
occasion the residents of Taroom petitioned the Home Secretary to remove the 'half-
caste Carbo' from their district because he was 
frequently going through the town and mixing with the members of our little 
community. We are afraid that whatever he is suffering from will spread 
amongst us. 
Being infected by disease-carrying Aborigines was not the only type of contamination 
that concerned the white population. Equally disturbing, if not more so, was the threat 
to 'white blood'. Miscegenation was an issue that deeply concerned all those involved 
in Aboriginal administration from Meston onwards. J.W. Bleakley, while Chief Protector 
was particularly disturbed by the changes it posed. In 1914 he stated: 
The rescue and care of the young woman and children has now become a 
35 Hazel McKellar, interview, 20 March 1984. 
3^  Register of Removals, 1913; A. Meston to Under Secretary, Home Department, 13 June 
1903, QSA COL/144 03/1524. 
3"^  Residents of Taroom to Home Secretary, 5 December 1900, QSA COL/143 00/18523. 
65 
special feature of our work . . . in fact I might say is regarded as the most 
important portion of it. 
The reason for such a focus he added, was 'to keep the race clean'. Bleakley was 
referring to the 'Aboriginal race'but that was only part of the issue. The other and more 
critical agenda was to keep the white race pure. Despite this rhetoric, the number of 
women and children removed to Barambah to avoid miscegenation or potential mis-
cegenation was small. In 1910-14, only 9 percent of removals were in this category. In 
the period 1930-34, only 7 percent of removals to Barambah were of young women and 
children ostensibly in need of care and protection. Young women were in too much 
demand as domestics for the department to engage seriously in a campaign of rescue. 
When the Department did act it was frequently a belated response. In 1939, when Agnes 
Dodd gave birth to a child fathered by a white man, the Chief Protector ordered her 
removal to Barambah. Despite the protests of her parents who claimed they could look 
after her and the child, she was taken to the settlement because in the Chief Protector's 
estimation 'she was somewhat below average mentality'. He also added that he doubted 
'she could be controlled'. In other words, he was fearful of another case of mis-
cegenation. Clearly, a major purpose of the removals program was to isolate 
Aborigines and whites. Yet it was not to keep whites away from Aborigines, as was the 
intention expressed by Meston and others, but vice versa. The removals were used to 
segregate the useless, the socially unacceptable to places were they were out of sight, out 
of mind. 
The second major function of the removals process was control. When the 1897 
legislation was being framed, the threat of removal as a means of control was not con-
38 QPP (1914) 3: 1023. 
3^  J.W. Bleakley to Minister for Health and Home Affairs, 11 September 1939, QSA A/4091 
39/10119. 
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templated. But after four decades, it became the single most important means of 
maintaining while hegemony and of controlling the indigenous population. The threat of 
removal served to exercise control in a number of contexts; in townships, in fringe and 
station camps, in labour relations and on settlements. For those blacks who were allowed 
to live on station camps or on the fringes of country towns because of their economic 
value, their interaction with whites was carefully regulated. Any unacceptable behaviour 
could result in deportation to a reserve. Threats to whites or their property were not 
tolerated. A number of deportations to Barambah were as a consequence of attacks on 
cattle and sheep. In 1910 Speecheley was deported from Boulia becau.se he was a 
'reputed cattle killer and horse sweater'. The local Protector claimed he found 'the 
carcasses of ten cattle in the vicinity of his camp. In 1912, Bertie Brown was 
removed from the Maryborough district for 'going about armed and killing cattle'. In 
the same year, two women, 'Mary' and 'Mary Tyson' were deported from the Springsure 
A T 
district because they had supposedly been 'harassing sheep with large mobs of dogs'. 
Crimes of even the most petty nature could result in deportation. More generally, 
Aborigines were required to act appropriately in the presence of whites. 'Prostitution', 
'trading in prostitution', 'drunkenness', 'threatening women', 'going about half naked'were 
all actions that resulted in removal. Billy Newman was expelled from the Winton 
district because, in the Protector's words: 'he was a menace to society by attempting to 
"" Under Secretary, Home Department to W. Hamilton, 8 September 1911, QSA COL/G250 
708. 
'^^ Register of Removals, 1912. 
'•2 ibid. 
'*3 Probably the most extreme case was the removal of a family from Mt. Isa to Palm Island 
because the father had supposedly stolen a torch (Rosser, Dreamtime Nightmares, 23). 
'*'* see entries for 'Billy Newman' and 'Langlo Louise', Register of Removals, 1908; 'Billy Lillas', 
Register of Removals, 1909. 
i7 
indecently assault women - a confessed nymphomaniac'[sic]. Even just drinking 
alcohol, and not necessarily being intoxicated, could lead to deportation. Evelyn Serico 
was only six years old when removed to Barambah from the Gympie district because her 
uncle was caught consuming alcohol. She recalls: 
Aborigines were not supposed to have beer. Of course it was reported. A 
few weeks later the police from Yandina arrived with a buckboard. We had 
to pack up straight away and leave. They took us into Yandina. We stayed 
the night in jail and they put us on the train the next day for Murgon . . . It 
was such a little offence. 
However, even simply being suspected of committing a crime could result in deporta-
tion as Donald Gunn (Carnarvon) explained to the members of the Legislative Assembly 
in 1919: 
It is idle to say that all these people were removed for their own protection; 
too often they are removed to get them out of the district. If someone loses 
a fowl or sheep, an aboriginal is blamed for the theft, and when the matter is 
reported, the first thing the police do is to deport the aboriginal from the dis-
trict. The Aboriginal has no court to which he can appeal, and I have known 
a man to be put in irons and thus deported to the settlement. 
Local blacks became convenient scapegoats when public outrage demanded a solution to 
a crime. When a Cairns resident Peter Lumberg, was brutally murdered in 1905, the 
police were unable to identify immediately any suspects. In an attempt to solve the crime 
quickly, the police detained two local blacks. Tommy Tommyhawk and Tommy Norrigie, 
in the local watch-house. Although there was no evidence linking the two men to the 
crime, they were detained in custody by the Inspector of Police under his authority as 
Protector of Aboriginals. The police employed various methods to extract a confession 
from the men, including tying a chain around their legs and hanging them from a tree! 
Despite this treatment, neither man confessed. Yet instead of being released, the 
^^ Register of Removals, 1908. 
'^ E. Serico, interview, 4 December 1984. 
"••^  QPD 134 (1919-20): 2563. 
68 
Inspector of Police then ordered their removal to Barambah."^^ The authority became a 
potent weapon in the hands of a police officer when fulfilling the dual functions of 
protector and prosecutor. Obviously, for those Aborigines who remained in station camps 
and on the fringes of towns, the removal of an individual or family, or the threat of 
removal, was a salutary reminder of the necessity to respect the codes of behaviour and 
norms of the dominant white society. 
Besides controlling the behaviour of Aborigines in their relationships with whites, 
the threat of removal also served to regulate their behaviour within fringe camps. Fringe 
camps were tolerated as long as they did not disturb the visual and aural sensibilities of 
townspeople. Persons constantly quarrelling or causing fights were deported to a reserve. 
'Bob'was deported to Barambah from Mein in North Queensland because he was 'con-
tinually spearing Aborigines and taking their gins'. He supposedly acquired six gins by 
this process and was 'dreaded by all the aborigines in the district' according to the local 
protector. Fringe dwellers were also required to observe European norms regarding 
family responsibilities. In 1928 when 'Oliver'deserted his family in CunnamuUa, he was 
caught by the police when trying to cross the border and sent to Barambah for being a 
'wife deserter'. In order to make him a responsible husband and father his wife and 
family were then sent to join him! Fringe camp life was never totally secure for there 
were no bounds as to the irrational reasons offered by a Protector to remove a fringe 
dweller he disliked. The highpoint of such irrationality was probably reached in 1929 
^ T. Mowbray, Report into certain alleged Police Irregularities in connection with the Peter 
Lumberg Murder Case, 4 June 1906, QSA HOM/J27 07/9489. 
'*' Register of Removals, 1912. 
5° Register of Removals, 1928. 
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when the Protector at Coen ordered the removal of 'Ulsana' and 'Annie' because they 
were 'dangerously affected by the moon'. 
The removals process played a critical role in maintaining a servile Aboriginal 
labour force. Aborigines played a vital role in the development of the pastoral industry 
52 in Queensland. The fear of removal was exploited as a means of inculcating the right 
attitudes to time, the virtues of work, the importance of compliance and reliability. 
Aboriginal employees were ever conscious of the possibility of deportation, as Ruby de 
Satge, who worked on cattle properties in north west Queensland, observed: 
Well, when people didn't want to work they would be sent off. That's 
punishment for them. If they did anything wrong they'd get into trouble for 
it There was no innocence in those days. They weren't allowed to say 
anything or back answer. 
Black workers lacked security in their employment and a multitude of reasons could be 
used to remove those who did not perform. The standard phases used for deportation to 
Barambah included 'will not work, a source of nuisance', 'absconding from hired 
service', 'refusing to work', 'has no regular employment', 'tired of work'. The threat of 
removal was a most potent and valuable weapon in the employers' arsenal of worker 
control. It was critical in maintaining and regulating Aboriginal labour. 
Apart from controlling the behaviour of Aborigines around townships and in the 
workforce, the threat of removal was utilised to regulate behaviour on the settlements and 
51 Register of Removals, 1929. 
This issue is discussed at length in chapter sbc. Dawn May estimates that on stations in the 
more remote areas of the state, blacks outnumbered Europeans on a ratio of five to one ('Aboriginal 
Labour in the North Queensland Cattle Industry 1897-1968,' PhD thesis, James Cook University, 
1986, 410). See also her work on the earlier period. From Bush to Station: Aboriginal Labour in 
the North Queensland Cattle Industry, 1861-1897 (Townsville: James Cook University, 1983). 
53 Rosser, Dreamtime Nightmares, 24. 
5'* The dynamics of Aboriginal labour is discussed in chapter six. 
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missions. During the period 1908-35, ninety-nine deportations to Barambah were from 
other settlements. In turn, a similar number were sent from Barambah elsewhere. In 
both situations, the primary reason was disciplinary action. When B.J.T. Lipscombe 
appeared before the South Australian Royal Commission on Aborigines in 1913 and was 
asked how he dealt with refractory natives, he responded: 
I deal with them here. I sometimes threaten them that if they do not behave 
properly I will send them to Mornington Island. That usually has the desired 
effect. They do not want to be sent to Mornington Island because they have 
heard from the other blacks what sort of place it is. 
Although Lipscombe never did send anyone to Mornington Island because of the logistical 
difficulties, he and his successor Semple did deport troublesome inmates to the other 
government settlements. The main destination for Barambah offenders was Palm Island, 
known colloquially as 'Punishment Island'. For more than eighty Barambah inmates 
who were deported there, the term was apposite. One 'refractory' inmate sentenced to 
the island was Martin Bligh. According to the Superintendent his crime was allegedly 
'causing a riot at the Murgon races and . . . being the ringleader of the disorderly 
element on the settlement'. Bligh was not given any opportunity to refute the 
allegations: he and his family were simply deported without warning in the middle of the 
night. After Bligh had gone, a relative wrote to the Home Secretary complaining about 
what had happened: 
I need not say how great the shock came to us. They were painting the 
inside of their little hou.se during the day and had prepared a nice little garden 
for the competition . . . their home has been broken up. 
Bligh's experience reminded other inmates that adopting some European mores did not 
guarantee immunity from deportation if accused of a misdemeanour. Inmates who incited 
55 Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 81. 
5^  Deputy Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Under Secretary, Home Department, 30 June 1928, 
QSA HOM/J675 28/4784. 
5^  J. Anderson to Mr. Stopford, 24 June 1928, QSA HOM/J675 28/4784. 
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others to rebel or stirred up trouble were almost invariably removed to another settle-
ment. For example in 1929, a group of eight inmates deserted Barambah and enjoyed 
a brief period of freedom until they reached Chinchilla, approximately two hundred 
kilometres away. When caught all but one, Leslie Jerome, were returned to the 
settlement. Jerome was regarded as the instigator of the trouble and sent to Palm Isl-
and. But not only were ringleaders and troublemakers deported. Any inmate the 
Superintendent regarded as too disruptive could be sent north. Steve Hart was removed 
to Palm Island in 1938 because of 'his addiction to intoxicating liquor and consequent 
quarrelsome disposition'. Bessie Williams was deported to Woorabinda in 1934 because 
she was a 'disturbing influence on the settlement' as a result of having 'engaged in 
immoral conduct with a married man'. 
Removing inmates to another settlement had a dual purpo.se. As well as being 
a punitive measure, it was also intended to dissuade others from flouting the settlement 
regimen. The threat of deportation to a distant settlement was the principal means for 
preventing inmates absconding. Given the extent inmates did abscond, however, it was 
not a very successful deterrent. Some inmates were habitual deserters. In 1930, Bob 
Fogarty was sent to Palm Island because he was a 'constant absconder and a bad 
example to others.^^ After his removal to Palm Island he managed to return to his 
former settlement. He again absconded from Barambah, only to be caught and sent to 
Palm Island for the second time!^^ Fogarty's exploits were matched, if not surpassed by 
58 Register of Removals, 1929. 
5^  J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 5 July 1940, 
QSA A/4141 40/5012. 
^ Register of Removals, 1934. 
^^  Register of Removals, 1930. 
62 Register of Removals, 1932. 
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Bernie Turner. He first absconded from Barambah in 1929, was caught and returned 
to the settlement. Two years later he was sent to Palm Island for 'in.solence and 
disobeying the Superintendent's orders'. Within months he escaped and made his way 
back to Barambah. He was returned to Palm Island only to desert once more. The 
Superintendent at Palm Island then refused to take him for the third time, so Turner 
became an inmate of the Yarrabah mission. 
Constant refu.sal to work on the settlement was another reason for removal. 
Lipscombe's method of dealing with 'loafers', as he explained to the South Australian 
Royal Commission on Aborigines was: 
I would report the matter to the head office in Brisbane. Most probably the 
head office would issue a summons on the husband and very likely he would 
be deported. We would keep the wife and children here. 
During the 1930s Barambah inmates who refused to work were known colloquially as 
'drones'. They constantly defied the authority of the Superintendent and when all 
attempts to discipline them failed, a number of the group were sent to Palm Island. 
Their deportation reminded the other inmates that laziness was not tolerated. The 
settlement code of behaviour, as defined by the administration, did not permit slothfulncss. 
Inmates were expected to contribute towards the maintenance and upkeep of the settle-
ment. 
The control and discipline of Aborigines was a paramount function of the 
removals process. The preceding analysis has shown how it was utilised in relation to 
Aborigines in fringe and station camps, in the labour force, and on settlements. Another 
63 Register of Removals, 1929, 1931, 1932. 
^ Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 79. 
65 Jimmy Edwards, interview, 24 October 1984. 
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application concerned Aborigines within the prison system. Almost 4 percent of all 
deportees to Barambah were from various prisons throughout the state (see table 3.2). 
Barambah served as a de facto jail as Aboriginal prisoners were deported to the 
settlement on the completion of their sentence. In 1912, when Ned Cullen had finished 
serving a six month sentence for 'assaulting his gin', he was deported to Barambah 
because the Chief Protector did not think it was appropriate he should 'return to his 
tribe'. The power of removal was a convenient means by which the courts could 
extend the sentence of an Aborigine beyond the statutory limit. When Dick Holman was 
found guilty of stealing in 1913, the Bench of Magistrates ordered that 'after the comple-
tion of his sentence, he be removed to a reserve'. 
Significantly the authority to remove was used, not only to extend the length of 
a prison sentence, but also to punish when the courts failed to secure a conviction. 
During the debate on amendments to the Aboriginals Protection Act in 1901, the Home 
Secretary freely acknowledged using his authority in this manner. He related the ca.se 
of one man who he did not doubt had committed murder but was not convicted becau.se 
'there was no legal evidence that he had committed the murder'. The Home Secretary 
ordered his removal to a reserve and defended the action by claiming it was in 'the best 
interests of the whole district' and the person himself. The removals process ensured 
Aborigines found little justice in the legal system. They confronted a system that 
presumed their guilt, rather than their innocence. When appearing before the courts, their 
fate was almost invariably sealed. Conviction or no conviction, they were separated from 
^ Register of Removals, 1912. 
^^  Register of Removals, 1913. 
^ QPD 87 (1901): 594. 
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their country and kin. The only difference was the length of sentence and type of 
institution where it was served. 
Despite the seemingly unlimited scope to which the removals process could be 
used to punish and discipline, in 1934 the Aboriginals Protection Act was amended to 
further curtail the civil liberties of the state's indigenous inhabitants. The power of 
removal was extended to allow the Minister to detain any 'aboriginals or half-castes' who 
in his opinion were 'uncontrollable' in an institution such as a prison, for an indefinite 
period. Removal was no longer confined to a settlement or mission. The definition of 
an 'uncontrollable' person was broad: it was someone who either was convicted under 
certain sections of the Criminal code or was a 'menace to the peace, order and proper 
control and management of an institution'. Thus an Aborigine deemed 'uncontrol-
lable' could be imprisoned without trial for the term of his natural life, simply at the 
behest of the Minister. When this section was being debated the only objection were 
raised by James Kenny (Cook) who commented that such powers broke 'every tenet of 
70 British justice'. Such remarks were rather belated as the blacks had been denied any 
semblance of justice since the removals program had been instigated in 1897. The 1934 
amendment was but a modest extension of the comprehensive powers the Minister already 
possessed. By 1934, more than 5700 Aborigines had been forcibly removed to reserves, 
without any regard for their rights. For most the only 'crime' they had committed was 
being born black. The tenets of British justice had been blithely ignored where the 
treatment of the Aboriginal population was concerned. 
^' The Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Acts Amendment Act 1934, 
s 9. 
70 QPD 164 (1934): 1690. 
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Apart from receiving inmates from prisons, Barambah was also the depot for 
inmates from other institutions such as orphanages, asylums for the insane and lazarets. 
Aboriginal inmates in these institutions, having recovered mentally or physically or 
72 become too difficult to manage, were sent to a settlement. Some inmates spent time 
in several institutions before eventually arriving at the settlement. Annie Woods, for 
example, began her 'disciplinary career' in 1920 when she was jailed for one month in 
Rockhampton for obscene language. On her discharge she was placed in the local 
Reception House, ostensibly because she was suffering from 'mania'. While in the 
Reception House the visiting Medical Officer observed her foot was infected which he 
73 
suspected was leprous. Without tests being conducted, Annie Woods was then 
transfered to the lazaret on Peel Island. She remained an inmate there for the next 
twelve years despite repeated tests showing no traces of leprosy. In 1933 moves were 
finally made to transfer her elsewhere. The Commissioner of Public Health suggested 
she be admitted to the Benevolent Asylum at Dunwich 'where she would be properly 
cared for' but this proposal met with strong opposition from the Medical Superintendent 
at Dunwich. He informed the Home Secretary: 
I do not consider Annie Woods a fit subject for Dunwich for three reasons. 
She is very childish and it would soon leak out that she had been at Peel 
Island and she would have no peace. Further, I have a suspicion that she is 
inclined to prostitution, not really for intense sexuality but considering that it 
was one means of obtaining cash. As a coloured woman, her position would 
be unpleasant. She has been very kind to the coloured inmates and has 
helped them with sewing etc. Her condition of submentality would not attract 
much attention in an aboriginal settlement and altogether I think she would be 
much happier there than in Dunwich. 
^^  Between 1908 and 1936, 73 removals were in this category. 
2^ See, for example the case of Jack Gilbert who was removed from Goodna asylum to 
Barambah because he had 'recovered mentally' (Register of Removals, 1930). 
"^3 Dr Voss to Home Secretary, 4 October 1920 and 8 November 1920, QSA COL/283. 
'^ '* Dr F. Challands to Dr J. Coffey, 5 December 1932, QSA COL/283. 
"^5 Dr F. Challands to Under Secretary, Home Office, 23 January 1933, QSA COL/283. 
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Barambah was a place of last resort, a convenient dumping ground for unwanted or 
troublesome inmates from other institutions. 
The removals process was critical in forging links between Barambah and other 
76 
institutions which constituted Queensland's 'carceral archipelago'. Barambah and the 
other Aboriginal settlements had many distinctive features, but they were also part of a 
network of institutions which were dedicated to control and discipline: prisons, orphanag-
es, asylums, lazarets. Within the carceral archipelago, the Aboriginal settlements had a 
clearly defined position on its outer rim. Usually when white inmates of institutions such 
as prisons and lunatic asylums were disciplined and normalised, they were sent back into 
society. On the rare occasions when Aboriginal inmates were regarded as normalised 
however, they were transfered not back into the white society but further away into the 
outer part of the archipelago, to institutions even more removed, at least sociologically 
and psychologically. 
Resistance to removals 
Just as Aborigines in the nineteenth century vigorously resisted attempts to 
expropriate their land and destroy their culture, so too did their twentieth century 
counterparts oppose moves to separate them from their land and families. Aborigines did 
not willingly acquiesce to the removals program as writers such as Bleakley have 
77 
suggested, rather they resisted in a spirited and sustained manner. One of the most 
common forms of resistance was simply to escape into the bush when the police came 
with a removal order. In 1908, Chief Protector Howard reported that two boys on 
^^  M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 297. 
^^  Bleakley, Aborigines of Australia, 195. 
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Womblebank station in north-west Queensland were to be deported to Barambah but they 
78 had 'absconded into the bush and [could] not be found.' Similarly, on Tinnenburra 
station in south-west Queensland the McKellar family avoided deportation to Barambah 
7Q 
by fleeing, along with other families, shortly before the police arrived. Others avoided 
removal by escaping across the border into New South Wales. Probably the largest 
group to move interstate were the Wangkumara people who originally lived in the far 
south-west of the state. They moved across the border to Tibooburra in the late 1910s. 
In some respects, the move was fortunate for the Wangkumara. By moving as a group, 
they managed to retain their identity and language to a greater degree than if they had 
81 been dumped on a settlement. Another group to escape deportation by moving across 
the border was a group from Hillview camp near Beaudesert. In 1926, the local 
Protector attempted to have them removed from the district because they were not 'fond 
of work'. After having obtained approval for such action however, he had to inform the 
Chief Protector that they were 'at present wandering in N.S.W.'. In 1935 Horace 
Hamilton, when he became aware he was to be deported to Barambah, escaped to Tweed 
Heads from Gayndah. Likewise Ellen Hocking fled across the border when a number 
of the St. George camp were being removed because they were 'indigent'. Once 
interstate, escapees usually remained there as the effort required to locate and then 
*^ QPP (1908) 3: 935. 
'^ ^ Hazel McKellar, interview, 20 March 1984. 
80 ibid. 
8^  Although they were later moved to Brewarrina in the 1930s by the New South Wales 
Aborigines Protection Board, the Wangkumara language and some customs were kept alive by the 
some of the group. In 1985, a Wangkumara teaching program was devised and Wangkumara 
dictionary published (David Huggonson, 'Cecil 'Ngaka' Ebsworth: Wangkumara Man of the corner 
country,' Joumal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland 14 [1990]: 117). 
82 Register of Removals, 1926. 
83 Register of Removals, 1935. 
^ Register of Removals, 1915. 
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capture them was beyond the resources of the department. The Chief Protector's attitude 
was that as such people were usually of 'a troublesome disposition', it was better to leave 
them.^^ A more subtle form of resistance was adopted by Dave Wharton who lived on 
the outskirts of CunnamuUa during the 1920s and 30s. According to his daughter. Hazel 
McKellar: 
There was never any attempt to round up the people as a group from the 
camp and send them away to the Mission, I think my father had a bit of 
political knowledge. He would have stood his ground if they had tried to 
send anyone away for no reason. He was around when they put the reserve 
there and there was this peg right alongside a cedar tree. It was a surveyor's 
peg and he said no one could ever shift him from there. He was right up to 
date on civil liberties. 
Wharton may not have been fully aware of the unlimited power the Minister pos.se.ssed 
to remove the camp, but he was astute enough to dissuade local officials from taking any 
actions. 
Even if removed to a settlement, resistance did not stop. Numerous attempts 
were made by deportees to return to their home country. Tommy Tommyhawk, who was 
wrongfully su.spected of murdering Peter Lumberg, was removed to Barambah twice and 
on both occasions he managed to escape and return to his family in the Cairns district, 
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a distance of more than 1200 miles. A similar feat was achieved by four men who 
returned to Torrens Creek near Hughenden in June 1911 after being sent to Barambah 
in the previous year. In 1913, two Coen residents successfully made their way home 
after being deported to Barambah.^^ These accomplishments were acknowledged even 
85 Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Commissioner of Police, 24 February 1922, QSA Transfer 
1227/34 22/4782. 
^ McKellar, Matya Mundu, 81. 
8'' QPP (1906) 2: 930. 
88 Register of In-letters, Home Secretary's Office, 1911, QSA HOM/B39 'Aboriginals'. 
8^  Register of Removals, 1913. 
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by Chief Protector Bleakley as 'remarkable feats of endurance'. He noted that to return 
home, these men had 'walked a good one thousand miles through unknown country, 
90 
avoided populated places and subsisted on bush foods'. But not all attempts to return 
home were successful, some ended in tragedy. Charlie Dugiman was deported to 
Barambah in April 1938. Two days after his arrival, he was reported mi.ssing but five 
months elapsed before his remains were discovered several kilometres away on 
Barambah station. 
The impact of removals 
Despite the spirited resistance, the removals program nevertheless had a profound 
impact on Aboriginal cultural and social life. One of the primary consequences was the 
separation of Aborigines from their land. Unlike the European perspective which viewed 
the land as something to be exploited as an economic resource. Aboriginal understanding 
was radically different. The land was sacred: it was imbued with a religious significance. 
The land was the source of meaning and identity. A clan belonged to the land, rather 
than the land belonging to a clan. In turn, there were obligations to care for and protect 
92 the land. Thus to be taken from one's'country'was a profoundly traumatic experience. 
Although many Aborigines had already been forced off their land and into fringe camps 
by the time the removals program started, they frequently lived in close proximity to their 
country. They still maintained, albeit in a limited form, links with their land. With the 
^ B\cak\cy, Aborigines of Australia, 195. 
^' South Bumea Times, 30 September 1938. 
2^ The literature on the Aboriginal understanding of the land is extensive, but see Marcia 
Langton and Nicolas Peterson, eds.. Aborigines, Land, and Land Rights (Canberra: Australian In.stitute 
of Aboriginal Studies, 1983); W.E. Stanner, White Man got no Dreaming: Essays 1938-78 (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1979). 
'3 McKellar, Matya Mundu, 69-84. 
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removal to a distant reserve however, the association with their land became more 
difficult to maintain. 
Apart from severing the ties with the land, the other consequence of being 
removed to a settlement was separation from family and other kin. Under the removals 
program, wives were separated from husbands, children were taken from their parents and 
the elderly isolated from their children and grandchildren, Val Clements was separated 
from his father when four years old. He was removed to Barambah in 1908 with his 
mother and sister as he recalled: 
The government was gonna collect all the Aboriginals off the stations and 
bring them into the settlement. That was how it was with us. They came 
round to where we were and they picked us up. Our father objected to it. 
He said he'd educate us so they held us back. It went to Townsville for a 
court case. When the case came up they said, 'No, you can't stay'. So they 
fetched us off on the train. 
Clements never saw his European father again despite his willingness to care and provide 
for the family. Daisy Gorringe was taken away from her German father and Aboriginal 
mother when ten years old to 'be educated'. She 'cried for her family ' day and night 
when taken by the troopers but never saw them again. Equally traumatic was the 
separation of the elderly from their offspring. In 1928 Albert Holt, his wife, several of 
his children, along with his aged mother-in-law were removed from Springsure in Central 
Queensland. They were not all taken to the one reserve. Instead, because Holt's mother-
in-law was much 'darker' than the rest of the family she was sent to Woorabinda while 
the others were transported to Barambah. One of Holt's daughters, Rita Huggins vividly 
remembers leaving her grandmother behind: 
We went to Woorabinda to leave her there. She only lived three weeks after 
'^* Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
5^ Hazel McKellar, interview, 20 March 1984. 
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that. She went into the bu.sh to die. She didn't have the will to live. "Don't 
take my gundaburries (children). Don't take them. I bring them into the 
world," she said to the policeman but he just pushed her aside. 
Under the Act, no relationship, no affinity was sacrosanct; even wives were taken from 
their husbands. Any question of basic human rights, even legal rights were ignored. 
The consequences of removing Aborigines from their land and the disruption of 
kinship networks were profound. As W.E.H. Stanner noted: 
every personal affiliation was lamed, every group structure was put out of 
kilter, no social network had a point of fixture left. 
The result of the removals program was quite different to that claimed by the proponents 
of the scheme. Ironically, rather than being for the 'care and protection' of the state's 
Aborigines, it contributed to the destruction of so much of their cultural and social life. 
Was the removals program a tragic nfiistake, a well intentioned exercise where the 
consequences were only realised afterwards? Can Meston and his succes.sors be excused 
on account of ignorance? Anthropological research in the past twenty-five years and the 
land rights movement have greatly increased the non-Aboriginal understanding of the 
centrality of land in the Aboriginal world view. The proponents of the removals policy 
96 Rita Huggins, interview, 7 December 1984. 
The disregard for personal relationships and rights is aptly illustrated with what happened 
to Minnie Koran. When Archibald Meston visited Rockhampton in 1902, she was living with a 
Pacific Islander and he ordered her removal to Durundur settlement Of course, it did not occur to 
Meston that the couple may have been legally married. Minnie's husband protested vigorously to the 
police but was unsuccessful in stopping her deportation (A. Meston to Under Secretary, Home Office, 
30 May 1902, QSA COL/144 02/12740). Meston's motives for removing Minnie Captain from her 
husband became apparent two months later in a letter she wrote to her husband: 
Just a line to tell you how I am getting on. I have been staying in Brisbane for a week 
and our little boy is at the Mission Station Woodford. Mr. Meston wants me to get 
married to a black boy at Woodford Mission Station; but I won't get married to nobody 
as I'm already married to you. I will try to get back to you somehow if I can (Minnie 
Koran to husband, 9 July 1902, QSA COL/144 02/12740). 
Even the conservative Rockhampton Record expressed concern at the injustice of the episode. The 
paper noted that while Meston's action could have been in accordance with the strict letter of the law, 
'the fact must remain that a great hardship has unnecessarily been done to both the islander and the 
woman' (Rockhampton Record, 28 May 1902). 
8^ W.H. Stanner, After The Dreaming (Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1968), 57. 
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however, cannot be too quickly excused for their lack of understanding. Indeed, the 
association with land and attachment to 'country' was well recognised even when the 
removals policy was being first implemented. Archibald Meston was well aware of the 
affiliation Aborigines had to the land but felt their plight was so desperate, it was no 
QQ 
time for 'rose water and sentiment'. In 1901, when amendments to the Aboriginals 
Protection Act were being debated, A.C. Gregory claimed that to remove Aborigines from 
their own homes, 'would have the effect of destroying life more rapidly than was done 
100 by the wild blacks themselves'. Of course, Gregory as a member of the ruling elite, 
may well have been more concerned that his colleagues in the pastoral industry had ready 
access to cheap labour. Nevertheless Gregory's comments, and those of Morehead and 
Webber quoted at the beginning of this chapter, did indicate an understanding of the at-
tachment Aborigines had to the land. In 1899, a Miles resident wrote to his local 
member of Parliament about the need to do something concerning the plight of the local 
blacks. He was not sure what could be done but was adamant that removal was not the 
solution. He commented: 
The one thing you must make the Home Secretary understand is that the old 
blacks will not leave their old Yowrie, They say they will die here. 
A miner on the Cania goldfields near Warwick was similarly perturbed about the plight 
of the local blacks. The police had attempted to persuade them to go to a reserve but the 
miner believed, as he protested to his local MLA, that 'they want to die where they were 
102 born and have bred, and would rather be shot than removed. Even J.W. Bleakley, 
who served as Chief Protector for twenty-nine years and instigated the removal of more 
Aborigines than any other Protector, was not oblivious to the effects of removal. In his 
^ A. Meston to Home Secretary, 18 September 1900, QSA COL/145, 
too Qp^ gy (1901): 1250. 
^°' W. Addison to Mr. Moore, 28 August 1899, QSA COL/143 99/12164. 
°^2 E. Williams to W. Kent, 16 June 1902, QSA COL/143 02/9969. 
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volume, The Aborigines of Australia, he wrote: 
It is inevitable that, to a people so clannish in their ideas, removal from their 
own country, with all its sacred associations, to another and entirely strange 
land, would be the cause of a good deal of hardship to them. 
Clearly, the cultural and social significance of land was recognised by those who had 
even a rudimentary understanding of Aboriginal culture and society. 
In exposing the impact of the removals program on Aboriginal society, it is 
evident that the declared reasons for removing Aboriginal people was a facade. As other 
commentators revealed, removals were used to discipline and isolate. But the rationale 
for the program was more comprehensive. It was used to control and dominate not only 
Aborigines on reserves, but on fringe camps, in towns and in the workforce. Aborigines 
lived with the constant fear that they could be removed, without warning, to a remote 
reserve. The trauma associated with removal was not confined to those who were 
removed but also affected those persons left behind. The sudden loss of a sibling, father, 
aunt, or grandparent created a sense of bewilderment and uncertainty in the camp, 
particularly when the reasons for removal were unknown. Few Aborigines remained 
unaffected by the removals program. If the sight of a trooper or policeman with a rifle 
evoked terror in the nineteenth century, in the twentieth century it was a policeman with 
a removal order. The removals program came to be one of the principal means for 
controlling and dominating the state's indigenous population. Despite recognising the 
importance of the removals policy in 1897, Home Secretary Tozer would not have 
envisaged the critical role it would play in the development of the reserve system. By 
1939, when a new Act was passed, more than 6500 Aborigines had been deported to 
reserves. Removals became the technique par excellence for maintaining and extending 
European hegemony. 
103 Bleakley, The Aborigines of Australia, 195. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THOSE SPECIALLY APPOINTED TO GUIDE AND CONTROL 
The settlement staff 
So far all efforts to improve or preser\>e the aboriginals have been made under 
conditions certain to end in failure, and they have usually been directed by men 
destitute of the absolutely essential qualifications (Archibald Meston, 1896). 
At first, the official idea was that the only duties required of the white staff would be 
the issue of rations, medicine and tobacco and the maintenance of order. 
Consequently, the miserably low salaries offered were not likely to attract a very 
efficient type of Superintendent and assistant, but many of these underpaid officers 
gave zealous and loyal sendee under discouraging conditions and gained the respect 
and trust of their native charges (J.W, Bleakley, 1959). 
When advising the Queensland government on the establishment of reserves, 
Archibald Meston stressed that one of the 'necessary conditions' for success of the system 
was the appointment of the right personnel. In his estimation, previous efforts to create 
missions and settlements were undermined by the ineptness of those cho.sen to be in 
charge. For reserves to be viable, a critical ingredient was a Superintendent with a 'strong 
physique' for 'physical power appeals to the Australian aboriginals as to all native races'. 
A person with such attributes would be able, he claimed 
to stand apart . . . with the absolute authority to order work to be done, 
tolerating no disobedience, always kind, dignified and firm; stern and severe if 
necessary. 
Meston was convinced that no settlement could fail with such a person in charge. 
Moreover, with a strong and firm Superintendent, a settlement would be cheap to adm-
* Archibald Meston, Queensland Aboriginals: Proposed System for their Improvement and 
Preservation (Brisbane: Government Printer, 1895), 24. 
2 J.W. BXoakXcy, Aborigines of Australia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961), 323. 
3 Meston, Queensland Aboriginals, 30. 
'* A. Meston, Fraser Island Mission Station, QSA COL/483. Bill Thorpe has analysed Meston's 
predilection for physical strength in 'Archibald Meston and Aboriginal legislation in Colonial 
Queensland,' Historical Studies 21 (1984): 60-62. 
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ini.ster as few other staff would be required. He did not envisage appointing a bevy of 
staff as was the tendency of mission societies. Thus when Meston had to appoint a 
Superintendent for the Fraser Island reserve in 1897, he had no hesitation in selecting his 
son Harold. Despite possible charges of nepotism, Archibald Meston felt his son was 
eminently suited for the position because he had the ability to be 'sharp and summary 
in the settlement of any troubles that require prompt action'. After two years of Harold 
Meston's rule, the expected benefits of a regimen of 'stern control' were noticeably 
absent. The problems which arose during his superintendency exposed the inadequacies 
of such an approach. As well, they highlighted the need to appoint more than one penson 
to oversee the administration of a settlement. The government was also reminded about 
the importance of selecting the right staff when Mary Frew was appointed female 
protector of aboriginals in 1900. Her term of office was marked by controversy. She 
became an embarrassment to the government when her ineptitude was exposed in 
Parliament and was dismissed. 
By the time the government assumed responsibility for the management of the 
Barambah reserve in 1905, it had received salutary lessons about the staffing of reserves. 
This chapter examine how such lessons were applied on Barambah. First, the 
development of the administrative structure is discussed: what positions were created and 
how did they reflect the changing understanding of the purpose of the settlement? 
Secondly, the criteria for appointing staff is analysed. The third major Lssue concerns the 
competence of the staff. Were those appointed, as Bleakley suggests, 'loyal and zealous 
5 Ray Evans and Jan Walker, '"These strangers, where are they going?": Aboriginal-European 
relations in the Fraser Island and Wide Bay region 1770-1905,' Occasional Papers in Anthropology 
No 8, ed. P. Lauer (St. Lucia: Anthropology Museum, 1977), 83. 
^ T. Blake, 'Excluded, Exploited, Exhibited: Aborigines in Brisbane 1897-1910,' Brisbane: 
Aboriginal Alien Ethnic, ed. R. Fisher (Brisbane: Brisbane History Group, 1987), 53-5. 
'' QPD 98 (1906): 1660-7. 
86 
officers'? As well as examining the staff on the settlement, the role of officials outside 
the settlement cannot be overlooked. In the maintenance of settlement discipline, the 
invaluable role of the Queensland police force cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, the 
role of the Chief Protector and other officials in the day-to-day administration of the 
settlement must be explored. 
The administrative structure 
The first 'guardians' of Barambah inmates consisted of a Superintendent, 
Assistant Superintendent, matron and teacher. Responsibility for the overall conduct of 
the settlement was in the hands of the Superintendent. His specific duties included 
setting work to be done each day, dealing with correspondence, keeping accounts, making 
arrangements with employers, as well as inspecting the camps. The Assistant 
Superintendent's primary responsibilities were supervising the various farming activities 
o 
as well as overseeing the distribution of rations. The duties of the matron included 
cooking for the sick women, cutting out and making up clothes as well as attending to 
women in confinement. For the school teacher, there were tasks each day of the week. 
Besides the normal school activities, she was responsible for the cleaning of the school 
each Saturday and teaching Sunday School on the following afternoon. 
During the settlement's infancy when only these officials were employed, there 
was, as had been pointed out in chapter one, a laissez-faire approach to control and 
discipline. The focus of settlement administration was on conducting a successful labour 
8 J.M. Costin to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 5 May 1905, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
^ F. Taylor to Secretary, Public Service Board, 31 May 1906, QSA HOM/J18 06/6745. 
°^ J. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Department 8 September 1911, QSA HOM/JllO 
13/13934. 
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depot. While these objectives were paramount, there was little need for extra staff. But 
as the settlement expanded as the administration sought to exercise more rigorous control 
over the inmates, more staff became necessary. In July 1909, a new position was created 
with the dual responsibilities of storekeeper and medical attendant. This position was 
partly in response to the opening of a retail store which was established to discourage 
inmates from travelling to the township of Murgon to shop as well as exercising greater 
control on how inmates spent their money. Also, the position was created to provide 
more adequate medical services on the settlement. By the beginning of 1909, it was 
evident that more than just a medicine chest in the Superintendent's office was needed 
to cater for the health needs of the inmates. In the preceding year thirty-three deaths 
had occurred and the 'number of old, helpless and feeble . . . from other districts' was 
increasing. This arrangement was maintained for just over two years. In September 
1911, the Chief Protector inspected the settlement and recommended that becau.se the 
duties of the storekeeper and the medical attendant were of 'such magnitude', full time 
officers for both positions were warranted. He observed, 'at least 80 to 90 children not 
to mention old and infirm natives who [required] pretty constant medical attention'. 
Howard was also of the opinion that there was enough work to keep the storekeeper fully 
occupied by re-allocating some of the Superintendent's duties. The Superintendent's 
clerical duties had grown to the extent that he spent little time out of the office. The 
Chief Protector believed that it was imperative for the good management of the settlement 
that the Superintendent 'devote his time equally between his office work and outdoor 
12 
supervision'. Another position created at this time was visiting Medical Officer. Dr 
11 QPP (1910) 3: 977. 
2^ R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Department 8 September 1911, QSA HOM/JllO 
13/12934. 
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David Junk, who practiced in nearby Wondai was appointed to this role, visiting the 
1 ^ 
settlement on a weekly basis as well as attending to emergency cases. 
Between 1915 and 1921, the number of staff on the settlement increased from 
seven to fourteen. This period coincided with the beginning of J.W, Blcakley's reign as 
Chief Protector when he sought to re-orientate settlements from being merely labour 
depots to institutions of reform and control. Bleakley was not as enthusiastic about the 
hiring of labour as his predecessor Howard. Instead, he believed that the primary 
function was to keep the inmates isolated from white society so they could be civilised, 
or in his words raised 'to higher planes in the social scale'. The Bleakley ideal was 
for settlements to be self contained and self sufficient. As part of this aim a sawmill was 
constructed and water supply established on Barambah in 1917-18. The sawmill was 
intended not only as a training facility but to provide timber for administrative buildings, 
staff quarters and cottages for the inmates. The water supply was necessary for the 
development of a vegetable garden and orchard. To manage the sawmill, maintain the 
water service, and construct the cottages, a sawyer, engine driver and carpenter were 
appointed in the latter part of 1917. Four years later a farm assistant was added to the 
18 Staff to oversee the 'food producing activities'. Other appointments during this period 
3^ Junk held this position for twenty years. He undertook his medical training in Ireland and 
migrated to Australia in 1909. In the following year he established a practice in Wondai and for a 
period was the only doctor between Gympie and Kingaroy {QPP [1911] 3: 1322; South Burnett Times, 
11 February 1938). 
''* Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 97; QPP (1916) 3: 173, (1917) 3: 1004. 
15 QPP (1917) 3: 1005. 
1^  QPP (1918) 1: 1679. 
1^  Chief Protector to Accountant Home Department, 17 December 1917, QSA A/26858. 
18 Bleakley, The Aborigines of Australia, 120. 
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included two nurses - one in 1915 and another in 1920 - and an additional teacher. 
When a new teacher was appointed to Barambah in June 1917, he was faced with the 
unenviable task of having to teach over 100 pupils in a cla.ssroom designed for a 
maximum of 56 pupils. The teacher, J.G. Gleghorn complained about the difficulty of 
trying to impart even a rudimentary education in such an environment. As his wife was 
a qualified teacher, she was appointed soon after their arrival on the settlement to the 
2n 
school. By the end of 1921, Barambah's staff had grown to 14. 
While the total number of staff was to remain more or less constant for the 
following two decades, some positions were abolished and others created. One important 
change that occurred was in the roles of the A.ssistant Superintendent and Superintendent. 
Following a review of its administration in 1923, a new Superintendent was appointed to 
Barambah during the following year with the specific task of developing the agricultural 
21 
and pastoral potential of the reserve. To relieve him as much as possible of clerical 
duties, the tasks of the Assistant Superintendent were altered so that instead of being 
responsible mainly for 'outdoor activities', the job became a desk-bound one. Instead of 
overseeing the sawmill, building work, livestock and agricultural activities, he became the 
22 
settlement's accountant and responsible for most of the clerical duties. The next change 
to the staffing arrangements occurred in 1928 when an assistant Clerk was appointed 
19 QPP (1917) 1: 669. 
2° J.G. Gleghorn to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 24 August 1917, QSA HOM/J423 
22/2053. 
21 J. Irwin and A.E. Gibson, 'Report on Barambah Aboriginal Settlement,' 20-23 January 1923, 
QSA Transfer 1227/128 21/3735; G. Bradbury and C.O'Leary, 'Report on the Aboriginal Settle-
ments at Palm Island, Cherbourg and Woorabinda,' Fryer Mss. 44/144, 16. 
22 ibid., 17. 
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Figure 3.1 Development of administrative structure 
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to assist with the ever burgeoning bureaucratic procedures and correspondence associated 
with the administration of the settlement. 
In 1932 an investigation by G. Bradbury, an accountant in the Home Secretary's 
office and C, O'Leary the Deputy Chief Protector, into the operations of the settlement 
resulted in several alterations to the staffing arrangements. One change involved the 
position of settlement Matron which since 1905 had been filled by the wife of the 
Superintendent on a supposedly part-time basis. While an industrious person may have 
been able carry out the necessary duties when there were only 300 inmates on the settle-
ment, by 1932 - the population had increased to over 800 - the workload had become, 
as described by Bradbury and O'Leary, 'more arduous'. As a result of their report, the 
position of settlement Matron became a fulltime appointment in 1933. Another 
outcome of the Bradbury-O'Leary report was the retrenching of the sawyer and carpenter. 
After employing these tradesmen for more than 15 years, Bradbury and O'Leary felt that 
as 'practically all of the necessary buildings on Barambah had been erected', their services 
25 
were no longer required. 
The decrease in total staff numbers caused by these retrenchments was not 
however, permanent. In 1935, the position of assistant Clerk was filled after being left 
26 
vacant for three years and a manual training teacher was appointed in 1938. By 1939, 
the fulltime staff had grown once more to 14. The overall growth in staff numbers more 
or less matched the increase in the settlement's population. In 1905, the ratio of staff to 
23 QGG 131 (1928): 917. 
2'* Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal settlements,' 18-19. 
25 ibid., 67. 
2^  Assistant Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 8 April 1937, QSA 
A/3908 37/3677; Report of Inspection of Cherbourg Aboriginal School, 1 March 1939, QSA A/1599 
39/30224. 
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inmates ratio was 1:78 compared with 1:70 in 1939. Ironically, such ratios were not too 
different from that which had existed on Fra.ser Island when Harold Meston first took 
27 
charge of the reserve in 1897. These figures indicate that the success of a settlement 
was not just influenced by the number of staff that were employed. Fra.ser Island did not 
fail just because of a lack of personnel. Effective control also depended on the type of 
staff employed. 
The selection of staff 
In selecting staff for the Barambah, varying criteria were applied. The first 
appointment to Barambah was Albert Tronson and in the circumstances he was the most 
logical choice as Superintendent. Tronson had served as Superintendent of the Durundur 
settlement for four years and when the government decided to close that settlement and 
transfer the inmates to Barambah, they did not hesitate in continuing with his services. 
But while Tronson was probably the most suited person to manage Barambah in 1905, 
such was not the case when he was initially appointed to Durundur in 1901, Tronson 
had few credentials for the job, having spent most of his working life in a grocery store 
in Maryborough. He had no experience with Aborigines, was not familiar with working 
the land nor was he, like his prcdece.s.sor, Harold Meston, a man of a 'strong physique'. 
Al.so, Tronson did not manifest any philanthropic or humanitarian concerns as was so 
characteristic of those who managed reserves in the nineteenth century. What Tronson 
did have in his favour, however, was his connections to the Meston clan. Tronson's 
sister Nina was married to Harold Meston which meant that Archibald Meston was his 
2S 
sister's father-in-law. Thus Archibald Meston's daughter-in-law was Tronson's sister. 
2^  Evans and Walker, 'Aboriginal-European relations in the Fraser Island and Wide Bay region 
1770-1905,' 90. 
28 Mrs B. Smith, interview, 23 November 1984. 
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Given Meston sr's propensity for patronage, it is not surprising Tron.son was appointed 
to Durundur despite his almost total lack of experience and necessary attributes. 
When Tron.son resigned in May 1906, there were eleven applicants for the 
position. Lack of managerial skills or experience with Aborigines did not deter most who 
applied. One applicant who at the time was unemployed could only boast that the most 
2Q 
responsible position he had ever held was that of hospital wardsman. An accountant, 
Robert Edwards, acknowledged that he had little experience with Aborigines but did not 
regard it as a liability. In his application he stated: 
I may say that neither of us [that is, he and his wife] has had any experience 
with Niggers but have no doubt that with the help of the assistant 
Superintendent and our own commonsense we could cope with the position 
successfully. 
Other applicants included a storekeeper, teacher, bank clerk, mounted trooper, store 
manager and a tram inspector. While no candidate had outstanding qualification or 
appeared eminently suitable, the most obvious choice appeared to be the applicant with 
managerial and financial experti.se. Yet one of the more unlikely contenders was chosen. 
Prior to his appointment, Bertram Lipscombe worked for the Metropolitan Transit 
Commission as a tram inspector. How experience in checking tram arrival and depar-
ture times would have been seen as valuable experience in managing an Aboriginal 
settlement defies comprehension. Lip.scombe freely admitted later on that he had 'no 
intimate knowledge of the care and management of aborigines' before he arrived on the 
-51 
settlement The obvious question surrounding his appointment is: was it another case 
2^  Applicants for position of Superintendent and Matron, Barambah Aboriginal Settlement, QSA 
HOM/J18 06/6745. 
3^  R.R. Edwards to Home Secretary, QSA HOM/J18 06/6745. 
31 Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 78. 
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of patronage? Given his lack of experience and experti.se Lipscombe was indeed 
32 probably appointed a result of a such a process. 
When the next Superintendent was appointed in 1924, more consideration was 
given to the type of person needed to administer an institution with 700 inmates. As well 
the government recogni.scd 
that in order to develop the industrial work of the settlement and to place the 
cattle breeding industry on a sound and satisfactory basis, a man with 
experience in cattle raising and agriculture should be obtained. 
There were forty applicants for the position, including five who had experience in the 
care and administration of Aborigines. Both the Superintendents and their assistants at 
Palm Island and Taroom as well as the storekeeper at Barambah submitted applications. 
Yet the government clearly did not rate such experience as important as expertise in the 
pastoral industry. The successful applicant, William Semple was a 'man with experience 
in cattle raising and agriculture'. Semple, aged forty-two years at the time of his 
35 
appointment, migrated from Scotland in 1908. On his arrival in Queensland he found 
employment on a property in the .south-west. He gained experience on several properties 
before he was appointed a sub-manager on Cressbrook station near Esk which at the 
time was regarded as one of the premier properties in the state. Semple stated in his 
Patronage app)eared to be rife in the Home Secretary's office and the Chief Protector's office 
at this time. Indeed, Chief Protector Roth attempted to have a Mr A. Jones, who was the brother 
of the government Storekeeper, appointed as superintendent of Barambah but was obviously overruled 
(W. Roth to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 2 May 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768). 
Another example of patronage concerned Mary Frew who was forced to resign as Female Protector 
of Aboriginals in 1906 after her incompetence was described in some detail in Parliament. Despite 
her limitations however, she still managed to find favour with some as she was promptly offered a 
position as inspector of outdoor relief {QPP [1907] 1: 1138). 
33 Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal settlements,' 16. 
3^  List of Applicants for the Position of Superintendent, Aboriginal Settlement, Barambah, QSA 
A/33247, 49/12379. 
35 Mrs. E. McKenzie, interview, 8 December 1984. 
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application that when at Cressbrook he was in charge of 'one of the largest herd of stud 
cattle in Australiasia' as well as being responsible for the farming operations which 
involved more than '1000 acres under cultivation'. Semple also claimed that while 
working in the western regions of the state he had 'a little experience at handling black 
labour'. Given the type of person that was being sought for the post, the choice of 
Semple was not unreasonable or inappropriate. Indeed, the government probably thought 
they were fortunate in being able to secure the services of a person with such credcn-
37 tials and calibre as Semple. 
The criteria for appointing the first three Superintendents to Barambah varied in 
each case; the first was a promotion, the second was most likely a case of patronage and 
the third was based on the candidate's experience and qualifications at cattle breeding, not 
human management. These differing criteria were no less evident in the selection of 
other staff to Barambah. 
The position for which qualifications and experience were most recognised was 
that of teacher. With one exception, all had prior experience in the classroom before 
their arrival on the settlement and several had taught Aboriginal children. J.G. Gleghorn 
(1917-22) had spent four years teaching at the Myora settlement on Stradbroke Island 
before his appointment to Barambah while T.L. Williams (1922-3) had taught for four 
years at a school that had been exclusively established for Aboriginal children at Gayn-
36 W. Semple to H. Dignan, QSA A/33247 49/12379. 
3^  Semple's appointment was not, however without controversy. The storekeeper on Barambah 
T.A. Williams had also applied for the position and was bitterly disappointed when he missed out. 
He felt that he was the most qualified and deserved the job. Williams had worked as storekeeper for 
ten years and prior to his arrival at Barambah, he had been a missionary and teacher in the Torres 
Strait for over fifteen years (T.A. Williams to E. Rushing, 19 July 1924, QSA HOM/J504 24/2407). 
Williams probably also felt he deserved the post because his predecessor, CA. Maxwell had been 
promoted to the position of Superintendent at Taroom after only serving three years as storekeeper 
on Barambah {QPP [1912] 3: 1691). 
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dah.-'^ When Mabel Stewart was appointed assistant teacher in 1923, she came with 
more than eighteen years teaching Aboriginal children in New South Wales. Whenever 
po.ssible, teachers who could teach industrial or domestic subjects as well as the basic 
subjects were appointed. Irene Guymer, for example, was successful over five other ap-
plicants when she applied for a position in 1921 because of her domestic science qualifi-
cations. In 1917, Esther Gleghorn was appointed primarily because of her experience 
'in teaching infants, sewing and music'. Other teachers came to the settlement with a 
background in the state school system. Robert Crawford became Head Teacher in 1928 
after serving in that position at Cecil Plains and other country schools. 
Although most of the nursing staff also had some experience before coming to 
A ^ 
the settlement, not all were qualified or even had some basic experience. Due to dif-
ficulties in attracting suitable personnel because of the low salaries offered and poor 
conditions, the department had to resort, at times, to employing virtually anyone willing 
to undertake nursing duties. Such appointments normally lasted for only a brief period. 
For example, a Miss Lock was appointed assistant nurse in 1927 despite having no 
qualifications. She proved to be such a liability that she was dismissed after only twelve 
38 Nancy Roberts, 'The Gayndah Aboriginal School' (typescript, n.d.); QPD 177 (1941): 1009. 
T.L. Williams later entered state politics, representing the Labor Party for the seat of Port Curtis for 
15 years. Williams was elevated to the ministry by Forgan Smith and he held the portfolios of 
Agriculture and Stock and later Public Instruction. 
3^  List of Applicants for the Position of Assistant Teacher, Aboriginal Settlement, Barambah, 
QSA HOM/J448 22/9830. 
0^ ibid. 
'•i J.G. Gleghorn to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 24 August 1917, QSA HOM/J423 22/3053. 
•^2 Accountant Home Secretary's Office, 10 October 1928, QSA A/26865 26. 
"^3 The most qualified were Sophie Augstein (1913-21) and Cornilea Rynne (1936-65) who had 
diplomas in nursing {QPP [1914] 1: 583; South Burnett Times, 5 April 1967). 
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months.'^ One exception was E.M. Rich. Although without qualifications or experience 
when appointed in 1915, she proved to be an able employee, serving as an a.ssistant nur.se 
for twenty-four years. 
Ironically, the only position on the settlement for which qualifications were 
es.sential was one that dealt not directly with people but with machinery. The engine 
driver had to be a 'ticket man'. The first person appointed to the position was G.V. 
Alford in 1917 and when he resigned in 1920 after a dispute over wages and conditions, 
he wrote to the secretary of his union stressing that it was imperative that he 'notify 
Bleakley that the boiler and engine on the settlement must not be used except by a ticket 
man'. In respon.se to the Union secretary's letter, Bleakley stated that he did not need 
to be 'instructed' on the matter as there was no question of appointing anyone but a 
A^ 
'properly certified driver'. 
As Aboriginal settlements throughout the state grew in number and size, a 
bureaucracy developed in which careers could be made in Aboriginal administration. By 
the 1930s, most positions were filled by promotion. L.J. Ballard served as Clerk and 
storekeeper at both Palm Island and Taroom for a total of .seven years before being 
AQ 
appointed storekeeper at Barambah in 1930. Similarly, N.W, Thomp.son was promoted 
"^^ Dr. Junk to Home Secretary, 13 July 1927, QSA HOM/J637 27/5479; Dr. Junk to Under 
Secretary, Home Department, 8 November 1926, QSA HOM/J692 26/8554. 
•^5 QGG 153 (1939): 1859. In 1935, the Director General of Health, Dr R. Cilento visited 
the settlement and commented that Rich was a 'valuable active person who knew the natives' (Raphael 
Cilento, Diary, 23 February 1935, Fryer Mss 44/25). 
^^ G.V. Alford to G.H. Marriott, 9 November 1920, QSA A/8724. 
'*'^  J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 22 February 1921, QSA HOM/J402 
21/8440. 
48 Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal settlements,' 29. 
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to storekeeper at Barambah after serving in that capacity at Palm Island. On the 
settlement itself, avenues for promotion existed, R.J. Hough was first employed as 
storekeeper before being appointed to the more senior position of Clerk. Another 
promotion on the settlement involved G.V. Alford. Alford was initially appointed as the 
engine driver in 1917 before being promoted to Assistant Superintendent - a position he 
held for two years. While staff came to Barambah as the result of service on other 
settlements, others left to fill more senior positions elsewhere. CA. Maxwell served as 
storekeeper for three years before being appointed Superintendent at Taroom, while 
Robert Curry held the post of Assistant Superintendent before being promoted to 
52 Superintendent at Palm Island. 
Despite the development of a bureaucratic structure with avenues for promotion 
and the recognition of competent personnel, the appointment of relatives or friends 
continued with certain appointments. The exercise of patronage is at times difficult to 
substantiate, but it was undoubtedly the key factor in Augusta Lipscombe's appointment 
as teacher in 1908. When appointed she had no qualifications or experience in teaching 
but in her favour was the fact that her father was Superintendent. Family connections 
were also probably decisive in enabling R.J. Hough to obtain employment in 1929. 
Hough was related by marriage to Superintendent Semple and was most likely responsible 
for securing him the position of storekeeper particularly as Hough was particularly adept 
'^^ J.W Bleakley to the Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 20 March 
1941, QSA AUD/V141 40. 
50 Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal settlements,'17. 
51 J.W Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department 22 June 1922, QSA HOM/J402 
21/8440. 
52 QPP (1915) 3: 1691; J.W Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department 22 June 1918, 
QSA HOM/J402 21/8440. 
53 V. Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
at clerical duties. With Olive Shimmin, it was most likely her friendship with William 
Gall, the under Secretary of the Home Department, which enabled her to secure the 
position of settlement Matron in 1932. Gall had recommended her on account of 'her 
good service in the Prisons' and her knowledge of effective 'discipline' . Later, when a 
series of charges about her lack of competence were made by both a Public Service 
Inspector and the Deputy Chief Protector, Gall vigorously defended her in a memo to the 
Home Secretary of no less than thirty-nine pages. 
The competence of the staff 
During the first few months he was on the settlement, Albert Tronson gave every 
indication that he was a more than able Superintendent. As discussed in chapter one, his 
lai.ssez-faire approach to the control and discipline of inmates resulted in a minimum of 
disquiet and unrest. Under his guidance, the settlement soon began earning revenue 
through the hiring out of labour. In the first year, the settlement earned £300 from 
57 deductions from wages for 'settlement maintenance' . Tronson utilised his experience 
in commerce in managing the settlement and his objective was to make the place a 
profitable concern. For him, the success of the settlement was measured in terms of how 
many pounds, rather than souls, were saved. Indeed, Chief Protector Roth acknowledg-
ed Tronson's ability, admitting that he was much ' too smart ' for him when it came to 
5"* W. Gall, memo, 9 March 1934, QSA A/31710; Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal 
settlements,' 17. 
55 Soon after her arrival on the settlement, Shimmin made it known to the other staff that she 
and the under Secretary were personally acquainted (CD. O'Brien, Report on Cherbourg Aboriginal 
Settlement QSA A/31710, 31). 
56 W. Gall, memo, 9 March 1934, QSA A/31710. 
5"^  W. Roth to Accountant Home Secretary's Office, 13 February 1906, QSA A/31708 07/10416. 
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financial matters.^^ Tron.son's proficiency was evident in other areas. The meticulous 
manner in which he kept his personal diary for 1905 suggests he found little difficulty 
in coping with the clerical duties associated with the job. The competence which 
Tronson revealed in the initial months would have delighted his superiors - but their 
confidence was short-lived. 
Despite Tronson's obvious abilities, questions were being raised about his 
suitability for the position less than six months after he arrived. In August 1905, the 
Assistant Superintendent, Robert Morri.son wrote to the Chief Protector complaining about 
Tronson's behaviour. He alleged that his Superintendent had been sending stores away 
from the settlement, purchasing and killing diseased cattle for meat for the natives, not 
paying the blacks wages due to them, and selling tobacco belonging to the settlement. 
An official from the Chief Protector's office was sent to investigate but concluded there 
was insufficient evidence to take any action. The Chief Protector was also reluctant 
to act because he was well aware how difficult it was to find a suitable replacement. But 
when further allegations were made about Tronson, Roth had no option but to order a 
thorough enquiry. 
The investigations into Tronson's actions were carried out by J.M. Costin, the 
accountant in the Home Secretary's office. Costin discovered Tronson had extensively 
misused his authority for his own benefit. In October 1905, Tronson's wife had applied 
for two 160 acre blocks at Cloyna, approximately ten miles from the settlement. Soon 
58 W. Roth to Under Secretary, Home Department 15 March 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
5^  A. Tronson, diary, 1905. 
^ W. Roth to Under Secretary, Home Department, 13 March 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
61 Register of Agricultural, Grazing Farm and other Selections under the Crown Lands Act of 
1884 and Subsequent Unds Acts, QSA LAN/P247 2243. 
101 
after the application was accepted, Tron.son began sending settlement labour to the selec-
tion. At times, up to twelve men from Barambah were sent to work on his property. 
The men were accompanied by their wives and children and were fed with rations sent 
from the settlement. As well, a number of implements including hoes and rakes which 
belonged to the settlement found their way onto the Tronson selection. On visiting the 
selection, Costin was quite amazed at what he saw, as he told the Chief Protector: 
I saw about 80 acres of corn, nearly ripe, with pumpkins planted between 
rows in the usual way, about 20 acres of other land on which the scrub had 
either been fallen or the trees ringbarked; a hardwood hou.se about 20' by 10' 
and another house in the course of construction. I wish to draw your 
attention to the improvements just mentioned and ask you to compare them 
with the cultivation etc. on the settlement. 
Of all the selections in the district, probably no other had been so well established in 
such a short time. Costin's enquiries also revealed that some local residents believed that 
Tronson was acting quite properly. They understood that he was put in charge of the 
settlement on the condition that he employed a number of Aborigines on his own 
selection. Of course, Tronson was aware of the impropriety of his actions. When he 
realised that the Chief Protector was to be informed, he promptly submitted his 
resignation. Tron.son misused his authority for his own ends. Despite the evidence that 
he had appropriated settlement labour and goods for himself, Tronson was not charged 
with any offence nor was any action taken to recover any of the materials and goods he 
had used on his selection. By contrast, just several months previously, two inmates had 
62 J.M. Costin to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 5 May 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
65 W. Roth to Under Secretary, Home Department, 2 May 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
Tronson moved onto his selection on his resignation and remained in the district for most of his life 
(J.E. Murphy and E.W. Easton, Wilderness to Wealth [Brisbane: Smith & Patterson, 1950], 276). 
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been jailed for six months for stealing dogs. Tronson po.ssibly avoided being charged 
because at the same lime allegations had been made about Roth's conduct as Chief 
Protector which forced his resignation. Ex-grocer's a.ssistant Albert Tronson could not 
be accused of lacking enterprise even if most of that talent went into exploiting 
Aboriginal labour for his profit rather than into managing the settlement. Tronson was 
not to be the last official who acted corruptly. 
Tron.son's term as Superintendent was markedly different from that of his 
successor, B.J.T. Lipscombe. Apart from the length of time they served - Tronson was 
on Barambah a mere fifteen months compared with Lipscombe's eighteen years - they 
differed in their management techniques. Whereas Tronson was a person of enterprise, 
Lipscombe was the embodiment of caution. While Tron.son was not reluctant to act 
decisively, Lipscombe dithered and hesitated about every decision that had to be made. 
Yet despite his limitations, Lipscombe did possess useful qualities as far as the department 
was concerned. His experience as a tram inspector did prove to be of value on the 
settlement. After Albert Tronson had .set up an efficient system for the hiring of labour 
and the settlement had gained a reputation as a source of cheap labour, what then was 
required was a person to see that the operation ran efficiently. Clerical competence 
became more valued than entrepreneurial flair. From his background in checking tram 
tickets, noting arrivals and departures, Lipscombe was conditioned to pay attention to 
details, to follow procedures, to maintain order. Consequently, the routine tasks 
associated with the hiring of labour suited his temperament and were within his 
capabilities. Lipscombe became the quintessential bureaucrat. He could be relied on to 
follow faithfully instructions and was most reluctant to make decisions without first 
66 Tronson, diary, 19 September 1905. 
6^  Roth was accused of selling artefacts and specimens which he had acquired while Chief 
Protector {QPD 98 [1906]: 1667-73). 
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seeking the advice of the Chief Protector. During his first two years at Barambah he 
wrote an average of two letters per day to his superior on matters ranging from whether 
'Tommy Tomahawk may go out to work' to if the 'Chief Protector approves of natives 
going to Kilkivan to work'. He also regularly wrote reports to the Chief Protector 
about the most mundane events that occurred on the settlement. Bertram Lipscombe 
obviously relished office work. In 1910 he dealt with over 2800 items of inward 
70 
correspondence and a similar number of outward correspondence. 
Initially, Lipscombe's predilection for clerical duties did not adversely affect the 
administration of the settlement. As the number of inmates increased, as more staff were 
appointed and the activities on the settlement expanded, Lipscombe's limitations became 
increasingly apparent. In 1918, his competence was questioned by other staff which 
resulted in an enquiry being conducted into the administration of the settlement by the 
Police Magistrate from Gympie. Lipscombe took the enquiry very seriously and sought 
71 permission 'to employ a solicitor so that the facts [could] be bought out'. The enquiry 
found problems did exist in the administration of Barambah but they were not severe 
enough to warrant any dismi.s.sals or transfers. The Magistrate concluded that the 
72 problems could be overcome by more clearly defining the duties of officials. But this 
solution was short-lived. Three years later, the Assistant Superintendent, G.V. Alford 
became so frustrated with Lipscombe that he resigned. He wrote to the South Burnett 
68 In the twelve month period July 1906 - June 1907, Lipscombe sent 489 letters to the Chief 
Protector, an average of two letters per working day (QSA POA/Kl). 
6' BJ.T. Lipscombe to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 24 September and 26 November 1906, 
QSA POA/Kl. 
''^ QPP (1911) 3: 1323. 
''I BJ.T. Lipscombe to the Home Secretary, 30 October 1918, QSA HOM/J279 19/124. 
"^2 Chief Protector to Under Secretary, Home Department, 28 March 1919, QSA HOM/B54 
'Aboriginals-staff. 
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Times criticising the administration of the settlement. He lampooned Lipscombe, 
n't 
suggesting that all he seemed to do most of the day was tell 'little yarns' to the staff. 
Alford was not alone in his assessment of the Superintendent. Following a visit to the 
settlement in July 1920, the Chief Protector reported to the Home Secretary: 
I am more than ever concerned that such development of this institution will 
only be obtained when a thoroughly capable general manager has been placed 
in full control..I am satisfied that for the want of competent management, the 
institution loses far more than the cost of the proposed manager. 
As a result of Bleakley's report, an increase of £20 in Lipscombe's salary was not granted 
75 
as his 'service was not certified as efficient'. Lipscombe again faced criticism two 
years later when missionaries from the Aborigines Inland Mission, who had only just 
arrived in the district to work on the settlement, wrote to the Home Secretary asking him 
7^ 
to 'visit Barambah and order a re-organisation'. This request was the catalyst for an 
77 
investigation that was undertaken by the Public Service Board. On this occasion 
Lipscombe did not survive. He was transfered to a clerical position in the Police 
78 Department on a considerably lower salary. 
When William Porteous Semple replaced Lipscombe in March 1924, the depart-
ment was optimistic that the management of the settlement would improve significant-
ly. Semple's background in station management suggested he was admirably suited to 
transform the settlement from being a financial burden on the state into a self-
3^ South Bumett Times, 14 October 1921. 
''^ J.W Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department 19 July 1920, QSA A/26860 38. 
•^5 Accountant Home Secretary's Office, 18 May 1922, QSA A/26862 24. 
"^6 Aborigines Inland Mission to Home Secretary, 24 March 1922, QSA HOM/B60 'Reserves 
Southern'. 
^^  J. Irwin & A.E. Gibson, Report on Barambah Aboriginal Settlement, 23 January 1923, QSA 
Transfer 1227/ 128. 
"^8 Public Service Commissioner to Home Secretary, 15 February 1924, QSA A/33427 49/12379. 
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supporting institution. In practice, Semple proved to be only marginally more competent 
than his predecessor. Like Lipscombe, Semple became preoccupied with clerical work 
to the detriment of his other duties. Although he had a full time Clerk to handle most 
of the financial matters of the settlement, and from 1927 an assistant Clerk, Semple 
7Q 
nevertheless managed to find a multitude of tasks to occupy his time in the office. 
When Bradbury and O'Leary reported on the administration of the settlement in 1932, 
they were critical of the amount of time the Superintendent devoted ' to clerical work, 
including typing' . In their opinion, part of the problem was that Semple created a greater 
workload for himself because 
he was inclined to digress from the subject matter and [was] prone to treat 
the same subject in various communications, all of which added to his work 
of t y p i n g . ^ 
They concluded that while Semple was an honest employee, he 'had little knowledge of 
R1 
office work and routine' . The Bradbury-O'Leary report was critical of other aspects 
of Semple's performance. In the area where he was supposedly an expert, pastoral work, 
the results had been dismal. Since Semple had assumed control, the cattle breeding 
operations had performed poorly. Bradbury and O'Leary concluded that this indicated 
Semple was not 'sufficiently conversant with the various pha.ses of the industry' to 
82 
warrant being called an 'expert ' in cattle breeding. 
The Bradbury-O'Leary report also addressed the issue of Semple 's 'erratic ' and 
'impulsive temperament ' . Such traits, the report observed, resulted in the Superintendent 
frequently being in conflict with other staff which affected the 'general tone of the settle-
^^ J. Hooper to Under Secretary, Home Department, 15 July 1927, QSA HOM/J637 27/5483. 
8^  Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal settlements,' 16. 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid., 36. 
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ment'.^^ The first major dispute occurred in 1928 when Semple cla.shed with the hospital 
staff and visiting medical officer. In a letter to the Chief Protector, Semple alleged that 
the administration of the hospital was lax and that the Matron was 'quite unfit for her 
duties'. Dr Junk, the visiting medical officer and the Matron vigorously defended the 
charges. Junk claimed Semple's allegations were 'exasperatingly piffling and unfounded' 
and that the Superintendent had no right to interfere in the administration of the hospi-
tal. Despite the resentment his actions caused, Semple continued to critici.se the 
ho.spital staff. When Matron Aitkenhead described in her monthly report for November 
1930 that the general health of the settlement was less than satisfactory, Semple claimed 
'the whole report is rather stupid and the settlement health is most satisfactory'. Not 
surprisingly, when Bradbury and O'Leary investigated the management of the settlement 
in 1932, they found that one of the staff whose loyalty Semple had difficulty in obtain-
S7 
ing was the hospital Matron. Semple had similar problems with Aitkenhead's successor, 
E.T. de Ridder. Within months of her arrival on the settlement de Ridder requested a 
transfer becau.se she felt severely hampered in her work due to the constant interference 
by the Superintendent. Another staff member with whom Semple had a troubled 
relationship was the farm foreman, R.E. Culyenburg. Semple felt Culyenburg was less 
than competent and he 'refused to accept responsibility for the work he performed'. Not 
83 ibid., 17. 
8^  W. Semple to Deputy Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 23 October 1928, QSA HOM/J692 
26/8554. 
85 Dr. Junk to W. Gall, 8 November 1928, QSA HOM/J692 26/8554. 
86 W. Semple to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 1 November 1930, QSA HOM/J806 
30/10376. 
8^  Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal settlements,' 26. 
88 C. O'Leary to Under Secretary, Home Department 11 April 1934, QSA A/31710. 
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surprisingly, this attitude engendered little loyalty towards the Superintendent in 
89 Culyenburg. 
The most acrimonious relationship Semple had with another staff member was 
with Olive Shimmin, the settlement Matron between 1933 and 1934. Conflict began 
almost as soon as Shimmin arrived on the settlement. It quickly escalated into a major 
feud and disrupted the administration of the settlement. An enquiry was held into the 
cause of the problems by the Police Magistrate from Bundaberg, C D . O'Brien. O'Brien 
concluded that both Semple and Shimmin were at fault and recommended the latter's 
90 
appointment be terminated. Shimmin, however, managed to enlist the support of 
William Gall, the Under Secretary in the Home Secretary's office, who successfully 
stalled any action. The feuding continued and prompted a further investigation by the 
Deputy Chief Protector of Aboriginals, C. O'Leary. O'Leary also found that both parties 
contributed to the conflict and recommended that both officials be transferred. 
Although O'Leary thought Semple was less blameworthy than Shimmin and that he was 
honest in his endeavour, he concluded that: 'a measure of the unhappy relationships 
which existed between the members of his staff must be attributed to him' . In O 'Leary ' s 
view, part of the problem was that in a small community such as Barambah, 'any official 
can be left too long' . He proposed that the most desirable outcome for the settlement 
Q2 
was for both Semple and Shimmin to go. Shimmin was transfered to the women ' s 
8' Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal settlements,' 21. 
^ C D . O'Brien, Report on Cherbourg Aboriginal Settlement QSA A/31710, 37-8. 
^1 C. O'Leary to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 1 November 1934, QSA A/31710. 
92 ibid. 
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section of the Brisbane Prison but Semple remained. He eventually spent twenty-five 
years on Barambah, retiring in September 1949. 
Despite the various limitations of the Superintendents, anarchy did not eventuate 
and they managed to evoke a sense of authority on the settlement. They were invariably 
known as 'Boss' by the inmates. Such a term was a tacit recognition by the inmates of 
the control the Superintendent had over their lives. The Superintendent was their protec-
tor, guardian, prosecutor, judge and jailer. 
Like Lipscombe and Semple, the Assistant Superintendents tended to be imbued 
with honest intentions but were not particularly efficient or enterprising. The first 
Assistant Superintendent, Robert Morrison, was described as a 'conscientious servant'. 
His successor, John Peterson, was also an honest journeyman who served for over ten 
years before going on active service in 1917. He later returned to the settlement as 
a carpenter and sawyer. R.J. Hough, who served as Assistant Superintendent and Clerk 
between 1930 and 1943, was described in the Bradbury-O'Leary report as being a dutiful 
servant but was 'particularly slow at his work and his knowledge of settlement matters 
Q7 
was very limited'. 
93 Deputy Commissioner, Public Service Department to Secretary for Health and Home Affairs, 
9 September 1949, QSA A/33247 49/12379. 
9" J.M. Costin to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 5 May 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
95 QPP (1912) 2: 61; Chief Protector to Accountant, Home Secretary's Office, 7 March 1918, 
QSA A/26858 216. 
96 J.W Bleakley to the Under Secretary, Home Department, 6 December 1922, QSA A/31708 
22/9880. 
9^  Bradbury and O'Leary, 'Report on Aboriginal settlements,' 18. 
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One Assistant Superintendent who was more akin to Albert Tronson than to 
Lipscombe or Semple was C.L. Hogg. Hogg, who was appointed in 1926, was 
competent but corrupt. As Assistant Superintendent and chief Clerk Hogg was respon-
sible for the financial affairs of the settlement. Hogg had access to a considerable 
amount of cash each week and began misappropriating it soon after he arrived on the 
settlement. The first indication that something was amiss was revealed in an audit of the 
settlement accounts in 1927, The auditor noted that while the 'cashbook was well kept' 
- which suggested Hogg understood bookkeeping principles - there was a shortfall of 
£40. When asked to explain this discrepancy, Hogg pleaded 'negligence and careless-
QQ 
ness, brought about by overwork ' on his part and offered to make up the shortfall. 
Hogg's explanation was accepted by the auditor. He concluded in his report that the error 
was due to 'carelessness and confusion through the mixing up of moneys and not due 
to intentional dishonesty' . But the Chief Protector was not convinced. He felt Hogg 
'had deliberately withheld accounting for these remittances for purpo.ses of his own ' . 
Bleakley sought to have Hogg transfered but failed to get the necessary approval as 
100 there was no conclusive evidence that he had misappropriated the money. 
When the Barambah accounts were audited in the following year, Blcakley's 
intuition proved to be correct. The audit revealed Hogg had utilised almost every 
possible avenue to misappropriate money. One scheme involved falsifying the records 
of cash payments to inmates. The auditor noted that it was a simple matter to alter these 
records. He also observed that numerous cards 'showing the transactions of natives 
employed on the settlement' were missing at the time of the audit. Co-incidentally, it 
98 JJ . Dennehy to Auditor-General, 11 November 1927, QSA AUD/V37 534. 
99 J J . Dennehy to Auditor General, 7 November 1927, QSA AUD/V37 534. 
1°*^  J.W Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 29 November 1927, QSA AUD/V37 
534. 
no 
was to these persons that the largest advances had been made. The auditor al.so strongly 
suspected, but he had no conclusive proof, that Hogg was using some of the money 
forwarded from the Home Secretary's office for wages of aborigines employed on the 
settlement for his own benefit. Another of Hogg's fraudulent schemes concerned 
maternity allowances. He misappropriated £105 which should have been paid into the 
accounts of twenty-one mothers. The auditor was able to present irrefutable evidence 
of Hogg misappropriating a total of £156, but he strongly suspected the precise figure 
was much higher. He was unable to calculate the exact amount because so many records 
had been lost as well as falsified. When Hogg realised he could no longer conceal 
his activities, he submitted his resignation. Yet remarkably, despite the evidence 
indicating the extent of Hogg's actions, no effort was made to lay charges against him 
102 
or, at least, to recover some of the money. 
Problems with financial mismanagement were not confined to the Clerk'sposilion. 
The settlement was plagued by a succession of storekeepers who either misappropriated 
money or stock or who were singularly inept at bookkeeping. Shortfalls in the retail 
store accounts were a recurrent theme in auditor's reports. In 1928 the auditor reported 
that the retail store's 'stock book had been badly kept and numerous errors [had] been 
made'.'^-^ The storekeeper, T.A. Williams, had been in the position for fourteen years, 
yet appeared not to have mastered even basic bookkeeping skills. The auditor was 
critical of Williams in the following year and found a shortfall of £156 in the accounts. 
He also noted that certain grocery lines had 'been charged out at excess rates'. Whether 
this had happened through carelessness on Williams' part or for his own personal gain, 
101 A.G. Dunlop to Auditor General, 13 February 1929, QSA AUD/V46 1547. 
i°2 Accountant, Home Secretary's Office to Public Service Superannuation Fund, 20 August 
1929, QSA A26865 136. 
i°3 A.G. Dunlop to the Auditor General, 12 November 1928, QSA AUD/V46 1547. 
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the auditor was unable to a.scertain without further investigation. But the issue had 
become academic by the time the audit was done, as Williams had died suddenly four 
months earlier. 
Williams' replacement, L.J. Ballard was equally inept at managing at the store. 
In 1934, the auditor commented adversely on the retail store accounts: 'numerous errors 
were located in the stock book and it is evident that the storekeeper had not accurately 
balanced the books for some time'. The auditor also queried other aspects of the 
operation of the retail store, in particular the sale of sugar. In re-examining the records, 
he discovered certain irregularities existing from the time Ballard had started. Although 
the evidence was only circumstantial, he thought Ballard may well have been making a 
profit for himself by 'overstating the issue (of sugar) from the free store and transfcring 
surplus stock to the retail store'. The auditor recommended further probing into the 
matter but as Ballard was already under investigation on another, more serious complaint, 
no action was taken. This matter concerned the disappearance of cattle from the 
settlement and Ballard was the prime suspect. Following police enquiries, Ballard was 
107 
charged with breaches of Public Service regulations and suspended from duty. Ballard 
was eventually cleared of the charges and reinstated but he was transfered to another 
department. ^ °^ 
1°^  E.A. Cullin to the Auditor General, 26 November 1929, QSA AUD/V57 29. 
l°5 A.G. Dunlop to the Auditor General, 21 November 1934, QSA AUD/V97 34. 
106 ibid. 
10"^  Crown Solicitor to Commissioner of Police, 30 April 1935, QSA POL/J19 409M. 
108 Chief Protector to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 8 May 1935, 
OSA A/4740 'Aboriginals staff. 
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Ballard's departure was not the end of either incompetent or dishonest 
storekeepers. He was replaced by a Mr, Graham who had no previous experience in 
either bookkeeping or managing a store, Graham's ineptness became most apparent when 
100 
the store accounts were audited and soon after he was forced to resign. In an effort 
to rectify the continuing problems caused by inefficient personnel, C.R. Mayne, the 
storekeeper at Palm Island, was transfered to Cherbourg. Mayne introduced a number 
of procedures to record properly the distribution of rations and stock and as a result the 
store began to function more efficiently. But when he was absent for several months 
in 1938 a relieving storekeeper, A.G. Weimers, managed to create losses in stock and 
money totalling £58. This shortfall, the auditor claimed, was not due to dishonesty on 
Weimers' part, but solely to his 'incompetency' and that the 'work was totally unfamiliar 
to him',^^1 
This debacle further highlighted the need for experience in managing the store. 
Following Mayne's resignation in 1939, N.W. Thompson the storekeeper at Palm Island 
was transfered to Cherbourg. This move appeared initially to be successful, but the 
familiar problems soon reappeared. When the store accounts were audited in 1941, a 
significant shortage in the stock was discovered. The auditor claimed the deficiencies 
were due to Thompson's carelessness and not dishonesty. The Chief Protector thought 
otherwise. As Thompson had already been reprimanded for carelessness while in charge 
of the store at Palm Island, this second occurrence of negligence was inexcusable. He 
was dismissed from the position but no action was taken to recover the shortfall in the 
109 W. Semple to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 19 March 1936, QSA AUD/V105 35. 
110 J.W Bleakley to the Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 20 March 
1941, QSA AUD/V141 40. 
111 Auditor to Under Secretary, 18 January 1939, QSA AUD/V124 38. 
112 J.W Bleakley to the Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 20 March 
1941, QSA AUD/V141 40. 
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store accounts.^^-^ Problems in the store continued with Thompson's succe.s.sor, W.G. 
Pearse, Pearse, like Thompson, came to Cherbourg after gaining experience at Palm 
Island. Yet while Thompson may have been honest but careless, Pearse was found to 
corrupt. When an audit revealed shortages in stock and cash totalling £90, the auditor 
concluded that such a deficiency was not due to carelessness alone. As a result, Pearse 
was charged with breaches of Public Service regulations and dismis.sed from the 
position. With one exception, every person who served as storekeeper left the 
settlement with doubts about either their integrity or competence. On the one hand for 
some the temptation of misappropriating money or goods was too great yet for others the 
task of simply balancing the books was beyond their capabilities. 
The hospital also faced continual difficulties in hiring the right personnel. As 
mentioned previously, the department had to resort occasionally to appointing untrained 
staff. Their performance and competence varied as did that of the qualified staff. When 
Mary O'Loughlin, a qualified nurse, was appointed Matron in 1911, she initially gave 
every appearance of being most competent. In January 1913, Chief Protector Howard 
reported that O'Loughlin had 'done excellent work and given every satisfaction' and 
recommended an increa.se in her salary. Later that year Howard had quite a different 
opinion of her abilities. During an unannounced visit to the settlement he was dismayed 
at the conditions in the hospital. He found 'the wards and in fact the whole interior of 
the building far from clean' and was disturbed to learn that 'numbers of young and 
113 Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs to Auditor General, 16 July 
1941, QSA AUD/V151 41. 
11"* Auditor General to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 17 November 
1943, QSA AUD/V171 43. 
115 R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Department 14 January 1913, QSA HOM/JllO 
13/12934. 
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apparently strong people' had recently died. ' Equally disconcerting were allegations of 
indiscretions by O'Loughlin. These charges included O'Loughl in 's ' f ight ing with a gin 
in the camp' , 'purchasing whisky and offering it to the natives' and 'being over familiar 
117 
with certain natives' . Some inmates had refused to go to the hospital for attention 
because of her behaviour. The Chief Protector concluded O'Loughlin 'exhibited a 
blameworthy lack of interest in the welfare of the sick' and as a result was dismi.s.sed 
118 
from the position. 
Similar charges of neglect were levelled at another Matron, Agnes Kyle-Little. 
In October 1928, Mrs Semple in her capacity as settlement Matron, complained to the 
Chief Protector about what she perceived was a 'great reluctance of sick natives to enter 
the hospital' and as a result eight inmates had died in the previous seven weeks. 
Semple was supported by her husband who asserted that the hospital was ' the worst run 
department of the whole settlement and probably the dirtiest when it should be the most 
120 
efficient'. TTie Matron, not unexpectedly, strenously denied the charges and was 
supported by the Visiting Medical Officer who was keen to point out that neither the 
191 
Superintendent nor his wife had any nursing experience. 
116 R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Department 22 August 1913, QSA HOM/JllO 
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Although the allegations levelled at Little lacked substance because they were 
made by non-professionals, this was not the case when similar charges were made about 
the administration of the hospital five years later. In October 1933, a Nurse Gardiner 
was appointed to assist during a measles epidemic. Gardiner, a double certificated nur.se, 
spent three weeks on the settlement and was dismayed at the standard of health care. 
She informed the Chief Protector: 
Miss Thomas [the Matron] did not do any nursing, she used to spend her 
time writing up reports. The morals are very lax there, I was not going to 
knuckle under to a nurse [Miss Baulch] who knew nothing about maternity 
work. The conditions in the hospital and the kitchen were very dirty when I 
was there, 
Gardiner's comments confirmed to the Chief Protector what he had already suspected: that 
both were a liability, Thomas and Baulch were dismissed in early 1934 yet their 
replacements proved to be no more satisfactory. Almost immediately upon her arrival, 
Nurse Joseph caused disruptions in the hospital. Deputy Chief Protector O'Leary 
concluded after a visit that she was a 'most unreliable and unsatisfactory assistant'. 
The new Matron, de Ridder, was similarly unsuited to the position. In O'Leary's view, 
she was an 'excitable and hysterical' person, quite 'temperamentally unfitted to be in 
charge of a hospital catering for aboriginal patients'. The only rea.son de Ridder was 
not transfered immediately was because a suitable replacement could not be found. The 
high turnover of nursing staff was indicative of the difficulties within the hospital. 
Between 1920 and 1938 no less than seven different matrons and nine a.ssistant nurses 
were appointed. 
122 C D . O'Brien, Report on Cherbourg Aboriginal Settlement, QSA A/31710, 17. 
123 C. O'Leary to Under Secretary, Home Department, 11 April 1934, QSA A/31710. 
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The least troublesome and seemingly most competent group of officials were the 
teaching staff. No teacher was ever dismissed or transfered becau.se of ineptitude or 
wrongdoing. Despite the poor wages and unattractive conditions, teachers with 
considerable experience came to work on Barambah. Both E.W. Dabelstein, who was 
appointed Head Teacher in 1923, and his successor Robert Crawford had previously 
served in similar positions in state schools. Some appointees even had some experience 
of teaching Aboriginal children. John Gleghorn had been teaching at Myora Aboriginal 
school immediately prior to his appointment and T.L. Williams had taught for four years 
125 at Gayndah Aboriginal school before his appointment to Barambah in 1922. When 
Mabel Stewart was appointed to the school in 1923 she had had sixteen years experience 
'in touch with aborigines as a Missionary and teacher' and also ten years as a teacher in 
12fi 
a New South Wales .school. Also, the teachers appointed remained longer than the 
other staff. Two long serving staff were Margaret Geddes and Evelyn Pearse. Both had 
extensive teaching experience prior to their arrival and they taught on Barambah for 
fourteen and eight years respectively. The other long serving teacher was Robert 
Crawford. He was appointed Head Teacher in 1928 and remained in that position for the 
128 
next thirty-five years - a term of service unsurpassed on Queensland settlements. 
Not all teachers however, who served in the school, were as experienced or 
qualified, Augusta Lip.scombe was appointed to the school in 1908 despite having no 
qualifications or experience in teaching. She remained at the school for almost nine years 
125 J.G. Gleghorn to Under Secretary, Department of Public Instruction, 9 September 1918, 
QSA A/15993 18/33920; Roberts, 'The Gayndah Aboriginal School,' 11. 
126 Applicants for position of Assistant Teacher, Aboriginal settlement Barambah, QSA 
HOM/J448 22/9830. 
12'^  B. McKenna to Public Service Commissioner, 3 September 1924, QSA A/15993; J.L. Fowler 
to Director of Education, 10 March 1932, QSA A/15994. 
128 Accountant Home Secretary's Office, memo, 10 October 1928, QSA A/26865 26; QPP 
(1965): 1067. 
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and in the assessment of former pupils, her accomplishments were minimal. Ettie 
Meredith felt that under Lipscombe's guidance, she 'didn't have much teaching' - she 
129 learnt much more when sent out to work as a domestic, Evelyn Serico claims that 
she 'never learnt a thing' from Lipscombe and Val Clements claimed Lipscombe 'didn't 
know much more' than he did. Her teaching technique, he recalled was such that she: 
would get her knitting or crocheting and she would put something on the 
board and just sit there or get one of the bigger girls to teach. She used to 
just sit out the front , , , very little teaching. 
For almost nine years the school was conducted in this manner until Lipscombe resigned 
through continued ill-health. 
In assessing the performance of the Barambah staff, one of the most striking 
features was their ineptitude, A recurrent theme in the history of the settlement was the 
problems caused, not by the inmates, but by those who were appointed to 'guide and 
control' them. Although patronage contributed partly to the level of incompetence, even 
those employees who were appointed on merit more often than not found the task beyond 
them. Of course, it could be argued that the very nature of the work was impossible to 
undertake with even modest success. J.D. O'Brien who conducted the inquiry into the 
administration of the settlement in 1934, recognised the difficulties inherent in the 
Superintendent's position: 
The man who would be a complete success on such a settlement has, in my 
opinion, yet to be found. He should combine so many different qualifications 
that I doubt whether such a man exists. 
The inefficiency and incompetence of the staff had important consequences on the 
settlement. One of the most obvious implications was in the quality of health care. On 
129 Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. 
130 Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
131 C D . O'Brien, Report on Cherbourg Aboriginal Settlement QSA A/31710, 15. 
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more than one occasion, accusations were made that patients had died or their illne.ss was 
prolonged because of the maladministration in the hospital. Another consequence of staff 
incompetence was that the control and discipline of inmates did not develop to the extent 
which the government so earnestly desired. Both Lipscombe and Semple devoted an 
inordinate amount of time to office work instead of monitoring the behaviour of inmates. 
This lack of surveillance enabled the inmates to maintain their cultural distinctiveness and 
identity,^-'^ 
Another notable feature of the Barambah staff was the extent of corruption. The 
reported cases of white staff impropriety were almost certainly a fraction of the total 
number. Without exception, every inmate interviewed in the course of this research was 
convinced that they had been defrauded by one of the staff. Typical of such views were 
the comments of Val Clements when asked whether the inmates were ever cheated: 
A lot of it did go on I think. In my own heart and soul I do believe with 
the clerks a lot of it went on but I can't prove it. A lot of people felt they 
never got their money. You hadn't the faintest idea how much you had put 
in. When the war broke out, they put a war loan on of 20,000 to 30,000 
quid - that money must have accumulated for years and years. 
Thus when C,L, Hogg was discovered misappropriating settlement monies, the inmates 
were not surprised. They had suspected well before the other staff that something was 
amiss with their accounts. Indeed the events surrounding Hogg's dismissal were so vivid 
in the mind of Ettie Meredith that she could recollect some fifty-five years later the 
1 "XA 
name of the audit inspector who conducted the investigation! An inevitable 
consequence of such corruption was that it reinforced in the Barambah inmates the 
132 This issue is more fully examined in chapter eight 
133 Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
13^  Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. Ironically, Ettie Meredith was one of the women 
who were defrauded of their £5 maternity allowance by Hogg (A.G. Dunlop to Auditor General, 13 
February 1929, QSA AUD/V46 1547). 
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perception of whites as greedy and materialistic. For the Barambah inmates, they did not, 
however, feel exploited only by the blatantly dishonest officials such as Tron.son and 
Hogg. All the staff, regardless of how personally sincere and honest in endeavour, gained 
at their expense. The officials on the settlement were supplied with accommodation that 
was superior to that provided for the inmates. Whenever a beast was killed, the choicest 
cuts went to the officials as did the best produce from the farm. Furthermore, inmates 
worked in the homes of officials doing domestic work and gardening for little or no 
remuneration. Not surprisingly, the inmates regarded the settlement as the 'white 
man's paradise'. 
Despite the lack of managerial and administrative abilities of the Superintendents 
and the other staff, they nevertheless managed to control and contain the inmates within 
the reserve. Such an achievement was only possible with the assistance of others outside 
the settlement, particularly the police. The vital assistance the police gave in the 
administration of Barambah and the other settlements was aptly described by Home 
Secretary Appel in 1913: 
The Aborigines Department and the Police Department act in conjunction. 
Each of our police officers in charge of a station is a local protector, and 
each trooper an agent of the local protector..We have tentacles like an 
octopus, and they stretch throughout the State. It is by that means that we 
have complete control over the aboriginal. 
The police were the settlement's ancillary staff, a.ssisting in the control and discipline of 
inmates. Their principal contribution was in ensuring the removals program operated 
efficiently and effectively which, as discussed in the previous chapter, was an integral 
feature of the reserve system. Whenever the Home Secretary approved the removal of 
135 Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. 
136 Evelyn Serico, interview, 4 December 1984. 
13^^ Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 86. 
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a individual or group, it was primarily the responsibility of the police to put the order 
into effect. Indeed, as far as Richard Howard was concerned when he was Chief 
Protector, it was totally a police matter. When asked by the South Australian Royal 
Commission on Aborigines in 1913 about who took neglected children from their parents, 
Howard declared that the police did not merely help his department, but 'they did it 
1 -JO 
air. When further questioned what he would do if a police officer refused to remove 
a child, he replied: 'most probably dismiss him'. For the Police department, the task 
of escorting deportees to the settlement was unrewarding and a time-consuming exer-
cisel40 
Just as the police were indispensable in the removals process, so too they were 
invaluable in keeping inmates on the settlement. Whenever an individual or group 
deserted the settlement, the Superintendent depended on the police to locate and return 
any such offenders. The settlement staff did not have the time or resources to roam the 
state in search of deserters. For the most part, the police network was highly effective 
as absconders rarely managed to get more than 100 miles from the settlement before 
being caught. In August 1905 for example, three inmates attempted to abscond but only 
managed to reach Gayndah, seventy-five miles north-west of Barambah, before being 
detained by the local police. On another occasion, seven deserters reached Chinchilla 
138 ibid., 89. 
139 ibid. 
1^*0 When Speecheley was deported from Boulia to Barambah in 1913, he was accompanied by 
the local police officer, Constable Nutt. The round trip took the Constable over four weeks, much 
to the chagrin of the Officer-in-charge of the district who complained that he could not afford to 
have men absent from the district for so long (Sub-Inspector Byrne to Commissioner of Police, 14 
February 1911, QSA A/44742 61M). The Police Department also expressed concern at the costs 
incurred in escorting Aborigines to the settlement The Chief Protector did refund some of these 
costs, but not necessarily the total amount. Thus when Thomas Coogan was deported from Tambo 
to Barambah in 1914, the police tried to recoup some of their expenses from Coogan himself be-
cause they knew he had a 'fair bank account' (memo 579, QSA A/44744 61M). 
l'*l Tronson, diary, 20 Augu.st and 6 September 1905. 
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before being apprehended by the police. But not all inmates who absconded were 
caught. Some Barambah absconders successfully avoided the police net by crossing the 
border into New South Wales.^'^^ 
This chapter would not be complete without reference to the involvement of the 
Chief Protector and the Home Secretary, The Chief Protector made innumerable 
decisions that impinged upon the settlement's operations ranging from who was sent to 
the reserve, to the appointment of staff, to the purchase of a plough. The Chief 
Protectors most involved with the administration of Barambah were Richard Howard and 
J.W. Bleakley, Howard served as Chief Protector from 1906 to 1913 and Bleakley held 
the position from 1913 to 1942. Both men visited the settlement regularly and took 
an active involvement in its affairs. Howard saw that part of his responsibilities was 
to inspect Barambah regularly and give 'directions for the conduct of the institution'. 
But even more than being involved with specific administrative matters, the Chief 
Protector set the parameters for the operation of the settlement. In the following chapters 
the extent to which the Chief Protector exercised such control will be examined. 
142 Register of Removals, 1929. 
In February 1938, Kathleen Black and Tom Simpson deserted on a settlement mare and 
travelled south and by the time the police were notified, the pair had managed to cross the border 
into New South Wales (The Chief Protector of Aboriginals to the Commissioner of Police, 11 March 
1938, QSA POL/J19 409M). 
1 For a discussion of Blcakley's career see Ray Evans, 'Bleakley, John William,' Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, Volume 7: 1891-1939, eds. B. Nairn and G. Serle (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1980), 325-6. 
l'*5 Report on Office of Chief Protector of Aboriginals, December 1922, QSA Transfer 
1227/128. 
146 QPP (1913) 3: 1073. 
1'*^  How the Chief Protector exercised such control is aptly illustrated by the manner inmate 
labour was utilised both on and off the settlement. Under Richard Howard, Barambah flourished as 
a labour depot because he did not believe 'the idea of isolating [Aborigines] from contact with white 
people was altogether desirable'. He felt they were capable of being brought into ' spheres of useful-
ness' and had no qualms about the hiring out of labour and allowing contact with whites {QPP [1906] 
2: 1263, [1909] 2: 971, [1912] 3: 923). By contrast J-W. Bleakley was an avid isolationist He 
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By comparison with the Chief Protector, the input of the Home Secretary was 
minimal as he almost invariably followed the advice of the Chief Protector. The 
administration of Aboriginal settlements did not have a high priority in a portfolio that 
included a smorgasbord of responsibilities ranging from health through to prisons and 
asylums for the insane. For an ambitious Home Secretary, there was little political kudos 
in Aboriginal affairs. The constant turnover of Home Secretaries also meant that few 
held the position long enough to develop an understanding of the issues involved. In the 
period 1905-40, no fewer than fourteen different ministers were responsible for the 
Aboriginal affairs compared with only three Chief Protectors. During his twenty-
nine year term as Chief Protector, John Bleakley served nine Home Secretaries. Given 
these circumstances, the Chief Protector was readily able to dictate government policy. ^^^ 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine who were appointed to guide 
and control the Barambah inmates. As will be discussed in following chapters, despite 
the inefficiency and ineptitude of the staff, the settlement did survive and expand. A 
regime of discipline and control was developed, and the inmates' labour systematically 
believed labour was much better utilised on the settlement with the aim of making it a self supporting 
institution (Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers [1913] 2: 97). This issue is discussed more fully in chapter six. 
Colin Hughes and B.D. Graham,/I handbook of Australian govemment and politics 1890-
1964 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968), 186-8. 
1^*9 But the Chief Protector did not always have a monopoly on advising the Home Secretary. 
Until 1939, the Chief Protector's office was officially a sub-department of the Home Secretary's office. 
The Chief Protector formally communicated with the Home Secretary through the Under Secretary. 
Between 1913 and 1934, the Under Secretary of the Home Department was William Gall. For details 
on his career see, Paul D. Wilson, 'Gall, William' Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol 8: 1891-
1939, eds. B. Nairn and G. Serle (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1981), 610-11). Gall was 
not reluctant to override Blcakley's advice and he held strong views on how Aborigines were to be 
protected including at one stage advocating sterilisation as a means of overcoming the 'Half-caste 
problem'. He visited Barambah on more than one occasion and did not hesitate to offer sugges-
tions about the administration of the settlement He became deeply embroiled in the conflict between 
Semple and Shimmin in 1934. As Shimmin had been recommended on his advice, he was clearly 
affronted by the Public Service enquiry that severely criticised her behaviour. Gall wrote a memo of 
no less than thirty-nine pages attempting to refute the conclusions of the enquiry (W. Gall memo, 
9 March 1934, QSA A/31710). 
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exploited. The government would have been well pleased with the task they 
accomplished. From another perspective, however, the staff did fail in their task. 
Despite the vigorous attempt to destroy Aboriginal culture and inculcate supposedly 
superior European values, the inmates resisted and maintained their identity. The 
dynamics of this process were complex, but certainly the behaviour of the staff who 
worked on Barambah did little to suggest that the European culture was to be admired 
and adopted. Rather they reinforced in inmates their already deeply held suspicions about 
'whitefella' culture. The inmates learnt, just as their forbears had discovered with often 
tragic consequences, that the 'whitefella' regarded them as objects to be dominated, 
controlled and exploited. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL 
The techniques of domination 
The classical age discovered the body as objects and targets of power . . . It is easy 
to find signs of the attention then paid to tJie body - to the body that is manipulated, 
shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces 
(Michel Foucault). 
/ think that any child whom the Protector considered should be separated from 
aboriginal conditions should be taken away as soon as possible so as to leave as 
little remembrance as possible of the camp in the child's mind (J.W. Bleakley). 
In his seminal work on the history of prisons. Discipline and Punish: the Birth 
of the Prison, Michel Foucault describes how the prison system emerged in place of the 
traditional techniques of punishment which were symbolised by the lash and the scaffold. 
Whereas the latter was concerned with punishment by inflicting pain on the body, the 
prison focused on the domination and control of the body. The aim was to 'render 
individuals docile and useful by means of precise work on their bodies'. These 
technologies of control and discipline that characterised the modern penitentiary system 
were gradually disseminated to other institutions throughout society. These institutions 
formed what Foucault referred to as a 'carceral archipelago' and included orphanages, 
reformatories, the workshop, the almshouse, lazarets, and the penitentiary convent. 
1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 
136. 
Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 95. 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 231. 
" ibid., 299. 
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Aboriginal .settlements could al.so have been included in this list. A principal 
objective of the Barambah settlement was to control and discipline tho.se removed there. 
Despite suggestions that it was established as a refuge or 'sanctuary for the distressed', 
Barambah was never a pa.ssive institution where the displaced remnants of the indigenous 
inhabitants were able to maintain their culture and lifestyle without interference. From 
the outset, a primary purpose of the settlement regime was to reform, subjugate and 
dominate the inmates. Aboriginal culture was regarded as intrinsically inferior and a 
central feature of the settlement's morfu.? operandi was the attempt to destroy the inmates' 
cultural identity and inculcate a 'limited amount of civilisation'. The process of 
establishing cultural hegemony involved a variety of techniques, the most prominent being 
schooling and the dormitory system. 
J.W. B\eak\ey, Aborigines of Australia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961), 195. 
Other techniques of control included the removals process which is examined in chapter two 
and the exemptions process which is examined in chapter six. 
Also to be considered is the role of religion in the process of reform and control. Home 
Secretary Tozer, in introducing the 1897 Bill, stated that in his view religion was 'of not much value 
to the blacks'. He acknowledged that while missionary bodies were to be commended for their work, 
he felt that he 'could not advise the State to incur one single farthing of expense in anything but the 
secular education of the b\acks'(QPD 78 [1897]: 1538). Archibald Meston's condemnation of Christian 
missions was much stronger. He had 'no faith at all in missionary work among the aboriginals' and 
believed that all mission stations had 'been failures from the beginning' (Minutes of evidence of Royal 
Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary Papers [1913] 2: 111). For this reason, 
while missionaries were not banned from visiting, when the government took control of Barambah in 
1905, they were not encouraged either. It was not until the 1920s that missionaries became active 
on the settlement and even then their activities were circumscribed. 
The Aborigines Inland Mission (AIM) first sent two missionaries to work on Barambah in 
1921. They were not allowed to live on the settlement, but travelled out from Murgon each day. 
The role played by these missionaries was rather different from other missions. They could not 
practice 'rice Christianity' - that is, encourage inmates to convert to the Christian faith by offering 
food or other items. They strenuously encouraged inmates to reject their traditional beliefs and 'old 
ways'. Yet by the 1930s, a significant number of inmates were attending regular church services {Our 
Aim, 1930-40; E. Brainwood, interview, 6 September 1982). The AIM church became an important 
part of the settlement culture. 
The acceptance of Christianity by inmates is a complex issue and clearly warrants further 
investigation. One possible factor was the willingness of the missionaries to allow the inmates to 
assume a degree of leadership and control within the church - something they were not allowed 
efsewhere on the settlement For a recent analysis of this issue see Tony Swain and Deborah Bird 
Rose (eds). Aboriginal Australians and Christian Missions: Ethnographic and Historical Studies 
(Bedford Park: The Australian Association for the study of Religions, 1988). 
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The School 
The importance which the government attached to schooling was evident even 
in the preliminary stages of planning for the reserve. When W.J. Thomp.son first 
requested assistance in early 1900 to establish the Barambah mi.ssion, the Home Secretary 
informed him that as well as financial assistance for general expenses: 
as soon as a building is ready for school purposes (to be approved), a teacher 
will be provided, and paid, by the Government, and the furniture for the 
School, and all school requisites, will also be supplied by the State. 
Despite the promise of assistance, a school was not opened until the mission had been 
operating for more than two years. The school building was constructed from rough bush 
timber 'with branches and leaves for roofing' and a dirt floor similar to the hut built for 
orphaned and neglected children. The school opened on 4 May 1903 with thirty-two 
children in attendance and by the end of the month an additional eight children had en-
rolled. This first experiment in education was short-lived. The teacher. Miss Tabb, 
resigned after less than eight months and the school remained closed until July 1904 
when another teacher was appointed. When the school reopened, the new teacher, 
Marion Kennett, was confronted with the unenviable task of attempting to teach forty 
children with only twenty-four slates, two dozen reading books and a 'broken black-
'^ Under Secretary to WJ. Thompson, 20 February 1900, QSA COL/G143 590. The Home 
Secretary's willingness to establish a school on the reserve probably stemmed from his visits in 1899 
to Yarrabah and Deebing Creek where he was impressed at the educational standards being achieved. 
At Deebing Creek he was astounded to see a ten year old 'pure aboriginal' girl do simple sums of 
vulgar fractions and at least a dozen pupils doing 'compound proportion and sums of that sort' {QPD 
82 [1899]: 119). 
8 Barambah Cherbourg 1904-1979 (1979), 6. 
9 Cherbourg State School, A Social Studies Resources Book (Cherbourg: Cherbourg State School 
Press, 1981), 93. 
10 QPP (1905) 1: 762. 
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board and very little chalk'cramped into a rough bush .shelter. Indeed, the .school was 
to be constantly plagued with these and other problems in the sub.sequent decades. 
A major problem was the lack of adequate accommodation. In 1905, when the 
Durundur settlement was clo.sed, the school building was dismantled and re-erected at 
Barambah. This building was obviously an improvement on the previous structure, but 
its suitability was short-lived. According to government guidelines for schools at that 
time, a building of that size was intended to accommodate a maximum of fifiy-six 
10 
children. Yet soon after it was erected, sixty-five children were enrolled. As 
enrolments increased, the problems a.ssociated with overcrowding were exacerbated. By 
1910, with over ninety children in attendance, children were forced to sit on the veran-
13 dah. In 1916, the Home Secretary announced that a new school was to be built 'along 
State school lines' to accommodate 150 pupils but it remained no more than a promi.se 
for another eight years. Criticism of the facilities became more trenchant as the 
numbers increased and conditions deteriorated. In 1918 the District Inspector of Educa-
tion reported that 'both school and veranda are so crowded with desks that there is no 
spare floor space and the teachers experience much difficulty in moving among the 
pupils'. He also noted that as the school was an 'old weatherboard structure, unlined and 
unsealed', it was 'very hot in summer and very cold in winter'. To ease the crowding 
some classes were taught outside under a bough shelter when the weather was 
11 M. Kennett to Under Secretary, Department of Public Instruction, 30 September 1904, QSA 
A/15993 04/16532. 
12 QPP (1906) 2: 932. 
13 Ettie Meredith, interview, 1 August 1988. 
1^  QPD 125 (1916-17): 2296. 
15 R.G. Skelton to Under Secretary, Department of Public Instruction, 17 October 1928, QSA 
A15993 18/11163. 
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favourable.^^ In 1920, the a.ssistant teacher Esther Gleghorn raised the matter of 
overcrowding with the Chief Protector. 
Is it not a fact that you have a better barn recently erected with nothing to 
put in it than this school which has to accommodate at times over 120 
children and blacks at that. I doubt much if you could find a square yard in 
the roof walls or floorinc without holes or cracks . . . The building is nothing 
more than a death trap. 
As a temporary solution, the verandah was enclosed but this action only created other 
18 
difficulties. The relocation of some children onto the verandah resulted in one cla.ss 
being situated in three places. Not surprisingly, when the District Inspector of Education 
visited the school in 1922 and found one class of sixty working in an open shed and the 
other spread over three rooms he concluded: ' the Government fails to secure the general 
good order required for normal working conditions' . 
A new school building was finally built in 1924 (see figure 4.1). Yet it was not 
as a result of government largesse that a new building was erected. Rather, the 
benefactors were numerous Aboriginal people from throughout the state who had made 
involuntary contributions to the Aboriginal Property Protection Account, as it was from 
this account that the building was financed. When the Governor opened the building 
in November 1924 'and spoke approvingly of the facilities', it is doubtful whether any 
21 
reference was made to the source of funding. As with the previous structure, when 
16 R.G. Skelton to Under Secretary Department of Public Instruction 18 November 1919, QSA 
A/15993 19/54085. 
1^  E. Gleghorn to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 17 September 1920, QSA HOM/J423 22/3053. 
18 QPP (1921) 2: 562. 
19 R.G. Skelton to Under Secretary Department of Public Instruction, 19 October 1922, QSA 
A/31708 22/%73. 
20 Memorandum, Barambah expenditure, 4 June 1930, QSA HOM/J778 30/5156. The 
Aboriginal Property Protection Account is discussed in chapter six. 
21 W. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 11 November 1924, QSA HOM/J539 25/434; 
QPP (1925) 1: 1082. 
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finally opened, it proved to be too small for the number of pupils. The building was 
designed to accommodate 150 pupils but by the time of its construction, enrolments had 
increased to over 180. The most obvious problem was that there were two classrooms 
but three classes. Again, part of one class was forced to sit on the verandah. The 
government was slow in responding to the inappropriateness of this arrangement. In 1933 
the Chief Protector asked the Home Secretary to consider the 'matter of enlarging' the 
22 
building. Three years later the issue was still unresolved when the District Inspector 
reported that 'conditions on the verandah were unsatisfactory for teaching' . As well, he 
noted that for the pupils, 'in summer there is the glare of the sun to contend with; in 
23 
winter the cold winds while wet weather renders conditions very uncomfortable' . 
Finally in 1937, a new wing consisting of one classroom and head teacher 's office was 
added.^"^ 
Another recurrent problem was the number of pupils per teacher. Indeed, a 
characteristic feature of the Barambah school was the large clas.ses. Within a year of the 
school being opened, sixty children were enrolled and only one teacher. Enrolments 
continued to increase and by 1916, one teacher was responsible for more than more 100 
children. The appointment of additional teachers in 1918, 1929 and 1939 helped to 
decrease the average class size, but these gains were offset by the gradual increa.se in 
enrolments. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the size of the cla.sses fluctuated between 
sixty and ninety pupils. Although it is unreasonable to compare the size of the classes 
22 J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 13 March 1933, QSA A/3624 33/2202. 
23 G. Chadwick to Director of Education, 3 September 1936, QSA A/15995 36/47131. 
2^  QPP (1937) 2: 1205. 
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Figure 4.1 School 1924 
with current standards and expectations, a comparison with the size of classes in state 
schools in the corresponding period is justified. Compared with children attending State 
schools, the Barambah children were clearly disadvantaged (see figure 4.2). Barambah 
classes were on the average twice the size of classes in State schools, and during the 
period 1910-20, were three times as large. The department did acknowledge the need 
to appoint additional staff but frequently found it difficult to attract staff. After the 
Chief Protector expressed concern in 1914 that a 'roll of 90 scholars' was 'rather too 
large a number for one teacher to manage', the government agreed to appoint an 
Statistics on class sizes in state schools are from QPP (1940): 629. 
26 In comparison with Pahn Island, the Barambah school was well staffed. In 1924 the Chief 
Protector reported that there were 110 scholars in the school but no teacher. An 'educated native 
girl' was in charge and had achieved 'fairly good results' {QPP [1924] 1: 982). 
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Figure 4,2 Class sizes: Barambah school and State schools 
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additional teacher. The position was advertised in March 1916 but was not filled until 
October 1917. Similar problems occurred when attempts were made to appoint a third 
teacher. Provision was made in the 1919-20 Estimates for the position but it remained 
vacant until October 1924. 28 
2"^  QPP (1914) 3: 1028, (1915) 1:528. 
2^  Under Secretary Department of Public Instruction, memo, 13 March 1916, QSA A/15993 
16/8582; QPP (1919) 1: 1154. The department also had difficulties in filling existing positions when 
a teacher resigned or was sick. In 1915, the school was closed when Augusta Lipscombe was absent 
for four months with typhoid fever as a temporary replacement could not be found. The school was 
also closed in the following year. When Lipscombe resigned, her successor George Holland stayed only 
six weeks. As another replacement was not found immediately, the school was closed for six months. 
Similar action was neces.sary when John and E.sther Gleghorn resigned in 1922. 
There were several difficulties in attracting teachers to work on Barambah. Apart from the 
lamentable working condition.s, the wages offered little incentive to teach on the settlement. The 
assistant teacher, in particular, was poorly paid. In 1919 the assistant teacher was paid only £50 per 
annum, less than half the amount the settlement's bullock driver - who was an inmate - received 
{QPP [1919-20] 1: 1154). ALso the accommodation provided for teachers was hardly luxurious. 
When Marion Kennett arrived on the settlement in 1905 she slept in a room in the assistant 
Superintendent's house while eating her meals in the school. It was an arrangement which was 
'attended with a great deal of discomfort in wet and cold weather' (J.M. Costin to Chief Protector, 
5 May 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768). When the Glcghorns arrived in 1917, they were forced to 
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Within the classroom, the basic objectives were to give a 'very elementary 
29 knowledge of reading, writing and arithmetic'. The state school syllabus was used as 
a guide as to what subjects were taught and how the curriculum was organised. To 
accommodate the 'native mind', the amount of time spent in each grade was considerably 
longer than the usual twelve months. In the early years, five years were spent at school 
progressing through two grades. By 1919, an additional grade was taught which meant 
seven years were spent progressing through three grades. Twenty years later, most 
Barambah pupils were leaving .school after spending eight years to complete fourth 
grade. Apart from the three core subjects, domestic science and manual arts subjects 
appeared intermittently in the curriculum. The teaching of these subjects was dependent 
on the enthusiasm of the teacher or other staff. During Marion Kennett's term between 
1905-08, sewing was taught to the girls. After Kennett's departure, instruction in sewing 
was occasionally given on a voluntary basis by others on the settlement. The wife of 
T.L. Williams gave les.sons in 'sewing, knitting and darning . . . in her own time without 
any payment'. In the early 1930s, the settlement matron taught the girls needlework. 
In the early 1920s, the male pupils were given instruction in the manual arts when T.L. 
share three rooms and a kitchen with the assistant Superintendent and his wife for more than twelve 
months (J.G. Gleghorn to Under Secretary, Department of Public Instruction, 9 September 1918, OSA 
A/15993 18/33920). Of course, the more fundamental problem in attracting staff was the prevailing 
racial attitudes. As 'primitives' the children were not considered fit subjects to be educated or civilis-
ed. Given these circumstances, it was not surprising there were few applicants or that the Under 
Secretary of the Department of Public Instruction, when asked to help find a teacher for Barambah, 
commented: 'I do not know of a teacher who would be likely to accept the position but, if you so 
desire, the vacancy will be advertised in the Education Office Gazette' (J.W. Bleakley to Under 
Secretary, Home Department, 4 March 1916, QSA A/15993 16/8582). 
29 J.M. Costin to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 5 May 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
3^  Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982; R.G. Skelton to Under Secretary, Department 
of Public Instruction, 18 November 1919, QSA A15993 19/54085; G.R. Henden to Director of 
Education Department of Public Instruction, 30 July 1940, QSA A/15999. 
31 QPD 186 (1945-6): 1030. 
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Williams was appointed to the school specifically with the task of establishing industrial 
training. Williams al.so encouraged 'the children on the making of flower and vegetable 
gardens' although with little success. These subjects, however, lap.sed when Williams 
left the settlement after only six months. In 1934, several boys who appeared to have 
aptitude for manual arts were sent to the Murgon Rural School for instruction in 
sheetmetal work, leather work, blacksmilhing and wood work. 
The modified state school syllabus remained as the basis for teaching until the 
early 1930s when at the request of the Chief Protector, the Head Teacher Robert 
Crawford drew up a syllabus for use on Barambah and the other government settle-
ments. This syllabus was designed to take into account the specific circumstances and 
needs of the pupils. Using the 1930 state school syllabus as a guide, Crawford devi.sed 
a scheme that included four grades of schooling. Crawford considered that standard was 
sufficient given 'the difference in environment and mental ability between the aboriginal 
child and his white brother'. Furthermore, a higher standard of education was not deemed 
necessary because the 'commercial and academic world' held no openings for the 'settle-
ment native' - his future lay with the 'labouring cla.ss', while a few would take up scmi-
skilled occupations. In devising the syllabus, Crawford saw the principal aim of the 
school as preparing the child for life on the settlement. In each subject, the emphasis 
was on teaching subjects that would be of practical value on the settlement. The English 
syllabus was designed to teach the children to 'speak correctly', to be able to write letters 
32 QPD 177 (1941): 1009. 
33 J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 6 December 1922, QSA A/31708 
22/9673. 
3^  J.W. Bleakley to Director of Education, Department of Public Instruction, 29 May 1934, QSA 
A/15995 34/23994. 
3^  Robert Crawford, 'General Scheme of Work for Aboriginal Schools situated on Govern-
ment Aboriginal Settlement.s,' University of Sydney Archives, Elkin Papers, 1/12/223. 
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and 'indulge in recreative reading'. The purpose of Mathematics was primarily to give 
'a practical working knowledge in the system of monetary exchange'.-^^ Geography was 
included in the curriculum to provide 'a general knowledge of Australia'. The subject 
'Civics and Morals' was regarded as of the utmost importance. It was designed to 
encourage the children 'in paths of honesty, industry, thrift, care of personal and public 
property, and recognition of respect due to officials and guardians' as well as to promote 
iiiiiMLs of personal cleanliness and cleanliness oi nome and seiiiement generally'. History 
was not taught as a separate subject but formed part of the course in 'Civics and Morals'. 
The scheme proposed that 'the stories of Australian History should . . . not be overloaded 
with unimportant details'. Rather, history was to be used as moral lessons, emphasising 
'the qualities of courage, perseverance' and 'facing difficulties'. In keeping with the 
view that most of the children were destined to rise no higher than the labouring class, 
the teaching of vocational subjects was seen as equally important, if not more important 
than academic subjects. The teaching of domestic science and manual training in a com-
prehensive and systematic manner began in 1939. All boys in grades three and four were 
given instruction in manual training one day per week while a number of ex-school 
boys attended lessons for half a day per week. At the same time, more extensive 
instruction was given in .sewing and other domestic subjects and finally in 1940 a 
18 domestic science room was constructed at the school. 
From the department's perspective, the school was regarded as a most success-
ful activity. The school g'^ ew from thirty-two pupils and one teacher in 1903 to 242 
3^  Mathematics was no less an important tool in imposing white values than the more obvious 
subjects such as civics and morals. For a discussion on the role of mathematics in the imposing of 
western culture, see Alan J. Bishop, ' Western mathematics: the secret weapon of cultural imperialism,' 
Race and Class 32 (1990) 2:51-66. 
37 ibid. 
38 G.R. Hendren, Visit to Cherbourg School, 1 November 1939, QSA A/15999; Norman 
Warner, interview, 18 September 1984. 
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pupils and a staff of four in 1939 (see figure 4.3). In the annual reports of the Chief 
Protector, references to the school were invariably favourable. In 1907, for example, the 
children at Barambah were described as 'making good progress' and in the following year 
the report noted 'the behaviour has been good and the general appearance of the scholars 
-JQ 
neat and clean'. Phrases such as 'progress at the school has been satisfactory'and 'the 
children clean, well dressed and bright' became cliches in the annual reports. Positive 
perceptions were al.so conveyed visually. In the earlier reports, photographs of the .school 
were included to indicate that the school was an integral part of the settlement (sec fig-
ures 4.4 and 4.5). Both photographs convey an image o{' education in action. The 
.settlement had a 'real' .school with a teacher, blackboard, desks and pupils. Visitors to 
the settlement also commented favourably on the school. In 1910 the Visiting Justice 
39 QPP (1907) 2: 1278, (1908) 3: 939. 
"*" QPP (1930) 1; 954. 
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reported that, in his estimation, no one could 'feci anything but admiration for the 
splendid control and discipline' in the school. On another occasion the Visiting Justice 
commented to the Home Secretary: 'the pupils are very orderly, generally industrious and 
anxious to show good work'. In 1928, the same official noted how 'smoothly and 
pleasantly' work was carried out in the school. When Courier Mail reporter Clem Lack 
visited the settlement in 1937, he wrote enthusiastically about the school, expressing his 
surprise at the 'high standard of proficiency' of the children and informed his readers 
41 
that it was 'not inferior to that exhibited by many white children in our State schools'. 
On one level the school was regarded as a success because children were in 
attendance, teachers present and there was a building to accommodate them. There were, 
however, other reasons that the school was regarded as a succe.ss. Despite the problems 
with inadequate accommodation and large classes, the school was claimed to be successful 
because it appeared to achieve its basic objectives. The first objective of the school was 
to prepare the children for a future life on the settlement. The school was intended not 
to educate, but to instruct the pupils how to became 'good' and 'industrious' inmates. 
The purpose of the school was, as J.W. Bleakley declared in 1922, to help them 'build 
up a civilization of their own suitable to both the changed conditions and their own 
intellectual development'. They were taught to respect authority, to learn discipline and 
order. The emphasis on these virtues is aptly demonstrated in figure 4.4 which depicts 
the pupils engaged in physical drills and apparently dutifully heeding the instructions of 
their teacher. The pupils were al.so taught the importance of neatness and cleanliness. 
^^ J. MacDonald to Under Secretary, 9 November 1910, OSA A/31708, 10/11689; J. Hooper 
to Under Secretary, 15 July 1927, QSA HOM/J637 27/5483; J.B. Freeman to Under Secretary, 3 
November 1928, QSA HOM/J692 28/8208; Courier Mail, 3 April 1937. 
42 QPP (1922) 2: 475. 
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Figure 4.4 School children at desks - 1911 
Figure 4.5 School children doing drills - 1912 
1.38 
Hence, the repeated remarks by the Chief Protector and others about the neatness of the 
children's work. 
The second objective of the school was to train the children to be diligent and 
obedient workers. As discus.scd in chapter six, a major function of the settlement was 
to provide cheap labour for farmers and pastoralists throughout the state. Ironically, this 
objective of the school was not too different from that of the state school system. In 
1930, the Director of Education commented in his annual report, in the state schools 'a 
determined universal effort' is being made 'to establish a sturdy and intelligent universal 
peasantry on the land'. The difference between the state schools and the Barambah 
school was that in the latter situation, the pupils could never be propertied peasants. On 
Barambah, the school reinforced in the children that their vocation was not to be farmers 
or landowners but farm labourers - they were to serve the interests of agrarian capitalism. 
Accordingly, the children were taught only what was considered necessary to be useful 
farm labourers and domestic servants. The philosophy of the school was well 
Summarised by Governor Leslie Wilson following a visit in 1934: 
It seems far more important to me, that they should be instructed in this 
practical work than in history and geography. Once they can read, write and 
do simple arithmetic, that would seem all that is required. 
When the District Inspector of Education was suggesting improvements to the syllabus 
in 1938, he noted that geography should be introduced, not for educational reasons, but 
becau.se it would assist the children when they eventually 'go to various parts of the state 
44 
to work'. He also noted that 'history has been wisely eliminated' from the curriculum. 
"•3 L. Wilson to Deputy Premier, 6 June 1934, QSA A/3699 34/5048. 
""^  G.R. Hendren to Director of Education, 1 June 1938, QSA A/15999 38/30224. 
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That the school was designed, not to educate, but to train and discipline, was 
clearly recognised by former pupils. Val Clements, who attended in the late 1910s and 
early 1920s, felt little effort was made to teach the children. When asked if more could 
have been done in the school, he said: 'they could have done a lot more. They could 
have brought in teachers if they had wanted to, but they weren't interested'. Evelyn 
Serico believed that incompetent teachers such as Augusta Lipscombe, were deliberately 
kept at the school as part of a policy to ensure the children on the settlement did not 
learn too much , , , They [the department] wanted to keep us down , , , they 
didn't want us to be educated. We were only taught so we could be domestic 
servants and labourers. 
The perceptions of former pupils that little effort was made to teach them and conditions 
were not conducive to learning were substantiated in reports by Inspectors from the 
Department of Public Instruction. From 1912, the school was visited annually by an 
Inspector and frequently, their as.sessment of the school contradicted the glowing reports 
in the Chief Protector's reports. In 1917, for example, the District Inspector made this 
assessment after visiting the settlement and finding one teacher for 117 children: 
If the object of the school is to keep the children quiet, and out of mi.schief 
during the daytime and to train them to be lazy with as much incidental 
teaching as a teacher can give 117 children in five different clas.ses in an 
overcrowded room with less fioor space than four square feet per child, it is a 
success, but if the aim is to cultivate their intelligence, to give exerci.se to 
their self activity, to train them to be industrious and self reliant with a fair 
knowledge of the work of cla.ss three when leaving, the school is a failure. 
By contra.st, the Chief Protector in his annual report for that year merely commented that 
48 
'progress is, under the circumstances, very satisfactory'. 
''^  Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
'^ Evelyn Serico, interview, 4 December 1984. 
''^  W. Earnshaw to Under Secretary, Department of Public Instruction, 9 August 1917, QSA 
HOM/J423 22/3053. 
48 QPP (1918) 3: 1978. 
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The standard of education on the settlement was not comparable to that offered 
in the state school system. Not that the government ever intended to provide an 
education that would allow Aboriginal children the same opportunities as their white 
counterparts. As Robert Crawford observed when creating a syllabus in 1934, it was 
'to make the native a better aboriginal and not a poor imitation of the white man'. 
The Dormitory System 
Although various attempts had been made throughout the nineteenth century to 
establish dormitory-type institutions to discipline and control Aborigines, none had lasting 
success. Macquarie's Native Institution survived only seven years while William Smithies' 
Mission School in Perth survived a mere four years. On Fraser Island, 'locked 
dormitories for females' were proposed as a means of overcoming the problems of 
discipline and morale but never eventuated. Thus when the Barambah settlement was 
being established, the potential of the dormitory system as a mechanism for social control 
was still largely unrealised. 
The view that the standard of education in the school was not comparable to the State system 
was shared by the white officials on the settlement They refused to send their own children to the 
school. When the number of white children on the settlement was sufficient for a school, the staff 
lobbied the government to set up a school for their children. Their principal objection to 'white 
children being taught in the aboriginal school' was 'the deleterious effect on the character of white 
children'. The school was opened in 1932 with fourteen children enrolled. It continued in exis-
tence until the numbers dropped to five in 1941. Prior to the school being opened the white children 
had undertaken correspondence lessons (R.T. Crawford to Director of Education, 1 July 1930, QSA 
EDU/Z569 32/2587; J.L. Fowler to Director of Education, Department of Public Instruction, 19 March 
1932, QSA EDU/Z569 32/12076; Annual Returns of Cherbourg Provisional School, QSA EDU/AB 
1062; E. Pearse to J.B. Edwards, 21 January 1932, QSA EDU/Z569 32/2587). 
^^ Robert Crawford, 'General Scheme of Work for Aboriginal Schools.' 
^^  CD. Rowley, The Destruction of Aboriginal Society, 90; W. McNair and H. Lumley, Pioneer 
Aboriginal Mission (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1981); Ray Evans and Jan 
Walker, '"These strangers, where are they going?": Aboriginal-European relations in the Fraser Island 
and Wide Bay region 1770-1905', Occasional Papers in Anthropology No 8, ed. P. Lauer (St Lucia: 
Anthropology Museum), 1977, 85. 
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Like the school, a dormitory for young children was seen as priority when the 
reserve was being established. Indeed, in the initial years of the .settlement, although the 
reserve itself was gazetted as an Aboriginal reserve, the activities that took place on it 
were regarded, at least officially, as that of an industrial school or reformatory. When 
W.J. Thompson was, somewhat belatedly, formally appointed Superintendent in April 
1904, it was not as might have been expected under the provisions of the Aboriginals 
Protection Act, but under the Reformatory Schools (Industrial) Act 1865. He was 
52 
officially designated Superintendent of Barambah Industrial School. Similarly, Albert 
53 Tronson and B.J.T. LipvScombe were appointed Superintendent under the same Act. 
Under the Reformatory Schools Act, 'any child born of an aboriginal or half-caste 
mother' was deemed to be a 'neglected child' and as such was liable to be sent to a 
reformatory or industrial school. Some of the first removals to Barambah were made 
under the provisions of this Act despite the Aboriginals Protection Act providing the 
necessary authority to remove children to reserves. 
In the embryonic stage of the dormitory system, 'neglected' children were cared 
for by two women in a simply constructed hut with a bough shelter. Despite the obvious 
difficulties, an effort was made to keep the children away from the 'infiuences of the 
main camp'. One such attempt involved providing the dormitory inmates with sweetened 
52 QGG 82 (1904): 1424. 
3^ QGG 84 (1905): 1116, 87 (1906): 118. 
54 Reformatory Schools (Industrial) Act 1865, s 6. 
^^  For example in 1906, Victor Johnson was sentenced to seven years at the Barambah 
Industrial School for being a neglected child (Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Under Secretary, 
Home Department 15 October 1906, QSA HOM/J20 06/11857). In 1906, the Reformatory Schools 
(Industrial) Act was amended and the section referring to the child of Aboriginal or half-caste mother 
deleted. Nevertheless, the idea that the settlement was an industrial school or reformatory remained. 
In 1910, the Visiting Justice entitled his report, 'Inspection of Barambah Aboriginal Settlement, which 
is also an Industrial School'. He noted that there were eight orphan children at the school, one of 
whom had been sent to the settlement on the orders of a Magistrate (J. MacDonald to Under 
Secretary, Home Department 9 November 1910, QSA A/31708 10/116890). 
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tea with their meals! Such a privilege was denied to the other inmates and it was 
thought that the main camp would then hold no attractions for the dormitory inmates. 
It is doubtful that this approach at enforced segregation was successful, but it did serve 
to create a distinction between members of the settlement, between the dormitories and 
the camp, a distinction which widened as the dormitory system developed. In 1909, a 
more substantial building was erected to serve as a single girls' dormitory (see figure 4.6) 
en 
and in the following year, a boys' dormitory was constructed. Both buildings were 
modest in size and provided only enough room for sleeping. Inmates slept on the fioor 
- no beds or mattres.ses were supplied. Cooking and other activities were carried out 
58 
under a bough shed next to the quarters. The cooking was undertaken by the older 
girls under the supervision of a sub-Matron and, as well as preparing meals, the girls had 
8 
to collect firewood and water from the creek. The latter task was quite arduous. As 
Ettie Meredith recalls, it consisted of: 
going to the creek each day and putting the water in two kerosene tins. They 
were attached to a long stick which we put on our shoulders to carry. 
The older girls were also responsible for cleaning the quarters and mending clothes and 
each day the settlement Matron went round 'to see that the day's work was properly 
done',^ 
In the early stages of the dormitory system, most inmates were of school age or 
under but a number of older girls also resided in the dormitory. These older girls were 
placed in the dormitory partly to protect them from 'the evil infiuences of the camp' as 
^^  BJ.T. Lipscombe to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 23 December 1907, QSA A/31708 08/574. 
"^^  QPP (1910) 3: 976, (1911) 2: 1015. 
^^  Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. 
59 ibid. 
^ Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 82. 
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Figure 4.6 Single girls' dormitory - 1909 
well as training them as domestic servants. Because there were not the proper facilities 
in the quarters for such training, the girls were trained in the homes of the settlement 
staff. The arrangement was described by the settlement Matron in 1913 as follows: 'We 
have the children in the house with us. At night they go to the dormitory, where there 
are women under my charge'. Such a system suited the administration admirably. 
They received free domestic service in their homes and the cost of caring for the 'orphan 
and neglected' children on the settlement was considerately reduced. 
When J.W. Bleakley became Chief Protector in 1913, the purpose of the 
dormitory system was expanded. As well as catering for children and older girls, 
mothers and their children began to be accommodated within the system. Throughout his 
career, J.W. Bleakley was greatly concerned about the dangers of miscegenation and the 
61 ibid. 
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'Half-caste problem'. When appointed Chief Protector, he moved quickly to make 'the 
rescue and care of young women and children . . . the most important' part of the 
department's work. In successive annual reports, he was keen to record the number of 
children and women who had been rescued from the infiuences of camp life and sent 
to 'institutions on reserves for better care and protection'. To inculcate European values 
and mores in these women and children it was not just sufficient to remove them to a 
settlement, they needed to be placed in an strictly controlled environment. 
The policy of rescuing young women and children resulted in a significant 
increase in the number of dormitory inmates, particularly in the later part of the 1910s. 
In the period 1913-20, 339 women and children were removed to the settlement. Not 
all ended up in the dormitories, but sufficient numbers did to cause severe overcrowding. 
In 1920, when assessing the need for new buildings on the settlement, the Under 
Secretary of the Home Department considered 'a proper place of shelter for single boys 
and single girls' was a greater necessity that a school. Apart from the overcrowding 
in the sleeping quarters, the bathing and toilet facilities were rudimentary. For Chief 
Protector Bleakley, the lack of suitable accommodation made it 'absolutely impossible to 
do satisfactory work in looking after and training' the inmates. These problems, however, 
were almost incidental compared with what he regarded as the greatest deficiencies in the 
system, the lack of 'strict supervision and facilities for training'. In May 1922, the 
government was pointedly reminded of these faults when G.W. Shand, the Anglican 
2^ QPP (1914) 3: 1023. 
3^ QPP (1918) 1: 1676, (1916) 3: 1735. 
^ see chapter two. 
5^ W. Gall, memo on letter, E. Gleghorn to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 17 September 1920, 
QSA HOM/J423 22/3053. 
^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 6 December 1922, QSA A/31708 
22/9880. 
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minister in Murgon, expressed his concern about what was apparently happening when 
girls from the settlement were sent out to work. He informed the Home Secretary: 
It is becoming a regular thing for girls to return from domestic service in a 
certain condition and remain at the dormitory until the child is born, the 
father of the child being a white man. 
In reply, the Chief Protector suggested the problem was not as acute as Shand claimed. 
Nevertheless he was embarrassed by the issue, particularly given his abhorrence of 
miscegenation, Bleakley preferred that all inmates remained on the settlement, but felt 
in the circumstances there was no alternative but to send girls out to service. As he 
explained: 
until institutions can be provided on reserves where these girls can be safely 
cared for and trained amongst their own people . . . there is nothing cLse but 
domestic service offering. The only other alternative is a life of idleness and 
degradation in the camp. 
Bleakley also mentioned that it was the intention of his department to build a 'large 
Girls Home' on Barambah. With such facilities it was hoped that all the girls on the 
settlement would be 'supervised and trained' in 'all the feminine accomplishments u.seful' 
on a settlement, thereby obviating the need to send them out to service. 
The 'large Girls Home' was finally built in 1925 and marked the beginning of 
a new era in the dormitory system. The building was a decided improvement on the 
existing facilities. TTie floor area was more than six times that of the old girls' quarters 
and cooking and eating no longer had to be undertaken in a bough shed. The building 
was a two-storied timber building with verandahs running along one side on both levels 
(see figures 4,7 and 4.8). The upper level contained sleeping quarters which were divided 
67 R.W. Shand to J. McCormack, 29 May 1922, QSA HOM/J431 22/5034. 
^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 13 June 1922, QSA HOM/J431 
22/5034. 
69 ibid. 
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into two main section.s, one for single girls and the other for school-age girls. Located 
on the lower level was the kitchen, dining room, pantry, storeroom, dressing rooms, 
70 
office and sewing room. The building cost almost £2000 to construct, and like the 
71 
school, was funded from the Aboriginal Property Protection Account. The girls dor-
mitory was the largest and most prominent building on the settlement. It was situated 
in the centre of the administrative domain and well away from the camps (.see figure 8.3). 
The size and location of the dormitory signified that the training and protection of young 
females was one of the most important activities on the settlement. 
For the government, the construction of the new dormitory represented a 
significant development in the care and protection of Aborigines. For the opening of the 
building, a group of over twenty politicians and public servants visited the settlement. 
The girls' dormitory was opened on 2 October 1925 by Home Secretary Stopford and 
72 
named in his honour, 'The Stopford Home for Aboriginal Girls'. As such a large 
contingent of politicians had not been on the settlement before, every opportunity was 
taken to convince them that expenditure on Aboriginal welfare was worthwhile. The 
visitors inspected a native cottage, listened to a brass band and saw a demonstration of 
73 
spear throwing. For lunch, the Parliamentarians were 'entertained by the girls in their 
new dining room' but the meal was not typical dormitory fare. The menu included 
'jellied crab with mayonnai.se dressing, cold roast duck, trifle, fruit with jelly, and devilled 
°^ J.W. Bleakley, Aborigines of Australia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961), 198; Ruth Hegarty, 
Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
"^^ QPP (1926) 1: 1023; Memorandum, Barambah expenditure, 4 June 1930, QSA HOM/J778 
30/5156. 
^^  QPP (1926) 1: 1018. James Stopford entered Parliament in 1915 as the member for Mt 
Morgan. A former engine driver and union organiser, he was a member of the ALP and was 
appointed Home Secretary in 1923 and held that position for six years. He later held the Mines 
portfolio from 1923 to 1936 (Carol Gistitin, 'Stopford, James', Australian Dictionary of Biography 
Volume 12:1891-1939, ed. J. Ritchie-(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1990), 103-4. 
"^3 Brisbane Courier, 5 October 1925. 
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Figure 4.7 Floor plan, girls' dormitory - 1924 
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almonds' (see figure 4.10). According to the Chief Protector, the meal won for the 
'7/1 
girls 'the warmest prai.sc' from all present. Of course after such a meal, how could 
anyone question the value of settlements and in particular, the dormitory system? 
Unlike the old girls' quarters, the new dormitory did not provide accommoda-
tion for women with babies and young children. To cater for this group, a separate 
75 dormitory variously known as the 'babies home'or 'mothers quarters'was built in 1927. 
The upgrading of the dormitory buildings was finally completed when a new boys' 
7fi dormitory was built in 1928. The new buildings increased significantly the total 
number of the inmates who were confined in dormitories. In 1910 only 3 percent of the 
population lived in dormitories, but by 1933 over 22 percent were dormitory resi-
77 dents. By the early 1930s, 66 percent of all children aged between five and fourteen 
78 
were dormitory inmates. 
Every opportunity and excuse was used to move children from the camp into the 
dormitories. In 1936 when Florrie Cummins died, her five children were placed in the 
79 dormitories although relatives in the camp could have cared for them. Lottie Solomon 
and her children were placed in the babies' home in 1928 by the Superintendent for 'her 
"^^  J.W. Bleakley, Aborigines of Australia, 198. 
'5 QPP (1928) 1: 941. 
'^^ QPP (1929) 1: 1219. 
'^ ^ QPP (1912) 2: 1015-6; O. Shimmin to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 6 February 1934, QSA 
A/3682 34/3002; QPP (1934): 886. 
^^  The number of children between ages five and fourteen was derived from taking the 
percentage of children in this age range as calculated in the 1928 census (Aboriginal Census 
Barambah Settlement June 1928, QSA HOM/J686 28/7056) and applying that figure to the 1933 total. 
79 Darcy Cummins, interview, 1 August 1988. 
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Figure 4.8 Girls' dormitory - 1924 
Figure 4.9 Sleeping accommodation, girls' dormitory 
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own protection' after allegedly fighting with her husband. Younger inmates were sent 
to the dormitory for punishment. Jimmy Edwards was ordered to spend 'a couple of 
months' in the boys'dormitory by the Superintendent 'for stealing stock horses'. The 
dormitories also served as child-minding centres so that single mothers could be sent out 
to work as domestic servants. Ruth Hegarty, for example, spent all of her childhood in 
the dormitory while her mother worked as a domestic in the South Burnett district -
82 
she saw her mother only during holiday periods. Another group of inmates who were 
placed in the dormitories included single women who fell pregnant when out working. 
They were placed in the mothers' dormitory to be instructed in the 'care of children'. 
The expansion of the dormitory facilities not only increa.sed the capacity to 
'discipline and control a greater number of inmates, but al.so extended the length of time 
spent within the dormitory system. Inmates developed what Michel Foucault has termed 
83 
'disciplinary careers' - a lifetime could be spent moving from one institution to another. 
The system was structured so inmates moved from one dormitory to another as their cir-
cumstances changed. As Ruth Hegarty describes: 
The thing about it was the structure of the place. Your whole life was 
mapped out for you. Say you were in the babies dormitory, you turned five, 
your mother had no choice of keeping you. If she wanted to keep you the 
choice wasn't hers until she married and moved out of the dormitory. Your 
mother was sent out to work and you were packed over to the girls 
dormitory. 
You stayed there until you turned fourteen when you were sent to work even 
if you were in the middle of your school year. Some girls were sent to work 
in the hospital but a lot like myself were sent out to domestic work. When 
you came home from holidays, you were never allowed to go to the camp, 
you had to stay in the dormitory. Girls who got pregnant while out working 
^ W. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 8 October 1928, QSA HOM/J688 28/7274. 
^^  Jimmy Edwards, interview, 24 October 1984. 
82 Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
3^ Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 300. 
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were put in the mothers dormitory. I left the dormitory when I was twenty-
one to get married. 
Marriage was one of the few avenues of escape from the system. Other girls simply 
did not return to the settlement after going out to work. For males, their 'disciplinary 
careers' was usually much shorter for when they had reached fourteen, they were no 
longer considered to be in need of protection and guidance and were sent out to work. 
Once admitted to the dormitory system, every inmate was soon made aware of 
the purpose of the dormitory — to be instilled with the virtues of cleanliness, discipline 
and order. The daily routine was highly structured. Bells were rung throughout the day 
to signal times for meals, duties, when to rise and when to go to bed. The first bell of 
the day was to signal rising and the beginning of duties which included making the beds 
and cleaning the floors. All inmates was required to make their own bed which 'had to 
85 be perfectly straight, no hollow ones were allowed'. The sleeping quarters were swept, 
scrubbed and polished each day, while the dining room, kitchen, bathroom and laundry 
were cleaned and scrubbed twice a day. Even the verandahs were swept and scrubbed 
each day. Apart from the floors, the walls, windows, and doors were regularly cleaned. 
Personal hygiene was also of the utmost importance. Each morning before school all 
children were inspected by the settlement Matron. As Darcy Cummins recalled: 
The parade ground consisted of about twelve lines with about twenty abrea.st. 
Matron Burke walked along with a big solid five foot lawyer cane. If we 
were dirty or our clothes were dirty we would be whacked or boxed on the 
^ Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
*^  Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. 
^ O. Shimmin to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 10 October 1934, QSA A/31710, 34/11056; Ruth 
Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
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Figure 4.10 Menu Parliamentary delegation - 1925 
ears and then sent to the side of the dormitory to the washroom. She 
wouldn't touch a blackfellow. She would point to someone who she thought 
had dirty hair and one of the girls with her would do the inspection. Five 
days a week there was an inspection. It was a long observance you had to 
have clean clothes. 
The older girls were inspected later in the morning when 'a close check of towels, 
underclothes, heads and bodies was made'. There were also regular inspections for 
head lice. For girls, such inspections were always dreaded because of the consequences 
of being caught with lice. The treatment was simple - all hair was removed. The 
ignominy of having a bald head was always a source of acute embarrassment for the 
dormitory girls as Ruth Hegarty vividly recollected: 
We always had bald heads. I never had much hair, I can always remember 
the clippers were cold. There would be tears when you saw all your hair 
being cut. You were never allowed even a cap on your head. You could 
^^  Darcy Cummins, interview, 1 August 1988. 
^ P. Burke, Dormitory and Settlement Report for January 1936, QSA A/3827 36/1931. 
15.3 
always tell the dormitory kids, they had bald heads, while the camp kids 
would have nice hair. 
The obsession with cleanliness became at times a charade. Becau.se of the limited water 
supply, the school-age girls were forced to wash together in groups of up to eight in the 
90 
one tub. A swim in the creek every few days would probably have been more 
hygienic. 
The importance of cleanliness was apparent to all who visited the dormitories. 
Visiting Justices regularly included in their reports on the settlement comments such as: 
'the various dormitories and dining rooms are well arranged and cleanly kept' and 'the 
Matron has succeeded on fostering in the girls a love for cleanliness and order'. When 
the assistant Chief Protector visited the settlement in October 1937 he was singularly im-
pressed by the 'particular attention' given to keeping the buildings 'clean and tidy'. 
When the Courier Mail featured the settlement in a two part series in 1937, reference 
was made to how 'scrupulously clean' the dormitories were. In the previous year, the 
Sydney Morning Herald had noted in a brief article on the settlement: 'these buildings 
93 are worth seeing . , . spotlessly clean and well managed'. To the administration, these 
comments were evidence that the system was succeeding. 
The preoccupation with cleanliness was not limited to physical aspects; moral 
purity and cleanliness were also considered vitally important. Thus, visits by missionaries 
^^  Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
^ Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
^^  J.B. Freeman to Under Secretary, Home Department, 3 November 1928, QSA HOM/J692 
28/8208; J. Hooper to Under Secretary, Home Department 15 July 1927, QSA HOM/J637 27/5483; 
see also T. Nevitt to Under Secretary, Home Department 21 February 1924, QSA HOM/J502 24/1944 
and 28 July 1926, QSA HOM/J601 26/6604. 
^^  R. Holmes to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 8 April 1937, QSA A/3908 37/3672. 
3^ Courier Mail, 3 April 1937; Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 1936. 
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from the Aborigines Inland Mi.ssion to the dormitories were welcomed. They visited the 
dormitories each Friday and held Bible clas.ses in each section. Inmates were encouraged 
to attend church and Sunday School. Prayers were ritually said every morning upon 
rising while grace was recited before and after each meal. One of the main strategics 
used to keep the dormitory inmates 'pure', was to regulate interaction strictly with the rest 
of the settlement. Every effort was made to prevent the dormitory inmates from being 
corrupted by the 'real forces of evil'supposedly present in the camp. Visits to relatives 
in the camp were restricted to weekends and then only during the day - overnight visits 
were strictly forbidden. A permit was necessary regardless of the relationship between 
the inmate and host. Even a mother had to obtain permission to see her child for a 
97 couple of hours. Apart from school, the only other contact dormitory inmates had 
with other inmates was at social occasions such as corroborees, funerals, dances and the 
pictures. Interaction with the rest of the settlement was also restricted with the intention 
of keeping, the girls at least, chaste. Inappropriate sexual behaviour was forbidden. It was 
principally to prevent any 'playing around' that the girls' dormitory was surrounded by 
a six foot high barbed wire fence and the sleeping quarters locked each night and 
98 patrolled by native police. For girls of marriageable age courtship was permitted but 
only in a situation where it could be carefully monitored: 
Each afternoon at five o'clock the girls were brought by the police to an area 
in front of the girls' dormitory. Single fellows would come from the 
'^^  Our Aim, July 1933. 
'^ Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
^ Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 1936. 
97 Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988; Jimmy Edwards, interview, 
24 October 1984; Janey Arnold, 'Apartheid in Queensland,' Young Socialist July 1976: 8. 
^^  C. Fisher, 'Cherbourg,' The Australians: 1938, ed. P. Spearitt and B. Gammage (Sydney: Fairfax, 
Syme and Weldon, 1987), 85; Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
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settlement and meet the girls. Courtship was under the strict supervision of 
the police for about half an hour. 
The inevitable consequence of trying to regulate such relationships was to foster 
clandestine meetings and alliances. The fence did not prevent any girl with even a little 
desire to escape from doing so. In 1934, a Public Service Inspector called the fence an 
'exhibition of an official fiction' because although it was intended to 'keep inmates in', 
100 it was quite obvious that it did not. The fence was equally unsuccessful at keeping 
people out - all that was needed was a pair of pliers. Indeed in the 1930s to remark that 
a young man owned a 'pair of pliers' was the euphemism for saying he was having a 
relationship with a dormitory girl. 
Another strategy to keep the dormitory girls chaste was to ban all references to 
sexuality. Any comments or discussion on sexual matters were regarded as 'dirty'. As 
Ruth Hegarty, who grew up in the dormitory in the 1930s remembers: 
You were told you were dirty if you wanted to talk about anything to do with 
anything. Now when we got our monthlies, or your things, you just called it 
things , , . nobody explained to you what it was all about. Nobody told you 
we expect that sort of thing . . . They never told us about change of life. 
We used to cry because we didn't know what was going on. 
It was dirty to talk about any part of your body. If you named the name you 
were dirty for talking dirty and you'd get punished for it , , , Pregnant was a 
word you didn't u.se. If you noticed someone fictling fat and said they were 
having a baby, 'you talk dirty' was the reply. 
This conspiracy of silence had unfortunate consequences. The female inmates were ill-
equipped for adulthood. Many girls from the dormitory fell pregnant when they were 
99 Darcy Cummins, interview, 1 August 1988. 
' ^ CD. O'Brien, Report on Cherbourg Aboriginal Settlement, 23 January to 3 February 1934, 
OSA A/31710. 
^^^ Darcy Cummins, interview, 1 August 1988. 
°^^  Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
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1 AT 
sent out to work because, as Ruth Hegarty noted, they 'weren't prepared for anything'. 
Thus, instead of diminishing incidence of miscegenation, the dormitory regime only 
served to increase the number of 'Half-caste' children as most girls fell pregnant to white 
men off the settlement. 
For female inmates, one of the stated aims of the dormitory system was to train 
them in 'all of the feminine accomplishments useful in native settlement life'. Such 
training included laundering, baking, sewing, knitting and gardening. Not surpris-
ingly, there was an emphasis on skills that fostered cleanliness and neatness. But this 
training had more than a vocational purpose, for it was also a source of cheap labour. 
All of the manual work in the three dormitories was undertaken by the older girls. In 
return, the girls were provided with meals, basic clothing and accommodation. The 
sewing room in the girls' dormitory was used not only to teach sewing, but al.so to 
manufacture most of the clothes used by the dormitory inmates. Records of the number 
of items made were meticulously kept. In 1932-3 for example, a total of 1113 garments 
and 251 household articles was produced in the workroom. These arrangements helped 
to minimise the costs associated with maintaining the dormitories. A consequence of 
these practices was that it helped to reinforce in the inmates ideas of the sexual division 
of labour. Outdoor work was regarded as a male activity while domestic work was the 
responsibility of females. Further, the inmates were inculcated with the view that it was 
the role of the female to be subservient to males. Unlike the girls who were responsible 
for all the work in their dormitory, the only duties the boys had to perform each day was 
103 ibid. 
1^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 13 June 1922, QSA HOM/J431 22/5034. 
1°^  J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, 30 November 1934, QSA A/3699 34/5048. 
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making their beds. Tasks such as cleaning and scrubbing the floors were carried out by 
the older girls.^^ 
To the casual observer, the dormitory inmates appeared to enjoy privileges and 
conditions that were denied the other inmates, particularly those who lived in the camp. 
Unlike some of the structures on the settlement, there was nothing primitive or rough-
shod about the dormitory buildings. Each dormitory had a dining room, kitchen, pantry 
and sleeping quarters, and inmates received three meals a day. Yet, on clo.ser examina-
tion, conditions in the dormitories were no better, and at times were indeed worse, than 
elsewhere on the settlement. Although the dormitories contained sleeping quarters with 
beds and mattresses, this did not necessarily mean one inmate per bed (see figure 4.9). 
Overcrowding and the lack of blankets during the winter months forced the inmates to 
sleep together. In October 1934, when Mrs Crawford was appointed acting Matron she 
was astonished to find the following practice occurring: 
the school girls had two or three beds pushed together, some seven or eight 
girls sleeping on these beds, covered over with one or two blankets and the 
mattresses from the other beds. 
This was not an isolated incident as former inmates Nellie O'Chin and Viola Hill recalled 
how they slept in the one bed each winter with 'the mattress from the other bed over 
108 them' and just a couple of blankets. Those inmates who lived in the camp were at 
least able to keep warm around a camp fire. 
Although dormitory inmates were served three meals per day, the quality and 
quantity of food left them constantly hungry. As Ruth Hegarty recalled: 
^^ Darcy Cummins, interview, 1 August 1988; Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 
15 August 1988. 
^^"^ D.M. Crawford to Superintendent Cherbourg Settlement 31 October 1934, QSA A/31710 
34/11056. 
1°^  Nellie O'Chin and Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
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I was always hungry. I was never full. Wc were always looking for 
something to eat. Breakfast consisted of porridge and two pieces of bread. 
We never had hot porridge - it was always hard by the time we came to eat 
it. You could cut it with a knife. The bread used to be mildew and 
strinev - it was never fresh. We used to soak the bread in treacle to eat 
With lunch and the evening meal being of a similar standard, the inmates used a variety 
of means to supplement their diet. Food was swapped at school with the other children. 
For example, the dormitory children exchanged dried peas for 'bush tucker'. Inmates 
frequently resorted to theft as a means of overcoming hunger. The Superintendent's yard, 
situated nearby to the dormitories, contained a grove of fruit trees. As Nellie O'Chin 
recalls: 
We used to watch Boss Semple's fruit. He had a big pear tree, a verandah 
full of grapes, trees loaded with oranges. We used to sit at the fence and 
watch all the stuff, see the birds eat it. They never shared anything with 
us. 
Such abundance was irresistible to some inmates and the Superintendent's yard was raided 
on numerous occasions. Another source of extra food was the pantries in dormitories. 
On one occasion Jimmy Edwards, who had been placed in the dormitory for discipli-
nary reasons, broke into the pantry during the night, stole 'some eggs and tomatoes' and 
112 then went and shared them with his relatives in the camp. Dormitory inmates al.so 
supplemented their diet with bush food. 'Pigweed' was particularly popular because it 
was 'very filling'. The nasturtium plant was also eagerly sought and was called by the 
inmates 'the bread and butter plant' because it was eaten by placing the fiower between 
the leaves. Flowers from ti tree and silky oak trees were sucked for their sweetness. 
^^ Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
11° Nellie O'Chin, interview, 15 August 1988. 
Ill ibid. 
11^  Jimmy Edwards, interview, 24 October 1984. 
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Mussels, which could be found along the creek bank, were regarded as a delicacy. 
As discussed in the following chapter, lack of food and poor diet were by no means 
restricted to the dormitory inmates. Camp inmates also experienced problems with 
shortages of food. But whereas their shortages were spasmodic, hunger was a chronic 
problem in the dormitories. The other inmates had the opportunity when their rations 
were insufficient, of supplementing their diet by hunting and fishing. 
Confinement in a dormitory had other disadvantages. Inmates were actively 
discouraged from owning even a few meagre possessions. As a former inmate suc-
cinctly described the situation: 'you owned nothing, everything was company property'. 
For the school age children in particular, everything was shared. All the clothing was 
pooled and stored in the one room. Each morning and evening, they simply dressed in 
'what was handed' to them. The public nature of the dormitories did not encourage the 
ownership of personal items as there were no lockers or cupboards for individual use -
the sleeping quarters consisted only of beds. As Ruth Hegarty recalls: 
It was no good having anything nice. I deliberately went without socks and 
shoes in the winter although I had them. My mum bought them for me but I 
wouldn't wear them because the others would chuck off at me. 
By comparison, the other inmates were privileged. Although they did not own an 
abundance of possessions, they were at least able to own items such as horses, dogs, 
fishing lines, cricket bats and clothes. 
113 Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. Besides the lack of 
adequate food, dormitory inmates faced problems with insufficient eating utensils. An inventory of the 
girls' dormitory in 1934 revealed there were only 16 small and 78 large plates, 21 mugs, 30 spoons and 
25 forks for 90 people. The inmates were forced to eat their 'soup by soaking it in bread' and use their 
hands to eat their food (D.M. Crawford to Superintendent, Cherbourg Aboriginal Settlement 7 
November 1934; C. O'Leary to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 1 November 1934, QSA A/31710 
34/11056). 
11** Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
11^  ibid. 
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To maintain order and control in the dormitories, the inmates were governed by 
a plethora of rules and regulations. Inmates lived in fear of being punished. Penalties 
were severe even for the most minor infringement of dormitory rules. Corporal 
punishment was the most common penalty, particularly for the younger inmates. As 
mentioned, the Matron always carried a large cane when inspecting the children for 
cleanliness and the sub-Matron of the girls' dormitory had a cat-o'-nine tails which she 
was not reluctant to use. Corporal punishment however, was not limited to children. 
On one occasion Superintendent Semple struck sixteen year old Jean Stuckey 'three or 
four heavy blows with his walking stick' for allegedly giving a nurse 'check'. The blows 
were so hard that Stuckey still had 'two marks on her shoulder four and half inches long' 
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the next morning. For female inmates, another form of punishment was detention in 
the dormitory gaol, a small building with two cells at the rear of the girls dormitory. 
Inmates were gaoled for what, at least it seemed to them, were the most trivial 
misdemeanours. 'Giving a white person a back answer' for example, could result in a 
night in the cells. Being accustomed to the communal conditions in the dormitory, 
younger children found detention in the dormitory gaol a lonely and terrifying experience, 
particularly. Children usually only spent a night or weekend in gaol but for older 
women the period of detention could be much longer. In 1931, Madge Bernarvis and 
Lucy Martin were put in gaol 'every night for a fortnight for running away'. Vera 
Weazel spent an extended time in gaol when she refused to go to a job in the Longreach 
district. Her reasons for not leaving the settlement, as she told the Visiting Justice, were 
116 Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
11^  CD. O'Brien, Report on Cherbourg Aboriginal Settlement, 23 January to 3 February 1934, 
QSA A/31710. 
11^  Viola Hill remembers that she was first detained in the dormitory gaol when nine years old and 
'cried all night' (Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988). If solitary confinement was not sufficient 
enough punishment for the younger inmates, the dormitory manager had the bbxirre habit of 
'scratching on the walls during the night'. 
11^  W. Gall, memo, 9 March 1934, QSA A/31710 34/4548. 
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because she had 'two babies, one at the camp with her mother and the other at the 
Salvation Army Home at Ycronga . , , and did not want to be away from her children'. 
Even the Visiting Justice thought the punishment was 'rather drastic' in the 
120 
circumstances. The most severe punishment, and the most feared, was removal to 
another settlement. The very mention of the names Palm Island or Woorabinda invoked 
a sense of dread in the dormitory inmates. As Ruth Hegarty commented: 
They seemed so far away , , , on the other side of the world. You would 
hear all sorts of stories about those places, that they would catch you and 
marry you to an old man. 
Nellie O'Chin's sister was sent to Palm Island in the early 1930s to 'quell her rebellious 
122 ways'. By the late 1930s, mastery of the 'technology of coercive behaviour' was 
clearly evident in the dormitories as almost every aspect of the inmates' lives was 
controlled and regulated. 
The purpose of the school and dormitories, as expressed in government policy, 
was to impart in the inmates a 'limited amount of civilisation', to raise them up the 
123 
social scale. The guiding principle was succinctly expressed by Chief Protector 
Bleakley described: 'If the remnants of the race are to be saved, they will have to be 
civilized,' The term 'civili.se' infers that it was a beneficial process and to suggest 
that it was destructive or malevolent implies a contradiction. Yet the techniques used on 
Barambah were anything but civilised. The 'civilising' process was not like writing text 
onto a clean slate or filling a gla.ss with clean water. The slate first had to be cleaned. 
120 ibid. 
121 Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
122 Hope Neill, 'The Beating Heart of Australian Culture,' paper delivered at Catholic Religious 
Education Conference, Brisbane, May 1988. 
123 QPD 82 (1899): 119. 
124 QPP (1922) 2: 475. 
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the glass emptied. The process of social construction also entailed social deconstruction 
- the eradication of the inmates' identity and culture. The settlement was a means, as 
125 Denis Walker describes, of 'psychological genocide'. 
The extent to which these institutions of reform and control succeeded in their 
aims was mixed. They did achieve a degree of control and 'reformed' some aspects of 
the inmates' behaviour and lifestyles. Inmates did not openly and persistently defy the 
settlement regimen. Yet at another level, inmates resisted the attempts to remake their 
identity. Ironically, the manner in which the school and dormitories operated did not 
encourage the inmates to adopt the values of white society. In the dormitories, the 
inmates were poorly fed, denied privacy, forced to sleep in crowded conditions, separated 
from their families and sent to work throughout the state. Indeed, the oppression and 
hardship in the dormitory system only served to reinforce a sense of 'otherness' in the 
inmates. In the school, the crowded conditions and few teachers did little to foster an 
appreciation of the so-called superiority of European culture. The lack of learning 
enabled inmates to maintain their own cultural traditions and forms. 
12^  Denis Walker, 'Human Rights - the final solution,' unpublished paper, 1988, 2. 
12^  The issue of cultural resilience and identity is discussed more fully in chapter eight. 
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CHAPTER FFVE 
A DEPOT OF SEMI-STARVATION, DISEASE AND MISERY 
The health of the inmates 
With the advent of these settlements, and the appointment of medical men to attend to 
the aboriginals there has been a distinct improvement in their health (Home Secretary 
J.G. Appel, 1915).^ 
Never before have I seen a whole classroom in which the majority, if not all, of the 
children were ill-nourished These children have been ill-fed (A. Jefferis Turner, 
Director of Infant Welfare, 1937).^ 
In May 1906 the President of the Murgon Progress Association wrote to the 
Chief Protector of Aboriginals about conditions at the Barambah settlement: 
I wish you to know that the settlement, instead of being a home for the 
blacks as is intended by Parliament and the people of the state who provide 
the money is a depot of semi-starvation, disease and misery. I make this 
indictment deliberately and I challenge you to investigate as you may feel 
disposed to disprove it. 
The Chief Protector, not surprisingly, refuted the allegations. He responded to the letter 
by denying 'absolutely that . , . the natives on the settlement' were being treated in such 
a manner. The primary purpose of the settlement, at least as declared in the Aboriginals 
Protection Act, was to provide 'better protection and care for the aboriginal and half-
caste inhabitants' of the state. Therefore, to admit that the only government settlement 
was a 'depot of semi-starvation, disease and misery' would have been to acknowledge 
that the reserve system was a failure. 
1 QPD 125 (1916-17): 2289. 
2 A. Jefferis Turner to Under Secretary, Home Department, 2 December 1936, QSA A/3939 
37/9222. 
3 G. Arnell to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 27 November 1906, QSA A/31708. 
'* Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, 13 December 
1906, QSA A/31708 06/13850. 
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From the outset of the reserve system, the claim was repeatedly made that one 
of the principal rea.sons for establishing reserves was to assist in 'ameliorating the 
condition of the aboriginals' and that reserves led to a demonstrable improvement in the 
health of the inmates. In 1897, Home Secretary Tozer claimed the Fraser Island 
settlement dramatically arrested the death rate among in the local Aboriginal population. 
When the Aboriginals Protection Act was being amended in 1901, Tozer's successor, 
J.F.G. Foxton cited the example of Durundur settlement to illustrate the beneficial effect 
of the reserve system. He claimed that 110 blacks had been living on the settlement for 
eighteen months and during that time only one death had occurred. This situation, he 
claimed, contrasted with conditions in the western regions of the state where it appeared 
that 'in a very short time' there would be 'very few blacks left'. Twelve years later. 
Home Secretary Appel told the South Australian Royal Commission on Aborigines that 
wherever the government had 'the natives in hand' on settlements and missions, 'they 
were increasing in numbers'. He had no doubt that Aborigines fared better on reserves 
than in the bush. In the Chief Protector's annual reports a recurrent theme was that as 
far as health was concerned, the conditions on the reserves were superior to those in bush 
camps. The standard of health on reserves was typically reported as being 'generally 
good'or 'satisfactory'. In his 1923 report the Chief Protector drew attention to the vital 
statistics of the preceding two years which revealed that births had exceeded deaths. It 
was an indication he believed, that contrary to popular belief, 'the natives were not dying 
^ QPD (1897) 78: 1540. 
^ Tozer maintained that in the year prior to removal the number of Maryborough Aborigines 
had dropped from 102 to 46 but 'since going to Fraser Island not a single death had occurred' {QPD 
[1897] 78: 1540). 
•^  ibid., 1142. 
^ Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 88. 
' QPP (1909) 2: 1010, (1917) 3: 1005, (1919) 2: 542, (1921) 2: 559, (1926) 1: 1017, (1927) 1: 
1121. 
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out fast'. He also remarked that 'this improved vitality' was 'particularly noticeable on 
self-contained reserves'. 
The view that reserves played a vital role in halting the decline in the aboriginal 
population is by no means confined to those responsible for maintaining the system. In 
a review of Broome's Aboriginal Australians, Bridges argues that 'institutionalisation 
saved the race' and claims that even 'some fair-minded Aborigines' support this view. 
In attempting to refute the central theme of Broome's book that Aborigines were the 
victims of violence and oppression. Bridges contends that 'Aborigines were 
institutionalised not so much to protect them from unscrupulous whites as from themsel-
ves'. Even among commentators who concede that institutionalisation did perpetuate 
the oppression of Aboriginal people and the destruction of their culture, there is a 
grudging recognition that at least reserves kept blacks alive and saved them from totally 
dying out, Kamien for example, who was well aware of the impact of reserves on 
Aboriginal life and culture through his research and involvement with the Aboriginal 
community in the Bourke district, nevertheless expresses the following view: 
However, the settlement and mission system was not wholly bad and in many 
areas it contributed to the survival of the Aborigines by providing food, water 
and more recently medical attention. 
But how valid are these views? Neither Kamien nor Bridges present any evidence to 
substantiate their claims, Kamien appears to assume that because settlements and 
missions supplied food, water and medical attention, the health of Aborigines must have 
improved. Bridges' position rests on even more dubious grounds and appears merely to 
1° QPP (1923) 1: 1071. 
11 Barry Bridges, 'Aborigines as Victims Again,' Teaching History 18 (1984): 31. 
M. Kamien, 'The Aboriginal Australian Experience,' Changing Disease Patterns and Human 
Behaviour, eds. N.F. Stanley and R.A. Joske (London:Academic Press, 1980), 261. 
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be a continuation of the tradition which argued that becau.se reserves were established to 
protect and preserve, they must have indeed done so. 
The issue of the role reserves played in the survival of Aborigines and in the 
improvement of their health, has received scant attention and analysis. No doubt it is 
partly because of the lack of this analysis that views such as Bridges' 'institutionalisa-
tion saved the race' continue to be propounded. One study that has dealt with the i.ssue 
is Evans and Walker's analysis of the Fraser Island settlement in the period 1897-
1 -I 
1905, Although the settlement started on a promising note with no deaths in the first 
ten months, the situation quickly changed. The settlement was found to be riddled with 
sickness and di.sease cau.sed by a 'combination of malnutrition, insanitation and general 
debilitation'. Ankylostomiasis, a severe form of hookworm disease, became endemic. 
Inmates also suffered from 'syphilis, influenza and other bronchial and chest complaints'. 
Between February 1900 and July 1901, almost one-sixth of the settlement died when 
thirty-three deaths were recorded. In total, there were over seventy deaths in the eight 
years the settlement was in operation. As Evans and Walker poignantly describe it, such 
a situation meant that 'the alienated inmates had to watch helplessly as their numbers 
diminished and a vast burial ground of Aborigines encroached upon their camp'. Rather 
than ameliorating the condition of the Aborigines who had been removed to the island 
from all parts of the state, the settlement appeared to hasten their dcmi.se. 
13 Ray Evans and Jan Walker, '"These strangers, where are they going": Aboriginal-European 
relations in the Fraser Island and Wide Bay region 1770-1905,' Occasional Papers in Anthropology 
No 8, ed. P. Lauer (St. Lucia: Anthropology Museum, 1977), 39-105. 
I'' ibid., 87. 
1^  William Lees estimated the population at 168 when he visited the settlement in October 1901 
(William Lees, The Aboriginal Question in Queensland [Brisbane: City Printing Works, 1902], 31). 
1^  Evans and Walker, 'Aboriginal-European relations in the Fraser Island and Wide Bay region 
1770-1905,' 88-89. 
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The dismal record of the Fra.ser Island settlement rai.ses doubts about any bold 
claims that reserves were instrumental in saving the Aboriginal race. But was this an 
exception or were the patterns of ill-health repeated elsewhere, such as on Barambah? 
This chapter focuses the issue of whether the settlement succeed in improving the health 
of its inmates or was it indeed a 'depot of semi-starvation, misery and disease'? 
Mortality 
Evaluating the health of a community or group is, as Peter Moodie observed in 
Aboriginal Healtli, not an easy task. The concept of 'health' has no clearly defined edges 
and has 'components of subjectivity and relativity' which are culturally conditioned. 
Nevertheless, the use of quantitative data such as mortality statistics can 'provide some 
17 
very positive information about the health ecology'of a community. In examining the 
vital statistics for the settlement, one of the most striking features is that contrary to 
expectations, the decline in the Aboriginal population was not immediately arrested (see 
table 5.1). Indeed, it was not until the late 1920s that the birth rate began consistently 
to exceed death rate. Between 1905 and 1925, 453 births were recorded whereas there 
were more than twice that number of deaths on the settlement, a total of 923. In the 
period 1905-19, an average of one out of every eight inmates died each year. Following 
the calamitous years of 1918-19 when over 200 inmates died, there was a sharp decrease 
in the death rate. By the late 1930s the death rate had dropped to 35 per 1000. But this 
decline did not necessarily signify a significant improvement in the health of the inmates. 
1^  Peter Moodie, Aboriginal Health (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), 6, 
118. 
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Table 5.1 
Vital Statistics - 1905-
Year 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Births 
11 
10 
10 
12 
10 
14 
19 
19 
16 
20 
39 
23 
36 
32 
26 
34 
27 
23 
20 
28 
24 
30 
17 
32 
25 
38 
38 
38 
45 
40 
53 
45 
36 
43 
39 
-39 
Deaths 
30 
24 
22 
33 
25 
28 
51 
52 
60 
49 
44 
59 
28 
79 
124 
37 
28 
45 
45 
34 
26 
28 
24 
23 
24 
20 
35 
33 
36 
43 
29 
25 
30 
32 
34 
Total 
Population 
295 
237. 
214 
215 
306 
328 
351 
369 
376 
413 
530 
590 
600 
620 
540 
600 
664 
692 
663 
667 
659 
669 
669 
729 
755 
814 
801 
807 
859 
850 
901 
928 
921 
995 
983 
Birth 
Rate 
37 
42 
47 
56 
33 
43 
54 
52 
43 
48 
74 
39 
60 
52 
48 
57 
41 
33 
30 
42 
36 
45 
25 
44 
33 
47 
47 
47 
52 
47 
59 
48 
39 
43 
40 
Death 
Rate 
101 
101 
103 
154 
82 
85 
145 
141 
159 
119 
83 
100 
47 
127 
229 
62 
42 
65 
68 
51 
39 
42 
36 
32 
32 
25 
44 
41 
42 
51 
32 
27 
33 
32 
35 
(Sources: TTie figures are derived from the Annual Reports of the Chief Protector except for the 
following data: 
Population - 1916, 1917, 1918 and 1920 were estimates based on the number of removals, births and 
deaths in each year; 1919 - QSA HOM/J301 19/6468. 
Births - 1921-29 only combined figures for Barambah, Taroom and Palm Is are given. The Barambah 
figures were derived by calculating the percentage of the total population of the three settlements on 
Barambah and then calculating the proportion of births on Barambah. 
Deaths - Chief Protector of Aboriginals, Register of Deaths, 1910-36) 
169 
per 1000 
1901-05 1906-10 1911-15 1916-20 1921-25 1926-30 1931-35 1936-40 
H\\\l Barambah i l i Total Aboriginal WM Total,Australia 
Figure 5.1 Comparative Crude Death Rates - per 1000 of population 
(Sources: Australian death rates - Year Book of Australia 1954, 389. Aboriginal. Death rates - L. 
Smith, The Aboriginal Population of Australia [Canberra:ANU Press 1980], 230). 
To put the death rate in perspective, figure 5.1 compares Barambah's death rate with the 
total Aboriginal population of Australia, and also the total Australian population. 
Between 1906 and 1920, Barambah's rate was more than ten times that of the Australian 
population and almost four times that of the Aboriginal population. While there was a 
marked decline in Barambah's death rate in the following two decades, it was still three 
times the Australian rate and one and half times the Aboriginal rate. 
Coinciding with the high death rate on Barambah was a high birth rate. In the 
period 1906-40, the birth rate on Barambah was two to three times the rate for the white 
population and was consistently higher than the total Aboriginal rate (sec figure 5.2). For 
the Chief Protector and others, the high birth rate was an indication the settlement was 
170 
per 1000 
1906-10 1911-15 1916-20 1921-25 1926-30 1931-35 1936-40 
Barambah E l Total Aboriginal Total Australia 
Figure 5.2 Comparative Birth Rates - per 1000 of population 
(Sources: .see figure 5.1) 
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a virile and healthy community, that the inmates 'liked life there'. But to infer that the 
high birth rate was an indicator of good health is quite presumptuous. As Moodie has 
ob.served: 'there is considerable justification for regarding high fertility as a 'disea.sc' of 
the community in iLs own right, particularly if high fertility is uncontrolled'. On 
Barambah, the high birth rate was probably partly due to a loss of traditional methods 
of fertility control. Al.so the dormitory system disrupted the transmission of knowledge 
about .sexual matters between generations. According to one inmate, the high incidence 
of pregnancies among girls when they first went out to work was because 'they were not 
1^  QPP (1923)1: 1071; P. Tcnnison, 'Cherbourg,' Modem Times, August 1948, 41. Apart from 
suggesting that the population was growing from year to year proved that the blacks liked living on 
the settlement, Tcnnis<"»n went so far as to claim 'it is .something like their idea of Utopia'. 
19 Peter Mcxxlic, Aboriginal Health, .38. 
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Table 5.2 
Infant Mortality 1906-38 
Year 
1906-10* 
1911-15 
1916-20 
1921-25 
1926-30 
1931-35 
1936-38* 
Births 
25 
113 
151 
122 
142 
214 
124 
Deaths 
8 
48 
44 
42 
38 
46 
29 
Rate 
(per 1000) 
320 
425 
291 
344 
268 
215 
233 
* incomplete 
(Sources: Register of Deaths, 1910-36; Tronson Diary, 1905; Monthly Reports of the Superintendent, 
June 1937, QSA A/3932 37/7900; July 1937, QSA A/3936 37/8670; Augu.st 1937, QSA A/3939 
37/9300; October 1937, QSA A/3953 37/11854; November 1937, QSA A/3965 38/1222; March 1938, 
OSA A/3982 38/4662; April 1938, QSA A/3989 38/5777; June 1938, QSA Ay4001 38/7722; July 1938, 
OSA A/4009 38/9023). 
20 taught anything . . . or prepared for adulthood'. One of the consequences of the above 
average birth rate on Barambah was that abnormally high demands were placed on very 
21 limited resources. Thus the excessive number of births, far from being an indication 
of good health, pointed to the existence of multiple health problems, particularly among 
mothers and children. 
The poor state of health on the settlement is also refiected in the infant mortality 
rate which is generally regarded by epidemiologists as the 'best single indicator not only 
of the state of a community's health but also of its economic, social and educational 
22 
situation'. Clearly, the incidence of infant deaths confirms the poor state of health that 
existed on the settlement (see table 5.2). In the first decade, almost half the children 
20 Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
1^ Gillian Colinshaw, 'The Determinants of Fertility Among Australian Aborigines,' Mankind 
13 (1981): 37-55. 
D. Gordon, Health, sickness and society: Theoretical concepts in social and preventative 
medicine (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1976), 141. 
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500 
per 1000 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
1906-10 1911-15 1916-20 1921-25 1926-30 1931-35 1936-40 
Barambah Australia 
Figure 5 3 Comparative Infant Mortality Rates 
(Source: Au.stralian figures -CM. Young, Mortality Pattems and Trends in Australia [Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Scp/ice, 1976], 11). 
born did not live for more than twelve months. In the period 1916-25, one out of every 
three did not survive infancy. By the late 1920s, a quarter of all children born lived less 
than a year. TTie infant mortality rate was to remain at around 250 per 1000 well into 
23 
the 1950s. As with the overall mortality rate, the infant mortality rale was signif-
icantly higher than the Australian rate (.see figure 5.3). Until the 1920s, the Barambah 
rate was between four and five times the Australian rate. In the 1930s, however, it was 
between six and .seven times higher than the Australian rate. Although both rates 
declined in the period 1906-40, the fall in the Barambah rate was modest compared with 
the improvement in the rest of Australia. The infant mortality rate for Australia was 
A.E. Dugdale, Infant feeding, growth and mortality: a 20-ycar study of an Australian 
Aboriginal community. Medical Joumal of Australia (1980) 2: 381. 
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halved in this period while the Barambah rate only declined 20 percent. The public 
health measures which resulted in the significant decrease in infant mortality in the 
general community had a negligible impact on the settlement. 
Causes of mortality 
The causes of death ranged from suicide to heart failure to pneumonia and 
complication from infiuenza (see table 5.3). Of the infectious di.sea.ses, the most severe 
in terms of casualties were tuberculosis and pneumonia. At the turn of the century, 
tuberculosis was the leading cau.se of death in Australia but the introduction of various 
public health measures resulted in a significant decline in the number of fatalities from 
25 the disease by the 1940s. The advances in the treatment of tuberculosis, however were 
not evident on Barambah. Indeed, the disease became more prevalent in the 1920s. In 
the period 1920-29, there were a total of sixty-eight deaths from tuberculosis compared 
with thirty-two in the previous decade. In 1922, out of a total of forty-five deaths on 
the settlement, eleven were attributed to tuberculosis. Tuberculosis was an endemic 
problem which affected not only the older inmates. Of the fifteen cases reported between 
January 1936 and July 1938, eleven were under thirty and almost half the victims were 
77 
eighteen years or younger. 
D. Gordon, Health, sickness and society, 189-90; R. Patrick,/I history of Health and Medicine 
in Queensland 1924-1960 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1988), 204-206, 158-64. 
R. Patrick, A history of Health and Medicine in Queensland 84. 
^^  Register of Deaths, 1922. Tuberculosis was a major health problem among Aboriginal people. 
At Point McLeay settlement in South Australia, 13 percent of all deaths between 1864 and 1894 were 
attributed to tuberculosis while at Point Pearce 28 percent of deaths were a result of tuberculosis in 
the period 1880-99 (Peter Moodie, Aboriginal Health, 148). 
^^  see note to Table 5.5. Tuberculosis was to remain a chronic problem on the settlement well 
into the 1950s. In 1958, a forty bed hospital was constructed specially for TB patients. However, 
it was never fully occupied and was turned into a general hospital {South Bumett Times, 17 April 
1958; R. Patrick, A history of Health and Medicine in Queensland, 218). 
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Table 53 
Causes of death: 1910-1936 
Cause 
Infectious Diseases 
tuberculosis 
pneumonia/infiuenza 
childhood diseases 
venereal disease 
bronchitis 
enteritis and other 
diarrhoeal diseases 
other 
Deaths 
130 
253 
25 
105 
45 
25 
49 
Percent 
11,7 
22.9 
2,3 
9,5 
4,1 
2,3 
4.4 
Organ-related diseases 
heart disease 
brain 
other (kidney, liver) 
cancer 
circulatory diseases 
Accidents 
Nutritional related diseases 
Senile Decay/old age 
Infancy (convulsions, birth 
related problems) 
Other 
Unknown 
Total 
66 
12 
17 
8 
18 
19 
62 
99 
115 
43 
16 
1107 
6.0 
1,1 
1,5 
0,7 
1,6 
1,7 
5,6 
8,9 
10,4 
3,9 
1,4 
100.0 
(Source: Register of Deaths, 1910-36) 
Pneumonia and infiuenza accounted for more deaths than any other single cause, 
Infiuenza epidemics were reported at Barambah in 1907, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1915, 1918, 
1919, 1922, 1924, 1933 and 1939,^^ They became so frequent that on one occasion the 
Chief Protector noted in his annual report that the 'usual epidemic' had occurred at 
2^  QPP (1908) 3: 9.39, (1909) 2: 1010, (1911) 3: 1313, (1912) 2: 1015, (1916) 3: 1738, (1919) 
2: 542, (1920) 2: 231, (1923) 1: 1071, (1925) 1: 1091, (1934): 882, (1939) 2: 1330. 
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Barambah.^^ Usually, these outbreaks claimed no more than 'a few victims' but in 1918 
and 1919, the epidemics were of a quite different magnitude. When infiuenza broke out 
in 1918, 119 persons were affected. Sixty-seven of these cases developed into 
pneumonia of which twenty-six proved to be fatal. There were a total of 77 deaths in 
30 that year, the highest recorded up to that time. 
In 1919, the settlement was devastated by what became known as the 'Spanish' 
infiuenza pandemic. This pandemic which eventually claimed thirty million victims 
31 
worldwide, reached Queensland in early May 1919, The fir.st evidence of an outbreak 
32 
on Barambah appeared on 25 May. Just three days later, the epidemic had claimed 
thirty-five victims. After a week the number of fatalities had increased to sixty-seven. 
The final toll after the epidemic subsided was eighty-seven and only eight inmates 
remained unaffected. Although children were affected, none died. Of those who died, 
males outnumbered females by a ratio of two to one. This pattern parallels what 
McQueen describes as the 'most distinguishing characteristic' of the pandemic; the 
34 
abnormally high incidence among males in the twenty-five to forty age group. 
Although the pandemic had a major impact throughout Australia resulting in over 12 000 
2^  QPP (1939) 2: 330. 
^ QPP (1919)2: 542. 
^^ Humphrey McQueen, The "Spanish" Influenza Pandemic in Australia, 1912-19,' Social 
Policy in Australia, ed. J. Roe (Sydney: Cassell, 1976), 131-147; R. Patrick,/I history of Health and 
Medicine in Queensland, 241. 
^^ The epidemic had such a dramatic impact on the settlement that even after fifty-five years 
Evelyn Serico could recall the name of the person who supposedly brought the virus to Barambah. 
As she recalled: 
He was an outsider, Bertie Devane. They must have sent him in. They must have 
known he had it. It wasn't fair. He didn't belong to the settlement. 1 often wondered 
whether there was a connection with that, why did they put him into Cherbourg. He 
wasn't an inmate of Cherbourg (interview 4 December 1984). 
^^ Dr D. Junk to Commissioner of Public Health, 25 May, 3,4,14, 
20 and 27 June 1919, QSA HOM/J301 19/6468. 
^ Humphrey McQueen, 'The 'Spanish' Influenza Pandemic in Australia,' 141. 
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deaths and causing major social upheaval, it had an even greater impact on the .settlement. 
The mortality rate on Barambah - 143 per 1000 - was seven times the rate for the rest 
of Australia, The swiftness and severity with which the epidemic hit was like a mini-
holocaust. So many deaths occurred in such a short time that people were wrapped in 
blankets and buried in mass graves. Many victims died huddled around a fire and in 
35 
order to straighten their bodies for burial, their legs had to be broken. 1919 was a 
fateful year on the settlement. A total of 124 inmates died during the year which 
represented 20 percent of the population. In subsequent years, although outbreaks of 
influenza did not occur on the scale of 1918-19, pneumonia and influenza remained the 
leading cause of death. 
Like infiuenza, the childhood infectious diseases, measles and whooping cough 
usually appeared on the settlement in epidemic proportions. Epidemics of whooping 
cough were reported in 1910, 1931-2, 1936 and 1938. Serious outbreaks of measles 
occurred in 1907, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1916, 1925, 1933 and 1937.^^ The 
most severe epidemics of measles occurred in 1913 and 1916. In 1913 there were four 
37 
fatalities and three years later the seven inmates suffered fatal attacks. The group most 
vulnerable group to whooping cough were childen aged two years and under. An 
epidemic of whooping cough in November 1931 resulted in the deaths of no less than 
eight infants. In the 1936 epidemic there were two fatalities, one seven months old and 
^^ Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982; Evelyn Serico, interview, 4 December 1984. 
^ Whooping cough - QPP (1911) 3: 1313, (1937) 2: 1194, (1939) 2: 1330; Our Aim, December 
1931. Measles - A.G.C. Hawthorn, Inspection of Barambah 1 May 1908, QSA A/31708 08/6326; 
QPP (1909) 2: 1010, (1911) 3: 1322, (1912) 2: 1015, (1926) 1: 1017, (1934): 882, (1938) 2: 1097. 
"^^  Register of Deaths, 1913, 1916. 
^ W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 7 December 1931, QSA A/3555 31/9445; Our 
Aim, December 1931. 
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the other eighteen months. Another childhood infectious di.sease that appeared on the 
settlement was poliomyelitis. The only serious outbreak of this disea.sc was in 1937 when 
the settlement was placed in quarantine for six months. There were two fatalities while 
a number of others were left partly crippled. 
A less frequently occurring infectious disea.se was typhoid fever. Epidemics were 
reported in 1915 and 1926 and a small outbreak occurred in 1935. On each occasion 
the number of fatalities was small. The 1915 outbreak claimed three victims while in 
1926 two deaths were reported. One consequence of the 1915 epidemic was the 
closure of the school for over four months due to the school teacher Augusta Lip.scombe 
catching the fever. When typhoid fever was detected on the settlement in 1926, extra 
nurses were called in and the settlement was placed in quarantine in an attempt to 
minimise the effects of the fever. Despite these measures, a total of seventy inmates 
caught the fever, although most ca.ses were not serious. An inoculation program in 
1934 very likely contributed to the low incidence of the fever when there was an 
outbreak in 1935. Only three serious ca.ses were detected and just one proved to be 
fatal - a boy who 'had been too weak to be inoculated'. 
^^  November 1936 report, QSA A/3885 36/12116. 
'*° J.W. Bleakley to Superintendent, Cherbourg Aboriginal .settlement, 17 September 1937, QSA 
A/3937 37/8976; South Bumett Times 17 December 1937, 25 February 1938. 
^^ September report, QSA A/3947 37/10858; December report, QSA A/3965 38/1345. 
'^^ QPP (1916) 3: 1738, (1927) 1: 1121; Courier Mail, 27 February 1935. 
^^ Register of Deaths, 1915, 1926. 
^ QPP (1927) 1: 1121. 
^^ Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Under Secretary, Home Department, 18 March 1934, QSA 
A/4741 "Reserves - Southern", 
46 May 1935 report, QSA A/3779 35/8310. 
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Of the other specific causes of death, heart di.sea.se was one cause where the 
incidence was not significantly different from the rest of the state's population. In the 
period 1936-38, the death rate in Queensland for diseases of the heart was 1.87 deaths 
per 1000 while by comparison the Barambah rate was 2.46 per 1000. Similarly, 
violence and accidents did not figure prominently in the mortality statistics. There was 
only three reported suicides - two in 1928 and one 1938 - and just one ca.se of 
48 
homicide. In 1922 George Tyson, who was recogni.scd as a 'clever man', was 
murdered by four inmates after he had 'boned' the wife of one of the offenders. While 
deaths as a result of complications in childbirth did not figure prominently in the 
mortality statistics, the risks associated with childbirth were significant. On average, 
one in every fifty deliveries resulted in the death of the mother; a rate that was three 
times greater than that of the Australian population. The high maternal mortality rate 
paralleled the high infant mortality rate. Childbirth was a risky enterpri.se for both the 
child and mother. 
Almost 9 percent of all deaths on the settlement were attributed to the ambiguous 
causes, 'senility', 'old age' or 'natural causes'. These terms were convenient to use when 
the cau.se of death was difficult to determine or there were multiple causes. Undoubtedly 
deaths did occur that could have been reasonably attributed to senile decay or aging. But 
such terms could also be used to mislead or disguise other causes of death. The number 
of deaths attributed to senility and old age conveys the impression many inmates enjoyed 
a normal life span and that they died contentedly, free from trauma and suffering. Yet, 
^"^ Queensland Year Book 1939 (Brisbane: Government Statistician, 1939), 62. 
'^ Register of Deaths, 1928; South Bumett Times, 11 March 1938. 
"' Circuit Court, Kingaroy, 8 May 1923, QSA HOM/J466 23/4068. 
^^  D. Gordon, Health, sickness and society, 145. 
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classifying persons as 'aged'was a subjective exercise. In 1937 for example, when the 
Superintendent was reporting the deaths of inmates he described the cases as follows: 
female, venereal di.sease, aged 
very old man 
female, very old, senility 
male, aged, degeneration, heart failure. 
52 The respective ages of these persons was forty, sixty-four, fifty-nine and forty-three. 
The term 'aged' obviously had a different meaning on the settlement. At forty years, a 
person could be considered elderly and very old at sixty years. In one sense, such 
descriptions were reasonable as few inmates lived more than sixty years. In 1928, less 
than 2 percent of the inmates were sixty or over and compared with 9 percent in total 
53 Queensland population. The different understanding of the term 'old age' disguised the 
low life expectancy of the Barambah inmates, for only a small number experienced what 
was then considered to be a 'normal life span'. 
One cause of numerous deaths, which the department never acknowledged and 
indeed, was masked by such terms as 'senility' and 'old age', was trauma as a result of 
removal. In attempting to explain the high death rate on Barambah in 1912, the Chief 
Protector argued that it was because of the 'large numbers of natives removed when in 
the last stages of disea.se and senile decay'. For the sick, the trauma of being removed 
^^  W. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 23 June 1937 QSA A/3926 37/6676; 23 July 
1937, QSA A/3932 37/7900; 24 August 1937, QSA A/3936 37/8670; 23 November 1937, QSA A/3953 
37/11854. 
2^ Aboriginal Census, Barambah Settlement, June 1928, QSA HOM/J686 28/7056. 
5^  ibid.; Queensland Year Book 1939, 41. 
One woman who lived on the settlement for many years and was generally regarded as being 
very old was Jenny Lind. She was recognised as the Queen of the Wakka Wakka and was supposedly 
100 years old when she died (Headstone, Cherbourg cemetery). Her age may well have been 
overstated by twenty years but nevertheless to have survived even eighty years was a remarkable 
achievement 
55 QPP (1913) 3: 1089. 
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from their land and separated from their kinship network, would have only exacerbated 
the severity of their illness. When Archibald Meston removed a group of thirty-two 
Aborigines from Barcaldine to Durundur in June 1902, one person died the day after 
arrival, and another two in the first six weeks. In 1928, when Rosie Holt was removed 
from the Springsure district to Woorabinda, she lived for only three weeks after arriving 
on the settlement. According to her grand-daughter, once she became separated from 
57 
her family, she ju.st 'went into the bush to die - she didn't have the will to live'. The 
seemingly innocuous terms 'senility' and 'old age' provided a convenient means of 
masking the brutality and violence of the removals process. 
Morbidity 
Although the data on morbidity is not as comprehensive as that on mortality, 
what is available does confirm the pattern of ill-health revealed in the mortality statistics 
(see table 5.4). Just as infiuenza and pneumonia were the most common cause of death 
so they were the most common complaints, accounting for 45 percent of cases treated. 
As a group, infectious diseases predominated. Tuberculosis, diarrhoeal problems, 
hookworm, infiuenza and pneumonia and ophthalmia accounted for 73 percent of all 
complaints. This figure confirms what the analysis of the mortality statistics has revealed, 
that infectious diseases were the major cause of ill-health on the settlement. Apart from 
CO 
infiuenza, the most common complaint was ophthalmia, or more precisely, trachoma. 
As Moodie has noted, this disea.se has had a long history of endemicity among Aboriginal 
^^  Tronson Diary, 16 June, 2 and 4 August 1902. 
^^  Rita Huggins, interview, 7 December 1984. 
R. Patrick, A history of Health and Medicine in Queensland, 18. 
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Table 5.4 
Morbidity 1920 
Cause 
Infectious diseases 
influenza,pneumonia 
diarrhoeal problems 
tuberculosis 
ophthalmia 
hookworm 
Nutritional deficiencies 
Heart 
Senility 
Accidents 
Convulsions 
Other 
Total 
Number 
n 
4 
24 
12 
19 
•6 
7 
« 
4 
183 
Percent 
4S 
7 
2 
13 
6 
10 
3 
3 
4 
2 
100 
(Source: Treatment at hospital, Barambah, June - December 1920, 
OSA HOM/J377 21/1309) 
groups particularly in dry areas. The prevalence of the trachoma was due to two 
factors, the climate and environment. The hot, dry and dusty climate combined with 
'repeated secondary infection due to the poor personal hygiene, the use of clothing and 
blankets which [were] rarely washed, and flies', to place great stress on the conjunctiva. 
While the climatic conditions encouraged the spread of one di.sease, it aLso 
inhibited the spread of another, hookworm. The tragic spectacle which occurred on 
Fraser Island of inmates being reduced to 'earth eaters' as a result of internal parasites 
was not repeated on Barambah. The only reference to earth-eating was in September 
1906 when the Superintendent reported the death of Gomme, an 'earth eater'. 
Hookworm nevertheless was a problem on the settlement. A survey conducted in 1920 
Peter Moodie, Aboriginal Health, 162. 
60 ibid. 
61 BJ. Lipscombe to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 26 November 1906, QSA POA/Kl. 
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as part of the Au.stralian Hookworm Campaign found that despite the .settlement being 
in a 'region that was considered outside the area of endemic hookworm di.sease', 
hookworm was present in 25 percent of the population. This figure compared with 1.4 
63 
percent in the immediate district and an overall rate for Queensland of 9.2 percent. 
After a systematic treatment program and improvements were made to sanitation, a follow 
up survey twelve months later found the rate of infection was half the previous level. 
Leprosy was the one di.sease that was considered too contagious and dangerous 
to be treated on the settlement. Suspected sufferers were sent to the Peel Island lazaret 
but not all ca.ses were accurately diagnosed. Prior to 1940, there was no effective 
treatment of leprosy. Yet some Barambah inmates did return to the settlement after a 
period at the lazaret. Billy Moss, for example, was sent to the island in August 1908 
and two years later the Medical Superintendent reported that he had 'shown no symptoms 
of the disease for six months'. Clara Don was removed to Peel Island in 1933 and 
within three years she was allowed to return to Cherbourg. Not all patients managed 
to return so quickly. Annie Woods was tested negatively for the disea.se in 1926 but was 
not transferred to the settlement until 1933. A total of eight cases were diagnosed on 
Barambah; one in 1908, another in 1919, four in 1933 and two in 1937. This number 
W.A. Sawyer and A. Ping, 'An Investigation of hookworm disease at the Barambah Aboriginal 
settlement,' Reports of the Australian Hookworm Campaign, 2 (1921): 819. 
ibid., 829; Australian Hookworm Campaign, Final Report of the Australian Hookworm 
Campaign, 1st October 1919 to 30th September 1924 (Brisbane: 1924), 21. 
^ Sawyer and Ping, 'Investigation of hookworm disease on Barambah Aboriginal settlement' 
830. 
6^  Dr. L G. Row to Under Secretary, Home Department, 18 June 1910, QSA COL/280, "Billy 
Moss" file. 
^ Dr. J. Cofi'ey to Under Secretary, Department of Public Health, 22 September 1936, QSA 
COL/277, "Clara Don" file. 
6'^  Dr. F. Challands to Under Secretary, Home Department, 23 January 1933, QSA COL/283, 
"Annie Woods" file. 
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does not appear significant but when compared with the total number of admi.ssions to 
Peel Island, a disproportionate share were from Barambah as well as the other Aboriginal 
fro 
settlements and missions. 
Contrary to the repeated assertions of the Chief Protector, the health of the 
settlement was far from satisfactory. The state of the inmates' health as revealed in the 
mortality and morbidity statistics stand in stark contrast to his glib comments. By any 
standards, the mortality rate was high. In the first fifteen years of the settlement, an 
average of one in eight inmates died each year and one in every three children born did 
not survive more than twelve months. The overall mortality rate improved in the 1920s, 
children still had a one in four chance of not surviving infancy. As well, epidemics of 
various kinds regularly swept through the settlement. Yet, despite the claims about the 
health of inmates and a reluctance to draw attention to the mortality rate, successive 
Chief Protectors and other officials did acknowledge that the number of deaths on 
Barambah was higher than might be expected. But they strongly refuted any suggestion 
that the above average death rate was as a result of conditions on the settlement or that 
is was a reflection on its administration. Rather, the Chief Protector and others 
maintained the reasons for the high death rate were beyond their control. 
The most repeated explanation for the above average death rate was that is was 
a result of the 'many old, indigent and sick' who were 'sent to the settlement when 
unable to care for themselves'. As Chief Protector Bleakley described the settlement 
on one occasion, it was: 
a dumping ground for ca.ses that the charitable Missions are not always eager 
to receive - the lame, the halt and the incorrigible. Many of these deportees 
^ QPP (1938) 2: 935; Courier Mail, 18 November 1933. 
6^  QPP (1938) 2: 1104. 
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are received only in lime to ease their last hours and these and delicate 
children born of parents whose constitutions when they were sent were 
undermined with di.sea.sc, drink, opium and prostitution. 
Thus the inference was that if Barambah was a more 'normal' reserve, the death rate 
would have been much lower. The second reason was the supposedly inherent weakness 
of the 'native constitution'. In 1913, Chief Protector Howard explained to the South 
Australian Royal Commission on Aborigines that 'natives were more su.sceptible to 
71 disease than whites'. Similarly, the Visiting Justice in 1926 felt that the health of the 
settlement was 'more than satisfactory' considering it was 'a well known fact that the 
72 
average coloured person' did not have the 'resisting powers of the white to di.sease'. 
The Superintendent frequently attributed the cause of death to the weakness of the 
individual. Comments such as 'the child was always weakly' and 'this girl was always 
73 
more or less ailing' were common in his monthly reports. There was no suggestion 
that the conditions on the settlement may have contributed to the deaths. During the 
1919 influenza epidemic the settlement Medical Officer Dr Junk told the Commissioner 
of Public Health he felt the di.sease was 'not of a very severe type': a remarkable 
statement considering the number of victims worldwide who succumbed to the epidemic. 
He claimed the high number of fatalities was becau.se 'our poor aborigines make bad 
HA 
subjects for any di.sease whatever'. The third reason for the high death rate was clo.sely 
related to the second. As well as physical weaknesses, it was believed that the native 
70 QPP (1914) 3: 1028. 
^' Minutes of evidence of Royal Commission on Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 88. 
^^  T. Nevitt to Under Secretary, Home Department 10 December 1926, QSA HOM/J612 
26/10603. 
^^  July 1937 report, QSA A/3936 37/8670; November 1937 report QSA A/3965 38/1222. 
^^ Dr. D. Junk to Commissioner of Public Health, 28 May 1919, QSA HOM/J301 19/6468. 
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psyche was also flawed: They were 'born fatalists' and died 'very easily'.^ If Aborigines 
were going to die, 'no surgery or medicine, however modern', could save them. This 
argument was also u.scd by Junk in explaining the abnormally high death rate in the 1919 
epidemic. He suggested that 
a great many died of simple funk and some through grief and panic made 
little resistance or even courted death. There can be no doubt of this 
fatalistic creed among Australian aborigines. 
These explanations were without substance and served as excuses for 
governmental inaction and indifference. The claim that the death rate was inflated 
because of the large number of old and sick who were removed to the settlement cannot 
be sustained on several accounts. First, the number of persons removed because they 
were old or in need of medical attention was quite small. Between 1922 and 1930, only 
77 
five people were removed for these reasons. In the same period, there were 297 deaths 
on the settlement. Assuming that all five died soon after arrival, such removals would 
have accounted for only 1.7 percent of all deaths. Secondly, the mortality statistics 
indicate that deaths were not confined to the old or chronically ill. Infants accounted for 
78 
20 percent of all deaths. The majority of tuberculosis victims were aged under thirty. 
The prevalence of death among the younger inmates was noted by Chief Protector 
Howard following a visit to the settlement in 1913. He reported to the Home Secretary 
that he had discovered, much to his surprise, that a number of 'young and apparently 
7Q 
Strong young people'had recently pa.ssed away. The evidence for the second and third 
'^ P. Tennison, 'Cherbourg,' Modem Times, August 1948, 5; Sydney Morning Herald, 21 
November 1936. 
''^ Dr. D. Junk to Commissioner of Public Health, 3 June 1919, QSA HOM/J301 19/6468. 
'^ '^  Register of Removals, 1922-30. 
''^ Register of Deaths, 1910-1936. 
'^ ^ R. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Department, 22 September 1913, QSA HOM/JllO 
13/12934. 
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claims was even more tenuous than the first. Although a major cause of the dramatic 
decline in the Aboriginal population throughout the nineteenth century was disease, the 
claim that Aborigines were more su.sceptiblc to disea.se than whites was ba.sed more on 
prevailing views on race than any scientific evidence. Likewise, the notion that 
Aborigines were fatalists sprang more from populist 'doomed race' theories than any 
scientific or rational observations. The arguments, viewed in retrospect, defied logic and 
were an example of circular rea.soning: 
® Aborigines were a weaker race than Europeans becau.se of the ea.se with 
which they succumbed to disease; they succumbed to disease because 
they were an inferior race, 
° Aborigines were fatalists because of the ease with which they died; 
because of their fatalism, aborigines died quickly. 
Such arguments were essentially racist and buttressed the myth that the Aborigines were 
on 
both culturally and physically 'thousands and thousands of years behind the white race'. 
Factors influencing quality of health 
In attempting to explain the high death rate, the department studiously avoided 
referring to any factors which suggested that they were in any way responsible. Rather, 
the focus was on the inmates. Death were a result of the victim being old, sick, fatalistic 
81 
or susceptible to disease. Inmates died despite the best intentions of the government. 
The system was not at fault, the inmates were to blame. As a consequence, the impres-
sion was created that there was nothing untoward about the conditions on the settlement 
^ QPD 174 (1939): 453. 
*^ The government was always eager to highlight the medical facilities provided on settlement. 
In 1910 a small hospital with four beds was erected and in 1921 it was replaced by a much larger 
building with accommodation for thirty patients (see Figure 5.4). This building and its equipment, in 
the government's view compared 'very favourably with any other country hospitals'. But as the visiting 
Medical Officer observed, the quality of care was influenced much more by the competence and of 
the staff, as well as the number employed, than the facilities (Dr. D. Junk to Home Secretary, 13 July 
1927, QSA HOM/J637 27/5479). As discu.ssed in chapter three, complaints about the competence 
of the nursing staff resulted in more than one investigation of the administration of the hospital. 
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Figure 5.4 Hospital erected in 1921 
or the way inmates were treated. The environment on the settlement was not unhealthy, 
it was maintained, only the inmates. Thus in alluding to the old and sick who were 
removed to the settlement as well as their vulnerability to disease, the department 
attempted to conceal the real reasons for the high death rate. Yet, the health of the 
inmates cannot be discussed without reference to the social and environmental condi-
tions that prevailed on the settlement. The prominence of infectious diseases as a cause 
of morbidity and mortality clearly suggest that factors such as the quality of the water 
supply, sanitation, diet and to a lesser extent overcrowding and migration were of critical 
importance in determining the level of health on the settlement. 
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(a) water supply 
The settlement's water supply came almost exclusively from Barambah creek 
which formed the northern border of the reserve. As di.scu.ssed in chapter one, the 
availability of a good water supply played a decisive role in the original selection of the 
Barambah reserve. The owners of Barambah station claimed that Barambah creek 
provided 'a never failing supply of running water' and some of the waterholcs were large 
82 enough to 'fioat a moderately sized ship'. Initially, water was obtained when required 
from the creek in buckets and tins and stored in containers. In 1918, a reticulated water 
service was installed that gave some inmates easier access to water. Water was pumped 
from the creek to two elevated tanks and distributed to the hospital, dormitories, quarters 
83 
and several cottages. The scheme cost almost £300 and like most other improvements 
84 
on the settlement was funded from the Aboriginal Property Protection Account, In the 
following twenty years, apart from connecting new dormitories to the service, no attempt 
was made to improve the availability of water to the rest of the settlement. A survey 
in 1936 revealed that only 27 percent of the population, most of whom were dormitory 
85 
inmates, had access to reticulated water. As a result of this survey extensions were 
made to the water service and by 1939, two-thirds of the settlement had access to 
reticulated water. The cost of these improvements were met by reallocating £400 in the 
department's budget that was set aside as 'bonus payments to aboriginal workers'. 
^^  Moore Bros, to Under Secretary, Department of Public Lands, 8 November 1900, JOL 
OM.AK/3/2, 94. 
^^  QPP (1919)2: 543; J.B. Freeman to Home Secretary, 3 November 1928, QSA HOM/J692 
28/8208. 
^ QPP (1918) 1: 1681, (1919) 2: 546. 
^^  Secretary, Department of Irrigation and Water Supply to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 9 
June 1936, QSA A/31710 39/5632. 
^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 12 October 
1937 and 30 May 1939, QSA A/31710 39/5632. 
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The benefits of reticulated water were mixed. Obviously, a plentiful supply of 
water was preferable to none or only a meagre supply. But as the reticulated water was 
simply pumped from the creek to the .settlement without undergoing any treatment, there 
was no improvement in the quality of water the inmates obtained. The risks in using 
water from the creek, regardless of the means by which it was obtained, were not 
insignificant as Barambah creek was polluted by a number of sources. Regular pollutants 
were cattle not only from the settlement herd but also from properties upstream using the 
creek for drinking. The creek was also used constantly by the inmates for bathing and 
on 
swimming. Human excreta was another problem. In 1921, the Australian Hookworm 
Campaign report on the settlement noted that 'as a result of the lack of privies amongst 
the aborigines, the banks of the creek . . . were being constantly polluted with human 
88 
excreta'. The hospital septic system also caused problems and was a constant 'source 
of worry' for the Superintendent, Due to the rocky ground where it was located, the 
effluent was not properly absorbed and particularly when there was a storm, found its 
'way readily down the gully towards the creek'. The system was installed in 1922 but 
the problem was not rectified until 1937 when major improvements were made to the 
00 
sewerage system on the settlement. 
The extent to which pollution from these sources presented a health risk on the 
settlement was determined partly by the volume of water flowing in the creek. The 
potential for infection from waterborne micro-organisms increased when the creek 
stopped flowing. Analysis of stream flow records indicate that in the period 1923-37, 
^"^ Rita Huggins, interview, 10 December 1984. 
^ Sawyer and Ping, 'Investigation of hookworm disease on Barambah Aboriginal settlement,' 
828. 
^' W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 13 June 1935, QSA A/3779 35/8310. 
^ Secretary, Department of Irrigation and Water Supply to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 9 
June 1936, QSA Ay31710 39/5632. 
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Barambah creek did not flow for a total of 961 days.^ This figure represents just over 
one-sixth of the total period. Usually when the creek did cease flowing, it was for an 
extended period. For example, in 1923 and again in 1926 the creek stopped running for 
over ten months. The creek aLso cea.scd to flow for an eight month period in 1936-
Q2 
37. Fortunately, the settlement was situated close to a large waterhole which provided 
water in dry periods. The quality of the water, however, was another matter. The longer 
the water had been stagnant, the greater it became a risk to the inmates' health. 
Significantly, the two major outbreaks of typhoid fever, which is commonly transmitted 
by water, occurred after the creek had been stagnant for a lengthy period. When the 
1915 epidemic occurred, the creek had not been running for eighteen months; while it 
had stopped flowing for nine months when the 1926 outbreak occurred. Also during the 
severe dry period in 1915 there was a epidemic of dysentery which is more commonly 
transferred by polluted water than even typhoid fever. Other diseases which occurred 
on Barambah and were occasionally transmitted by waterborne micro-organisms were 
measles and poliomyelitis. 
(b) sanitation 
Prior to 1920, sanitary services were almost non-existent. In the early years of 
the settlement the lack of such facilities did not present an undue health risk. During 
a visit in 1908 Home Secretary Hawthorn noticed that although there were no sanitary 
^^  Queensland Water Resources Commission, Streamflow records. Barkers creek (station 
13610A) and Barambah creek (station 136202C). These stations are located upstream of the 
settlement and the recordings were combined to arrive at a figure for the stream flow past the 
settlement 
92 ibid. 
9"^  R. Patrick, A history of Health and Medicine in Queensland, 224. 
9'* G. French, 'Water in Relation to Human Disease,' Environmental Medicine, ed. G.M. Howe, 
(London: Heinemann, 1973), 62. 
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conveniences, 'the blacks frequently shift[ed] their camps from place to place so that the 
ground [did] not become stale'. He recommended to the Superintendent to see 'that this 
[was] done often and at regular intervals'. As the population increa.sed and it became 
more difficult for the inmates to shift their camps regularly, the inadequacies of the 
sanitary measures became more evident. When the Australian Hookworm Campaign team 
visited the settlement in 1920, they were disturbed at the conditions: 
the sanitary conditions prevailing on the settlement were very primitive. Of a 
total of 103 aboriginal homes only six were provided with privies, and these 
latter were below standard, as were also the privies at each of the six homes 
of the officials. What pans there were emptied weekly and the nightsoil 
disposed of in an open trench some two miles from the settlement proper. 
As a result of these findings, action was taken to establish an 'effective sanitary service' 
Q7 
on the settlement. Fifty 'fiyproof pansteads' were installed. When the Australian 
Hookworm Campaign team returned to the settlement the following year, they found 
'practically no home without a privy' although 'the aborigines were still polluting the 
98 
neighbouring ground'. As well as the introduction of a proper sanitary service in 1921, 
a sewerage system was installed but it was limited to only servicing the hospital. In the 
late 1920s, the sewerage system was expanded to include the girls, boys and mothers 
QQ 
dormitories as well as serving staff residences. 
The problems created by inadequate sanitary arrangements affected the health of 
the settlement both directly and indirectly. As the report of the Australian Hookworm 
Campaign noted, the ab.sence of sanitary measures was a critical 'factor in the spread of 
9^  A.G.C. Hawthorn, Inspection of Barambah, 1 May 1908, QSA A/31708 08/6326. 
^ Sawyer and Ping, 'Investigation of hookworm disease on Barambah Aboriginal settlement,' 828. 
9'^  QPP (1921) 2: 563. 
9^  Sawyer and Ping, 'Investigation of hookworm disease on Barambah Aboriginal settlement' 
829. 
^ QPP (1929) 1: 1218. 
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the disease amongst the natives'. As mentioned in the di.scussion on the water supply, 
the inadequate sanitary facilities, particularly until 1920, had a major impact on the 
quality of the water and in turn infiuenced the health of the settlement. 
Apart from problems with the water supply and sanitation, the high level of 
movement on and off the settlement also contributed to the incidence of disea.sc among 
inmates. As well as the steady influx of blacks being deported from all parts of state, 
there was the constant movement of inmates to and from employment. Migration has 
long been recognised as playing an influential role in the transmission of infectious 
diseases. Certainly, it was recognised by Superintendent Lipscombe as a problem. 
In 1913, he reported: 
As in former years epidemics of measles, dengue etc have visited the 
settlement . . . Fresh arrivals often introduced these epidemics, developing the 
complaints some time after their arrival and then communicating them to the 
residents . , , The regular influx of natives from other districts is a great 
102 factor against successful treatment. 
A comparison of mortality and removal statistics indicates that the period when the death 
rate was highest coincided with the period of the greatest influx of removals (see table 
5.5), Between 1910 and 1919, removals peaked at an annual average of eighty-one 
while there was an average of sixty-seven deaths per year. Significantly, after 1920 both 
the death rate and the number of deportees arriving on the settlement decreased sharply. 
Disease was transmitted by inmates returning from employment and other activities. The 
demand for labour led to a constant movement of inmates on and off the reserve. The 
greater the number involved - at times up to thirty percent of the population were absent 
^^ Sawyer and Ping, 'Investigation of hookworm disease on Barambah Aboriginal settlement,' 
828. 
^ '^ Frank Fenner, 'Sociocultural Change and Environmental Diseases,' Changing Disease 
Pattems and Human Behaviour, ed. N.F. Stanley and R.A. Joske (London: Academic Press, 1980), 
7-26; William McNeill, 'Migration Patterns and Infection in Traditional Societies,' ibid., 27-36. 
102 QPP (1913) 3: 1100. 
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Table 5.5 
Comparison of Removals 
and Deaths per year 
Year 
1905-09 
1910-14 
1915-19 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
1935-39 
Removals 
39 
77 
86 
28 
28 
24 
35 
Deaths 
27 
48 
67 
38 
25 
33 
30 
103 
- the greater the risks of infection from outside sources. Infection was al.so 
transmitted by inmates returning from sporting events. In 1938, the department was 
approached by the organisers of a boxing tournament in Brisbane for permission to 
include several Barambah fighters in the event. The Chief Protector advised the Home 
Secretary against granting permission because he felt that such action in the past had 
'resulted in sickness amongst the boxers themselves and the conveyance of infection back 
to other inmates of the institution'. He also informed the Home Secretary that it was 
'after each of the previous visits a case of infantile paralysis occurred at the settlement 
resulting in the death of a victim'. This statement indicates that the department was 
aware of settlement's vulnerability to infection from outside sources, but the tone of the 
letter suggests it was u.sed as a convenient excu.se. If the Chief Protector had been 
genuine and consistent in his arguments about preventing the transmission of infection 
to the settlement, he would have stopped both the hiring out of labour and the removals 
program. Ironically, despite every effort being made to prevent the entry of alcohol 
because of its supposedly destructive nature, virtually no attempt was made to impede the 
transmission of infectious diseases onto the settlement. 
^^^ In 1914, the population varied from 499 in January to 348 in November to 440 in the 
following month {QPP [1915] 3: 1689). 
^^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 21 April 1938, 
QSA A/3978 38/3874. 
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(c) crowding 
Crowding is normally as.sociatcd with health problems in den.sely populated urban 
areas. Yet, although the population on Barambah did not exceed 1000 on a reserve 
totalling 7000 acres, crowding was a problem. Culturally, inmates were not accustomed 
to living in large groups. The dormitories and quarters were always filled to capacity 
with the inmates being forced to slept in cramped conditions. By the 1930s these 
buildings accommodated over 25 percent of all inmates. The girls dormitory catered for 
over ninety inmates, the mothers dormitory catered for fifty-six inmates while there were 
forty in the boys dormitory and thirty residents in the single men's quarters. Even 
'private' dwellings on the settlement were frequently crowded. Whether inmates lived 
in huts they constructed themselves or cottages supplied by the administration, the 
dwellings were never spacious when the size of a hou.sehold was taken into account. In 
107 1920, there was an average of six persons per dwelling. The second aspect of the 
crowding problem was the frequency with which inmates were in close physical close 
contact. Adults came into regular contact either queuing up each day for rations or 
^^^ In recent study of the relationship between residential densities and stress in Aboriginal 
communities, Fletcher concluded that 
Unduly high or low residential densities which are abnormal for a group may be making 
the life of the community more complicated and unpleasant than it need be, and might 
perhaps be remedied relatively easily if the problem could be recognised . . . The 
relevance for Australian Aboriginal communities is towards markedly lower interaction 
frequency contexts than the maxima which are used in other mobile communities. 
Aboriginal spatial organisation appears to strongly mitigate the increasing potential stress 
of interaction as residential communities become larger. (Roland Fletcher, 'Residential 
densities, group sizes and social stress in Australian Aboriginal settlement' Hunter-
Gatherer Demography: Past and Present, eds. B. Meehan and N. White [Sydney: 
University of Sydney, 1990], 91) 
^^ O. Shimmin to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 10 October 1934, QSA A/31710 34/11056. 
^°^ Sawyer and Ping, 'Investigation of hookworm disease on Barambah Aboriginal settlement' 
830. 
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assembling on parade prior to commencing work. The school brought the children of the 
settlement close together. As discussed in chapter four, severe overcrowding was a 
recurrent problem in the school. In 1918 for example, there was less than four square 
feet of space for each child - 108 children were crammed into a room designed for half 
that number. But not all crowding or close interaction was a result of the settlement 
regimen. The high regard inmates had for communal activities such as corroborees, 
gambling, dances, funerals, cricket and football matches added to the frequency of clo.se 
contact. Indeed, during several epidemics the administration placed a ban on activities 
108 
that involved large crowds. Crowding was obviously a factor in the prevalence of 
complaints such as influenza which like other respiratory viruses characteristically spreads 
most rapidly and becomes more common when people are crowded together, 'par-
ticularly in enclo.sed spaces during cold weather'. As well as contributing to the 
transmission of influenza, the overcrowding also fostered the spread of other respiratory 
diseases such as measles. 
(d) diet 
A critical influence on the inmates' health was the quality of their diet. Whereas 
the water supply, sanitation, migration and crowding were factors that affected the spread 
of infection, diet had a broad ranging impact on the level of morbidity and mortality. 
Most illnesses were influenced to some degree by the dietary patterns. For basic food 
supplies, inmates were dependent on rations which initially were issued daily. Later the 
system was altered to a weekly distribution. The type of food and amount issued as 
rations did not alter substantially over a thirty year period (see table 5.6). The trilogy 
^^ RJ. Hough to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 3 September 1932, QSA A/3598 32/7931. 
' ^ Cedric Mims, 'The Emergence of New Infectious Diseases,' Changing Disease Pattems and 
Human Behaviour, ed. N.F. Stanley and R.A. Joske (London: Academic Press, 1980), 233. 
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of flour, sugar and meat formed the cornerstone of the settlement diet. All inmates, 
regardless of circumstances, were issued with one pound of flour per day. When the 
settlement commenced, inmates were allowed two ounces of sugar per day but this 
amount was later increased to four ounces. In the 1932 scale, the allocation was reduced 
to two ounces but actual consumption on the settlement averaged three and half ounces 
per person per day. 
Unlike the principle of equal distribution involved in the allocation of flour and 
sugar, there was a differential scale for meat. Working adult males were entitled to one 
pound per day but non-working males received no meat. However, in the 1919 scale they 
were entitled to a daily allowance of four and half ounces. Women and children also 
received lesser amounts than working men. Their allocation progressively declined from 
eight ounces in 1908 to two ounces in 1932. In 1937 a new scale was adopted. Married 
women and children were entitled to a meagre one ounce per day while for 'women 
without husbands and children in dormitories', their daily quota was eight ounces. The 
extra amount issued to working men was obviously intended as a inducement to all adult 
males to work. Also, the government believed the men were more productive when they 
were well fed. In 1939, the Minister for Health and Home Affairs told his Parliamentary 
colleagues: 'it is realised now that the aboriginal can only work if he is well fed . , , if 
he gets that food he works as well as anyone else'. The other ration items such as 
rice, oatmeal and sago were issued in such small quantities that they had little influence 
^^ " G. Bradbury and C. O'Leary, 'Report on the Aboriginal Settlements at Palm Island, 
Cherbourg and Woorabinda, April 1932,' Fryer Mss 44/144, appendbc 6. 
'^^  Minutes of the State Nutritional Advisory Board, 20 April 1937, Australian Archives, 
CA1037, 55/1/17. 
^^ 2 QPD 174 (1939): 454. 
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Figure 5.5 Rations being issued to Barambah inmates - 1907 
in shaping inmates' dietary patterns. An analysis of the 1937 scale found that over 90 
percent of the calorie intake came from fiour, sugar and meat 113 
The standard ration issue was supplemented by produce from the settlement's 
farming operations. Vegetables were supplied 'when procurable' but the quantity 
depended on the success of the crop. In the most favourable circumstances, inmates 
received up to five pounds of vegetables per week. Although the settlement had a 
herd of dairy cattle, milk was only distributed to some inmates. Priority was normally 
•^  Minutes of the State Nutritional Advisory Board, 20 April 1937, Australian Archives, 
CA 10.37, 55/1/17. 
114 
115 
QPD 132 (1919-20): 304; QPP (1916) 3: 1728. 
W. P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 6 February 1934, QSA A/3682 34/2002. 
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Table 5.6 
Daily Ration Issue 
Item 1908 
Meat 
working men 
non-working 
women & children 
Flour 
Sugar 
Oatmeal 
Sago 
Rice 
Peas 
16 
-
8 
16 
4 
min 
min 
min 
-
Tea .25 
1919 
.25 
1932 
,25 
1937 
16 
4.5 
4.5 
16 
4 
2 
1 
1 
-
16 
2 
2 
16 
a 
1 
.4 
¥^. 
1.4 
16 
4.5 
varied 
16 
2 
1 
,4 
.2 
1 
.25 
amounts expressed in ounces 
(Sources: 1908 - Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Superintendent, Barambah, 7 January 1908, QSA 
A/31708 08/574; 1919 - QPD 132 (1919-20): 304; 1932 - G. Bradbury and C. O'Leary, ^Report on 
the Aboriginal Settlements at Palm Island, Cherbourg and Woorabinda, April 1932,' Fryer Mss 44/144, 
19; 1937 - Minutes of the State Nutritional Advisory Board, 20 April 1937, Australian Archives, 
CA1037, 55/1/17) 
given to nursing mothers and children but even then they only received small amounts. 
Settlement staff had little incentive to be generous in their allocation. In 1908 the 
Superintendent informed the Home Secretary's Office that the usual procedure was that 
after milk was 'served out to the natives', the remainder was 'set for butter for the use 
of officials'. Surprisingly, sufficient milk was left to produce 'about three lbs per 
117 
week'. The rations for children were also supplemented in the winter months with 
'thickened soup'. This practice was introduced on the advice of the Medical Officer in 
1917 and led, in the Chief Protector's estimation, to a 'marked improvement' in the child-
^^ ^ In 1935, the Superintendent reported that the amount of milk distributed varied between 
seven and twenty gallons per day (W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 14 August 1936, 
QSA Ay3862 36/8309 and 12 March 1937, QSA A/3905 37/3037). If the distribution of milk was 
limited to only children and child-bearing women, they would have been issued with the equivalent 
of one-tenth of a cup per day. 
^^ '^  BJ.T. Lipscombe to Accountant, Home Secretary's Office, 10 February 1908, QSA A/31708 
08/1820. 
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ren's mentality. Later, instead of soup the children were given a piece of 'bread and 
dripping with treacle or jam' as a means of improving their performance 
Initially, the department did not intend that the rations issued were to constitute 
the sole source of food. The inmates were expected to 'procure game to supplement 
120 their ration allowance'. How long this policy remained in force is not known - if 
indeed there was ever a point when the department felt that rations alone constituted an 
adequate diet - but for the inmates the rations they were given were never sufficient. 
They found it necessary to supplement their rations constantly from other sources. In the 
settlement's infancy, native game was still reasonably plentiful on the reserve and in the 
surrounding district. Some inmates even had the good fortune to own firearms and one 
managed to catch no less than fourteen dozen possums during an expedition through the 
121 
Murgon district in 1905, As numbers increased on the settlement and the timber-
getters and selectors moved into the district, hunting game became more difficult and less 
reliable as a food supply. Once the reserve was surrounded by agricultural blocks, 
inmates were virtually confined to hunting and fishing within its bounds. By the 1930s 
^'* QPP (1917) 3: 1005. 
119 W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 13 July 1935, QSA A/3787 35/9952. 
^^ ° Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Superintendent, Barambah 7 January 1908, QSA A/31708 
08/574. 
^^ ^ The owners of Barambah station claimed Barambah creek contained excellent fishing 
holes(Moore Bros to Under Secretary, Department of Public Lands, 8 November 1900, JOL 
OM.AK/3/2, 94). That some Barambah inmates had firearms was a great source of consternation to 
Chief Protector Walter Roth. He sought advice from the Crown Solicitor on whether he had the 
power to confiscate the items and was advised that there was 'nothing in the Acts to authorise him 
to deprive the aboriginals on Barambah Reserve of firearms which they [had] lawfully acquired by 
purchase with money from their wages' (Crown Solicitor re firearms in possession of aboriginals on 
Barambah Reserve, 22 March 1906 QSA HOM/J18 06/6937). The reference to the catching of 
possums is contained in. Charges against Mr. Tronson, 14 September 1905, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
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native game on the reserve had been so extensively exploited, that 'hunting and fishing' 
177 
became 'practically non existent', at least as far as a regular food supply. 
Some inmates resorted to augmenting their rations by theft and scavenging. 
The pantries of both the boys and girls dormitories were regularly raided. As well, the 
123 
retail store was a frequent target for raids by inmates. The dormitory children, who 
in their own words were 'always hungry', scavenged whatever food they could including 
banana skins, pigweed and nasturtium. The Superintendent's yard, which boasted an 
extensive number of fruit trees as well as a prolific grape vine was not immune from 
125 
raids. Another source of food was the Murgon refuse tip as Rita Huggins, who went 
there regularly as a child, describes: 
We used to go to the rubbish dump every Thur.sday and wait for the rubbish 
truck. There was my mother, Jessie Colonel, Granny Hegarty, the Duncans, 
the Stanleys, the Williams, the Gee Hoys,the Chambers and many others. We 
would wait for the rubbish truck to come. Then there would be a scatter to 
see who would get the best things. The men were very good, they knew we 
were there. They used to put the clothes to one side, the vegetables in 
another place. Mum u.sed to go for the pumpkin and potatoes and vegetables 
- it was all rubbish from the whitefellows in Murgon, 
The other avenue for supplementing rations was purchasing items from the retail store. 
The store was established on the settlement in 1909 ostensibly so inmates who were 
earning money could buy 'goods likely to be of service' including food on the scttle-
^^ ^ South Bumett Times, 17 February 1933. Inmates still hunted and fished in this period, as 
they do even today, but more for recreational reasons. 
^^ Alfie Starlight for example, raided the store twice within a short period in 1935 to obtain 
a bag of sugar. On the second occasion he was sent to gaol for three months (W.P. Semple to Chief 
Protector of Aboriginals, 13 July 1935, QSA A/3787 35/9952). For evidence of raids in the 
dormitories, Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988; Darcy Cummins, 
interview, 1 August 1988; Jimmy Edwards, interview, 24 October 1984. 
^^"^  Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
^^ ibid. The yards of other officials were also the target for raids (Doug Kina, interview, 15 
November 1983). 
^^ ^ Rita Huggins, interview, 7 December 1984. 
201 
ment instead of having to travel to the nearest township. But the department had 
another motive for opening the store - the more food that was purchased by inmates, 
the less the amount of rations required. 
Apart from the quantity of the rations supplied, there was also a problem with 
the quality of food issued. Inmates were constantly expressing their dissatisfaction with 
the meat issue. During an investigation into the administration of the settlement in 1905, 
inmates complained they were 'given meat that was unfit to eat'. When the matter was 
raised with the Superintendent he admitted purchasing 'lumpy'cattle for meat but that he 
did so for reasons of economy'. The vendor, a local farmer and friend of the Superin-
tendent, when asked why he sold the cattle 'ridiculed the idea that the cattle were not fit 
128 for the blacks, although he admitted he would not care to eat them himself. After 
advice from the Inspector of Stock, the Superintendent was instructed by the Chief 
Protector not to purchase any more cattle in such a condition. While this episode may 
have been an exception, inmates protested that, even when healthy cattle were slaught-
ered, they did not receive good quality meat. The standard practice was to reserve the 
best cuts for the staff and their families while the inmates were given whatever 
129 
remained. On one occasion, according to Jimmy Edwards: 
one of those old murries stood with a camera as the white officials went in 
and got their meat. The black people had to wait. You could see all the 
steak coming out. While they were handing bones to old murries, they were 
getting beautiful steak. I know for a fact, I had a lot of bones. TTie good 
meat went to the officials. 
2^7 J.W. Bleakley, Barambah Retail Store, 11 July 1912, QSA A/31708 12/8471. 
^^ Charges against Mr. Tronson, Superintendent of Barambah Aboriginal Settlement, 14 
September 1905, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
^^ ^ Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. 
^^ Jimmy Edwards, interview, 24 October 1984. 
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Supplies of non-perishable commodities such as flour, sugar and tea were 
obtained from the Government Storekeeper who was not adver.se to sending the settlement 
inferior stock. In the latter part of 1914, the settlement received supplies of sugar which 
both the officials and inmates found objectionable. In raising the issue with the Home 
Secretary, the Chief Protector commented: 
The Superintendent stated that the natives refused to'drink the tea made from 
it, complaining that it made them sick . . . The sugar was very dark in colour 
with dirty looking black congealed lumps freely mixed through it. 
Bleakley felt that the 'working native by his labour and contribution to the maintenance 
132 
of the settlement' was entitled to 'at least a palatable article'. The Government 
Storekeeper's response to the complaints was to claim that 'it was the best ration sugar 
133 
available at the time'. He also inferred that it was 'quite good enough' for blacLs. 
Of numerous institutions supplied by the Government Storekeeper, Barambah was 
obviously not on the list of those for which the best stock was reserved. The settle-
ment was a convenient dumping ground for sub-standard stock or supplies that would 
not have been acceptable at other government institutions. 
The food supplied in the dormitories and quarters was no less inadequate than 
the rations given to the rest of the settlement, A common complaint of the dormitory 
children was that they 'were always hungry'. This discontent arose not only from the 
meagre amounts of food they were given but also its poor quality, Ruth Hegarty lived 
in the girls dormitory during the 1930s and for her, the food was memorable because it 
so unpalatable: 
^^ ^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department 13 November 1914, QSA HOM/J130 
14/9443. 
132 ibid. 
'^ ^ Government Storekeeper to Under Secretary, Home Department, 2 December 1914, QSA 
HOM/J130 14/9443. 
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Breakfast was porridge and two pieces of bread. You could pick up the 
porridge in your hand or cut it with a knife. We never seen hot porridge or 
baker's bread. The bread used to be mildewy - sometimes stringy - it was 
never fresh. We used to soak the bread in treacle so you could eat it. 
Lunch was bread and treacle, sometimes hot soup. We used to suck the 
marrow out of the bone. 
Problems with the quality of the food were also encountered in the hospital. During an 
departmental investigation of the hospital in 1913, some patients complained that they 
were 'kept waiting till all hours for their food'. One patient became so disgruntled at the 
teck of service, she simply went home. Other patients complained about the quality of 
135 the soup, saying it tasted like 'salt water'. Such practices did little to assist the 
recovery of patients. Compared with the rest of the settlement, the dormitory inmates 
had far fewer opportunities to supplement their diet For the elderly and sick hunting and 
scavenging were not possible while the severe restrictions placed on the movement of the 
younger inmates limited the areas where they could hunt, fish or even scavenge for food. 
Despite the Barambah residents being acutely aware of the deficiencies in their 
diet from the time they were first moved onto the reserve, the department did not begin 
to question the adequacy of the rations until confronted with criticism from various 
medical authorities. The Chief Protector first publicly acknowledged there were problems 
when he noted in his annual report of 1932 that Dr Raphael Cilento had advised him of 
the need to correct the dietary scale on the settlements because it was 'lacking in 
nutritional properties'. Despite Cilento's reputation in the field of tropical medicine -^  
he had been director' of the Australian Institute of Tropical Medicine and also director 
•^^  Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
^^ E. Beeston to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 13 December 1913, QSA HOM/JllO 13/12934. 
136 QPP (J933) J. g87 
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of Public Health in New Guinea - no serious attempt was made to act on his advice. 
Four years later, by which time he had been appointed Director General of Health, 
Cilento repeated his criticism at a meeting of the State Nutritional Advi.sory Board. In 
a discussion on the dietary habits of aborigines he commented that 'in comparison with 
13S 
native diets in other lands, the aboriginal diet was very unsatisfactory'. Cilento's 
comments were based on observations he made when visiting various settlements, includ-
13Q 
ing Barambah, and on an analysis of the nutritional value of the rations issued. The 
analysis revealed that the energy value of the rations for working men was 3180 calories 
per day and for non-workers 2516, These levels were regarded as 'sufficient' in the 
circumstances, but most likely overestimated the energy value of the rations as they were 
based on the assumption that the meat was 'boneless'. As the oral evidence has revealed, 
such an assumption was quite incorrect. The quality of the meat was such that a more 
realistic analysis would have revealed that the daily calorie level to be 10 to 20 percent 
less than the figures suggested. A more serious problem with the rations was the lack 
of vitamins and minerals. There was a general deficiency of vitamins, in particular 
vitamin A. The daily intake of 250 units was one-sixteenth of what was regarded as 
adequate. As well, the rations only contained less the half the daily requirements of 
calcium, 
Cilento's comments on the dietary standards were supported by another leading 
medical figure in the state, Dr A, Jefferis Turner, In late 1936, Turner, in his capacity 
'^ ^ Cilento later served as second in charge of the Commonwealth Department of Health. In 
1934 Cilento was appointed the first Director-General of Health and Medical Services in Queensland 
(R. Patrick, A history of Health and Medicine in Queensland, 99). 
^^ Minutes of the State Nutritional Advisory Board, 20 April 1937, Australian Archives, 
CA1037, 55/1/17. 
'^ ^ ibid.; Sir Raphael Cilento, Diary, 23 February 1935, Fryer Mss 44/25. 
'^**' Assuming 30 percent of meat was bone, the value of rations for a working man would have 
been 2868 calories per day. 
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as Director of Infant Welfare, visited the settlement and was appalled at the situation. 
He informed the Home Secretary: 
The children . , , were provided with classrooms and State school teachers, 
resident nurses, a visiting doctor and hospital. 
Notwithstanding this the physical condition of these children is deplorable. I 
am accustomed to the sight of ill-nourished children all over Queensland, but 
only as a minority or as i.solated instances. Never before have I seen a whole 
classroom in which the majority, if not all, of the children were ill-nourished. 
These children have been ill-fed, I do not mean by this that they do not get 
enough to eat, but that their food is not such as to conduce to good health 
and physical development, I was not surprised to learn that they showed poor 
resistance to disease, and that the condition of their teeth is very bad. 
For Turner, the major cause of ill-health on the settlement was unquestionably the poor 
diet. He maintained that there was no reason why the children were not better 
nourished. Turner was well qualified to make such an assessment. He was Director 
of Infant Welfare, a position he had held for ten years and had pioneered a number of 
major developments in paediatric medicine in the state. From his extensive experien-
ce. Turner was acutely aware that real improvements in health did not come about by 
prescribing 'gallons of medicine' but by 'better nutrition, better home conditions, and 
better education'. Despite Turner's trenchant criticism.s, the department's response was 
limited merely to requesting the visiting Medical Officer to test the weight of the children 
^^^ A. Jefferis Turner to Under Secretary, Home Department 2 December 1936, QSA A/3939 
37/9222. 
142 ibid. 
^^^ His most notable contribution was the discovery in 1897, with Dr. Lockhart Gibson, that the 
lead paint commonly used on Queensland houses was responsible for lead poisoning in children. 
Turner conducted a campaign for over twenty-five years to have lead banned from household paint. 
He was also responsible for the introduction of diphtheria-toxin and was the first to recogni.se 
hookworm in Queensland children. The establishment of maternal and child welfare clinics throughout 
the state were also pioneered by Jefferis Turner (Jefferis Turner, Experiences in Preventative 
Medicine, MedicalJoumal of Australia (1938) 2:805-13). 
144 ibid. 
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over a twelve month period. No effort was made to address the substance of Turner's 
concerns and rectify the inadequacies in the diet. 
Turner's assertion that the 'very bad' condition of the children's teeth were as a 
consequence of their diet was supported by a United States researcher, Dr Weston Price. 
In 1936 Price visited the settlement in the course of conducting a world-wide survey on 
the relationship between nutrition and physical degeneration. On Barambah he 
examined the teeth of forty-five individuals and found '42.5 percent of the teeth had been 
attacked by tooth decay'. This figure contrasted with the results of a survey of Aborigi-
nes who had been raised in the bush which found that 'not a single tooth . , , had ever 
been attacked by tooth decay'. The incidence of dental caries on the settlement was, 
148 in Price's view, a result of the European diet and general lack of 'native foods'. 
While factors such as overcrowding and poor sanitation facilitated the spread of 
infection, the prevalence and severity of disease as well as the likelihood of death was 
greatly increased by undernourishment. Poor diet, as Turner ob.served, lowered the 
inmates resistance to disea.se. Although all illnesses were affected to some extent by 
dietary deficiencies, tuberculosis and the childhood infectious di.seases were notably 
influenced by undernourishment. The major importance of malnutrition in 'the 
^^^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 20 September 
1937, QSA A//3939 37/9222. 
Weston A. Price, Nutrition and Physical Degeneration: A Comparison of Primitive and 
Modem Diets (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, 1939). 
14^  ibid., 181. 
148 QPP 1^937^  2:1194. 
'''^ Sir Macfarlane Burnet, Natural History of Infectious Disease (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1953), 200. 
'^° W. Harding le Riche, Epidemiology as Medical Ecology (Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 
1971), 374. 
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infection, morbidity and mortality' of tuberculosis has been well documented. 
Similarly, the association between poor nutrition and infant mortality has been well 
established. Few infant deaths occurred on Barambah that were not influenced to 
some degree by the inadequate diet of not only the child but al.so the mother. The 
quality of the diet was also a factor in the excessively high number of births on the 
settlement. As Colinshaw has explained, an important means of controlling fertility 
traditionally among aboriginal women was a high energy expenditure coupled with a low 
calorie intake. On Barambah, this situation was reversed. The predominance of flour 
and sugar in the diet, combined with a 'greatly reduced energy expenditure', led to greatly 
increased fertility which in turn created a multiplicity of other problems. 
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that contrary to the government's 
expectations, the health of Aborigines did not improve when they were removed to 
Barambah; instead, sickness and disease flourished. Congregating between 900 to 1000 
persons with diverse traditions who were accustomed to living in small, isolated groups 
into a confined area and then supplying them with a subsistence diet, was hardly a recipe 
for improved health. The combination of a poor water service, inadequate sanitation, 
crowding, a high degree of migration and a nutritionally deficient diet resulted in an 
environment that exacerbated disease rather than improving health. Significantly, the 
1^ 1 Moodie, Aboriginal Health, 150. 
1^ 2 Regina H. Kenan, 'Health status: Australian Aborigines and Native Americans - a 
comparison,' Australian Aboriginal Studies (1987) 1: 41. 
1^ ^ Gillian Colinshaw, 'The Determinants of Fertility Among Australian Aborigines,' Mankind 
13 (1981): 44. 
l^ '* The health conditions on Barambah, particularly in the first twenty years, resembled the 
situation in Brisbane in the period 1824-30. The penal colony experienced a rapid increase in its 
population, rising from 200 in 1826 to 1000 in 1830. This rapid increase paralleled a similar rise in 
ill-health. In the summer of 1829, an average of 100 patients attended the-hospital and the mortality 
rate for that year was 90 per 1000. According to Patrick, 'the three main factors were overcrowding, 
malnutrition, and poor hygiene' (R. Patrick,/! history of Health and Medicine in Queensland, 15-16). 
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survival rate of Barambah inmates was less than upon other reserves and in bush and 
station camps. In the period 1901-40, the death rate on Barambah was well in excess 
of that for the total Aboriginal population of Australia (see figure 5.1). The difference 
was most pronounced in the period 1910-20 when Barambah inmates were dying at a 
rate four times faster than the rest of the Aboriginal population. The rates only began 
to approximate each other in the latter part of the 1930s. On other reserves there were 
generally fewer inmates and therefore the problems of crowding and poor sanitation were 
not as severe. The importance of the size of the population in influencing the health 
of a settlement or mission has been recently demonstrated in a study of mortality on 
Aboriginal reserves in Queensland between 1976-80. An analysis of key socio-
environmental variables found that incidence of deaths caused by infection was 
significantly higher on reserves that had a population over 800. Compared to other 
reserves, Barambah was at a disadvantage in that it did not have access to a constant 
supply of fresh water and the surrounding district only offered meagre amounts of native 
game. 
The conditions on Barambah also compared unfavourably with the situation in 
bush camps. Because these camps were invariably small and frequently isolated, 
overcrowding did not present a health risk and sanitation was a manageable problem. As 
well, an important part of the diet was 'bush tucker'. In a camp on the fringes of 
CunnamuUa during the 1930s while fiour, sugar and tea were a part of the diet, residents 
also hunted and fished regularly. According to Hazel McKellar who grew up in the 
^^ ^ For example on Point McLeay mission in South Australia, the death rate was significantly 
lower than on Barambah, varying between 62 per 1000 and 14 per 1000 in the period 1900-40. Also 
the population was less. For most of the time it varied between 300-400 and only reached over 600 
in the late 1930s (Fay Gale, 'A Changing Aboriginal Population,' Settlement and Encounter, ed. F. 
Gale and G.H. Lawton [Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1%9], 70). 
*^ ^ David S. Trigger et al., 'Mortality rates in 14 Queensland Aboriginal reserve communities,' 
MedicalJoumal of Australia (1983) 1: 362. 
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camp, fish was an integral part of her family's diet as the nearby Warrego river contained 
'a good fishing hole'and kangaroo, emu and porcupine were regularly hunted. The camp 
diet was also enriched nutritionally by fruit such as quandongs and bumbils (wild 
157 
oranges). The quality of diet in bush camps, while far from ideal, was nutritionally 
superior to the settlement diet. 
One of the government's primary objectives in establishing reserves such as 
Barambah was to attempt what bush camps seemed unable to achieve - the preservation 
of the remnants of the Aboriginal race. Yet, Barambah was singularly unsuited to 
improve the health of Aborigines, and if anything, was less successful than bush camps 
in achieving this aim. Despite the evidence, the government steadfastly refu.sed to ack-
nowledge there were any major problems with the health of the inmates. It did concede 
that the death rate was at times high but attributed the cause to the inmates own attitudes 
and inherent physical weaknesses. To admit that the high mortality rate was linked to 
the poor nutrition, overcrowding or inadequate sanitary measures would have been to 
acknowledge that the administration of the settlement was at fault and that the policy of 
removing blacks to reserves for their own benefit was a failure. Unquestionably, key 
determinants in the health of the settlement were the policies of the government and ad-
ministrative practices. Despite the repeated claims that the primary purpose of the reserve 
was to preserve and protect, greater priority was given to the other objectives of the 
settlement. Compared with the removals program, the control of labour and the civilising 
process, the issue of health was of secondary importance. The government exhibited an 
ongoing indifference towards the health of the inmates, being more concerned with other 
issues. They wanted to ensure above all that Aborigines were not a threat to white 
'^ ^ Hazel McKellar, interview, 10 February 1989; see also Hazel McKellar, Matya Mundu: A 
History of the Aboriginal People of south west Queensland (CunnamuUa: CunnamuUa Native Welfare 
Association, 1984), for a description of camp life. For a brief description of the diet in a station camp 
see Paul Behrendt, 'A remnant from the past,' Australian Aboriginal Studies, (1986) 2: 58-60. 
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society by removing them out of the way. It was for rea.sons such as this that little 
effort was made to improve the water supply or sanitary arrangements, and why, when 
the leading authority on child nutrition in the state claimed he had never seen so many 
ill-nourished children in the one location, the response was merely to weigh the children! 
In preceding chapters, the violent nature of both the removals program and the 
discipline and control were examined. Both were forms of institutional or covert 
violence. Yet as this analysis of health reveals, the violence inmates had to endure was 
not limited to removal from land and kinship and the concerted attempts to destroy their 
culture and identity. Being compelled to exist on an inadequate diet and in conditions 
that encouraged the spread of disease was another manifestation of pa.ssive violence. 
Although the government did not deliberately practice a policy of 'germ warfare', inmates 
were more vulnerable to disease than their counterparts in the bush and in fringe camps. 
As well, the deficiencies in their diet decreased their resistance. 
211 
CHAPTER SIX 
TREATED LIKE SLAVES . . . LIKE MERCHANDISE 
The Dynamics of Labour 
/ maintain that we have no right to treat these aboriginals or half-castes as slaves, 
yet this Bill proposes to treat them as slaves (Thomas Givens, 1901). 
We remained prisoners in an unjust system that treated us like merchandise (Hope 
Neill, former resident). 
When the South Australian Royal Commission on Aborigines conducted hearings 
in Queensland during July 1913, one witness who gave evidence was the MLA Robert 
Hodge. As the member for the electorate which encompa.ssed the Barambah settlement, 
Hodge had an interest in the 'Aboriginal question'. When questioned as to his 
understanding of the purpo.se of the settlement, he replied that it was no more than 'a 
rendezvous for labour'. Such a claim was not refuted by either Chief Protector Howard 
or Bertram Lipscombe, the Barambah Superintendent who aLso appeared before the 
Commission. Indeed, Lipscombe presented evidence that gave substance to Hodge's 
a.ssertion. He informed the Commission that although a total of 721 Aborigines were 'on 
his books', there was never that number on the settlement al the one time as most were 
'chiefiy out on agreement'. Chief Protector Howard fully approved of using the 
settlement as a labour depot, telling the Commission how the men would 'work for three 
or four months and then go to the settlement for a month for a spell'. His only regret 
1 QPD 87 (1901): 221. 
^ Hope Neill, 'The Beating Heart of Australian Culture,' (Paper delivered at Catholic Religious 
Education Conference, Brisbane, May 1988). 
^ Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission into Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 104. 
^ ibid., 78. 
212 
was that the department could not 'supply the demand' for labour.^ The utilisation of 
Barambah as a labour depot contrasts sharply with its original purpose as a refuge or 
sanctuary for the remnants of local Burnett tribes, Barambah was never simply a refuge, 
a place where blacks could spend their last days in tranquillity and isolation,. Rather, it 
was a place where Aborigines could be more systematically and thoroughly exploited for 
their labour. 
The first task in this chapter is to examine the dynamics of settlement labour. 
By delineating the extent to which inmates were controlled, it will be seen that a major 
function of the reserve was as a 'rendezvous for labour', A prominent feature of the 
administration was the vigour with which it endeavoured to maximi.se the return on 
inmate labour both on and off the settlement. The aim is to show that while purport-
ing to be an institution solely for the benefit of Aborigines, capital's demand for cheap 
labour actually dominated the settlement's operation. The second task in this chapter is 
to examine the status of the Barambah workers. The role of Aboriginal labour in the 
development of Australian capitalism and the status of black workers has increasingly 
become the subject of critical analysis by historians. Over a decade ago, Hartwig 
proposed that the theory of internal colonialism provided, in contrast to structural-
functionalist theory and the theory of a pluralist society, the most appropriate theoreti-
cal perspective for understanding the historical development and dynamics of Aboriginal-
white relations in Australia, Drawing upon Wolpe's application of the concept of internal 
colonialism in the South African context, Hartwig argued that a distinguishing feature 
of the development of Australian capitalism was the 'dissolution of the Aboriginal mode 
of production and the resocialisation of its agents for entry into capitalist production 
ibid., 90. 
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relations',^ Reserves played a vital role in the resocialising process. Their function was 
to train Aborigines so that they would ultimately 'become regular sellers of labour-
power in the general society'. In the interim, the labour-power of inmates on settlements 
and reserves was utili.scd as much as possible, operating akin to 'a colonial migrant-
labour force'. In Hartwig's view, the reserve, as well as stations, could be likened to 
the village or tribal lands in a colony, as a place from which labour could be 
obtained as required, to which it could be returned when not, and payments 
for which might make no provision for maintenance of dependents. 
This system resulted in employers obtaining labour power at below cost because they 
'were relieved of paying a portion of the necessary means of subsistence'. Thus 
according to Hartwig's analysis, reserve inmates were seen as part-time or potential 
wage-labourers while the reserves were colonies from which cheap labour was recruited, 
A different perspective on the role and place of Aboriginal labour in the 
development of Australian capitalism has been adopted in an recent article by Evans, 
Prompted by late nineteenth century accounts that described Aboriginal workers as slaves, 
he raises the question as to precisely what was the nature of Aboriginal labour relations. 
He notes that among twentieth century historians, 'the status of Aboriginal workers under 
the aegis of Australian colonialism had remained indefinite and obscure', A 
smorgasbord of labels has been used to describe the indigenous worker, including helot. 
^ Mervyn Hartwig, 'Capitalism and Aborigines: The Theory of Internal Colonialism and its 
Rivals,' Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism, ed. E. W. Wheelwright and K. 
Buckley (Sydney: A & NZ Book Company, 1978), 132. 
'^  ibid., 134. 
^ ibid. 
^ ibid., 135. 
°^ Ray Evans, '"Kings" in Brass Crescents. Defining Aboriginal Labour Relations in Colonial 
Queensland,' Indentured Labour in the British Empire 1834-1920, ed. K. Saunders (London: Croom 
& Helm, 1984), 183-212. 
" ibid., 186. 
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peon, serf, wage-labourer as well as slave. 'Clearly', he says these labels 'cannot all 
awkwardly be hung upon the black worker, unless it can be shown that this entire range 
of preci.se labour forms was operative among oppressed indigenes across the Australian 
12 
colonies'. In response to this confusion, Evans draws upon the theoretical analysis on 
slavery and slave formation by Orlando Patterson to argue that 'slave' was indeed an 
13 
apposite description of the Aboriginal worker, at least in colonial Queensland. An array 
of evidence is presented to demonstrate that the fundamental elements in the slave mode 
of production - the existence of direct force, the sense of utter powerlessness in relation 
to others, the constant threat of violence, natal alienation, propertylessness, the exclusion 
from market relations - existed in Aboriginal labour relations in colonial Queensland. 
The studies of both Hartwig and Evans provide contrasting frameworks for the 
analysis of the status of the Barambah worker. From the perspective of the theory of 
internal colonialism, the reserve is regarded as a training institution as well as a 
repository of cheap labour, Hartwig and other historians such as Buckley and 
Wheelwright, who have embraced the internal colonialism concept, emphasise that 
although Aborigines from settlements, when sent out to work, were poorly paid and 
exploited, they nevertheless were regarded as wage-labourers and as part of the 
proletariat or subproletarian class. Further, Hartwig as well as Wheelwright and 
Buckley assert that as far as protecting the Aboriginal worker, 'Queensland was ahead 
12 ibid. 
^^ Orlando Patterson, 'On Slavery and Slave Formations,' New Left Review 117 (1979): 31-
67. Patterson has elaborately more fully on the theoretical aspects of this issue in. Slavery and Social 
Death (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
^^ Ray Evans, '"Kings" in Brass Crescents'; Bill Thorpe has presented further evidence of the 
slave mode of production in 'A Social History of Colonial Queensland: Towards a Marxist Perspec-
tive' (PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 1985), 1-44. 
'^ K. Buckley and E.W. Wheelwright, No Paradise for Workers: Capitalism and the Common 
People in Australia 1788-1914 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), 26-29. 
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of all other frontier regions' because of the regulations that were formulated setting 
minimum wages and conditions for indigenous employees. But in the light of Evans's 
study, these assertions and the u.se of the 'wage-labourer' label must be queried. 
Although his analysis focused on Aboriginal labour patterns in colonial Queensland, the 
compelling nature of the argument presented by Evans prompts the question: has a slave 
or quasi slave mode been present in Aboriginal labour relations in twentieth century 
Queensland or, with the implementation of the Aboriginals Protection Act, did the slave 
mode di.ssipate and Aborigines became part of the proletariat, albeit the lowest level of 
the class? Could it be that 'slave' or another term more appropriately describes the status 
of the settlement worker rather than 'wage-labourer'? This question has added 
significance in the light of the emergence of a more critical assessment by former and 
present Cherbourg inmates of their past. Just as nineteenth century polemicists talked 
about slavery without defining precisely what they meant by the term, so recent 
refiections on conditions on the settlement have likened the situation to slavery. 
Comments such as 'the slavery of the black past', 'worked like slaves', 'treated like 
merchandise' and 'you had no choice' have all been used, particularly in reference to the 
17 
practice of forcibly sending inmates out to work. Even R.C. Katter, when Minister for 
Community Services, acknowledged in 1988 that 'a form of slavery was practiced' on 
Is Queensland settlements. 
In this chapter, the dynamics of inmate labour is examined in two parts. The 
first deals with the Lssues surrounding outside work: the establishment of the settlement 
as a labour depot, the demand for labour, type of work undertaken, conditions and 
*^  ibid., 30. 
^'' Courier Mail, 26 May 1988; Sunday Mail, 26 June 1988; Hope Neill, 'The Beating Heart 
of Australian Culture'; Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
18 Sunday Mail, 26 June 1988. 
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treatment in employment, the wages system, methods of discipline. The second part 
concerns the use of inmate labour on the settlement: the importance of their labour in the 
development of the settlement, payment for work, discipline and dissent, 
Barambah settlement began a vigorous program of hiring out labour immediately 
the government took control of the settlement in March 1905, Although he had resigned 
as the Southern Protector of Aboriginals by this time, Archibald Meston was an 
influential figure in shaping the events which culminated in the settlement operating as 
a labour depot. When Meston first advised the government in 1895 on how to protect 
and preserve the colony's indigenous inhabitants as well as outlining measures to prevent 
the 'extinction of that unhappy race', he also proposed the means whereby blacks could 
be incorporated into capitalist society. In his view, settlements could be multi-purpose 
institutions. On the one hand they could assist in ameliorating the conditions of blacks 
while at the same time meeting the demands of capital. He envisaged using reserves to 
train inmates in useful trades and imbue them with the value of industry and discipline. 
Meston claimed that three years after starting a reserve with 'strong healthy aboriginals' 
he would have a work force of '500 men ready for the cane, cotton, coffee, or other crop 
season on any part of the coast', 
Meston was unable, with the first settlement established under his direction, to 
demonstrate the viability of his scheme. The settlement at Bogimbah on Fra.ser Island 
was confronted from its inception by a multitude of problems. Indeed, the inmates 
struggled merely to stay alive in an oppressive and unhealthy environment. Consequently, 
^' Archibald Meston, Queensland Aboriginals: Proposed System for their Improvement and 
Preservation (Brisbane: Government Printer, 1895), 25-6. 
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they were in no state to cut cane or chip cotton. When Meston turned his attention 
to the Durundur reserve, he did manage to achieve some success in hiring out labour. 
The reserve was reopened in June 1900 with a contingent of over sixty blacks from 
southwest Queensland. Significantly, these blacLs who had been removed on Meston 's 
orders were not the elderly, infirm or those unable to care for thcm.selves, but were 
22 
mostly 'able bodied men ' . The average age of the contingent was thirty-five years. 
Obviously, Meston was more interested in blacks who would be useful workers than 
those most in need of care and protection. The services of the inmates were utilised by 
local selectors, particularly for clearing scrub. In October 1901 for example, of the 
twenty-six men on the settlement, nineteen were engaged in work on selections and 
23 
properties in the surrounding district. Meston subsequently noted that these western 
blacks were 'about the best working blacks' that he 'ever had to deal with ' . As dis-
cussed in chapter one, under the management of Albert Tronson the hiring out of labour 
became a flourishing operation. Little attention was given to agricultural work on the 
settlement. By the time Durundur was closed in March 1905 and the operations 
transferred to Barambah, Tronson had gained valuable experience in administering a 
labour depot for black workers, 
Tronson wasted no time upon his arrival in establishing the settlement as a 
labour depot. The settlement quickly gained a reputation as the source of cheap labour. 
Much of Tronson 's time as Superintendent was spent dealing with matters relating to the 
^° R. Evans and J. Walker, '"These Strangers, where are they going?": Aboriginal-European 
Relations in the Fraser Island and Wide Bay Region, 1770-1905,' Occasional Papers In Anthropology, 
no. 8, ed. P. Lauer (St Lucia: Anthropology Museum, University of Queensland, 1977), 87-90. 
2^  A. Meston to Home Secretary, 19 July 1900, QSA COl/144 00/11167. 
22 QPD 87(1901): 225; Daily Mail, 8 June 1909. 
^ Aboriginal Men on Durundur, 1 October 1901, QSA COL/144 01/15896. 
^^ QPD 87 (1901): 1143. 
218 
hiring of labour. Even a most cursory examination of his diary for 1905 reveals that he 
was preoccupied with such duties. For example the entry for 2 October was as follows: 
Fred Banks arrived from Beaudesert to Industrial school B/c to Dr Roth. 
Pass retd as required 
Wrote " " " for 3 bags of maize and carbon pencil 
" " " " re "Minnie Thompson" to be removed 
" " Mr C, Home, Gayndah can supply boys 2/- per week 
Sent receipt £1.6.0 to Mr T, Petrie North Pine 
" " £2 & wrote to Mr H. Wilson, Cooranga 
£1.10.0 to Accountant 
Paid Dick Ross £1.10.0 wages 
Wrote receipt for 1 Book Receipts 
Sent receipt £1.0.10 to Moore Bros. Barambah 
Sent cheques total £4.19.10 to Accountant £1 to be returned to Willie Malone 
"Bundoon" and "Bella" left for Police Alpha 
"Billy Boy" & "Toby" left for Mr H Wilson, Cooranga 
"Robert Law" left for Mr N Jones Kilkivan 
"Sandy" left to work for Mr Barker 
Sent report to Dr Roth.^^ 
These entries were typical of the matters Tronson dealt with each day and illustrate the 
multitude of tasks involved in the organisation of the hiring out of labour. 
The settlement received a steady stream of requests for labour from as far away 
as Charleville and Roma in the south-west and Alpha in the central west of the State. 
The majority of employers, however, were situated within a 100 kilometre radius of the 
settlement. Of the seventy employers of Barambah labour in 1905, twenty-two were 
pastoralists and selectors resident in the Murgon district and another fourteen lived in the 
Kilkivan, Nanango and Kingaroy districts. Tronson was eager to assist employers in 
every possible way. Providing the employer was suitable, Tron.son tried to fulfil requests 
for labour as quickly as possible. For example, on Tuesday, 1 August he received a 
request from Mr C. Booker 'to send 8 boys Saturday'. Tronson replied in the return mail 
he was able to send the 'boys' and in his diary entry for the following Saturday he duly 
2^  Tronson, diary, 2 October 1905. 
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noted the names of the eight men that left that day to work for Booker. Tron.son 
disliked idleness and was eager to have as many inmates out working as he could 
possibly arrange. Thus when a Kilkivan selector, J, Burns applied for three men for two 
27 
months work, Tronson offered instead to send four workers. Similarly when a 
Beaudesert grazier, Mr De Burghe Persse informed the Barambah Superintendent that he 
had sacked three workers from the settlement, Tronson promptly replied by stating he 
28 
'could send more men'. On another occasion when an employer wrote that he expected 
the men from the settlement 'to finish next week', Tronson was quick to respond that he 
2Q 
'could let him have men anytime'. On the rare occasion no work was available, 
30 Tronson allowed inmates to leave the settlement to look for work themselves. 
In 1905, there was a total of 166 casual engagements and twenty-five 
31 
agreements for longer periods, most of twelve month duration. Although demand for 
labour came predominantly from the rural sector, Barambah inmates were also sought for 
other menial tasks. Several employers sought domestic help while one requested a 'boy 
32 to look after children'. Certain government employees were privileged to be able to 
employ younger inmates as houseboys. For example, Tronson supplied the Police 
Magistrate at Nanango with a 'boy' as well as the government Rabbit Inspector ba.sed in 
26 ibid., 1 and 5 August 1905. 
2'^  ibid., 26 and 27 July 1905. 
^ ibid., 18, 21 and 23 October 1905. 
2^  ibid., 8 and 12 September 1905. 
^ ibid., 7 August 1905. 
^' ibid., pa.ssim; J.M. Costin to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 5 May 1906, QSA H0M/J17 
05/5768. 
2^ Tronson, diary, 30 August 1905. 
220 
Charleville,"''^  Inmates were al.so recruited by the Police force for work as trackers. In 
1905, men were sent from the settlement to Alpha, Roma, Woodford, Nanango, 
Toowoomba and Rockhampton. 
Requests for labour in the rural sector fell into two distinct categories. First, 
there was the demand for the single employee or couple to work on a twelve month 
agreement. Such employees were engaged for general farm or station work. If a man 
was accompanied by his wife, she was usually employed as a domestic. The second 
category consisted of requests for a group of men for brief periods to undertake work 
such as scrub clearing. Selectors in the immediate vicinity of the reserve particularly 
availed themselves of labour in this form. Throughout 1905, Barambah inmates worked 
on more than twenty selections in the Murgon, Wondai and Kilkivan districts clearing 
scrub and preparing the land for cultivation. During the latter part of 1905, a Wondai 
settler, J. King of Wondai had between six to eight men working on his block. For 
those selectors who had just arrived in the district, such cheap labour was of great 
benefit. By using settlement labour, selectors were able, at minimal cost, to have their 
blocks working productively much sooner than if they had to clear their land alone or just 
with the assistance of their family. One person in the Murgon district who took full 
advantage of settlement labour was the Barambah Superintendent, Albert Tronson. Six 
months after his arrival at Barambah, his wife acquired two 160 acre blocks at Cloyna, 
fifteen miles away from the settlement. With the help of at times eight men from the 
settlement, rapid progress was made on the Tronson selection. He admitted that in just 
^^  ibid., 12 April, 6 November, 26 December 1905. 
^ ibid. 
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six months he was able to have a house, barn and pigsty erected, as well as cleared 
'about 90 acres of scrub . . , and planted about 50 acres of corn and pumpkins'. 
By the time Tronson resigned as Superintendent in May 1906, the Barambah 
settlement had gained a reputation as a source of cheap and reliable labour. Demand 
exceeded supply. Tronson's previous business experience and entrepreneurial flair 
undoubtedly contributed to the successful establishment of the settlement as a labour 
depot Tronson gave low priority to agricultural and pastoral activities; nor did he see 
his role as trying to civilise or christianise his charges. His primary task was to manage 
the settlement as economically as po.ssible. The most effective way he knew was by 
exploiting the labour power of the inmates. In just over twelve months, the hiring of 
labour had become an integral part of the settlement's activities. 
The labour hiring operations were consolidated under Tronson's successor, 
Bertram Lipscombe, Like Tronson, Lipscombe came to the settlement with little 
experience in the rural sector. Pastoral and agricultural activities were not his forte so 
consequently he paid almost no attention to developing those aspects of the settlement. 
Instead, he was much more at ease in his office attending to the multitude of clerical 
tasks associated with the hiring of labour. Under Lipscombe's guidance, the number of 
engagements soon increased to over 600 per year. In 1909, 616 males and 31 females 
36 
went out to work either on causal permits or yearly agreements. While Richard 
Howard was Chief Protector, Lipscombe was given every encouragement in developing 
the settlement as a labour depot, Howard did not believe in isolating Aborigines on 
reserves. Rather, he advocated that it was the responsibility 'of the department to obtain 
35 Statement by Mr. Tronson, 30 April 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
^ QPP (1909) 2: 1011. 
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employment for each and every individual' Aborigine. He also reali.sed that by sending 
inmates out to work and making 'a charge on their wages', the settlement could become 
self supporting. The early success of the scheme on Barambah prompted Howard to 
recommend the establishment of other depots in the state 'from which labour could be 
5 39 
recruited under proper supervision . 
The appointment of J.W. Bleakley as Chief Protector signalled a change in 
attitude towards the hiring out of .settlement labour. His goal was to create self-
sufficient self-contained institutions. He preferred that inmates remained on reserves. 
In 1920 he commented: 
the policy of absorbing them in the labour market has, after over about 
twenty years' trial, proved itself a failure, for the race are no further advanced 
socially; in fact they have physically and morally degenerated. 
Consequently, Bleakley did not actively encourage the employment of inmates outside the 
settlement. He specifically appointed William Semple as Superintendent to utilise more 
effectively the inmates' labour power on the settlement. But despite his views, outside 
employment flourished in the first five years Semple was on Barambah. Indeed, when 
Semple took over, rather than the number of engagements declining, there was a dramatic 
increase from only 334 in 1924 to 1369 in 1926,"^ ^ 
37 QPP (1909) 2: 973. 
•^  Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission into Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 84. 
39 QPP (1907) 2: 1264. 
^ Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission into Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 97. 
"^  QPP (1920) 2: 233. 
^'^ QPP (1925) 1: 1094, (1927) 1: 1123. 
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Figure 6,1 Demand for labour 1908 -1938 
When the overall pattern of the labour recruitment from Barambah is examined 
(see figure 6.1), it is evident that other factors were more influential in determining the 
number of engagements each year than the predilections of the Chief Protector. Clearly, 
the critical factor was the demand for labour in the rural sector. With few exceptions, 
a decrea.se in the demand for settlement labour coincided with a downturn in the rural 
economy. The effects of drought in 1915, 1918-19, 1923-24 and 1928 were evident in 
fewer requests for labour in those years. The 1915 and 1918-19 droughts severely 
affected the dairying industry in the Burnett region. Butter production declined 32 
percent between 1914 and 1915 while in the subsequent drought output dropped 33 
percent. In 1923, the Chief Protector acknowledged the 'adver.se sca.sons [had] greatly 
affected the demand for permanent labour' and similarly he admitted the reduction in 
43 Queensland Year Book 1939 (Brisbane: Government Printer, 1939), 341. 
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Figure 6.2 Demand for Labour 1929-38: yearly agreements versus casual permits 
demand for 'station and farm labour' throughout 1928 was a result of the 'prevailing 
drought ,44 
The economic crisis which began in late 1929 had a dramatic impact on the 
demand for labour. As the Chief Protector noted in his 1930 report, the depression was 
'keenly fell'on the government settlements. Throughout the 1930s, Barambah had an 
excess of labour available for outside employment. The greatest impact of the depression 
was the dramatic decline in casual work (sec figure 6.2). While the number of inmates 
being .sent out on yearly agreements in the 1930s al.so was lower compared with the 
previous decade, the decline was not as significant as the fall in the number being 
'"' QPP (1924) 1: 982, (1929) 1: 1215. 
^^ QPP (1931) 1: 894. 
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engaged for casual work. In 1930, only 140 casual workers were engaged compared with 
568 in the preceding year and demand fell even further in the following two years. In 
1932, a combination of the economic depression and drought resulted in only thirty-
three workers being required for casual work. For the rest of the decade, there was 
a slight improvement in the demand for casual labour but it was still much lower that the 
demand in the previous decade. It was only with the drastic labour shortages created by 
World War 2 that the labour power of inmates began to be again in demand in sig-
nificant numbers. Chief Protector Bleakley may well have been satisfied with the low 
level of outside employment during the 1930s, but the decline cannot be attributed to the 
fact that he was finally able to have his 'separate development' policy adopted. The 
dramatic decline in the number of inmates working outside the settlement was not 
because there was a sudden recognition that Blcakley's ideals for the settlement needed 
to be adopted, but as a result of the economic crisis. Throughout the period 1905-39, 
the demand for labour fluctuated in response to the state of the rural economy. 
Regardless of the department's policy, whenever capital had need for labour, the 
settlement administration was only too willing to accede to those requests. 
Within the rural sector, Barambah workers were engaged to undertake a 
diversity of tasks including 'scrub-felling, ringbarking, pear-cutting, burning off, chipping, 
corn-pulling , . , shepherding, fencing' as well as general farm and station work. As 
mentioned above, when the labour hiring operations began in 1905 under the aegis of 
Albert Tronson, settlers seeking assistance in clearing their land dominated the requests 
for labour for agriculture. Scrub clearing and associated activities continued to be the 
major work undertaken by inmates until the early 1920s when most of the land in the 
^ QPP (1922) 1: 894. 
'*'' QPP (1913) 3: 1085, (1914) 3: 1020. 
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Burnett region which was suitable for agriculture had been cleared. Such work was 
physically demanding and with little reward. Once farms were established, inmates were 
in demand as casual labour for equally menial and arduous work such as chipping weeds, 
pulling potatoes, harvesting corn. During drought, although the overall demand was 
lower, employers in pastoral regions required workers for the laborious task of cutting 
48 
scrub to feed stock. Despite the variety, there were several common features in the 
work undertaken; first, the work was invariably arduous and menial; secondly, it was 
work that the white labourer avoided if possible; thirdly, with the rarest exceptions, the 
Barambah workers were never placed in supervisory positions nor given the opportunity 
to acquire a trade or skills. On the occupational ladder, inmates were firmly entrenched 
on the lowest rung. 
Outside the rural sector, the demand for male labour came solely from the Police 
force. Ostensibly, men were required for work as 'trackers' but in reality little of their 
duties involved the use of traditional skills in detection. Instead, they were principally 
occupied caring for the police horses and in yard duties. While not as arduous as 
farming or pastoral work, the wages offered were so meagre, few inmates were willing 
to do the work. The only exception was service with the Victorian Police department 
which offered better conditions and wages. The practice of sending two Barambah men 
for twelve month periods to Victoria began in 1905 and continued until the late 1940s. 
^ Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Under Secretary, Home Department 1 September 1915, 
QSA HOM/J228 17/2504. 
"^^ QPP (1910) 3: 964. 
^^ In 1908, trackers with the Victorian police were earning approximately 15/- per week while 
trackers in Queensland were earning between fl and £1/5/- per month (Chief Commissioner of 
Police, Victoria to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 2 July 1908, QSA POL/J13 08/20%9; QPP [1911] 
3: 1323). 
^^  Penny Taylor, ed.. After 200 Years: Photographic Essays of Aboriginal and Islander Australians 
Today (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988), 186. 
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Although most work undertaken by Barambah domestics was on farms and 
properties, they were not confined to the rural sector to the extent of their male counter-
parts. Apart from farmers and pastoralists, employers of Barambah domestics included 
clergymen, doctors, a bookmaker, publicans, police officers, religious orders and public 
servants. Even Chief Protector Bleakley demonstrated his inconsistency by employing 
52 
a domestic from the settlement. The work pattern of females also differed from males 
in that while the latter tended to be employed principally in the Burnett region, requests 
for domestic labour came from throughout all of southern and central Queensland, For 
example, Nellie Sheridan, who began a career as a domestic at fourteen, worked at 
Goomeri, Nanango, Cooroy, Blackall, Longreach, Barcaldine, Brighton, Rcdcliffe, Aramac 
and Nebo, Other localities where Barambah women and girls worked included St, 
George, Roma and Charleville in the south-west, and Rockhampton and Bundaberg on 
the central coast, and Ilfracombe in the central west of the state. Not all domestics were 
employed in situations far removed from the settlement. As with male workers, 
employers in the immediate vicinity of the settlement took advantage of the cheap labour 
for domestic work. Apart from work on local farms, a number of Barambah women 
found regular employment in nearby Murgon, These women lived on the settlement and 
53 
walked into town each day. For the local residents, this was a most beneficial 
arrangement for not only did they have access to cheap labour, but they were spared the 
necessity of providing quarters and meals. 
Throughout the 1930s, although the overall demand for labour declined 
dramatically, the situation was different for domestic work. First, because Barambah 
domestics were employed by persons in a range of occupations - not just the rural sector 
^^  Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982; Evelyn Serico, interview, 4 December 1984; Rita 
Huggins, interview, 7 December 1984. 
^^  Evelyn Serico, interview, 4 December 1984. 
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- they were required by those employers who were least affected by the economic crisis 
and still able to afford domestic service. Secondly, by the early 1930s, the settlement had 
developed a reputation as a supplier of competent domestics. When William Semple 
became Superintendent in 1924, his wife, in her capacity as Matron took a keen interest 
in training the girls to become 'u.seful domestic servants'. According to Evelyn Serico, 
Mrs Semple 
came from a nice class of people. When she was on Cressbrook station she 
used to entertain the Governor and all that. She was very good for us young 
girls. She used to tell us what to do and what not to do when we went out 
to work. She used to study each girl when they came back from work to see 
how they behaved. 
By monitoring the performance of each girl who went out to work and correcting bad 
habits, Semple aimed to improve the quality of service provided by Barambah domesties. 
While Evelyn Serico and other girls appreciated the assistance given by the Superin-
tendent's wife, as well as her dedication, their training and subsequent employment 
nevertheless was designed to indoctrinate them with the view that their station in life was 
as the servants of whites, in particular the wealthy and powerful. Regardless of how 
competent they might be, becau.se they were black, they were destined to be no more 
than domestic servants. 
To meet the demand for labour, inmates were sent out to work as soon as they 
were regarded as being old enough to undertake light farm work or basic domestic duties. 
Initially, boys were recruited as young as twelve and girls at thirteen years. Prior to 
that age the department felt that inmates were not much use except 'to amuse and lake 
^^ J.B. Freeman to Home Secretary, 3 November 1928, QSA HOM/J692 28/8208. 
^^  Evelyn Serico, interview, 4 December 1984. 
^^  M. Kennett to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 21 September 1906, QSA POA/Kl. 
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care of children'. Despite these guidelines, children below the age limit were al.so sent 
out to work. Ettie Meredith was only eleven years old when she first began working for 
58 
a local Murgon dairy farmer in 1913. By the 1920s, when an extra year of schooling 
was regarded as useful, male inmates started work at thirteen and females at fourteen. 
Once a child became eligible for employment, no time was wasted in sending them out 
into the workforce. As Ruth Hegarty recalled: 'once you turned fourteen you were sent 
out to work even if you were in the middle of your year , , , which was normally fourth 
grade',^ 
Employers were attracted to the younger inmates for two reasons: first, they were 
the cheapest labour obtainable and secondly, children were supposedly easier to manage 
and discipline in contrast to older workers. While the first reason was undoubtedly true, 
the second was not always the case. Although most Barambah children, when first sent 
out to work, quickly became ob.sequious employees as a result of being threatened with 
all manner of punishments by their masters and mistresses, some did rebel and object to 
their treatment. Ettie Meredith, in her first job became so annoyed at the abuse she 
received from her employer, that she simply left and went back to the settlement When 
Clive Beckett, who was sent to work on a dairy farm outside Biggenden, became 
disgruntled with the treatment he was receiving, he opted for an extreme solution. One 
morning, when alone with the farmer's wife, he struck her several times on the back of 
the head with an axe. The blows proved to be fatal and as a result Beckett was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. Beckett was only thirteen years old at the time of the 
^'' J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department 20 August 1908, QSA HOM/J38 
08/9830. 
^^  Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. 
^^  J.B. Freeman to Home Secretary, 3 November 1928, QSA HOM/J692 28/8208. 
^ Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
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incident and following his trial the jury recommended that children of his 'colour [and] 
under sixteen years of age, should not be hired out'. This pica went unheeded by the 
government. As well, despite the salutary warning about hiring young children, 
employers continued to request the services of children from the settlement and in turn 
the administration was willing to meet their demands. 
Regardless of age or sex, there was little difference in how Barambah workers 
were treated by their employers. In accord with the lowly status of their work, few 
employers felt obligated to provide accommodation and food beyond the most minimal 
requirements. The combination of class and race ensured they were 'treated like dirt'; 
rarely was respect and dignity shown. Occasionally, there was an employer who was 
different, as Val Clements found when sent to work on a wheat farm near Murgon. He 
recalled the experience: 
I became quite a bloody hero there. His son left the property and then I took 
over. Drove the tractor, put the crops in. I was the right hand man on the 
property , , , I was only sixteen - knew every bolt around the place. He 
depended on me wholly. 
Clements felt that being treated almost like a son and given responsibility on the farm 
was an invaluable experience that enabled him to cope successfully with living in white 
society. He also acknowledged that such treatment was exceptional. He certainly was 
not treated in that manner on other farms where he worked. Also, on rare occasions, a 
girl working as a domestic was treated as if she was part of the family. Yet despite 
being regarded as .something more than an employee, her status remained unchanged. As 
^^  Rex v Clive Beckett, Circuit Court Maryborough, 28 August 1922, QSA SCT/CN8 22/17. 
^^  Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
^^  June Bond claimed that she was well treated by most of her employers and 'spoke warmly 
of a "wonderful atmosphere' where she worked (Jackie Huggins, '"Firing On in the Mind": Aboriginal 
Women Domestic Servants in the Inter-War Years,' Hecate 12 [1987J: 9). 
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J.W, Bleakley observed: 'she may become one of the family, but at the same time she 
,64 
remains a servant , 
Collectively, Barambah workers had no illusions as to their real status. The 
abysmal and frequently degrading conditions they had to endure left no doubt that they 
'weren't part of the family'. Typically, they were forced to eat their meals apart from 
not only the employer and his family but also from other workers. As Cecil Fisher 
recalled: 
When you went to a neighbouring station, the white fellers would eat with 
the other ringers [cattle station hand], and we had to eat at the woodheap or 
with the other blackfcllers,^^ 
Apart from the woodheap, meals were commonly taken next to the tankstand or if 
suitable, under the hou.se. The meals provided were invariably as basic as possible, 
consisting principally of 'bread, beef, tea and sugar, with the occasional potato'. Some 
employers had no compunction about feeding their Aboriginal employees with scraps from 
the kitchen or food that had gone stale. When Agnes Williams worked for a police 
sergeant near Warwick, she was forced to live on a diet which she described as follows: 
I had food rations and bread and dripping. The children would 'sneak' me 
some food at times. When we had dinner I was given scraps because 
according to them [the people I worked for], this is what I was used to, 
Barambah workers were treated little better than animals. Indeed, when the ca.se of the 
thirteen year old Clive Beckett, was discussed in Parliament, J.A. Weir (Maryborough) 
felt that since Beckett was forced 'to have his meals on the tankstand like a dog', it was 
^ Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission into Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 95. 
^^  Cecil Fisher, 'Cherbourg,' The Australians: 1938, ed. P. Spearitt and B. Gammage (Sydney: 
Fairfax, Syme & Weldon, 1987), 88. 
^ Jas. Old to Inspector of Police, Maryborough, 22 June 1916, QSA Transfer 1227/34 16/2064. 
^^  Huggins, 'Aboriginal Women Domestic Servants in the Inter-War Years,' 9. 
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not altogether surprising that he behaved in an animal-like manner. The treatment of 
Barambah workers was aptly described by Val Clements when he said of the bos.ses: 
'they wiped their feet on you'. With such attitudes, employers showed no reluctance in 
insisting on long hours of work and allowing little time for leisure. Domestics commonly 
worked a fifteen hour day and farm hands were kept occupied from sunri.se to sunset. 
Girls who were employed principally to look after children usually worked seven days 
a week. Their only respite was when they were allowed to return to the settlement for 
holidays. 
Female workers faced the added burden of sexual harassment and exploitation. 
As one former domestic stated: 'Sex . . . it was the same everywhere , , , part of your 
duties, part of the deal'. An inevitable con.sequence of employers believing they had 
an unfettered right to the labour of Aboriginal women was the belief they could use their 
70 bodies sexually as well. The dynamics of sexual encounters between white bosses and 
their Aboriginal workers was complex, as black historian Jackie Huggins has recently 
noted. In her view, inadequate attention has been given to the perspective of Aboriginal 
women. She writes: 
this area certainly remains an enigma, and detailed research is required to 
explore the question of were they 'victims', or 'collaborators' or 'somewhere 
in between', and what if anything did they get out of it. 
Although the extent of sexual exploitation is thus difficult to a.ssess, domestics becoming 
pregnant while in service was not an unusual occurrence. In 1914, of twenty girls 
removed from service to Barambah, thirteen were for 'care and confinement with 
^ QPD 140 (1922): 1035. 
^^  Sunday Mail, 19 February 1986, 
70 Huggins, 'Aboriginal Women Domestic Servants in the Inter-War Years,' 17. 
1^ ibid. 
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illegitimate children'. Eight years later, the Rev R.S. Shand wrote to the Chief Protec-
tor about the problems created by sending girls from the settlement out to service. As 
the Church of England Minister in neighbouring Murgon he expressed concern that it was 
'becoming almost a regular thing for girls to return from domestic service in a certain 
condition' and supplied a list of sixteen women who had a total of twenty-five children 
73 to white men in the previous eighteen months. The problem was an acute 
embarrassment as the Chief Protector acknowledged: 'the number of girls that get into 
HA 
trouble to white men , , , is a serious reflection upon the adminstration'. While the 
obvious solution was simply to stop 'sending out girls for domestic service', the demands 
75 for labour overwhelmed any such proposals. Consequently, the problem continued 
unabated. When Governor Leslie Wilson visited the .settlement in 1934, he could not fail 
to notice the 'many young children there, of such fair colour that one would think they 
were entirely white born'. In reporting his concerns to the Deputy Premier, he was 
informed that the problem was a result of sending girls out to work, 95 percent of whom 
returned 'either about to have a child, or who have had a child, the father of which [was] 
a white man'. In response, the Chief Protector claimed the percentage of girls 
becoming pregnant was exaggerated. In his view, 'the temptations to immorality' were 
just as great if not greater on the settlement and therefore he did not consider it advisable 
to withdraw girls from domestic service outside. He did acknowledge that the settlement 
benefitted from .sending the girls out to work in that it reduced maintenance costs on the 
"^2 QPP (1915) 3: 1685. 
•^3 R.W. Shand to Home Secretary, 29 May 1922, QSA HOM/J431 22/5034. 
'''* J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 13 June 1922, QSA HOM/J431 
22/5034. 
''^  R.W. Shand to Home Secretary, 29 May 1922, QSA HOM/J431 22/5034. 
''^  Leslie Wilson to Deputy Premier, 6 June 1934, QSA A/3699 34/5048. 
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settlement, but he failed to admit that the real beneficiaries of the system were the 
77 
employers who exploited the labour of the women. 
In the control and discipline of workers, there was close collaboration between 
employers, the department and the settlement administration, A variety of techniques 
were used to ensure that employers received the maximum benefits from Barambah 
labour, but not all were equally successful. In the initial stages of the system, the 
department firmly believed the best method of dealing with recalcitrant workers was to 
take action under the Masters and Servants Act. In 1908 the Barton Bros, from Burran-
dowan station complained to the Home Secretary about the problems they were 
experiencing with Barambah workers. They claimed that when there were slack periods 
on the station and the men were allowed to return briefiy to the settlement, they did not 
come back to work. In reply, the Home Secretary remarked: 
the Superintendent of the settlement has no power in the matter but points out 
that the remedy is with the employer who should take action under the 
Master and Servants Act, 
Despite the effectiveness with which the Act had been used in the nineteenth century to 
coerce workers, employers showed great reluctance to seek redress against their 
Aboriginal employees. When discussing in his 1914 Annual Report the problem of 
workers who flagrantly broke their agreement, the Chief Protector noted that while 
the employers have their redress through the court under the Master and 
Servants Act, , , . very few will go to this trouble, for, as they say, a 
dissatisfied aboriginal is of no use as a servant, and it would be a useless cost 79 
of time and trouble. 
Because the Act was used so infrequently, employers found even threatening prosecu-
"^^  J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department 30 November 1934, QSA A/3699 
34/5048. 
'^ ^ Under Secretary, Home Department to Barton Bros, 5 September 1908, QSA HOM/J38 
08/10284. 
79 QPP (1914) 3: 1020, (1913) 3: 1101. 
235 
tion had little impact.^ There was recourse, however, to other techniques that were 
more successful in gaining the compliance of workers. 
On the settlement, the main method for dealing with refractory workers was aptly 
described by Doug Kina: 'you had to work. If you didn't they'd put you in jail for a 
81 
week or so - starve you a little'. Such punishment was common and the length of im-
prisonment was at the discretion of the Superintendent, When Vera Weazel refused to 
go to work at Longreach because she did not want to be too far away from her two 
87 
children, she was locked up for more than two weeks and then still sent out to work. 
Before the construction of a jail on the settlement, the primary form of punishment used 
by the Superintendent was to withhold rations from any recalcitrant or reluctant 
83 
workers. 
Although the most frequent means employers u.sed to confront troublesome 
employees was verbal abuse or intimidation, some were not adverse to using a direct 
84 physical approach. The workers with whom employers felt most at liberty to deal 
physically with were girls with little working experience, because they were unlikely to 
strike back or run away. The extent of physical abuse ranged from light slaps on the 
face to such extremes as described by Agnes Williams in an interview: 
You see this scar on my face, well I reckon that was done by her [the 
mi.stress] because we had to scrub the pot and pans. And you know tho.se 
^ When John Webb, a Kingaroy selector threatened a Barambah inmate, Jacob with prosecution 
because he was not working hard enough, he simply left and returned to the settlement (J. Webb to 
Superintendent Barambah Aboriginal Mission, 12 May 1908 QSA HOM/J36 08/7058). 
®^  Doug Kina, interview, 15 November 1983. 
2^ W. Gall, memo, 9 March 1934, QSA A/31710 34/4548. 
^^  A. Tronson to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 23 March 1906, QSA POA/Kl. 
^ Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982; Rita Huggins, interview, 7 December 1984; Leslie 
Cook to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 26 November 1929, QSA Transfer 1227/30 30/527. 
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steelo pads with the gold threads through them, well I went off cleaning and 
she came in while I was cleaning the silver and I wasn't doing in right 
according to her. So she got it J the steelo] and scrubbed my face and said: 
'Now this is the way you rub'. 
The ignominy of such treatment left scars that were more than just facial. It deeply 
Of: 
marred the psyche and left a sense of worthlessness, of being 'treated like shit'. 
Although overt violence did play a part in the attempts to create a submissive 
and compliant workforce, more significant was the covert violence of the removals 
system. As discu.ssed in chapter two, the threat of removal was u.sed to intimidate all of 
the Aboriginal workforce in the state, regardless of whether a worker came from a 
settlement or lived outside. For Aboriginal workers who lived off the settlements, the 
threat of removal was a most effective means of forcing them to sign an agreement and 
• • 87 
work diligently for their employer, Barambah workers were acutely conscious that if 
they refused to work or were troublesome employees, they risked removal to one of the 
88 Other settlements. In 1923, the reasons for removal to Barambah included 'unable to 
work','loafers'and 'lazy and imprudent'. As well, one Barambah inmate was transferred 
8Q to Palm Island for 'refusing to work'. In the following year one worker was deported 
for 'bad language to employer' and another was sent away because he was a 'deserter 
00 from employment'. Deportation to another settlement was particularly feared by young 
domestics. As Ruth Hegarty and Nellie O'Chin recalled: 
*^  Huggins, 'Aboriginal Women Domestic Servants in the Inter-War Years', 9. 
^ ibid. 
^^  QPD 134 (1919-20): 2563. 
^ Larry Leedie, interview by Lance O'Chin, 27 September 1979, Foundation for Aboriginal and 
Islander Research Action, Cultural Revitalisation Project 32/5. 
^^  QSA HOM/B60 "Removals". 
^ QSA HOM/B62 "Removals". 
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Palm Island and Woorabinda - that scared us; becau.sc if you came back from 
your place of employment before the twelve months and broke your contract 
with the white people you got sent to Palm - that was punishment place. 
That scared us - even the mention of those names , , , TTiey seemed so far 
away - the other side of the world. 
The threat of removal played a critical role in maintaining a disciplined and servile 
workforce. The fear of deportation to a distant and alien place was sufficient to ensure 
that most workers complied with their master's demands. 
Apart from punitive measures, there was one incentive for workers to give 
faithful and diligent service - exemption from the Act, To be free from the provisions 
of the Act and all the constraints associated with living on the settlement no doubt 
inspired some inmates to work hard and demonstrate they were reliable and capable 
labourers. Exemption certificates were granted only to those blacks who demonstrated 
to the Chief Protector's satisfaction the capacity to survive in the outside world. In other 
words, they were imbued with capitalistic values concerning money, time, and work. But 
the standards required for exemptions were high; certificates were not freely issued, 
Q2 Between 1916 and 1939, only eleven were granted to Barambah inmates. The Chief 
Protector relied primarily on the Superintendent's opinion when a.ssessing an application 
for exemption. Therefore it was imperative that the applicant was favourably viewed by 
the Superintendent. Without his approval, the application had no chance of success. For 
example in 1937, John Cobbo wrote to the Home Secretary requesting to be exempted 
from the Act. He believed he was well entitled to such a privilege becau.sc he had 
served for two and half years in the AIF and had been working all his life. The reason 
he wished to be free from the Act and leave the settlement was, he wrote, because 
I , , . still intend to work, but under the circumstances I do not get much 
91 Ruth Hegarty and Nellie O'Chin, interview, 15 August 1988. 
^^  Aboriginals exempted from the provisions of the "The Aboriginals Preservation and Protection 
Acts, 1939-46", 3 March 1947, QSA POL/J16 396M. 
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incishment [sic] to work. I have to give half my wages to the scttlemt, and 
not much encouragmt.[sic] All I ask is the liberty to go to work and Keep 
the money I earn, and leave the mission and fend for myself as I have no 
chance here. 
Despite his military service and stated desire to work, Cobbo's application was rejected. 
The Superintendent regarded him as 'not a good type of native' and believed 'he would 
not undertake regular work but would only idle his time around country towns'. 
Evidently, only the most compliant inmates were considered for exemption. 
Barambah workers faced an array of techniques which were designed to control 
their behaviour and maximise their output. Yet the efforts at control were not limited 
to producing a docile and productive workforce. Equally important and no less vigorous 
were the efforts devoted to controlling the earnings of settlement workers. In the 1901 
amendments to the Aboriginals Protection Act, provision was made to give protectors the 
power to direct an employer to pay the wages of an Aboriginal and half-caste worker 
into an account under the control of the protector. No reference was made to controlling 
the earnings of settlement workers because at the time the legislation was passed, few 
inmates were earning an income. But once the practice of hiring out of settlement labour 
became established, a system was quickly developed to control earnings from outside 
employment. 
The first moves to exercise some control over the wages of settlement workers 
were initiated by Albert Tronson while he was Superintendent of Durundur, He 
implemented a scheme which involved deducting an amount from the wages as a 
contribution to settlement maintenance and when he moved to Barambah in 1905, a 
^^  J. Cobbo to Home Secretary, 17 August 1937, QSA A/3932 37/7942. 
^'^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 15 September 1937, QSA A/3932 
37/7942. 
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similar scheme was established there, Walter Roth, the Chief Protector at the time, ex-
plained the rationale for the scheme as follows: 
I considered it a fair thing for blacks who were sent into outside employment 
from the Barambah settlement to forego some proportion of their wages so 
earned as a set-off against their keep. It seemed but right that in return for 
the settlement rationing the wives and families of such men during their 
absence, and also supporting the wage-earners themselves when out of work 
that those earning money should give a quid pro quo. 
In other words. Roth decided that inmates would be taxed for the 'privilege' of living 
on a settlement. The benefits of the scheme soon became most apparent to the 
government. Deductions from the wages of inmates who went out to work were a useful 
means of generating revenue for the settlement. The hiring out of labour therefore 
benefited not just employers, but also the government. As the Chief Protector freely 
acknowledged: 'to be able to place the surplus labour from the settlement in congenial 
employment outside [was] a great convenience and saving in expense and maintenance'. 
Initially a simple formula was used to assess the amount deducted for settlement 
97 
maintenance - regardless of income, workers were levied one shilling per week. By 
1910, as wages increa.sed the formula became more complex; twenty percent was the 
standard contribution but no person paid more than three shillings per week while 
98 
workers earning less than five shillings per week were exempted. As wages increased, 
the department realised that by limiting the amount that could be deducted, lucrative 
5^ Walter Roth to Accountant, Home Secretary's Office, 13 February 1906, QSA A/31708 
07/10416. 
^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 1 November 1915 QSA HOM/J228 
17/2504; QPP (1913) 3: 1085. 
"^^  QPP (1905) 1: 765. 
^^  Under Secretary, Home Department, to Barton Bros, 2 July 1909, QSA COL/G236, 89. 
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income was being lost. Consequently, the formula was altered so that all workers 
QQ 
contributed a fiat twenty percent of their earnings to settlement maintenance. 
The obvious financial benefits resulting from inmates going out to work provided 
a major incentive to develop and promote Barambah as a labour depot. The eagerness 
of both Tronson and Lipscombe to engage inmates in outside work stemmed from a 
desire to generate income for the settlement. They sought to maximise revenue from 
settlement levies by first, sending as many inmates as possible out to work and secondly 
by attempting to levy workers with even the most tenuous relationship with the settle-
ment. In the settlement's infancy, because of the demand for labour, there were a sig-
nificant number of workers who, between finishing one job and going to another, only 
resided on the settlement for brief periods. In 1913, Superintendent Lipscombe claimed 
he was keeping the accounts of 721 Aborigines yet the average number of inmates during 
the year was only 376 including women and children. Upwards of 300 workers used the 
settlement merely as a stopover. Despite these workers having little attachment to the 
settlement or availing them.sclves of its so called 'benefits', they were still levied for 
settlement maintenance, Lipscombe justified such action by a.sserting that regardless how 
infrequent or brief their visits, these workers were nevertheless 'always attached' to the 
settlement. As well, they had a responsibility to maintain 'any relatives or friends 
there'. In the department's view, the only time a worker might be relieved of paying 
the maintenance levy was when he 'had been away from the settlement for a long time 
and had no relatives' residing there. Even workers in the district, who had never lived 
on the settlement, were levied for settlement maintenance because it was anticipated that 
99 QPP (1916) 3: 1732. 
^^ Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission into Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 78; QPP (1914) 3: 1030. 
°^^  ibid., 78-9. 
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they would eventually do so. As far as Bleakley was concerned, by contributing to the 
fund, these workers were then 'entitled to come and live on the settlement . . . when out 
102 of employment'. 
Initially, there was every indication that the settlement could become financially 
self-supporting from the maintenance levy scheme. In the period 1905-09, revenue from 
levies accounted for eighty-one percent of settlement maintenance costs, excluding 
salaries. In the financial year 1909-10, income from settlement maintenance levies 
almost equalled settlement operating costs. The government only had to contribute a 
mere £100 - a situation which inspired the Chief Protector to claim that the settlement 
would soon be self-supporting. But his optimism was short-lived. In the period 1910-
14, although the average amount collected from settlement levies doubled compared with 
the previous five year period, the cost of maintaining the settlement also escalated as 
more facilities were required and the population increased (see table 6.1). As a result, 
deductions from the wages of inmates accounted for only forty-six percent of costs. 
From 1920, the amount that settlement operating costs were offset by levies declined 
dramatically. In the period 1925-29, the contributions towards settlement maintenance 
accounted for less than three percent of total expenditure. The decrease was due partly 
to the general decline in the demand for labour but also to the fact that by the late 1920s 
the demand for labour was restricted to predominantly young boys and girls who were 
the lowest paid workers. A third factor contributing to the decline in revenue from the 
1920s was the lack of interest shown in the scheme by William Semple, As 
Superintendent, he was more concerned with developing the settlement's farming activities 
than with keeping the books in order. Indeed, in 1929 the government auditor was 
'°2 ibid., 81, 91 and 96. 
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Table 6.1 
Operating costs and Income from Settlement levies* 
Year Levies Operating Percent 
costs** 
1905-09 
1910-14 
1915-19 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
1935-39 
747 
1670 
722 
345 
207 
224 
444 
915 
3742 
5315 
7627 
7169 
6029 
7184 
81.6 
45.5 
13.6 
4.6 
2.9 
3.7 
6,2 
* amounts expressed in pounds 
** excluding salaries and wages 
(Source: Annual Report of the Chief Protector) 
moved to comment: 'it appears to be left to the discretion of the Superintendent whether 
103 
or not maintenance is deducted from the wages'. 
In 1930, as a result of the economic crisis, the government introduced an 
additional levy for settlement maintenance. In an attempt to offset the decline in revenue 
because fewer inmates were in employment, the government decided that as well as 
imposing a levy on the earnings of workers, a levy would be placed on their savings. 
All inmates with over twenty pounds in their accounts were 'debited with settlement 
maintenance at the rate of . . . five percent per annum, ba.sed on the quarterly balances 
on such accounts, provided that no such deduction [reduced] any balance below twenty 
pounds'. This levy applied regardless of whether a person was employed or not. Thus 
the thrifty and hard working made a double contribution towards the upkeep of the 
settlement. Although this levy did not become a major source of revenue - in 1931, 
'°^ Report on the Books and Accounts of the Barambah Aboriginal Settlement 26 November 
1929, QSA AUD/V57. 
^^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 20 May 1941, 
QSA A/4215 41/5068. 
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seventy-five inmates contributed a total of £177 - it did reduce the amount the 
govemment had to expend on the settlement. Although only intended as a temporary 
measure, the levy was not dropped until 1941. Deductions for settlement main-
tenance was the most conspicuous method used to siphon off the earnings of workers. 
But the twenty percent levy on earnings, and from 1930 the five percent tax on savings, 
was not the limit of the contribution made by the inmates to financing the operation of 
the settlement. Because of the rigid control which the department exercised over the 
inmates' accounts, it was able, through a complex system of accounts and procedures, to 
channel additional amounts towards the upkeep of the settlement (.see figure 6.3). The 
heart of the network was the Trust account in which all of a worker's earnings were 
deposited with the exception of the settlement levy and a small amount that went directly 
to the worker as 'pocket money'. The system of holding wages in trust was established, 
like other restrictive measures, ostensibly to protect the Aboriginal worker. They were 
supposedly to be shielded from such people as unscrupulous shopkeepers, hawkers, 
cardsharps and publicans. Also by controlling how money was spent, the department 
hoped to inculcate a spirit of thrift and responsibility and guard against practices such 
107 
as gambling. 
As the total amount held in trust accumulated, the department could not resist 
appropriating some of the money to meet part of the cost of maintaining the settlement 
and others activities. The Chief Protector legitimised such action when he claimed: 
°^^  Barambah Aboriginal Settlement, return of Bank accounts, 9 July 1931, QSA A/3584 
31/5165. 
^^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 20 May 1941, 
QSA A/4215 41/5068. 
107 QPP (1909) 2: 967. 
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Figure 63 Distribution of Inmates' Wages 
it is quite consistent with present-day ideas that the self-supporting members 
of a community should understand and bear their fair share of the respon-
sibility for the maintenance of the helpless and indigent class. To . . , allow 
these [aboriginal] workers the free control of all their wages, would not result 
in the material improvement in the conditions of their dependents. 
Of course, the contribution of so called 'self-supporting members' was quite involuntary. 
With no control over their accounts, the money was withdrawn without approval and 
diverted by various means into settlement funds. 
One avenue used to divert money to the settlement was via the Aboriginal 
Property Protection Account. This fund was established in 1904 to administer the 'wages 
of Aboriginals or half-castes absconding from service, and moneys of deceased 
108 QPP (1916) 3: 1731. 
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Aboriginals or half-castes, as well as moneys otherwise unclaimed',^ Thus any money 
held in trust for a Barambah inmate who absconded from service or the settlement, or 
who died, was transfered into the Aboriginal Property Protection Account. While the 
money from Barambah inmates was pooled with that from Aborigines throughout the 
state, the settlement did gain substantially when surplus amounts were redistributed. 
From 1916 onwards, the Aboriginal Property Protection Account was used to finance 
improvements to the Barambah settlement including the construction of the sawmill, 
hospital, cottages and girls dormitory. As well, the cost of installing a reticulated water 
service, a sewerage system for the hospital and dormitories and a sanitary service for the 
camps was met by the Aboriginal Property Protection Account, Between 1916 and 
1930, an average of £772 per year was expended on Barambah improvements from this 
account. In subsequent years, benefits to the settlement were more indirect. From 1931, 
a general allocation was made to supplement the budget of the Chief Protector's office 
which included provision for the maintenance of Barambah and other settlements. 
Inmates also subsidised the operation of the settlement through the interest that 
accrued on their savings. From the outset of the system of trust accounts, interest was 
not credited individually to inmates. Instead, it was regarded as belonging collectively 
to the settlement. Because the earnings of inmates were all deposited in just one Savings 
Bank account administered by the Superintendent, there was little difficulty in appropriat-
ing the interest to offset settlement expenditure. Initially, the interest earned by the trust 
^^ QGG 82 (1904): 1187. 
^^ ° In the case of deceased estates, refunds were made to relatives when they could be traced, 
but of £40,700 received from this source in the f)eriod 1905-39, only twenty-seven percent was 
reimbursed. In the same period, wages of deserters and unclaimed bank balances totalled £54,400 of 
which twenty-three percent was refunded. Between 1905 and 1939, over £70,000 was deposited in the 
Aboriginal Property Protection Account and not refunded. 
'^^  see statements of the Aboriginal Property Protection Account as contained in the Annual 
Report of the Chief Protector. 
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account was deposited in the Aboriginal Property Protection Account. The Chief 
Protector claimed this action was taken at the request of the inmates to purchase items 
117 
such as 'Christmas delicacies, presents and toys for children, sporting material'. But 
the department did not expend all the money on such items; the remainder assisted in 
financing the capital improvements to the settlement such as the sawmill and the hospital. 
From 1922, the interest earned by the trust account was credited directly to the settle-
ment operating fund and up to 1939, the settlement benefited an average of £171 per year 
from such an arrangement. While this figure represents less than three percent of annual 
settlement expenditure, it nevertheless assisted in reducing the amount which the 
government was required to outlay. In 1934, during debate on amendments to the 
Aboriginals Protection Act, the practice of appropriating the interest from savings 
accounts was severely criticised by the member for Cook, Mr, Kenny, He commented: 
The taxation laws do not extract the whole of the interest earned by the white 
race , , , Not only does the Government control the capital of the native; they 
also confiscate his interest. 
The Home Secretary defended the practice by asserting that the government was not 
really 'taking the interest of the Savings Bank accounts of the Aborigines', but that it was 
'an administration charge for the handling of such accounts'. Of course, the Home 
Secretary failed to mention that inmates were given no choice about whether they wanted 
the department to handle their accounts, nor did he acknowledge the obvious benefits to 
government funding in reducing the amount it was required to expend on the settle-
ment 
1^2 QPP (1913) 3: 1108, (1914) 3: 1034. 
"3 QPD 166 (1934): 1736. 
114 ibid. 
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By spinning an intricate web of accounts and procedures, the department was 
able to plunder the earnings of inmates almost at will. It did so without reservation and 
any thought of impropriety. Because of the secrecy surrounding the administration of the 
accounts, inmates had little knowledge of how much they had in their accounts or what 
happened to their money. Deductions were made without their knowledge or consent. 
For example, at the stroke of a pen, an account could be deemed 'unclaimed' and the 
money transferred into the Aboriginal Property Protection Account. Ironically, the period 
when there was a dramatic rise in the transfer of unclaimed balances coincided with the 
financial crisis of the early 1930s when the government desperately sought alternative 
means of revenue. Between 1930 and 1932, £25,000 was deposited in the Aboriginal 
Property Protection Account from so called unclaimed accounts. In turn, £14,000 was 
invested in Treasury stock and another £12,000 was transferred to the Home Department 
Standing account to subsidise expenditure on Aboriginal welfare. 
Inmates were certainly unaware of the extent to which they subsidised the upkeep 
of the settlement. The lack of detailed records and the circuitous route by which money 
was transferred to the settlement fund precludes any precise assessment of how much 
they contributed financially. For example, the percentage of accounts that belonged to 
Barambah inmates which were deemed 'unclaimed' and transfered into the Aboriginal 
Property Protection Account is unknown. However, by considering the data on settle-
ment levies and interest that was earned, and allowing for the most modest contributions 
from other sources, it is estimated that up to 1910, inmates subsidised eighty percent of 
11^  The financial problems the government faced also prompted the milking of the Aboriginal 
Provident Fund during this period. This account was established in 1919 and received contributions 
of 'all native workers not on reserves' at the rate of five percent for single men and two and half 
percent for married workers {QGG 112 [1919]: 1580). It was to provide relief for such workers and 
their dependents when in want {QPP [1922] 2: 472). For the first ten years, the fund was hardly 
utilised for such purposes and by 1929 there was a credit balance of £38,300. In the following two 
years, £16,000 was transfered from this account into the Home Department standing account. 
248 
the operating costs. In the following decade, they funded approximately one-third of 
settlement expenses while in the following two decades, ten percent of the cost of 
maintaining Barambah was offset by involuntary contributions from inmates. Ostensibly, 
the system of trust accounts was established for the benefit of the Aborigines of the state; 
but instead of being exploited by unscrupulous private white individuals, they had their 
earnings forcefully expropriated by a government intent on saving expenditure wherever 
possible. 
The secrecy surrounding the inmates' accounts made it easy not only for 
governments to expropriate inmates' money, but also for settlement officials. The lack 
of documentation and supervision presented corrupt officials with a variety of avenues 
for misappropriating money. In 1929 the clerk Robert Hogg was dismissed after an audit 
found that he had been extensively falsifying inmates' accounts. One technique he 
employed was not to credit maternity allowances to a number of accounts. The auditor 
also suspected, although he had no conclusive proof, that after giving an inmate an order 
for perhaps four shillings to spend at the store, Hogg was then recording the amount as 
£4/4/- (see figure 6,4) The auditor was thwarted from obtaining conclusive proof of such 
behaviour as the cards recording the financial transactions of fifty-one inmates had been 
strangely lost. 
Despite the rapacity of government, corrupt officials, and an administration intent 
on managing the settlement as cheaply as possible, inmates did manage to save money. 
Yet, as in every other sphere of their existence, there were tight controls on how they 
spent their savings. Inmates were primarily restricted to obtaining items from the 
settlement store where transactions were effected not by cash but by an order which was 
1'^  A.G. Dunlop, Report on the Books and Accounts of the Barambah Aboriginal Settlement 
QSA AUD/V46, 1547. 
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I 
a 
c 
This page was included in the report by the auditor to demonstrate the ease with which 
an entry could be altered. The amount debited to Ernie Pope appears to have be amended 
from 4/- to 4/4/- (QSA AUD/W46 1547). 
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issued by the Superintendent. Thus he could veto any purchases regarded as 
unwarrantedor unnecessary. Also, when the Superintendent fell it necessary for an inmate 
to have certain items, they were obtained from the store and the amount deducted from 
his or her account. For example, when girls first went out to work, in order to be 
presentable to their employers, they were issued with a number of items including 'a port, 
sandshoes, sandals, stockings, pants, and a towel'. But as they discovered later, the items 
were not provided free; the Superintendent simply deducted the cost of the items from 
117 their wages. 
The system of issuing vouchers instead of cash whenever possible had significant 
consequences for inmates. Apart from giving the Superintendent an even greater capacity 
to control their lives, they were almost totally excluded from market relations. Just as 
the Aboriginal worker in the nineteenth century was typically paid with food and tobacco 
118 
rather than cash, settlement inmates were remunerated in kind. They primarily 
exchanged their labour for goods, not cash. After the department had siphoned off a 
proportion of their earnings, inmates were restricted to obtaining commodities from the 
store. When they did require cash to purchase goods not obtainable on the settlement, 
the Superintendent only approved of such withdrawals if he was satisfied that it was for 
a worthwhile purpose. The system of controlling inmates' earnings effectively excluded 
them from any substantial participation in the cash economy. The rigid control over 
inmates' financial affairs reinforced their sen.se of powerlessness. They had no access 
to accounts, and not were in a position to keep an independent record of earnings and 
withdrawals. When Charlie Collins once summoned the courage to enquire as to the 
^^"^  Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
^^ ^ Thorpe, 'A Social History of Colonial Queensland: Towards a Marxist Perspective', 30. 
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status of his account he was punished with a brief term in gaol. Thus inmates learnt 
not to ask or question what they had earned or spent as Nellie Sheridan remarked: 
No one ever told us what our wages were. If you asked they punished you, 
cut off your hair, made you wear sack dresses and go out chipping the roads. 
You didn't ask, you never saw any records. 
The ex-World War I veteran John Cobbo sought exemption because he felt he did not 
get much encouragement to work and had to give most of his wages to the settlement. 
When Warry Phillips and Dan Cobbo were sent to work as trackers for the Victorian 
Police force in 1923, they objected to the system where most of their earnings were sent 
to the Chief Protector's office and they were given a small allowance for pocket money. 
They requested to be paid their wages in full because, as they explained to the Chief 
Commissioner of Police, the money sent away was 'almost as good as lost to them'. 
Despite the eagerness to develop the settlement as a labour depot, the department 
was acutely aware that inmate labour was crucial for any progress to be made on the 
settlement. It could only succeed by inmates themselves undertaking most of the work 
involved in creating the necessary infrastructure. In 1907 the Chief Protector clearly spelt 
out the obligations of inmates. Regardless of whether they had been out in employment 
and paid their 'settlement fees' they were expected to 'do a share of improvement work 
122 
and necessary repairs' when on the settlement. The rule was simple - no work, no 
rations. Such a threat appeared to be effective. In the Chief Protector's annual report 
for 1908 a series of photographs depicted inmates at work milking cows, chaffcutting, 
processing corn, cutting slabs, pitsawing, building a dormitory for girls. Another 
'*' Charlie Morton to Mr. Stopford, 22 March 1929, QSA Transfer 1227/30 29/2412. 
2^*^  Courier Mail, 26 May 1988. 
^ '^ Chief Commissioner of Police, Victoria to Chief Commissioner of Police, Queensland, 14 
February 1923, QSA POL/J13 Ml398. 
122 QPP (1908) 3: 939. 
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photograph contained a view of the 'stockyard fence built by Aborigines'.'""^ During the 
next two years, other work undertaken by inmates included construction of a store-
cum-dispensary and boys dormitory. Despite such progress, the development of the 
settlement, at least from the department's perspective, was hindered by the heavy demand 
for outside labour. In reviewing the work performed during 1912, Bertram Lipscombe 
noted that while inmates a.ssisted 'in building storekeeper's and nurse's quarters', very little 
farming was successfully undertaken, 'because the boys [were] continually leaving for 
work'. To compound the problems associated with the shortage of labour, it was the 
'good workers' who were most regularly employed off the settlement, while the 
'incompetent workers' remained. Consequently during the settlement's first decade, 
little progress was made in developing the agricultural and industrial potential of the 
settlement. 
By the mid 1910s however, a combination of factors resulted in a more serious 
effort being made to utilise the labour of inmates upon the settlement. One factor was 
the failure of maintenance levies to provide sufficient revenue to enable the settlement 
to be self-supporting. By 1915 it was not proving to be as successful as originally 
predicted. Although revenue from levies increased in the period 1911-15, it did not 
match the growth in operating costs (see table 6.1). Consequently alternative means for 
making the settlement self-sufficient had to be found. Secondly, the dramatic increase 
in the population between 1910 and 1916 taxed the facilities on the settlement and 
exposed the need for major improvements to the infrastructure. The third factor con-
tributing to the change of emphasis in the deployment of labour was the appointment of 
J.W, Bleakley as Chief Protector in 1913, As mentioned previously, Bleakley was not 
123 QPP (1909^ 2: 1001-5. 
124 QPP (1913) 3: 1100. 
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enthusiastic about the involvement of inmates in the outside labour market. His ideologi-
cal commitment to racial purity and fervent desire to keep the races as separate as 
possible meant he preferred inmates remaining on the settlement. In his view, it was 
much more beneficial to harness their labour-power within the confines of a reserve. 
He tolerated the hiring out of labour only because it assisted the department financial-
125 ly but felt the system did 'little towards improving the race as a whole'. His avowed 
aim for Barambah, as well as other settlements, was that it would become not only self-
1')/; 
supporting but a self-contained institution. 
To achieve these aims and to encourage the more competent workers to remain 
on the settlement, the department began paying some inmates a small wage as well as 
rations for working on the settlement. The scheme began in 1908 when two inmates 
were employed as Native Police, one as a carpenter and another as a stockmen. By 
1915, the number of inmates on the payroll had increased to thirteen. New positions 
included a bullock driver, hospital attendants, cooks and cowboy. Five years later, when 
an intensive building program was in progress, the number of inmates receiving wages 
177 
had increased to forty. Throughout the 1920s, the number of inmates on the 
settlement payroll fluctuated depending on economic circumstances. By the early 1930s, 
128 the number of inmates who were paid employees had stabilised at around thirty. The 
number of paid workers on the settlement however, must be seen in context. When the 
total settlement workforce is considered, only a minority ever received any remuneration 
other than rations. Even when the paid workforce was at its peak in the early 1920s, 
only one in five workers were paid. Prior to that period and afterwards, less than one 
125 QPP (J9I7) 3. I0Q4 
'2^ Hartwig, 'Capitalism and Aborigines: The Theory of Internal Colonialism and its Rivals,' 135. 
127 QPP (1909) 1: 288; (1914) 1: 372; (1920) 1: 338. 
128 QPP ^1929) 1; 4ig 
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129 in seven workers were on the settlement payroll. Clearly, the administration only 
paid those inmates whom they thought necessary to ensure the efficient operation of the 
settlement ^ -^ ^ 
Because most of the work undertaken by the inmates on the settlement was 
remunerated in kind rather than cash, the cost of developing and maintaining the 
settlement was considerably reduced. Only the minimum number of white staff were 
employed. As the wages paid to the inmates were also significantly lower than the white 
staff, inmate labour was utili.scd when and wherever possible. Essentially all the mundane 
and routine tasks on the settlement were allocated to the inmates. At the hospital all the 
131 
ancillary duties such as cleaning and cooking were undertaken by the inmates. 
Similarly in the three dormitories, these tasks were the responsibility of inmates and not 
any white staff. Also in the dormitories, most of the supervisory ta.sks were by 'select' 
inmates. Inmates served as monitors in the school as a means of minimising the number 
132 
of teachers. Inmates who were skilled as carpenters, saddlers, blacLsmiths and 
tinsmiths were kept occupied on the settlement. Indeed, following a review of the 
staffing arrangements on the settlement in 1932, the Deputy Chief Protector recommended 
129 For the number of paid workers see QPP (1915) 1: 528; (1920) 1: 338; (1925) 1: 404; 
(1929) 1: 418. As records of the total number of inmates who worked on the settlement are 
unavailable, it was assumed that all adult males aged fifteen to fifty-five years were made to work as 
well as all single females aged fifteen years and over. In the 1928 Census, there were 217 inmates 
who were in this category which represented 34.5 percent of the total population (Aboriginal Census, 
Barambah Settlement June 1928, QSA HOM/J686 28/7086). Thus the number of settlement workers 
was derived by calculating 34.5 percent of the total settlement population in each year. 
1-^  For example when Arthur who was a wardsman in the hospital told the Visiting Medical 
Officer he was going to leave because of the poor wags he was receiving, he was immediately offered 
an increase from £3 per month to £6/10/- (D. Junk to Home Secretary, 13 July 1927, QSA 
HOM/J637 27/5479). 
1^ 1 Cornelia Rynne, 'Looking Back: 1935-70,' JOL OM.79.006. 
132 QPP ^|9J4^ J. 533 
1^ ^ W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 10 October 1935, QSA A/3807 35/133342. 
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that the services of a white carpenter were no longer required as the 'native tradesmen 
. , . were sufficiently experienced to carry out all ordinary repairs and new construction 
of a minor nature'. This arrangement naturally meant a saving to the department as 
the rate of pay for an inmate who was employed as a carpenter was at a significantly 
lower rate than his white counterpart. Such a decision merely refiected the overriding 
consideration which dictated the use of inmate labour within the confines of the reserve. 
Inmate labour was exploited so that the settlement operated as economically as possible, 
or more specifically at minimum expense to the government. 
Having examined the patterns of labour both on and off the settlement, it is 
evident that Barambah workers could not be described as 'wage labourers'. Certainly, 
settlement labour was exchanged for cash, and there were regulations concerning rates 
of pay and conditions; but this does not necessarily mean that the inmates were wage 
labourers. For while wages were paid, inmates did not have control over their earnings 
and, for the most part, did not even sight them. Via a labyrinth of accounts, the depart-
ment maintained rigid control over their financial affairs. The nett result was a fictive 
wages system because inmates did not actively participate in a cash economy. They were 
only minimally involved in market relations. When their situation is compared with 
workers who were wage labourers, it is evident that such a description is inappropriate 
for settlement workers. Take for example the situation of a white farm labourer who 
lived and worked in the surrounding district. First, he was not forced to work for a 
particular employer for a fixed period of time. He could leave if harshly treated or 
conditions were not acceptable. The second distinguishing feature was that while such 
a worker might not have been well paid, at least he had control over his earnings. He 
1-^  C. D. O'Leary and G. Bradbury, 'Report on the Aboriginal Settlements at Palm Island, 
Cherbourg and Woorabinda and Aboriginal Missions at Yarrabah and Mona Mona,' Fryer Library, 
Mss 44/144. 
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could spend his money where and how he wished; he could dispose of it drinking and 
gambling, spend it more 'responsibly' or alternatively save it. The third difference was 
that whereas the black worker was legally prevented from owning property, the white 
labourer faced no such restrictions. He could become part of the propertied class, even 
if only on a modest scale, by purchasing a small farm. There was, therefore, little 
resemblance between the situation of white rural labourers and workers from the 
settlement. 
The suggestion that the settlement workforce followed the pattern of a 'colonial 
migrant-labour force' is not so much inapt as inadequate. CD, Rowley suggested 
that Queensland settlements were like Pacific Island villages where workers went out to 
1 "^ A * 
work for an agreed period of time on contract. Undoubtedly, the system of 
agreements and permits which were an integral part of the settlement labour system had 
its origins in colonial labour laws. Also, the concept of using the settlement as a labour 
depot was probably inspired by practices in the Pacific and other colonial situations. Yet, 
while settlement workers resembled a contracted migrant-labour force in some aspects, 
there were also significant differences. The control over migrant workers was more cir-
cumscribed. Although they were frequently coerced into leaving home to work, subjected 
to physical abuse in employment and paid minimal wages, such workers were not 
permanently bonded or exploited. In the Pacific Island context for example, once workers 
returned to their village after a three year indenture, they could resume their previous 
lifestyle. The social structure, kinship network and value systems of their communities 
135 Buckley and Wheelwright, No Paradise for Workers, 29. 
1^ CD. Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1971), 113. 
257 
remained substantially intact. Furthermore, they could return to agricultural or hunting 
pursuits, to a non-capitalist mode of production. The system of indentured service did 
not necessarily totally disrupt the lives of the such workers. 
By contrast, settlement inmates were trapped in a labour system from which there 
was no escape or respite; they did not enjoy a measure of freedom on completion of their 
term of service. It was a system that sought to control every aspect of their existence. 
Every endeavour was made to extract the maximum return from their labour. Inmates' 
labour was exploited both on and off the settlement. Similar techniques of coercion and 
control were used on the settlement as in outside employment. The viability of the 
settlement was only possible with substantial input from inmates. Moreover, the 
settlement regimen was dedicated to destroying their traditional lifestyle, of replacing the 
'primitive' values of a hunting-gathering mode of production with capitalistic values. The 
settlement was a training ground were inmates where inculcated with the virtues of 
diligence, discipline and obedience. Unlike most migrant labourers, Barambah workers 
were unable, on returning from employment, to resume a traditional lifestyle or practise 
unhindered many customs. The settlement was most unlike a traditional village in that 
it comprised individuals and groups who were culturally and linguistically disparate. On 
completing a term of service, Barambah workers did not return 'home', but to a place 
where they or their forebears had been forcibly removed. They returned to an 
environment of disrupted social systems and fragmented kinship networks. Clearly, there 
were sharp distinctions between the patterns of Barambah labour and that of typical 
indentured labour or migrant-labour forces. 
1-^7 Even if workers did not return home, when links were able to be maintained with their 
family, they were able to maintain their identity. For example, as Clive Moore has demonstrated in 
his study of Melanesians in the Mackay district, the resilience of Melanesian culture and identity was 
a result of maintaining links with kin groups in Malaita {Kanaka: a history of Melanesian Mackay 
[Port Moresby: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies and University of Papua New Guinea Press, 
1985]). 
258 
The pattern of labour relations on settlements has been compared also with the 
relationship between a feudal lord and his serfs. In describing some settlements in 
Western Australia, Hasluck has recently suggested they were like 'feudal castles'to which 
'the people were invited, encouraged, exhorted to attend' and could go 'for help in times 
139 
of trouble'. But the Barambah settlement bore no resemblance to a feudal estate; the 
inmates could not be likened to serfs or the Superintendent to a feudal lord. While serfs 
were exploited workers, they were 'not alienated from the means of production'. They 
worked areas of land over which they had some degree of control and responsibility. By 
contrast, although the land was available and the concept of allotting blocks of land had 
been tried successfully on other reserves, Barambah inmates were not considered 
responsible enough to be able to farm alone. Another distinction between Barambah 
inmates and serfs was that the latter was 'always an integral member of his community 
and shared fully in its cultural and symbolic life'. 
If the labels wage labourer, contract worker, bonded servant, serf are inap-
propriate or inadequate, how can labour relations be most aptly described? Is the term 
'slave', as suggested by former inmates, apposite? Slavery has been an ubiquitous 
institution, appearing in a 'bewildering array of guises, from the Greek and Roman forms. 
138 jgg Peter Biskup, Not Slaves Not Citizens: the Aboriginal Problem in Western Australia, 
1898-1954 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1973), 41. 
1^9 Paul Hasluck, Shades of Darkness: Aboriginal Affairs, 1925-1965 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1988), 28. 
^'^ Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission into Aborigines, South Australian Parliamentary 
Papers (1913) 2: 91. The idea of allotting blocks of land for inmates to work on their own account 
was seriously discussed by the department in 1923 but never eventuated {QPP [1923] 1: 1072). 
i'*! Patterson, 'On Slavery and Slave Formations', 41. In contrasting the slave and the serf, 
Patterson refers in total to five distinctive features of serfdom. 
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to African, American, West-Indian and so on'. As Orlando Patterson has shown in 
his comparative study of slavery, there are certain features of slavery that distinguish it 
from other social formations. As a 'relation of domination', slavery is distinctive first and 
foremost in that it is a 'individualised condition of powerlessness'. This condition is 
brought about by the continuous use of violence or the threat of violence. The second 
constituent feature of the slave relation is the slave's natal alienation. The slave was a 
'socially dead person': alienated from kin, denied rights or claims of birth. The slave did 
not belong to any legitimate social order. The third element of the slave relation was 
that the slave was a dishonoured person; 'he was without power except through another', 
A consequence of this relationship was 'legally a condition of propertylessness and 
symbolically a state of social death'. 
The first element of the slave relation, a condition of powerlessness was 
unquestionably present in Barambah inmates. The analysis in this chapter revealed that 
every facet of the inmates' labour was rigidly controlled. On reaching a suitable age, 
inmates were forced to go out to work. As one former inmate remarked: 'you had no 
choice'. There was no choice about where or for whom one worked. Inmates were 
sent to work, without their consent to distant parts of the state for periods of up to 
twelve months. Total control was also exercised over inmates' earnings; nothing could 
be purchased without the approval of the Superintendent. In every aspect of their labour, 
inmates were powerless. The effectiveness of the domination was such that inmates 
came to accept their situation as normative. As Tottie (Tollins, who came to the 
settlement as a child in 1908, commented: 
1^2 David Neal, 'Free Society, Penal Colony, Slave Society, Prison?,' Historical Studies 22 
(1987): 500. 
I''-' Patterson, 'On slave and slave formations,' 41. 
l"*^  Ruth Hegarty, interview, 15 August 1988. 
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It didn't dawn on me that life could be different, we were here and we were 
to obey. Now I don't think it was fair, but I didn't think of it then and nor 
did anyone else. We wouldn't be game to speak for ourselves. 
But the sense of powerlessness was not limited to the domain of work, A distinguishing 
feature of the settlement regimen, as examined in previous chapters, was the attempt to 
dominate totally inmates' lives. The government's goal was to have 'complete control 
over the Aboriginal', In almost every aspect of their existence, inmates were reduced, 
like slaves, to a condition of powerlessness, 
A no less prominent feature of inmates' social relations was their natal alienation. 
Inmates were ipso facto natally alienated persons. The processes whereby inmates were 
isolated from their families and kin groups have been discu.ssed extensively in previous 
chapters. Chapter two examined the removals program which had a devastating impact 
on kinship networks. Natal tics were regarded as of no consequence in removing people 
to the settlement. Every inmate, either directly or indirectly was affected by the removals 
process and as a consequence became cultural and 'genealogical isolates'. The removals 
process was deliberately aimed at severing links with the past. Chief Protector Bleakley 
firmly believed that children needed to be removed 'as soon as possible so as to leave 
as little resemblance as possible of the camp in that child's mind'. On the settlement 
itself, the so called civilising process was aimed more at social deconstruction than at 
inculcating new values, A focal point of this activity was the dormitories. In placing 
children in these institutions, family ties were irrelevant. Parents had no inalienable rights 
to care for their children. Dormitory inmates had limited access to their immediate family 
1'*^  Penny Taylor, ed.. After 200 Years, 186. 
146 QPP (1919) 2: 243; Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission into Aborigines, South 
Australian Parliamentary Papers, (1913) 2: 86. 
1"^  ibid., 95. 
i'*^  see chapter four. 
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and relatives. The psychological impact of the system was succinctly summed up by 
Nellie O'Chin who was placed in the dormitory while her mother went out to work: 'we 
never knew our mother's love'. Parents were strangers to their children. Barambah, like 
other settlements, was established in part, to obliterate all vestiges of the past. Like 
slaves, the inmates 
were not allowed freely to integrate the experience of their ancestors into 
their lives, to inform their understanding of social reality with the inherited 
meaning of their natural forebears, or to anchor the living present in any 
conscious community or memory. 
The third element of the slave condition is that slaves were 'always persons who 
had been dishonoured in a generalised way'. As Patterson observes, the slave had no 
honour because of his background, lack of independent social existence, and above all 
because of 'he was without power except through another'. Similarly, Barambah 
inmates were regarded as persons without honour. Their racial origins alone disqualified 
them for being treated with honour and respect. As Aboriginals or of Aboriginal descent, 
they were mere 'primitives', culturally 'thousands and thousands of years behind the white 
race'. The popular perception of inmates was reflected by the Brisbane Courier in 
1926 when discussing Barambah settlement: 'shall we blame the black man , , , for, of 
course, he is only a barbarian'. Barbarians, naturally, were not entitled to honour but 
open to all manner of abu.se and disdain. It was common practice by the department and 
153 
employers to refer to a male worker as 'boy', regardless of age. In employment, 
workers were frequently denigrated with terms such as 'niggers', 'black bastards' and 
l"*' Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 5. 
1^ ° ibid., 10. 
1^1 QPD 174 (1939): 453. 
1^2 Brisbane Courier, 16 October 1926. 
1^ -^  see Tronson, diary, passim. 
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'black buggers' and subjected to humiliating treatment. The dishonoured status of 
Barambah inmates was succinctly stated by Hope Neill when commenting on what it was 
like to live on the settlement - to be an inmate was to be 'treated like merchandi.se'. 
Another hallmark of slavery was the propertylessness of the slave. As Patterson 
aptly states, the slave was 
denied all po.ssibility of being a subject of property relations , , , The proper-
tylessness of the slave was the consequence of his powerlessness and not, as 
in the case of the worker, the cause of his real lack of power. 
A similar situation prevailed with Barambah inmates. They were prevented from entering 
into property relations. While Aborigines were not prohibited legally from owning 
property, there were obstacles, both de jure and de facto, that prevented them from doing 
so. When the 1897 legislation was being framed the issue of property was rai.sed but 
dismissed as irrelevant. A clause was proposed relating to regulations concerning 
'Aboriginals and half-castes selecting land' but when the Bill came before the house, the 
Home Secretary simply deleted the clau.se because he 'did not want to be bothered about' 
1 en 
the matter. When the Act was amended in 1901 however, provision was made for 
the protector to 'undertake the general care, protection and management of the property 
of all Aboriginals in his district'. The protector had the right to 'take possession of, 
158 
retain, .sell, or dispose of any property of an Aboriginal, whether real or personal'. 
These powers effectively meant that while they may have owned property, they had no 
control over it. Of course, for Barambah inmates the question of owning real property 
1^ '* Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. 
1^ ^ Hope Neill, 'The Beating Heart of Australian Culture.' 
1^ ^ Patterson, 'On Slavery and Slave Formations,' 39. 
15"' QPD 78 (1897): 1633. 
1^ ^ Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act, 1901, s. 13. 
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was an academic question. Confined to the settlement, there was no po.ssibility of 
purchasing property. 
In examining the dynamics of Barambah labour, the presence of a slave mode 
is not immediately apparent. The usual rhetoric, symbols and patterns of behaviour as-
sociated with slavery - the whip, the tyrannical master, the habitual use of naked 
violence, unremitting exploitation, the dispensability of human life - is notably aKsent. 
Instead, there are constant references to wages, savings accounts, conditions of 
employment. The labour system was supposedly 'for their benefit', but rather than 
protecting and preventing their exploitation, it resulted in inmates being more thorough-
ly and systematically exploited than before they came to the settlement. The claims made 
by former Barambah inmates and other observers about 'slave labour', about workers 
being 'treated like slaves', were valid. The dynamics of Barambah labour paralleled a 
slave mode of production. The essential characteristics of the slave relation, powerless-
ness, natal alienation, dishonour, and propertylessness were all present. 
Contrary to the repeated assertions of various apologists for the reserve system, 
the interests of the inmates were not paramount. They were not protected for their own 
good but were treated like slaves in order to satisfy the interests of capital and the 
government. These latter groups, and not the inmates were the beneficiaries of the labour 
system. Employers gained by the cheap labour and generally compliant workforce while 
the government was able to establish and maintain a institution of domination and control 
at minimum cost. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FROM THE OUTSIDE 
Popular Perceptions and Reactions to the Settlement 
The Barambah Aboriginal Settlement. . . is a decided menace to the public and a grave 
danger to the social purity of the district . . , The removal of the settlement would be 
a boon to the district (Murgon Branch, Queensland Farmers Union to Home Secretary, 
1920),^ 
Their football team , . , over the years, offered the people in the district an 
entertainment that, in form and style, was as close to the Bolshoi Ballet as probably tliey 
would ever want to see (Evan Whitton commenting on the Barambah team and its impact 
on the Murgon district during the 1930s), 
In delivering the 1980 ABC Boyer Lectures, the art historian and social critic 
Bernard Smith addressed the issue of the interaction between European and Aboriginal 
cultures since 1788, In one lecture, entitled 'the Mechanisms of Forgetfulness', Smith 
discussed 'some of the ways in which the crimes committed against Aboriginal society 
have been suppressed and removed from' the memory of white Australians. In 
Australian art and literature. Smith noted, little interest had been shown in the plight and 
status of Aboriginal Australians. No less a disinterest was shown by historians. Drawing 
on the work of W.E.H. Stanner who in a previous Boyer Lecture had described the 
absence of Aborigines in Australian historiography as the 'great Australian silence'. Smith 
suggested that in the 'writing of Australian history a cult of forgetfulness had been 
practiced on a national scale'. The mechanisms of forgetfulness were varied but a key 
component, in his view, was the reserve system. He suggested that reservations helped 
1 F. Gustafson to Home Secretary, 16 June 1919, QSA A/31708 19/2119. 
2 Evan Whitton, 'An Exquisite Revenge,' National Times, 19-24 September 1977, 20. 
^ Bernard Smith, The Spectre of Tmganini: 1980 Boyer Lectures (Sydney: Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, 1980), 17. 
^ ibid. 23; W.E. Stanner, White Man got no Dreaming: Essays 1938-78 (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1979), 207. 
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to 'throw a white blanket of forgetfulness across the central tragedy of Australian .settle-
ment',^ 
The idea that reserves were designed to remove blacks both physically and 
mentally from the landscape occupied by white Australians is supported by other 
historians and writers. In A Matter of Justice, CD. Rowley argued that reserves could 
be likened to an 'archipelago of tiny islands' scattered throughout Australia where groups 
of Aboriginal families were forced to live 'out of the way and out of sight'. The 
metaphor of archipelago was derived from Alexander Solzhenitsyn's description of the 
Soviet prison system as an 'Archipelago of the Gulag', Just as these prison camps were 
spread throughout the country yet virtually invisible to all but the inmates, aboriginal 
settlements and missions were, in Rowley's view, hidden away and generally unknown 
by the rest of society. This view is shared by Evans in his study of the Fraser Island 
settlement. He argues that a key factor in the establishment of the reserve was the desire 
to segregate and exclude the colony's blacks from the presence of whites. The reserve 
was not created as a result of any humanitarian impulse, but from the threat posed by 
the 'unregulated presence of a deviant group in the community'. Furthermore, Evans 
argues that the segregation of the dying and dispossessed race 'removed the drama of 
destruction to a remote stage, where it might be played out, unadvertised, in virtually 
n 
closed houses'. 
16. 
Smith, The Spectre of Tmganini, 22. 
^ CD. Rowley,/I Matter of Justice (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977), 14, 
^ Ray Evans, 'A Permanent Precedent': Dispossession, Social Control and the Fraser Island 
Reserve arid Mission 1897-1904 (St. Lucia: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Studies Unit, 
University of Queensland, 1991), 16, 27. 
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But how valid are the claims of Smith, Rowley and others? Although the 
intention of reserves may have been to place blacks out of sight and out of mind, the 
question arises, how successful were they in doing so? How effective was the reserve 
system in removing blacks from the consciousness of white Australians? A second issue 
concerns the level of ignorance and indifference in popular culture. Because blacks 
received scant attention in art and literature, were written out of Australian history and 
rarely featured in political debates, can it be assumed that the general population were 
equally oblivious to what had happened to Aboriginal Australians? Or was there some 
awareness in folklore, oral traditions and everyday knowledge of the reserve system? 
The task in this chapter is to examine critically these issues by focusing on how 
the Barambah settlement was perceived from the outside. To what extent was a 'white 
blanket of forgetfulness' thrown over the settlement? How well known was Barambah 
settlement in Queensland? What images, perceptions, did outsiders have of the set-
tlement? In analysing these issues, it is immediately apparent that there were two distinct 
perspectives from which the settlement and its inmates were viewed. TTie first set of 
'perceptions' belonged to those who lived in the immediate vicinity of the reserve, the 
residents of Murgon and the surrounding district. The second belonged to those who 
lived well removed from the settlement, in localities such as Brisbane and provincial 
towns. 
^ For the indifference shown by politicians towards the plight of aboriginals see Frank Stevens 
'Parliamentary Attitudes to Aboriginal Affairs' Racism: The Australian Experience, ed. F. Stevens 
(Sydney: Australian and New Zealand Book Company, 1972), 2: 110-149. 
In Queensland, the plight of aborigines attracted little attention in the political arena. 
Between 1900 and 1940, in the Queensland legislature the only substantial debates occurred in 1901, 
1934 and 1939 when changes to legislation were made. On average, less than one question was asked 
per year in that period. {QPD 87 [1901]: 208-227, 503-618, 628-641, 990-995, 1032-1145, 1254-
60, 1289-92, 1417-24, 1712-21; QPD 166 [1934]: 1554-57, 1687-91, 1730-38; QPD 174 [1939]: 
452-467, 484-499, 517-521). 
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As discu.ssed in chapter one. South Burnett residents were acutely aware of the 
presence of the .settlement from its inception. Complaints about the settlement were being 
voiced soon after the first inmates arrived. As the number of inmates gradually in-
creased, the settlement increasingly became a source of annoyance and discontent for 
local residents. For them, there was no blanket over the reserve that might help them 
to forget or ignore. Rather, the settlement was ari unwelcome feature of the region. 
With over 300 inmates, some who they believed were 'suffering from loathsome diseases', 
others who were 'lunatics' and yet others who were 'desperadoes' and 'criminals of the 
worst kind', local residents could not avoid being conscious of it. They had come to the 
district to overcome 'the wilderness' and create a 'happy and prosperous' community. 
Thus the presence of a colony of blacks in their midst and all the dangers it posed was 
a hardship they preferred to be without. The degree of their sensitivity towards the 
settlement was reflected in their repeated demands to the government to remove the 
settlement. They considered it to be a blot on the landscape, a hindrance to the 
development of the district. 
By the early 1910s, the vociferousness of South Burnett residents concerning 
Barambah eased. Publicly at least, the settlement became less of a threat. The change 
in local attitudes was brought about by two factors. First, in March 1911, Home Secret-
ary Appel visited the district and met a delegation from the Weinholt Shire (later the 
Wondai Shire) and Murgon Progress Association protesting about the dumping 'on the 
Barambah reserve of Aboriginals of a criminal class from all parts of the State'. The 
Home Secretary managed to quell their disquiet by promising no longer to send 
Aborigines who were either criminals or suffering from disease to the Barambah 
' J.E. Murphy and E.W. Easton, Wildemess to Wealth (Brisbane: Smith & Patterson, 1950), 5-
7. 
10 Dady Mail, 30 March 1911. 
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settlement.^^ Instead, they would be sent to one of the new reserves that the government 
planned to open at Taroom, Lloyd's Bay and Johnstone River. Indeed, after Taroom 
settlement was opened later in the year, the number of removals per year to Barambah 
declined until at least 1914.^^ 
The second factor contributing to less overt hostility towards the settlement was 
the changing perceptions the white inhabitants had of themselves and the district. By the 
early 1910s, the South Burnett was becoming, at least in the residents judgement, a 
'civilised' district. The townships of Wondai and Murgon were no longer primitive bush 
settlements. In 1911, there were 3700 residents in the Weinholt Shire which included the 
13 towns of Murgon and Wondai, The opening of a police station in Wondai in 1907 and 
at Murgon in 1910 gave residents a greater sense of security. Provisional schools 
operated in both towns and Murgon even boasted a Bra.ss Band. The Queensland 
National Bank opened a branch in Wondai in 1908 and the Bank of New South Wales 
in Murgon a year later. The Wondai Times (later the South Burnett Times) was 
established in 1910 and in the same year, a doctor set up permanent residence in the 
town. With these trappings of civilisation, residents began to feel more secure and 
confident. Their environment became less hostile and even the blacks were a little less 
threatening. 
11 Under Secretary, Home Department to Clerk, Weinhoh Shire Council, 13 April 1911, QSA 
A/31708. 
12 see chapter two. 
1^  Census of the Commonwealth of Australia: 1911, vol 3, (1914), 2041. 
1"* Chief Inspector Urquhart to Commissioner of Police, 28 October 1907, QSA A/41547 296S; 
Inspector Short to Commissioner of Police, 23 May 1910, QSA A/41638 501S. 
1^  R.B. Howard to Under Secretary, Home Department 21 February 1910, QSA A/31708 
10/2201; Murphy and Easton, From Wildemess to Wealth, 214-8, 257. 
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These changes however, did not signal a permanent shift in attitudes towards the 
settlement. Over the following three decades, there were periods when it appeared local 
residents had finally accepted the settlement. But intermittently, an incident would occur 
that triggered the same prejudices and fears that were voiced in the settlement's infancy. 
The absence of complaints did not signify a fundamental change in attitudes or indicate 
approval of the inmates. Rather, the dislike and hostility was suppressed temporarily. 
Until 1940 at least. South Burnett residents felt threatened by the settlement in three 
ways: first, they saw it as a threat to the health of the district; second, .some inmates 
were a threat to the maintenance of law and order; third, by occupying valuable 
agricultural land the settlement was seen as hindering the development of the district. 
Undoubtedly, the most common complaint South Burnett residents had about the 
settlement concerned the dangers it posed to their health. They saw the place as a 
breeding ground for disease and the inmates susceptible to a myriad of illnesses. 
Whenever there was an outbreak of disease of epidemic proportions, local residents 
became most alarmed. When the first signs of the devastating 'Spanish flu' epidemic 
appeared on the settlement in May 1919, the Murgon Shire Council was swift to respond. 
To protect the white inhabitants of the district, the Shire's Medical Officer ordered the 
complete quarantining of the settlement. Much to the chagrin of the Council, their 
Medical Officer did not have the authority to quarantine the settlement As the Chief 
Protector informed the Council, the settlement was not a "premises" under the meaning 
17 
of the Health Act . They were also told that the settlement's own Medical Officer, Dr 
Junk had taken the necessary steps and introduced a 'quarantine system that amply 
1^  On 21 May 1919 special regulations under the Health Act were proclaimed to deal with the 
influenza epidemic. The regulations gave a Medical Officer wide powers in dealing with suspected 
influenza patients. Apart from ordering the isolation of a patient in their home or removal to a 
isolation hospital, the Medical Officer was empowered to 'use such reasonable force as may be 
necessary' to effect such decisions {QGG 122 (1919): 1466). 
17 J.W. Bleakley to Commissioner of Public Health, 21 May 1919, QSA HOM/J303 19/7051. 
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protected the inmates of the reserve [and] the neighbouring public as well'.'* These 
arrangements irritated Murgon residents. When Superintendent Lip.scombe went to town 
three weeks after the first outbreak of the epidemic, the Council was prompted to write 
to the Home Secretary, They demanded to know why Lipscombe was in the town when 
the quarantine was still supposedly in force. They were also concerned about rumours 
that the quarantine was to be lifted for 'Native teamsters'. According to the Shire's 
Medical Officer, the 'only safeguard for the health of the population of the district' was 
the 'strictest quarantine being observed at the settlement'. 
Similar protests were made when an outbreak of typhoid in late 1926 resulted 
in the hospitalisation of more than seventy inmates. Two cases were fatal. The epidemic 
was not confined to the settlement as it swept throughout the South Burnett district. In 
Kingaroy alone, more than eighty cases were reported. When a young Murgon resident 
died from the fever, local residents became most alarmed. They had no doubts that the 
origin of the fever was the Barambah settlement. The fever had been transmitted, so the 
Murgon residents believed, via Barambah creek where the victim had been recently 
swimming. The epidemic prompted the Council to raise again with the government the 
possibility of moving the settlement elsewhere. They felt it was an 'undesirable es-
tablishment' and requested the Home Secretary to give 'earnest consideration' to closing 
the settlement and transferring the inmates to another reserve. The Council did suggest 
'an island in the Pacific would be an ideal spot' but the question of precisely where the 
inmates should go did not overly concern the Council. Anywhere else was suitable 
20 provided it was not within the Burnett district. Predictably, the government rejected 
1^  Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office, to Clerk Murgon Shire Council, 27 June 1919, 
QSA HOM/J303 19/7051. 
1' H.W. Sanderson to Home Secretary, 16 June 1919, QSA HOM/J303 19/7051. 
20 ibid. 
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the complaints and pleas of Murgon Cbuncil. The Home Secretary disputed the claims 
that the young Murgon resident who died from typhoid contracted the disea.se because 
of defects in the settlement's sanitary system. He felt it was more likely the disease was 
contracted elsewhere and claimed that 'every precaution against the spread of typhoid was 
taken on the Settlement'. The Home Secretary also dismissed suggestions about removing 
the settlement to another site. In a letter to J.B. Edwards, the MLA who represented the 
Murgon district, he simply noted that it was 'not intended to take steps in the direction 
21 
of removing the Settlement to another site'. 
As the epidemic had abated by the time the government had further responded 
to the Council, the question of continuing to lobby for the removal of the settlement 
became less urgent. Local residents reluctantly accepted the government's decision to 
retain the settlement in the district. Although they did not pursue the issue, the basic 
attitudes towards the settlement remained unchanged and six years later the dissatisfaction 
and disquiet about the settlement was resurrected when another 'health scare' appeared. 
In January 1933, not one, but two cases of leprosy were reported. Both suspects were 
quickly dispatched to the Peel Island lazaret. As only two cases had been diagnosed on 
the settlement in the previous thirty years, local residents became most alarmed at what 
they saw as a seemingly sudden upsurge in the prevalence of the di.sease. The South 
Burnett Times predicably reported the outbreak as representing a 'menace to the public 
health of the district'. The Wondai and Murgon Cbuncils again urged the government 
to move the settlement to a 'location where climatic and other conditions would be far 
more congenial to its inmates, and away from the proximity of populous townships and 
21 Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Office to J.B. Edwards, 5 April 1927, QSA HOM/J621 
27/1323. 
272 
what such proximity entailed'. Not surprisingly, the Home Secretary dismis.sed the calls, 
replying 'there was no possibility of having the settlement removed'. 
Such comments did little to appease local residents and to their dismay there was 
another outbreak of leprosy nine months later. Within a fortnight in October 1933, two 
inmates were diagnosed and removed to Peel Island, With a total of four ca.ses in less 
than a year, the South Burnett Times become even more strident in its opposition to the 
settlement, declaring that the institution was 'an anachronism in the district'. It com-
mented: 
Although every precaution is taken as soon as the cases are suspected, it is 
disquieting to know that this kind of thing is going on so close to Murgon, 
The circumstance goes to prove the unsuitability of the Cherbourg settlement 
as a refuge for Aboriginals from all over the State, and the injustice of 
retaining' such an institution in a closely settled district such as the South 
Burnett?^ 
As with previous controversies, the government dismissed claims that the settlement was 
endangering the health of the district. Home Secretary Hanlon defended the settlement 
with the usual comments. He declared: 
All Aborigines at Cherbourg are under strict medical supervision. They were 
kept under observation and on the slightest sign of any contagious or 
infectious disease they were isolated or removed. 
As well, the Deputy Chief Protector maintained the problems were being exaggerated. 
He claimed the percentage of lepers among Aborigines was very small and he doubted 
25 if 'it was any greater than among whites'. In response, the South Burnett Times ran 
an article headed: 
22 South Bumett Times, 10 February 1933. 
22 South Bumett Times, 13 October 1933. 
2'» Courier Mail, 18 October 1933. 
25 ibid. 
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CHERBOURG SETTLEMENT LEPROSY MATTERS NOT! 
"Not as Contagious as Many other Di.sea.ses" 
The Half-Caste Problem 
Government Admits Ineptitude 
The paper ridiculed the suggestion that the leprosy rate was no greater on the settlement 
than in the white community. It claimed Mr O'Leary had 'a nerve' to infer that leprosy 
was 'no more likely to be in evidence at Cherbourg with its polyglot population gathered 
from all the gunyahs in the State (including the tropical north and all that implies) than 
in a country town of similar population'. The South Burnett Times also took the 
opportunity to castigate the government over other aspects of the administration of the 
settlement. It suggested the increasing number of half-castes on Cherbourg indicated that 
the government was unable to deal with the problem of miscegenation. Again, the issue 
of transferring the settlement was raised. The paper claimed the South Burnett was an 
inappropriate location for a settlement and that the inmates would be far better off in a 
northern location 'where climate would be congenial and fishing etc. plentiful'. It 
asked: 
Should not these children of nature be allowed to live clo.se to nature - to 
live their own lives in segregation more complete than ever the artificial 
conditions of such as Cherbourg will ever permit? 
Removing the settlement to a more 'suitable' location seemed eminently sensible. But 
after having lobbied for almost thirty years without success, even the South Burnett 
28 Times reluctantly accepted that such a move was not likely. 
Apart from endangering the health of South Burnett residents, the settlement was 
also seen as a threat to law and order in the district. Murgon residents, in particular, 
were most sensitive to threats from the settlement. The town was situated a mere six 
2^  South Bumett Times, 27 October 1933. 
2"^  ibid. 
28 ibid. 
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kilometres from the settlement and was the epicentre of black-whi>te interaction in the 
district (.see figure 7.1). Although Wondai was also close to the settlement, Murgon was 
the town most frequented by Barambah inmates. They passed through the town going 
to and from work. As well, the Murgon railway station was the nearest to the settle-
ment. Ctonsequently, whenever blacks were either being removed to the settlement or 
transferred elsewhere, they alighted and embarked in Murgon, Murgon residents felt 
uncomfortable about Barambah inmates wandering around their town unsupervised, 
particularly when they believed many were of the criminal class. In 1915, the Murgon 
Shire Council asked the government to appoint an extra police officer to the district. 
The principal reason given for the request was that one constable was not regarded as 
sufficient in a district with 'a large coloured population' because there was 'always a 
29 
element of danger'. The government did accede to the request but the appointment of 
a second constable did not totally placate Murgon residents. In the following year the 
Council wrote to the Home Secretary protesting against 'blacks being brought to Murgon 
and allowed at large'. When the Council was asked to be more specific about its com-
plaint, the Shire Clerk admitted the protest was the 'outcome of a rumour circulating in 
the district at the time'. The issue was defused, at least temporarily, when the Barambah 
Superintendent assured the Shire Chairman that blacks arriving at the settlement who 
were likely to be a 'menace to the district' would be 'transferred elsewhere'. 
Such a promise may have quelled some of the unease local residents had towards 
the settlement, but it was short-lived. Soon after this incident, a Barambah inmate 
absconded from the .settlement and shot and killed a Kingaroy resident. Not surprisingly, 
2' LT. Allen to Commissioner of Police, 15 January 1915, QSA A/41638 501S. 
^ Clerk, Murgon Shire Council to Home Secretary, 20 July 1916, QSA HOM/J206 16/6758. 
21 Clerk, Murgon Shire Council to Home Secretary, 23 September 1916, QSA HOM/J206 
16/6758. 
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a 'great deal of dissatisfaction' was created among the settlers of the South Burnett. In 
the Legislative Assembly, A.J. Jones used the incident to 'question whether it was wise 
to establish settlements at all'. He commented: 
It was a question as to whether the settlement was not the home of some of 
the black criminals of the State, and the women folk who had to live close to 
the settlement were somewhat in fear , , , Some of the blacks at Barambah 
and other settlements had criminal instincts, and should not be placed in the 
midst of the community , , , It was not the Aboriginal's fault that he had a 
black skin',^2 
While the incident at Kingaroy was regrettable, the government did not believe it justified 
closing the settlement. The Home Secretary argued it was an isolated occurrence and 
South Burnett residents had no more cause to be alarmed about their safety than residents 
of other districts in the state. He defended the inmates, believing they 'were taking well 
to the settlement' and that 'there was very much cause to speak well of Barambah', 
Certainly, he did not think there were any grounds for moving the settlement 
33 
elsewhere. 
Local residents did not agree. They continued to believe they were vulnerable 
to attacks both on themselves and their property from inmates. The belief that the 
settlement was no more than a 'colony of criminals' persisted despite any evidence to 
support such views. In 1918, when a judicial enquiry was established to examine the 
administration of the settlement, the Murgon Chamber of Commence took the oppor-
tunity to raise the issue of the apparent threats to local residents posed by its proxi-
mity. It asked that the terms of the enquiry be expanded to allow evidence to be taken 
as to the desirability of moving the settlement on account of the 'criminals' who were to 
2^ QPD 125 (1916-17): 2293. 
3^ ibid., 2296. 
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a 'large extent uncontrolled' and a 'menace to the increasing white population of Murgon 
and district'. 
The government refused the request but the issue reappeared in the following 
year during the Spanish flu epidemic. On this occasion, it was the Murgon Farmers 
Union who took up the challenge to agitate for the removal of the settlement. In 
bringing the matter to the attention of the Home Secretary, the Union noted that it was 
not only events such as the epidemic that caused 'consternation to the general public'. 
As the secretary noted: 
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that during normal times the 
enhabatants [sic] are constantly roaming the District armed with firearms and 
other weapons soliciting food from farm houses during the absence of the 
male members of the family, and we consider the removal of the settlement 
would be a boon to the town and district. 
Despite the fervour with which these claims were made, the principal difficulty residents 
faced in convincing the government to treat the matter seriously was the lack of 
evidence. As the Chief Protector reported: 
no case of serious misbehaviour or molestation of European residents by the 
Settlement inmates can be quoted, except in one instance where, it transpired, 
the people were in the habit of harbouring the natives and gambling with 
them,^^ 
The threat posed by the inmates was more imagined than real. Much as residents wanted 
to believe inmates were imbued with barbarous instincts, there was certainly no evidence 
of such in their daily behaviour. 
^ Secretary, Murgon Chamber of Commerce to Home Secretary, 8 November 1918, QSA 
A/31708, 18/9870. 
^^  F. Gustafson to Home Secretary, 16 June 1919, QSA A/31708 19/7158. 
^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 5 November 1919, QSA A/31708 
19/7158. 
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Fears about physical safety were revived during a typhoid fever epidemic in 
1926. The Murgon Shire Cbuncil, apart from raising the obvious health problems po.sed 
by the settlement, took the opportunity to complain about the potential undermining of 
law and order. They wrote to the Home Secretary: 
(Complaints are frequently heard that too much liberty is allowed the "blacks 
from the mission". Game hunting goes on unchecked and many of residents 
are in a constant state of anxiety. Fires and minor depredations are the least 
to be feared, but when it is freely stated by some of the more sophisticated 
ones that they are coming in to "clean up" the town before long, this Council 
would be lacking in its duty if it did not bring the matter promptly to your 
notice. 
The Council also voiced concern about a 'persistent rumour' that a Rifie Club was to be 
formed on the settlement They recognised it was not just to deprive the 'Aboriginal of 
his natural freedom' but felt the 'welfare of the white residents of the Shire' could not 
be jeopardised. Yet another problem was the ease with which Aboriginals seemed to be 
38 
able to obtain liquor. 
For Superintendent Semple, most of the allegations were ba.seless. The rumour 
about the formation of a Rifle club was 'absolute nonsense' and he considered 'white 
residents were more careless with fires than the dark people'. Regarding the charge that 
the blacks were 'going to clean up the town', he commented: 
This is only a delusion and a most misleading fabrication',If the natives were 
so wild and lawless how could the Superintendent and his handful of officers 
39 
keep order and what would be their fate, 
Semple exposed the inconsistency in the attitudes of the white inhabitants. The image 
they had of inmates as 'dangerous savages' could not be substantiated. But on the issue 
of liquor, Semple shared the prevailing view that blacks were unable to 'handle grog'. 
^"^ N. Griffiths to Under Secretary, Home Department 15 February 1927, QSA HOM/J621 
27/1323. 
^ ibid. 
39 W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 22 February 1927, QSA HOM/J621 27/1323. 
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It had the capacity, he believed, to turn a normally 'docile and subdued' native into a 
'fiend' and was the cause of all acts of insubordination, lack of discipline and brawls on 
and off the settlement. 
These episodes highlighted the increasing difficulty local residents had in 
sustaining the image of settlement inmates as 'savages' ready to prey on vulnerable 
whites. Despite the entrenched belief that black skin = savage = criminal, after the 
settlement had been operating for twenty-five years there was little evidence to support 
such a contention. Moreover, there was a fundamental contradiction in the attitudes of 
the white inhabitants. While declaring that Barambah inmates threatened the peace and 
order of the district, they had no hesitation in employing them as domestics and farm-
hands. Black labour was a common sight on farms in the district and made a valued 
contribution to the development of agriculture. In Murgon, an equally common sight was 
Barambah women working as domestics. As well, storekeepers keenly sought the custom 
of inmates. Indeed, during the 1926 typhoid epidemic when complaints were being made 
about the failure of the administration to quarantine the settlement effectively, Murgon 
shopkeepers pleaded with the Superintendent to allow inmates to go into town to do their 
Christmas shopping. Even though the interaction was circumspect and at a discrete 
distance, whites encountered blacks as anything but barbaric or savage-like. The greater 
contact whites had with the inmates, the more difficult it became to sustain the stereotype 
of 'wild native' or 'untamed savage'. By the late 1920s, residents were no longer 
complaining, at least officially, about inmates threatening their physical safety although 
privately their attitudes remained unchanged. 
^ ibid 
41 W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 22 February 1927, QSA HOM/J621 27/1323. 
^^2 Conclusive evidence for documenting the persistence of the 'savage' stereotype is difficult to 
obtain. Such information is not willingly offered. The more extreme views tend to be confined to 
colloquial discourse. However, an insight into how South Burnett residents most likely regarded the 
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Another irritating aspect of the settlement was that it was seen as hindering the 
development of the district. By occupying valuable agricultural land. South Burnett 
residents believed it threatened progress in the region. When the Murgon Progress 
Association was lobbying for the removal of the settlement in 1909, it bluntly informed 
the government that 'it would be in the best interests of the State in our opinion to have 
A1 
white settlers occupying the land in place of Aboriginals', The question of prior 
occupancy was irrelevant. The inmates were not using the land productively, therefore 
it should be offered to those who would. Those selectors who had come to the area with 
a missionary-like zeal to exploit the land and produce a 'cornucopia, spilling crops and 
products', were dismayed that the reserve's 7000 acres were not all under cultivation. 
Although such views were not expressed frequently, they were implied whenever the 
question of removal of the settlement was mentioned. During the leprosy controversy of 
1933, the South Burnett Times argued that the inmates should be moved to a more 
suitable location in the north because 'hunting and fi.shing was practically non-existent' 
on Barambah. The inference in this comment would not have been lost on the readers. 
The inmates preferred to hunt and fish. They were not agriculturalists as evident in the 
inability of the settlement to be self-supporting. Therefore, the best solution was to 
inmates from Barambah can be gauged from the following comment from a person who had migrated 
from Scotland and went to work in the South Burnett during the 1920s. He said when he arrived 
in the district he was told 'the only difference between an Aborigine and an animal was that an 
Aborigine could light a fire'. 
'*^  Murgon Progress Association to Home Secretary, 3 June 1909, QSA A/31708 09/6751. 
^ South Bumett Times, 17 February 1933. 
^^  South Burnett residents could not see any reason why the settlement was not self-
supporting. The issue was raised on numerous occasions in Parliament particularly by the members 
for Nanango, Wide Bay and Maryborough {QPD 125 [1916-17]: 2290; 140 [1922]: 1039; 143 [1924]: 
577; 145 [1924]: 576; 146 [1925]: 945-6; 147 [1926]: 877; 150 [1927]: 1308-9; 171 [1937]:862; 174 
[1939]: 460). At the annual Conference of the Wondai Local Producers Association in 1930, 
trenchant criticism was made of the administration of the Barambah settlement According to the 
delegates, it 'could and should be made more self-supporting' (W.L. Osborne to J.B. Edwards, 2 June 
1930, QSA HOM/J778 30/5136). South Burnett residents naturally assumed because they were able 
to earn their livelihood off the land and were not dependent on government eissistance that there was 
no reason why Barambah inmates could not do likewise. In making such claims, residents over-
looked two important facts. 
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relocate the settlement and throw open the land for selection, A similar inference was 
made by the MLA J.B, Edwards (Nanango) when he raised the Lssue of transferring the 
settlement during the Estimates debate in 1932. Although he realised it was 'a big job' , 
he urged the government 'to consider removal of the settlement in view of the fact that 
a large white population is growing up in the district'. But Edwards had other reasons 
for his request Elsewhere in his speech he mentioned the possibility of the reserve, or 
at least part of it, being 'cut up for settlement by people who want land in the dis-
trict'. Like his constituents, he believed the land would be more effectively utilised by 
whites rather than the present occupants who were ill-disposed to agrarian pursuits. 
When local residents were unable to persuade the government to close the 
settlement and open the land for selection, on several occasions they tempered their 
claims and asked for part of the settlement When a delegation of local groups met with 
Home Secretary Appel in 1911, the representative of the Wondai Progress Association 
suggested that the 7000 acres which the settlement occupied could be put to better use 
First although the reserve occupied 7000 acres, the amount of land suitable for agriculture 
was small. According to Chief Protector Howard a major portion of the reserve was 'composed of 
high stony ridges and quite unsuitable for agriculture' (R.B. Howard to Under Secretary, Home 
Department 19 May 1908, QSA A/31708 08/6326). In 1933, a total of 56 acres was under cultivation 
but it is doubtful whether even the most astute farmer would have had more than 100 acres under 
cuhivation {South Bumett Times, 7 April 1933). Indeed, when the Queensland Water Resources 
Commission conducted a survey on land along Barambah creek suitable for irrigation, it found that 
less than 5 percent of the reserve was suitable for such purposes (Barker-Barambah Creeks Water 
Resources Investigation: General Layout of Proposed Scheme, Queensland Water Resources 
Commission, Map K2-57772). Thus residents over-rated the potential of the reserve to make the 
settlement a self-supporting institution. 
The second mistake local residents made was to assume that even if all the land was highly 
suited for agriculture, it was not sufficient to support the total population. In the South Burnett most 
farms averaged between 200-300 acres. Given the typical farming household average five to six 
members, this meant between thirty to fifty acres were needed per person for a farm to be self 
supporting. On the settlement, however, there was only 7000 acres for a total of between 600 and 
700 persons - a ratio of ten acres per person. Thus, even if the most favourable conditions existed 
and the farming procedures were efficient, the settlement could not have been self-supporting. It 
needed to occupy at least three times the area on good country if there was any possibility of attain-
ing self-sufficiency. 
46 QPD 162 (1932): 1207. 
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and that '3000 or 4000 acres should suffice for local blacks'. But such arguments 
•failed to move the Home Secretary, He reminded the delegation that as 'an Australian 
there was an obligation owing to the Aboriginal and that they should have some little 
space set apart for them'. Efforts to 'cut off a slice off the settlement' were revived 
four years later by the Wondai Chamber of Commerce, At a special meeting in July 
1915, members unanimously agreed to ask the Lands Department that land on the 'S.W, 
end of the Mission Reserve be thrown open for selection as agricultural farm' (see figure 
7.2), The Wondai Shire Council supported the move and told the government they 
were confident that 'the land lying idle at present would be eagerly taken up by 
selectors'. Again, the government was not moved by such requests. The settlement 
needed the land and as the Chief Protector reported, the particular portion of the reserve 
that the Wondai residents wanted was 'not of much u.se to anyone' as it was 'poorly 
52 
watered'. Local residents would not have been oblivious to this situation and this was 
probably the reason they did not persist with their campaign. This incident, like previous 
attempts either to grab parts of the reserve or to have the settlement closed, revealed that 
residents were motivated more by prejudice and irrational fears than a desire to obtain 
quality farming land. Inmates were judged to be incapable of farming because as 
Aborigines they lacked the necessary temperament and aptitude for such work. They 
'*'^  Wondai Times, 1 April 1911, in QSA A/31708 11/3589; Daily MaU, 30 March 1911. 
^ Daily Mail, 30 March 1911. 
^^ Dr. Junk to Mr. Bleakley, 19 July 1915, QSA A/31708 15/8723. 
°^ Wondai Times, 16 July 1915, in QSA A/31708 15/8723. 
1^ Shire Clerk to Under Secretary, Home Department 13 September 1915, QSA A/31708 
15/8723. 
2^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department 27 October 1915, note on BJ.T. 
Lipscombe to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, October 1915, QSA A/31708 15/8723. 
^^  QPD 125 (1916-17): 2293. 
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Figure 7.2 Area of reserve recommended by Wondai residents 
to be open for agricultural blocks 
were, by nature, nomads and inclined to work only when necessary. The blunter view 
was that blacks were naturally lazy and unreliable and hence not suited to the daily grind 
neces.sary to farm successfully. Thus South Burnett residents were aggrieved that a part 
of their district was being wasted on such a group. In condemning the settlement for not 
being .self-supporting, residents did not bother to examine possible rea.sons apart from 
assuTTiing the inmates were intrinsically incapable of farming the land. They overlooked 
that elsewhere in Australia Aborigines had demonstrated they could farm as competently 
as whites when given the opportunity. Local residents naturally a.ssumed becau.sc they 
^'^ At Cumeroogunga on the NSW Victorian border, a program of allocating blocks to certain 
families began in 1888. Some families did manage to develop their bl(x:ks but in 1908, the NSW 
Aborigines Protection Board, seized the bl(Kks because the scheme suppo.sedly was not working 
(Heather Goodall, 'A History of Aboriginal Communities in NSW 1909-1939,' |PhD thesis, Univer-
sity of Sydney, 1982], 102). For a discussion of Aborigines involved in farming in WA during the 
early 19()0s, sec Anna Hacbich, For Their Own Good: Aborigines and Government in the Southwest 
of Westem Australia (Perth: University of Western Au.stralia Press, 1988). 
2M 
were able to earn their livelihood on 320 acre blocks and were not dependent on 
government assistance, there was no rea.son why Barambah inmates could not do likcwi.se. 
Although the dominant images of the Barambah settlement were of a 'health 
hazard', 'a colony of criminals' and 'wasteland', occasionally it was seen in a different 
perspective. The negative images were derived from the prevailing stereotype of 
Aborigines as a primitive race who were culturally 'thousands of years behind the white 
race'. They were dirty, disease-prone, imbued with barbaric instincts and 'natural 
nomads'. Yet, not all aspects of primitivism were repulsive and offensive. As well as 
the 'ignoble savage', there was the 'noble savage'. Notably, it was the skills required 
for hunting - fleetness of foot, quickness of the eye and deftness of movement - that 
South Burnett residents occasionally applauded and admired. From the mid 1920s, 
inmates began to participate in a limited manner, in cultural and social activities in the 
district. This involvement was strictly monitored and circumscribed and primarily con-
cerned displays of their physical prowess. At the district's principal cultural event, the 
Murgon Show, boomerang throwing and spearing throwing competitions were inaugurated 
in 1926, In the same year, samples of produce from the settlement and examples of 
children's handiwork were put on display. In subsequent years, displays were entered 
also in the Kingaroy and Wondai shows and according to Superintendent Semple were 
57 
'commented favourably on by people attending'. When a race meeting was held to 
raise funds for the Catholic Church presbytery in June 1928, one race was 'set apart for 
^^  For a discussion of the development of this idea in western thought see Robert F. Berkhofer, 
The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1978), 72-80. 
^^  W.P. Semple to Chief Protector, note on letter J.W. Bleakley to Superintendent, Barambah 
Aboriginal Settlement 19 February 1926, QSA HOM/J584 26/1387; E. Brainwood, interview, 6 
September 1982. 
'^^  W.P. Semple to Director of Native Affairs, 16 June 1947, QSA A/32147 47/7925; see also 
J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department 4 June 1941, QSA A/4218 41/5644. 
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the Abos and Settlement horses' and described as the 'All Black Race', Several years 
later, a Sports day was held at Goomeri in aid of the Catholic Church and settlement 
inmates were invited to participate, A group of forty inmates conducted a corroboree and 
gave demonstrations of spear and boomerang throwing. According to the South Burnett 
Times, for those spectators who had never witnessed a corroboree, it was the 'star turn 
of the day'. The spear throwing also caused 'much excitement' and the crowd were 
'amazed at the dexterity of the boomerang throwers as they hurled their weapons above 
the crowd, and have them almost return at their feet'. So enthralled were the spectators 
with the display that they temporarily forgot all their antagonism and prejudice towards 
those whom they normally saw as a menace to their health and livelihood and 'freely 
subscribed to'a tarpaulin muster. In 1938, at a carnival to commemorate the switching 
on of electric light at the Murgon Showgrounds, the opening item was a corroboree by 
Barambah inmates. 
Apart from such displays, residents had the opportunity to witness the physical 
prowess of the inmates when they competed in local sporting competitions. Although not 
as romantic and exotic as corroborees and spear throwing, cricket and football provided 
an arena where inmates were able to adapt their 'native instincts'. Both cricket and 
football were popular forms of recreation for the inmates. The occasional social match 
was arranged with outside teams, but it was not until the late 1920s that settlement teams 
began competing on a regular basis in local competitions. Both the Barambah cricket 
^^  J. Anderson to Mr Stopford, QSA HOM/J765 28/4784. 
^^  South Bumett Times, 1 February 1935. A tarpaulin muster is a bush custom where a 
tarpaulin or blanket is spread out on the ground and coins are thrown onto it in appreciation for the 
efforts of the performer or performers. 
^ South Bumett Times, 2 September 1938. 
1^ The Chief Protector's Annual Report for 1908 contains a photograph of a football match at 
Barambah {QPP [1909] 2: 1005). For reference to Barambah inmates playing cricket see BJ.T. 
Lipscombe to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 26 November 1906, QSA POA/Kl. 
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and football teams proved to be highly successful in district competitions. For four 
successive seasons between 1933 and 1937, the Barambah cricket team were undefeated 
in the Murgon district competition. The team contained a number of outstanding players 
but the player who attracted most attention was Eddie Gilbert, Gilbert's 'freakish'action 
which involved a run-up of only four paces, and 'a whip-like wrist action which released 
the ball like a stone from a catapault', left an indelible impression on tho.se who saw him 
play. After achieving phenomenal success in the district competition during the 1929-
30 season, he came to the attention of the Queensland Cricket Association and was 
selected to play in the state side in the following season. He played for a total of 
twenty-three matches for Queensland over a six year period. The South Burnett was 
decidedly proud of his achievements and as his reputation grew they became increasingly 
willing to regard him as a 'South Burnett boy'. The South Burnett Times closely 
followed his representative career and staunchly defended him during the controversy over 
his bowling action. It frequently reprinted feature articles on Gilbert from the 
metropolitan press. 
The success of the cricket team was mirrored by the football team. During the 
1930s, the Barambah side was rarely defeated in matches against local teams. The team 
was renowned throughout the South Burnett for the finesse and panache with which they 
played the game. Indeed, the accomplishments of the 1930s Barambah side have became 
2^ Ray Evans, 'Gilbert, Edward,' Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 8: 1891-1939, eds. 
B. Nairn and G. Serle (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1983), 3-4; Courier MaU, 6 March 
1976, 17. 
^^  South Bumett Times, 9 January 1931; 16 January 1931; 30 January 1931; 13 March 1931; 
25 September 1931; 13 November 1931; 20 November 1931; 25 December 1931; 20 January 1933, 
27 January 1933; 17 March 1933; 22 December 1933; 4 October 1935; 10 January 1936; 7 October 
1938. 
^ South Bumett Times, 30 January 1931; 25 September 1931; 2 October 1931; 20 January 
1933; 22 December 1933; 10 January 1936. The impact Gilbert had on the settlement it.sclf is dis-
cussed in the following chapter. 
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legendary in the South Burnett, The journalist Evan Whitton spent his boyhood in 
Murgon and regularly saw the team play. In recollecting the relationship between the 
town and settlement, he wrote: 
Most visible was their football team. They trained every day, and worked up 
a talent for ensemble play rivalled only in my experience, by Mr, Duncan 
Thompson's Toowoomba teams of the 1950s. Over the years, they offered 
the people in the district an entertainment that, in form and style, was as 
close to the Bolshoi Ballet as probably they would ever want to see, which is 
an attitude I would be inclined to share. 
Among the players most remembered by South Burnett residents for their artistry were 
Frank Fisher and Jack O'Chin, Fisher played in representative sides for the South Burnett 
and also Wide Bay, He was known for his 'clever initiative, dash off the mark, and 
penetrative skill'. When he played for Wide Bay against England in 1935, the English 
£n 
captain described Fisher as 'the best country footballer he had played against'. Of Jack 
O'Chin, Whitton commented: he 'was, I suppose, as great an artist, in the sense that his 
art was conscious, as ever stepped on the football pitch'. 
Whether dancing in a corroboree or catching a football, the artistry and skill of 
Barambah inmates enlivened the otherwise bleak world of South Burnett residents. For 
the majority of inhabitants, their daily lives revolved around the daily grind of subduing 
the land and tilling the soil. The work ethic was esteemed and their lifestyle was noted 
^^  Evan Whitton, 'An Exquisite Revenge,' 20. 
^ The DaUy Mail, 24 July 1933. 
•^^  Courier Mail, 3 April 1937. 
^ Evan Whitton, 'An Exquisite Revenge,' 20. One aspect of O'Chin's play left an indelible 
impression on Whitton: 
He had a technique for fielding a high punt in the face of thundering forwards, that was 
a marvel of skill and confidence. He reached up for the ball with one hand, the palm 
turned away from him, and let the ball settle there. There was always a moment when 
he and the ball were motionless as the forwards rushed on. Then he would turn the 
wrist inwards, let the ball spiral down his arm, feint one way and step languidly the 
other. 
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for its austerity. With neither the time nor inclination to devote to artistic and cultural 
endeavours, they could not but admire and marvel at the performances and feats of the 
Inmates. This did not mean, of course, that residents saw the inmates in any scn.se 
superior or equal to themselves. These attitudes derived from the images of the 
Aboriginal as 'noble savage', as 'warrior', as the 'artful primitive'. Despite their 
unquestioned abilities and aptitude, they were still Aborigines, still primitives. As 
representatives of a previous stage in the development of the human race, they were 
living museum pieces and hence regarded as objects of curiosity. But this image of the 
noble savage must be seen in context. Unquestionably, the dominant images of the 
settlement were negative. South Burnett residents saw the inmates primarily as dirty, in-
dolent, disease-ridden and capable of the most heinous crimes; only infrequently were 
their perceptions coloured by the romantic or exotic. The exceptional sportsmen like 
Fisher, O'Chin and Gilbert were seen as just that - exceptions. 
Regardless of how inmates were perceived, it is evident that South Burnett 
residents were acutely aware of an Aboriginal settlement in their midst. It was a highly 
visible feature of the cultural landscape. Although occasionally residents were intrigued 
by the behaviour of the inmates, they more commonly would have preferred to know 
nothing about it. The constant complaints and controversy surrounding the settlement 
revealed that the place was anything but out of sight, out of mind. The repeated calls 
for the removal of the settlement indicated that residents desperately wanted to forget the 
plight of the indigenous inhabitants of the state. They strove valiantly, but unsuccess-
fully, lo throw a 'blanket of forgetfulness' over the inmates by having them removed to 
another location. They did not enjoy being at the epicentre of the government's attempts 
to protect and preserve the indigenous inhabitants of the state. 
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Outside the South Burnett, perceptions of the .settlement were markedly dif-
ferent. For most Queenslanders, their knowledge of the settlement was limited to vague 
notions as to its location and its existence as an institution specifically for Aborigines, 
They preferred not to know. Even for the more informed, they only had a rudimentary 
understanding of why the settlement was established and how it functioned. The images 
of settlement life were fragmented and distorted. On the rare occasions when a window 
into Barambah was opened, outsiders were only able to gain a fleeting glimpse of 
carefully selected features. Hidden from view were all of the institution's unpalatable 
aspects. Unlike the residents of the South Burnett, who had a more candid view, the 
public at large were presented with a highly sanitised version. These images were 
transmitted via several sources: the press, exhibitions and displays, film and personal 
visits. 
The presentation of wholesome and positive images is aptly illustrated by the 
way the press reported on Barambah. The first major feature article on the settlement 
appeared in the Queenslander in June 1907. Accompanied by a series of photographs, 
the article described life on the settlement in most idyllic terms. Both men and women 
were able to go out to work and they gladly contributed part of their earnings to the 
maintenance of the settlement. Children eagerly went to school where the standard of 
work was most commendable. The pupils' exercise books were considered 'marvels of 
neatness'. After school the children played and swam happily in the creek, Corroborees 
70 
were held 'frequently' and tribal customs still observed. The only negative aspects of 
this cameo of settlement life were references to the amount of land the reserve occupied 
and to the problem of half-castes. Reflecting local opinion, the Queenslander suggested 
^' Queenslander, 27 June 1907. 
°^ ibid. 
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that the settlement took up too much land, claiming 1000 acres was ample space for an 
Aboriginal settlement and suggested that the remaining 6000 acres could be thrown open 
for selection. The presence of half-castes did not go unnoticed. In particular, the 
presence of a child 'much fairer in complexion and lighter in colour of hair than the 
average European' compelled the paper to question whether the child 'should be placed 
in an orphanage where she would be brought up under more suitable conditions to her 
71 
than among Aboriginals', Despite these minor quibbles, the intent of the article was 
to give readers the impression that the inmates were well cared for and were more than 
contented living on the reserve. 
A similar image of the settlement was portrayed in an article in the Brisbane 
72 Courier in 1926. Under the heading, 'Preserving the Aboriginals', journalist Spencer 
Browne described the settlement in flattering terms. In his view, the work of the 
department could not be faulted as typified in the remarks on the girls dormitory: 
the latest accession is a big two-storied building, which is a girls' club or 
home, really an industrial club . . . where coloured girls live under very 
comfortable and elevating conditions, and where they are taught domestic 
duties, such as the economy of a household, cooking, laundry work, sewing 
and so on. 
They have a sympathetic matron and assistants, and an aim is to fit the girls 
for domestic service; but the paramount object is to fit them for wifehood and 
motherhood. 
There was no suggestion of inhumane treatment or any hint that discipline was severe. 
The impression was given that the welfare of the girls was paramount. As to the overall 
purpose of the settlement, Browne claimed: 
The idea is to develop the outlook, the psychology, of the people, and so far 
there is evidence they are rising to the situation. The aspiration is for a 
''I ibid. 
'^ 2 Brisbane Courier, 16 October 1926. 
''^ ibid. 
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comfortable home, a competent wife, and an industrious husband, and the 
development of a sense of dignity. 
There was no questioning whether this was what the inmates wanted. It was assumed 
they lacked dignity, their family life was impoverished because it was not of the 'nuclear' 
type, and that 'home' could not be a bark shelter. Therefore they could not but aspire 
to a 'better life'. The article clearly intended to convey to readers the idea that the 
settlement was most beneficial for the inmates. Because the settlement was 'well 
organised' and contained excellent facilities, there was no reason why the inmates should 
not have been blissfully contented and ever grateful to the government for what had been 
provided. 
A decade later, readers of Queensland's leading daily were treated to another 
feature article on the settlement. Written by the renowned journalist Clem Lack, the two 
75 part series gave a highly picturesque and romanticised view of settlement life. The tone 
of the articles was reflected in the titles: 'Native Comedy and Drama: Aboriginal 
Thespians Stage A Corroboree' and 'Roasted Snake is Popular: Sidelights on a Native 
Village' (see figure 7.3). While Lack did mention the school, farming operations, hospital 
and dormitories, he gave more attention to the unusual and novel aspects of settlement 
life. Several paragraphs were devoted to personalities such as Jimmy Flourbag and Jenny 
Lind. The latter Lack met crouched over a 'dying camp fire, her toothless gums clamped 
like a vyce [sic] round a short-stemmed pipe, which she sucked with evident enjoyment'. 
Jenny Lind was the 'Queen of Cherbourg' reputedly over 100 years old and was regarded 
as 'a prize exhibit'. What she was an exhibit of. Lack did not elaborate but presumab-
ly because of her age and appearance, she was representative of the 'real native'. 
^^  ibid. 
^^  Courier Mad, 11 March and 3 April 1937. 
•'^  ibid., 3 April 1937. 
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The centrepiece of Lack's account was the description of a corroboree and 
exhibition of spear and boomerang throwing. Lack described a corroboree in lurid terms: 
From a circle of crouching figures in the shadow came the orchestration in 
monotone of clicking boomerangs and the thump, thump, thump of pads 
struck by the hand, incessant as the beat of a tom tom. 
The dancers postured, stamped, and grunted in barbaric patterns and arabes-
ques of sight and sound. Their muscles rippled and quivered as they twisted 
and turned and whirled, ebon legs opening and closing in grotesque 
resemblance to a row of gigantic electrified scissors. 
The use of such imaginative language emphasised the 'exotic' nature of the settlement 
life. It was as if Lack's task was to convince his readers that, despite the mistreatment 
of Aborigines in the previous 100 years, the essential core of Aboriginal culture had 
remained untainted and uncorrupted. In particular, he gave the impression that traditional 
cultural practices were a prominent feature of life on the settlement. It was a Jiving 
museum where the lifestyle of the primitive could be observed. Although Lack carefully 
avoided any derogatory references to the inmates, he nevertheless reinforced prevailing 
stereotypes about blacks. His florid descriptions did not reduce the cultural chasm 
between black and white. Rather, they accentuated the differences and highlighted the 
idea that the inmates were still primitives and belonged to an inferior race. Although he 
did not devote much attention specifically to the administrative facets of the settlement, 
the tenor of his account suggested he had only praise for the department's work on Cher-
bourg, As with previous newspaper reports, the reader was given the unmistakable 
impression the inmates could not wish for a more desirable place to live. It was a 
paradise where the indigenous inhabitants lived in harmony and free from worry. They 
could only have been deeply appreciative of the government for providing such amenities. 
At least, that was the image conveyed by Lack's account of the settlement. 
77 ibid., 27 March 1937. 
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THE__COURLERiMML' ,__ .BRISBANE, S A T U R D A Y , - APRIL ' 3, -1937. 
;Eaaste(l SnaferiB ^ft)pular 
Ji Trip to Cherbourg^—ll. 
SIDELIGHTS 0I^iffE4N-
A NATIVE VILLAGE 
/T \N Sunday morning we made 
^ the roundi of the little ic t t le -
ment. Several of the dusky beaus 
of the villoge were enjoying their 
matutinal shove os we poised 
down.. the_narrow 'gross-covered 
street; One man was dexterously 
shaving himself with- one hand 
while he held a mirror in the 
other. 
Another inhobitont was bend-
ing down 'in _front of a micro-
scopic piece of looking gloss, 
propped on a pocking cose, which 
- enobled him to -see about a 
square inch of his foce at a time. 
Jenny Lind, known as the 
Queen of Cherbourg , is in t h e 
na ture of a prize exhibit . StTe wa.s 
By 
CLEM LACK 
(Illustrated by McBain) 
-He no beatuni 
; ex 
vfter a t - h o m e to us wh n we called to 
see her, a f te r runn ing the g a u n t l e t 
of half a dozen inquisi t ively sniff-
who live In ikle* 
mt-vtui!" - '— 
•We'flIso~5a'w' Jerr>' Jerome. Queens-
lands one time heavyweight cham-
pion. lounglriK around with his hands 
In his pockeLs, wUtt^a cavernous smile 
on hU face and a batiered felt ha t 
on hLTwboIIy'Ioclts!' Jerry 'sl i l l packs-
a rare punch, they sny. and occajloxi-
ally ."aibw5~tTTe"y6uhg fellows how he' 
t)Oxed his way to fame. He was 
(tcnulnely ([lad to See visitors from 
Brisbane, ot which he still entertaini 
lively recollections, and piled us with 
questions about old Identities and for-
mer associate.'; of the boxing world, of 
t 
A Joyous Occasion 
THE ' COt (R IER- -MAIL—BRt5BANC, S A T U R & A v , . >,i A , R c r T " 2 ? : — ^ 9 ^ ^ 
A Trip to Cherbourg-—I 
and Draeira 
Aboriginal Thespians 
' ' Stage-xLXjQiiQ]x)ree 
T N the weird, f i t ful gleam of 
burning faggots, piercing 
-thc_night_with j p e a r s o f Jlomc, 
fantastic figures bedaubed 
with white stripes and dots, 
and bedizened with head-
dresses of opossum skin, gross7 
ond cockatoo feathers, minced, 
pirouetted, and pranced in 
rhythmic pantomime. > 
By 
"CLEM LACK " 
* 
(Illustrated by McBain) 
, , , ,, , J , Coo l -b lock M u m m e r s . 
;"iv,^r.-.:p-. Ih^ (rl^kv aciU y of arin!r5-
rr\\\ \-ni;:h Harrv Co^rriln. a rrzular rraw:rtl b^!i;iul ;i;ni, pnu-^ i^nt: In lii.«; dairy caltip arc i>t.' 
Hpirr;^-: A.In a firni) h.-irr.-l rho.^l. anri .^t.ea!'.h\ apor-Oflch :^  hrn Ihr rnan, scn5- pert\. and farminz li 
Figure 13 Articles in Courier Mail - 1937 
\:^r\ --»n tlic pro- . 
earned rs\\i on ?. \ 
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Periodically, the Queensland public were given the opportunity to witncs.s dis-
plays similar to what Lack had observed. Surprisingly, the inmates were invited to par-
ticipate in some of the more significant public events in the state. On the occasions 
when the state wished to parade itself and its accomplishments, the indigenous inhabitants 
were prominently displayed. For example, during the visit of the Duke and Duchess of 
York in 1901 a corroboree, exhibition of spear throwing and 'Aboriginal arch' were 
no 
memorable features of the occasion. Similarly, during royal visits in 1927 and 1934, 
Aborigines featured prominently in the displays and pageantry which were organised to 
leave an indelible impression of the state on the royal guests. When the Duke and 
Duchess of York visited Queensland in April 1927, Barambah inmates provided a display 
7Q that, according to the Brisbane Courier, 'gripped their attention'. It was 'something 
altogether novel and fascinating'. As part of a bushman's carnival at Beaudesert, a group 
of fifty inmates performed a corroboree, gave an exhibition of spear throwing as well as 
conducting a 'mock shield fight'. As a sidelight Tommy Waldas demonstrated how to 
create fire by rubbing two sticks together. When he succeeded, the onlookers including 
80 the Duchess joined 'in the applause'. Seven years later the Duke of Gloucester visited 
the state and a similar performance was arranged. A special carnival was organised by 
the Royal National Association at the exhibition grounds and part of the entertainment 
was a display by a group of Cherbourg inmates with the assistance of a contingent from 
Palm Island. According to the Courier Mail, of all the events in the carnival, 'the Duke 
was interested most of all in the splendid entertainment provided by the Aborigines'. 
They performed 'picturesque exhibitions of native ceremonial dances and mimic battles'. 
The performance was roundly applauded by the crowd, and described as 'barbaric poetry 
'^ ^ T. Blake, 'Excluded, Exploited, Exhibited: Aborigines in Brisbane 1897-1910,' Brisbane: 
Aboriginal Alien Ethnic, ed. R. Fisher (Brisbane: Brisbane History Group, 1987), 49-58. 
^^  Brisbane Courier, 11 April 1927. 
8« ibid. 
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expressed in movement and gesture'. On both occasions the performances were charac-
terised by an exhibition of 'primitive skills', and therefore conveyed the image of the 
'tame savage'. 
The purpose of these displays before a royal audience was not simply to enter-
tain. The ritual and festival a.ssociated with royal visits were convenient occasions for 
affirming, as Hobsbawn expresses it, 'relations of authority'. The inclusion of Aborig-
ines in the program had an ideological as well as political function. As savages, albeit 
now tamed, the Aborigines were clearly at the lower strata of society. But whatever 
conflicts may have occurred in the past, there was now unity between black and white 
in the state. As the Brisbane Courier noted that at the close of the carnival for the 
Duke and Duchess of York: 'every one was happy . . . the Aboriginals succeeded in 
giving the Royal visitors a glimpse of real Australian life as it is lived in the open 
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spaces'. The performances by the Barambah inmates were part of a spectacle designed 
to create an aura of harmony and happiness. The inclusion of Aborigines in the events 
also had subtle political overtones. The vigour and enthusiasm of the performers 
suggested they were being well provided for and that the government was to be 
84 
commended for its benevolence towards the state's indigenous inhabitants. 
^^  ibid. 
*^  EJ. Hobsbawn, 'Introduction: Inventing Tradition,' The Invention of Tradition, eds. EJ. 
Hobsbawn and Terrancc Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 9. 
^^  Brisbane Courier, 11 April 1927. 
** Similar entertainment was given at less auspicious events such as local agricultural shows. 
In 1925, for example, a group performed for Maryborough residents at their annual show (J.L 
Dymock to D. Weir, 7 October 1925, QSA HOM/J567 25/75800). The following year, a contingent 
travelled to Toowoomba for the Australian brass band championships to provide entertainment of a 
different kind (Secretary, Australian Brass Band Championship Contest, to Under Secretary, Home 
Department, 28 February 1926, QSA HOM/J587 26/2124). 
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On a similar scale to the pageantry and festivities organised for the royal visiLs 
were the celebrations for Brisbane's centenary in 1924. A contingent of sixty inmates 
85 
were brought from Barambah to perform for the occasion. They featured as the mam 
attraction in an evening of entertainment held at the Exhibition grounds (see figure 7.4). 
Part of their performance included the perfunctory exhibitions of boomerang and spear 
throwing but the main feature was a 'Grand Native Corroboree'. Unlike the usual 
corroborees put on for public viewing which contained a pastiche of traditional items, this 
performance was a re-enactment of scenes from the frontier. In an effort to make the 
scenes as authentic as possible, four Martini Henry rifles, two dozen round of cartridges 
87 
and four tracker uniforms and caps were borrowed from the Police department. The 
opening scene began with a 'tribe on walkabout' going about their daily tasks and 'indul-
ging in the usual pleasantries of camp life'. Some of the tribe then trespassed on a cattle 
station and were driven off by a stockman. In retaliation, the tribe mounted a surprise 
attack on the stockman who only narrowly escaped a flurry of spears. In return, the 
native police were sent to the camp and 'without a word of warning, emptied the contents 
of several carbines into the merry throng'. One of the tribe was taken captive while 
the remainder were left to mourn over 'Budgeree, the warrior who had been killed in 
action'.^ 
This cameo of the frontier contrasted with the decidedly 'ahistorical' nature of 
the other public performances by Barambah inmates. Yet this particular display was not 
an attempt to educate the public or to acknowledge the state had a violent past and the 
^^  W.H. Halstead to Under Secretary, Home Department, 30 August 1924, QSA HOM/J527 
24/7584. 
^ Brisbane Courier, 14 August 1924. 
^^  Chief Protector of Aboriginals to Commissioner of Police, 1 August 1924, QSA POL/J51 
1623M. 
^ Brisbane Courier, 14 August 1924. 
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indigenous inhabitants suffered injustices. At a popular level, there was no need for a 
reminder about what had occurred in the first encounters between black and white. Most 
Queenslanders in the 1920s would have been acquainted with oral traditions about the 
frontier. The purpose of the display was rather designed to provide a contrast between 
the past and the present. It was to indicate the development of the city from the frontier 
period to the current era. If the beginnings of white occupation were marred by violence 
and strife, after a hundred years Brisbane was now a mature and civili.sed city. The 
historical imagery was employed 'as a base line for comparison with the present, but not 
as a guide for the comprehension or future transformation of contemporary public institu-
90 tions'. The display was not intended to evoke a sense of guilt or remorse about the 
past or suggest more needed to be done for the descendants of the victims of past 
violence. Although the pre.sentation did not deny that conflict had occurred in the past, 
it devalued the impact on the blacks. In reporting the display, the Brisbane Courier 
noted that the blacks who took part 'entered into their compact with zest, and their play-
acting was interesting, even if a little circumscribed by the environment'. Despite 
the seriousness of the plot, the 'Grand Corroboree' was seen more as light entertain-
ment rather than as sombre drama. As with the performances during the royal visits, this 
display was not designed specifically to promote the settlement. But most who observed 
the displays would have been aware the participants were 'reserve blacks' from a govern-
ment settlement somewhere in the South Burnett. The energy and vigour of the 
performers suggested to the audience that the settlement was beneficial for the inhabitants. 
^' See for example, the remarks by Home Secretary Hanlon in 1939: 
It must be understood that the slaughtering of the native races of Australia the callous 
manner in which the natives were destroyed by the white settlers, or invaders as they 
could be termed, is one of the blackest pages in our history {QPD 174 [1939]: 484). 
^ David Glassberg, 'History and the Public: Legacies of the Progressive Era,' The Joumal of 
American History 73 (1986): 976. 
' ' Brisbane Courier, 14 August 1924. 
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Figure 7.4 Advertisement - Brisbane Courier 11 August 1924 
Apart from these general displays of Aboriginal customs and skills, Barambah 
inmates were involved in exhibitions and performances that were specifically designed to 
promote the settlement. In 1911, the Chief Protector's department organised a display of 
the various faccLs of iLs work for the Royal National A.s.sociation's annual exhibition. 
Each .settlement and mission, including Barambah, was asked to contribute items of work 
by their inmates. Items displayed ranged from samples of school work to traditionally 
made implements and weapons. In the display presented in 1913, items from Barambah 
included 'fine specimens of carved whip handles and walkmg sticks'. ^ The displays 
became an annual cvcnl until they were 'discontinued in view of the need for economy' 
92 QPP (1914) 3: 1016. 
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in 1917.^ -^  The Chief Protector regarded the displays as most beneficial in bringing 
before the public the work being carried out among Aboriginals in the state. He firmly 
believed they helped to arou.se 'public interest'and increa.se 'practical sympathy'. But 
more importantly for the government, the displays also assisted in legitimising the 
practices of segregation, removal and exploitation of labour. 
During the late 1920s and early 19.10s, the settlement attracted public attention 
by conducting concerts at various venues throughout southeast Queensland. The concerts 
featured a variety of items including corroborees, duets, dancing, a 'leaf solo' and comic 
songs (see figure 7.5). At some venues the concert program also featured the settlement 
brass band. Organised by Mrs Semple, the Superintendent's wife, the purpose of the 
concerts was ostensibly to raise money for amenities and improvements on the 
settlement. But equally important, the concerts promoted the work of the settlement. 
Through such performances, the general public perceived the settlement as a worthwh-
ile institution. Following a concert in Bundaberg in April 1927, the Mayor wrote to the 
Home Secretary: 
I take this opportunity of congratulating you on the displays given by the 
Aboriginals connected with the Barambah mission. Their ability, combined 
with their good conduct in our midst makes them worthy credits to the State 
Government, 
'^ QPP (1918) 1: 1673; see also QPP (1910) 3: 1081, (1915) 3: 1679, (1916) 3: 1729; (1917) 
3: 997. 
^^ QPP (1914) 3: 1016. 
'^ South Bumett Times, 29 April 1931. 
^ For example, the proceeds from concerts held at Maryborough and Bundaberg in April 1927 
totalled £130 and the money went towards the upkeep of the brass band and purcha.se of a piano 
(W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, May 1927, QSA HOM/J623 27/4002). 
"^^  Mayor, Bundaberg to Home Secretary, 28 April 1927, QSA HOM/J629 27/3445. 
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In reporting on a concert held in Kingaroy, the local paper commented: 
The officials of the Barambah settlement who were responsible for the 
organising of the concert, are to be congratulated on the success of their 
endeavours. And not only does it go to show to the general public the high 
standard of education the natives are receiving, but it insists in breaking any 
monotony that may be experienced by the inmates of the settlement. 
As a promotional exercise, the government and settlement administration could not have 
been more pleased with such reactions. The remarks appeared to vindicate the reserve 
system and countered those critics who claimed too much money was expended on the 
upkeep of the settlement. 
Superficially, the concerts and exhibitions of handiwork appeared to promote an 
image of the inmates different from the traditional corroboree-cum-weapon throwing 
displays. They did not overtly convey the image of the inmates as 'primitives'. The 
inmates were seen and heard singing traditional concert hall items, playing bra.ss 
instruments and performing dance routines such as the 'Mexican Rose'. The public saw 
examples of children's handwriting, and samples of needlework and wood carving. Such 
displays and performances however, had racist overtones. The inmates were not admired 
and applauded for their abilities per se. Rather, the response was akin to the public 
reaction to freaks in a circus or the antics of performing animals. Just as such acts were 
promoted as 'see the amazing tricLs of Ned the talking horse', so the subliminal message 
in the displays and performances of Barambah inmates was: 'see what amazing things a 
savage can do'. When an example of a child's handwriting was put on display, the 
reaction was: 'how remarkable of a child with only a primitive mind'. Similarly, when 
Barambah inmates sang traditional Scottish songs at a concert, the response was: 'how 
amazing that such a culturally inferior race could learn some of the art forms of civilisa-
tion'. The displays only served to reinforce the prevailing stereotypes of the inmates as 
^^  South Bumett Times, 29 April 1931. 
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savages and primitives, although these cases did indicate that some could be regarded 
as 'clever savages'. The perception that blacks were intellectually inferior to whites 
remained unchanged. At the most, the displays indicated Aborigines were capable of 'a 
limited amount of civilisation'. 
In claiming reserves helped to throw a 'blanket of forgetfulness across the central 
tragedy of white Australian settlement', Bernard Smith implied that such institutions were 
designed primarily to induce collective amnesia in the white population. The imagery 
suggests settlement and missions throughout the continent were shrouded in mystery, with 
the public oblivious to their location and ignorant of their activities. The evidence 
presented in this chapter indicates such claims need to be qualified in two important 
respects. The first qualification is that for white Australians living in close proximity to 
a settlement or mission, Aboriginal Australians were anything but hidden from view. 
Their problem was not ignorance or forgetfulness, but that they were only too conscious 
of its presence. For South Burnett residents the Barambah settlement was all too visible, 
disfiguring the cultural landscape of the region. They resented having such an institu-
tion in their midst and could not easily expunge from their consciousness the consequen-
ces of conquest and dispossession. The settlement was a source of constant discomfort 
and unease. Repeated calls were made for its closure. Yet it was not just in the 
vicinity of settlements such as Barambah that white Australians were acutely aware of 
Aborigines. Fringe camps also served to confront and remind white Australia. In 
Queensland there was a significant increase in the number of Aborigines living on the 
fringe of towns, particularly in western Queensland during the 1930s. This movement 
caused consternation for local residents who tried to ensure they remained on the fringe 
of the towns. At CunnamuUa, for example, the Paroo Shire Cbuncil sought assistance 
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Figure 7.5 Program for concert by Barambah Inmates - Gympie 1927 
99 from the government to build a 'native village' on the outskirts of the town. At 
Mitchell, after several Aboriginal families came to live in the town as a result of the 
depression, the whites objected to Aboriginal children attending the local school. 
^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Department of Health and Home Affairs, 3 July 1940, 
QSA Ay4193 41/1617; Hazel McKellar, Matya Mundu: a History of the Aboriginal People of South 
West Queensland, (CunnamuUa: CunnamuUa Native Welfare Association, 1984). 
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Consequently, a school exclusively for Aboriginal children was established in the fringe 
^ , „„ 100 camp. 
Similar reactions occurred in New South Wales and Western Australia. In an 
analysis of Aboriginal communities in New South Wales during the period 1909-39, 
Heather Goodall describes a number of controversies in rural towns concerning Aboriginal 
fringe dwellers. In towns such as (Tondobolin, Brewarrina and Moree, the white residents 
constantly fought to deny Aborigines 'access to the services and precincts of the town'. 
In an study of black-white relations in the Yass district, Peter Read has shown similar 
102 
attitudes prevailed among the white residents. In Western Australia, tension between 
black and white was not confined to the northern frontier. Anna Hacbich has shown in 
her study of Aborigines in southwest of the state between 1900 and 1940, that clashes 
occurred in the wheat belt, notably around the towns of Katanning and Moora. During 
103 the 1910s repeated attempts were make to exclude the Aborigines from these towns. 
For the residents of these towns, the camp on their outskirts was as much a source of 
discomfort and unease as the Barambah settlement was for Murgon residents. The 
evidence presented in this chapter indicates that not all Australians were oblivious to the 
'central tragedy of white settlement'. In rural Australia, from Murgon to Moree to Moora 
- wherever black and white were in close proximity - the latter could not avoid or easily 
forget the plight of the former. 
^^ Mrs T. Smith to G.W. Conway, 6 March 1935, QSA EDU/Z1787; Mrs E. Mailman to 
Department of Public Instruction, 26 January 1935, QSA EDU/Z1787 35/2503. 
°^^  Heather Goodall, 'A History of Aboriginal Communities in NSW 1909-1939,' 156-215. 
^^ 2 Peter Read, 'A double headed coin: Protection and assimilation in Yass 1900-1960,' All 
that dirt: Aborigines 1938, ed. B. Gammage and A. Markus, (Canberra: History Project Incorporated, 
1982), 9-28. 
°^^  Anna Hacbich, For Their Own Good, 128-152. 
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Undoubtedly, city dwellers were less familiar with Aboriginal Australians than 
their counterparts in the bush. The reserve system did succeed to a degree in keeping 
Aborigines 'out of sight, out of mind' for urban Australia. The 'blanket of forgetful-
ness' was more evident in the city than in the bush. But occasionally, the blanket was 
lifted to reveal selected features of settlement life or to put the inmates on display. 
Barambah settlement was not totally hidden from the Queensland public although the 
opportunities to view the settlement and inmates were limited and infrequent. One reason 
for allowing a glimpse of the inmates was to reinforce prevailing notions of the racial 
superiority of whites. Inmates were paraded as objects of curiosity, as specimens of a 
past stage in the development of humankind. Rather than enlightening the public, such 
displays served to entrench existing prejudices. Another purpose of allowing glimpses 
of the settlement was to promote the government as humanitarian and compassionate. 
From the mid 1920s, the department encouraged visitors to the settlement to inspect first-
hand the 'care and interest that [was] being taken for the welfare and well-being of the 
Aboriginal population'. As Barambah was easily accessible by train from Brisbane, 
it became the 'showcase' for the department. Parliamentarians were frequently invited 
to visit and observe its operations and see that the public funds were being wisely sp-
em.i06 
Unquestionably the public were given a highly distorted view of the settlement 
and inmates. It was a 'manufactured image' designed to obscure the realities of 
settlement life. On the concert stage at Gympie or performing before the Duke and 
*^ J.B. Freeman to J. Stopford, 3 November 1928, QSA HOM/J692 28/8208. Visitors became 
more welcome on the settlement after W.P. Semple became Superintendent At times he became 
'deluged by visitors' and on one occasion reported 'no less than six car loads' in a single day (W.P. 
Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 4 June 1926, QSA HOM/J607 26/8258). 
°^^  South Bumett Times, 12 November 1937. 
^^ QPD 146 (1925): 946. 
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Duchess the image was of blacks still living a primitive and idyllic lifestyle. Tlie 
settlement was a place where they still danced, hunted and fished. There was no 
suggestion that they or their forebears were brutally treated and dispossessed of their land, 
no inkling that they were forcibly removed to the settlement, no indication of the high 
rate of mortality and morbidity, or that every aspect of their lives was rigidly controlled. 
Thus, while Smith's observation that reserves were designed to induce a sense of 
forgetfulness was partly true, it is more precise to say that the reserve system helped to 
obfuscate and mislead white Australia about the history of black-white relations. The 
government never denied the existence of Barambah or deliberately tried to hide it from 
the public. But it did make strenuous efforts to conceal what actually occurred on the 
settlement. 
The outside view of the settlement contrasted markedly with the perceptions from 
the inside. Whereas the general public were lulled into the belief that whatever the 
mistakes and tragedies of the past, at least in the present some measures were being 
undertaken to improve conditions for the state's indigenous inhabitants. Reserves became, 
to use Reinhold Niebuhr's phrase, a 'necessary illusion'. For the inmates, the changes 
were cosmetic. They were still subjected to violence and terror although the overt 
methods of the frontier had been replaced by more subtle and covert techniques. As in 
the nineteenth century. Aborigines were ruthlessly exploited for their labour, so the 
reserve system continued their slave status. Further the diseases that decimated the 
Aboriginal population on initial contact continued to flourish on settlements. Outside the 
reserve, such realities were unknown. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE BARAMBAH MOB - ONE BIG TRIBE 
Identity, Cultural Resilience and Vitality 
The government thought they would disband the different tribes by splitting them up 
around all the different reser\>es, but they didn 't realise that they were creating one 
big tribe (Kathy Fisher, former resident). 
Out of oppression evolved an additional kinship, an additional culture, an additional 
language, one that maintained our own tribal heritage . . . that embraced many 
aspects of the traditions, languages and cultures of the many tribal groups who were 
continually rounded up for all parts of the State (Hope Neill, former resident). 
In 1934 an anthropologist from the University of Sydney, Caroline Tennant 
Kelly, spent four months undertaking research on Barambah. Her task 'was to form 
some idea of the ritual and social life which obtained before the breakdown' of the 
inmates' culture. As a disciple of the structural functionalist approach to anthropology, 
Kelly was not interested in examining contemporary cultural patterns or the dynamics of 
social interaction on the settlement. She was primarily concerned with Aboriginal culture 
in its pristine form or what Kroeber termed the 'uncontaminated native'. Kelly saw the 
settlement as a 'disintegrated society' and did not notice the existence of any 'definite 
social patterns' among the inmates. In the words of her mentor A.P. Elkin, Barambah 
inmates led 'a kind of cultural non-existence'. 
^ Kathy Fisher, in After 200 Years: Photographic Essays of Aboriginal and Islander Australians 
Today, ed. Penny Taylor (Canberra; Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988), 205. 
^ Hope Neill, "The Beating Heart of Australian Culture,' paper presented to Catholic Religious 
Education Conference, Brisbane, May 1988, 7. 
^ C. Tennant Kelly, Tribes on Cherbourg settlement Queensland', Oceania (1935) 5: 401. 
'* quoted by William Simmons, 'Culture Theory in contemporary Ethnohistory,' Ethnohistory 35 
(1988): 4. 
^ Tennant Kelly, 'Tribes on Cherbourg settlement' 472. 
^ Courier MaU, 23 January 1935; A.P. Elkin, 'Native Education with Special Reference to the 
Australian Aborigines,' Oceania 7 (1937): 351. 
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Later observers have made similar comments about the settlement. In the early 
1970s, as part of an investigation into trends in Aboriginal education, Henry Schoen-
heimer visited Cherbourg to examine the state of education on the settlement. As a 
educationalist he believed the key to education on the settlement was the teaching of 
traditional culture but he found to his dismay that there was 'virtually no such culture 
left'. Only two old men could speak 'an aboriginal tongue and the language of most 
homes was 'very limited and basic pidgin eked out with gesture'. He concluded 'the 
n 
community had no cultural roots from which to draw strength'. As indicated by the title 
of his article, 'From Nowhere to Where', Schoenheimer saw the settlement as bereft of 
any cultural vitality. 
The idea that the reserve system destroyed Aboriginal culture and stripped the 
inmates of dignity and identity has had wide acceptance. Typically, settlements have 
o 
been regarded as fostering what Oscar Lewis described as the 'culture of poverty', 
Bernard Smith refers to the sense of 'despairing inertia' that pervaded reserves while Les 
Murray in his poem 'Beside the Highway' wrote: 
Beside the settlement, mad Jess sits down . . . 
9 Stares at walls, Another day half done. 
CD, Rowley suggested that in fringe camps and on settlements, there was 'little more 
than a stubborn adherence to remembered cultural remnants'. At a popular level. 
Henry Schoenheimer, Good Australian Schools and their Communities (Melbourne: Victorian 
Technical Teachers As.sociation, 1973), 127. 
Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family (New York: 
Random House 1961), xiv-xxvii. 
Bernard Smith, The Spectre of Tmganini (Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1980), 
22. 
CD. Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1971), 17. 
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settlement inmates were typically regarded as stranded between two cultures, neither black 
nor white. Even more critical perspectives suggested the reserve system created 'the most 
powerless people on earth'.^^ Given the extent of white hegemony and the unremitting 
desire to control and regulate every facet of aboriginal life, it is tempting to conclude that 
the inmates were so crushed and dispirited their only response was a pathetic mimicking 
of the values and behaviour of white society. 
Colonisation had a devastating impact on Aboriginal society. Undoubtedly, the 
violence on the frontier undermined many traditional practices and the reserve system 
continued the process. The removal process took people from their land and fractured 
kin.ship networks. The incarceration of children in dormitories further contributed to the 
decline of traditional customs. It is incorrect however, to conclude that as a result of 
these processes, inmates of settlements were left 'culturally impoverished' or possessed 
only a 'truncated version of European culture'. When Tennant Kelly visited the 
Barambah settlement, her preoccupation with trying to recover 'authentic Aboriginal 
culture' led her to overlook and ignore the current patterns of behaviour and cultural 
forms. She was not concerned with examining the dynamics of how the inmates had 
responded to their environment. The structural functionalist paradigm views culture as 
a static entity, something that is fixed in time. This view, as Colinshaw has noted is 
fundamentally flawed: 
If culture is a creation, an expression of a human group's responses to their 
social existence, then the changing conditions of that existence does not mean 
a loss of culture, [sic] one could as well lose one's biology. 
*^  Kevin Gilbert Living Black: Blacks Talk to Kevin GUbert (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), 
184. 
^^  Marcia Langton, 'Urbanizing Aborigines: The Social Scientists' Great Deception,' Social 
Altematives 2 (1981): 17. 
^^  Gillian Colinshaw, Black White or Brindle: Race in Rural Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 282. 
309 
When studying Aboriginal society, a primary difficulty for adherents to the structural 
functionalist approach was that they had certain criteria as to what constituted 'aborigina-
lity'. In the situation of the Barambah inmates, because they did not measure up to what 
was believed to be essential attributes of Aboriginality, they were therefore regarded as 
'not truly Aboriginal' or lacking an 'authentic culture'. But as black anthropologist 
Marcia Langton remarked: 
anthropology must no longer say that we have been assimilated or that we are 
not really Aboriginal because we do not have access to our myths or our 
ceremonies. There is something else happening what many anthropologists 
have failed to see'. 
Just as those Aboriginal people who lived a traditional lifestyle in Arnhem land, 
or resided on a mission in the Kimberley region or were inmates of a reformatory in 
rural New South Wales, possessed this 'something else', so too did the Barambah inmates. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the inmates managed to survive and 
maintain a sense of 'otherness' in the face of unremitting attempts to remake their identity 
and sever their cultural roots. How did 'an additional kinship, an additional culture' 
develop on the settlement? What processes helped to forge a 'Barambah identity' and 
encourage the inmates to regard themselves as belonging to 'one big tribe'? 
In his study on prisons and parapenal institutions. Discipline and Punish, Michel 
Foucault argues that a turning point in the history of disciplinary techniques was the 
publication of Bentham's treatise on the panopticon. The principle of the panopticon was 
that effective control and discipline were only possible with constant surveillance of all 
'^* For a critique of the structural functionalist approach and its impact of Aboriginal studies 
see Gillian Colinshaw, 'Aborigines and Anthropologists,' Australian Aboriginal Studies (1986) 1:1-
12; also A-K Eckermann, 'Cultural vacuum or cultural vitality,' Australian Aboriginal Studies (1988) 
1: 31-39. 
Marcia Langton, 'Anthropologists must change,' Identity 4 (1981): 11. 
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inmates. By the end of the nineteenth century, the principles enunciated by Bentham had 
been widely adopted in prison architecture and other institutions dedicated to reform and 
disciplined^ On Aboriginal settlements, however, these principles were difficult to adopt. 
The limitations of staff and other resources did not allow the adoption of Benthamite 
techniques. Despite the desire to control and dominate every facet of the inmates lives, 
constant surveillance on the panopticon model was not possible. Compromises were 
made and the principal aim became at least to keep the inmates confined to the reserve, 
even if their behaviour could not be constantly monitored. Consequently, on Barambah 
the inmates were able to create a domain or enclave from which they could insulate 
themselves from white control and offer some resistance to the hegemony of the state. 
The formation of an 'Aboriginal' or 'blackfella' domain was a critical element in the 
struggle by the inmates to maintain their identity and cultural distinctiveness. This 
domain was the counterpoint to the 'administrative' or 'whitefella' domain. The 
emergence of the two domains on the settlement was a dynamic process; they developed 
in opposition to each other. The 'whitefella' domain helped to shape and define the 
17 
'blackfella'domain and vice versa. 
In the 'mission era' when W. J. Thompson was Superintendent, there was little 
evidence of separate 'whitefella'and 'blackfella'domains. Thompson and his family lived 
18 initially in a tent and then in a slab hut among the inmates' camps. They were the 
only whites on the reserve and their lifestyle was similar to that of the inmates. To an 
^^  Michel Foucault Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 
200-9. 
17 
The existence of two domains was a common feature of aboriginal settlements throughout 
Australia. See Jeremy Long, Aboriginal Settlements: A survey of institutional communities in eastern 
Australia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), 205; also David Trigger, 'Black-
fellas and Whitefellas: the Concepts of Domain and Social Closure in the analysis of Race relations,' 
Mankind 16 (1986): 99-117. 
18 A. Meston to Home Secretary, 7 August 1901, QSA COL/144 01/12484. 
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outsider, the reserve appeared to be no more than a blacks camp on the banks of 
Barambah creek which just happened to have been joined by a white family who had 
'gone native'. Distinctive spheres of activity on the settlement began to emerge, however, 
when the government took control of the reserve in 1905. During that year a four room 
weatherboard cottage was erected for the superintendent as well as a school to 
accommodate for forty pupils. In the following five years, cottages for the teacher and 
assistant superintendent were erected. Other buildings associated with the administration 
of the settlement included an office, store, lying-in hospital, single girls' quarters, boys' 
quarters and wagon depot. These buildings were situated in close proximity to each 
other on a small ridge adjacent to the creek. 
By 1910, the two domains had become a conspicuous part of the land.scape (see 
figure 8,1), The administrative activities were located in a compact and discrete section 
of the settlement. By contrast, the Aboriginal domain occupied an area of ap-
proximately one square mile with its boundaries less sharply defined. Although the 
border with the administrative domain was clearly delineated, the location of the south-
ern, eastern and western perimeter was less distinct. Beyond the inmates' camps was the 
scrub where they regularly hunted and fished. Because the inmates were dependent on 
bush tucker to supplement their diet, particularly in the early period of the settlement, 
they also regarded the scrub area of the settlement as part of their territory or domain. 
But primarily the Aboriginal domain was the area where the inmates lived, which was 
colloquially known as the 'camp'. The most striking feature of the domain was the 
locating of camps according to regional or tribal affiliations. These arrangements were 
^^  A. Tronson, diary, 21 April and 9 September 1905. 
20 QPP (1906) 2: 933, (1907) 2: 1278, (1909) 2: 1010, (1910) 3: 977. 
The terms 'tribe' and 'tribal' are used advisedly. The popular understanding of the word 
'tribe' is of a group with a common culture and language, headed by a chief and living within a 
defined territory. But as Anderson observes, when applied to Australia, the term has certain dif-
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reported in the Queenslander of June 1907: 
A visit to the camp disclosed some interesting features. One was that the 
blacks from different localities each had their own camps. There were the 
Cooktown contingent in little bark gunyahs, Birdsville blacks were by 
themselves in bough miamias, and the Thargomindah tribe had a camp of 
very large dimensions. As might be expected, the majority of the people in 
the camp are Burnett blacks, and their dwellings are superior to tho.se from 
other places. 
The Thargomindah tribe was also known as the Kullilli mob, the Birdsville group as the 
Sundowners, and the Burnett blacks as the Wakka Wakka. The Wakka Wakka were 
undisputedly the premier group on the settlement. They were not only the largest mob 
on the settlement but, significantly, the settlement was situated on their traditional 
territory. Therefore they were accorded a special status as the 'owners' of the settle-
23 
ment''-' 
From the outset, where inmates established their camps within the domain was 
not determined or controlled by the administration. The Superintendent had neither the 
time nor resources to interfere with these arrangements. He was not overly concerned 
how inmates organised their camps, provided such arrangements were not disruptive to 
the administration of the settlement. The siting of the camps and the spatial relation-
ships between them were governed by norms and rules that the inmates themselves had 
generated. Traditional arrangements were adapted to suit the circumstances. For 
example, during the early period the Kullilli mob, from the Bulloo river region in south 
ficulties. 
Large groups did not band together for joint enterprises such as warfare or conquest 
nor were there formal rulers as such which had absolute power over many people. 
Nevertheless, the term can be used in a more limited sense (Christopher Anderson, 
'Queensland Aboriginal Peoples Today', Queensland: A Geographical Interpretation, ed. 
J.H. Holmes (Brisbane: Royal Geographical Society, 1986], 299). 
22 Queenslander, 27 June 1907. 
June Bond, interview. Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander Research Action, Cultural 
Revitalisation Project tape 3; John Mathew, Two Representative Tribes of Queensland (London: Fisher 
Unwin, 1910). 
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Figure 8.1 Barambah Aboriginal Settlement - 1910s 
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-west Queensland, were recognised as a major group on the .settlement. TTiis camp 
however, was not limited to only members from that particular group. As a number of 
inmates had come from adjacent tribes such as the Margdany, Bunthmara and Butjala, 
they also became part of the group. Thus the Kullilli camp was an aggregate of groups 
from the far south-west of the state. Similarly, the Cooktown mob comprised not only 
blacks from that specific locality but other inmates from the north who tended to identify 
with this group. By grouping together according to regional affiliation, the inmates 
were able to cushion somewhat the traumatic effects of removal from their country. For 
inmates who had been separated from their immediate family, it was con.soling to find 
25 kin even if they were only distantly related. 
The influx of over 800 blacks from throughout the state during the period 1910-
19 had a significant impact on the Aboriginal domain (see figure 8.2). First, as the main 
camps became more and more crowded, some inmates were prompted to move their 
camps further out. Some of the Cooktown mob moved out to the Bralbion creek area 
while others moved into the foothills to the east and west of the main settlement. By 
the early 1920s, inmates' camps were spread out over an area of approximately two 
square miles. The second change was in the number of groups on the settlement. New 
groups emerged during this period that reflected the diversity in the tribal origins of the 
inmates. These groups included the Kunggari from the Maranoa district, the Batjala from 
Fraser island, the Chinatown mob and the Hawkwood mob. The latter group came from 
Hawkwood station in the Eidsvold district which had employed a large Aboriginal work 
June Bond, interview, Cultural Revitalisation Project. 
When discussing kinship and genealogical data with informants, it was not uncommon to be 
told X was a relative through 'my mother's people'. The precise nature of the relationship was never 
fully clear to the informant, but what was imf)ortant was that a connection existed. 
2^  Evelyn Serico, interview, 4 December 1984; Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982. Map 
based on information supplied by Elsie McGowan, Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander Research 
Action, Cultural Revitalisation Project, file 32/9. 
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Figure 8.2 Barambah Aboriginal Settlement - early 1920s 
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-force. Other internal changes were evident in the formation of camps consisting of 
inmates with varying backgrounds. The 'bottom camp' for example, comprised Wakka 
Wakka, Kabi Kabi and Batjala families as well as the Hegarty family from the Ayr 
district in north Queensland. 
The administrative domain also underwent changes. By the early 1920s, new 
buildings included a forty bed hospital, women's home, mens' quarters, sawmill, barn, 
27 
cottage for storekeeper, teacher's residence, lockup. These buildings were sited in a 
manner which resulted in the emergence of streets and lanes on a rectangular gird pattern. 
Such an arrangement contrasted sharply with the layout of the inmates camps. Apart 
from the way the built environment was ordered in each domain, there were also marked 
differences in the type of structures erected. While all the administrative buildings were 
constructed from sawn timber, the inmates used an assortment of materials including bark, 
28 timber slab, disused kerosene tins, hessian and corrugated iron for their dwellings. 
The construction of weatherboard cottages for inmates was a major development. 
The first cottage was erected in 1919, and by 1922 a total of fourteen had been con-
structed. These cottages were erected on sixteen perch allotments laid out in 'village' 
2Q Style. The administration saw the village as a means of civilising the inmates. 
According to the Chief Protector, the cottages were designed to give the inmates an 
incentive to 'raise themselves from their present almost primitive state to a higher plane'. 
In his view, the cottages provided the conditions which allowed the inmates 'the 
enjoyment of family privacy, hygienic sleeping and eating arrangements, security of 
2"^  QPP (1913) 3:1100, (1915) 3: 1691, (1919) 2: 593, (1920) 2: 235, (1921) 2: 563, (1922) 2: 
476. 
2* Ettie Meredith, interview, 25 October 1982; Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984; 
Cornilea Rynne, "Looking Back: 1935-1970,' JOL OM.79.006, 5. 
2' QPP (1917) 3: 1005. 
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private property, home industries and recreations, all of which [were] es.sential to social 
30 progress'. Occupancy of a cottage was conditional on the inmates keeping it 'clean and 
tidy' as well as developing a garden. But much to the Superintendent's annoyance, as he 
told the Chief Protector in 1924, the majority were 'content to let weeds grow and 
rubbish accumulate' in their yards and made little attempt to keep the interiors of their 
31 
cottages clean or to improve them. ' 
The cottages were located at the intersection of the two domains. Physically, the 
village appeared part of the administrative domain. The neatly arranged rows of cottages 
gave the appearance of order and blended in with the other buildings in the domain. 
Also, as part of the disciplinary and civilising apparatus, the cottages belonged to the 
administrative domain. But the inmates rarely utilised the cottages as intended. The 
design of the buildings was ill-suited to the communal lifestyle the inmates preferred. 
Households were not limited to nuclear families nor did they adopt the 'civilised' sleeping 
and eating patterns. Instead, domestic arrangements resembled those of the camp as 
Cornilea Rynne described: 
These cottages were not lined or sealed and did not have any fioor coverings 
such as lino. They were sweat boxes in summer and freezing chambers in 
winter , , , Many people preferred to light fires in the yard and sleep on the 
ground with their dogs to keep them warm, others made fires in oil drums 
inside the cottage. 
Thus, from the perspective of everyday life in the 'village', it was still part of the 
Aboriginal domain. Taking up residence in a cottage did not signal a conversion to white 
values and mores because inmates still maintained a distinctive lifestyle. The values and 
lifestyle of the inmates in the cottages were more akin to the those of the inmates in the 
•an 
QPP (1918) 1: 1679. The Home Secretary thought that the cottages and their arrangement 
along the lines of a village would 'be more comfortable' for the inmates and believed they 'would 
not want to go away' as much as they did {QPD 125 [1916-17]: 2296). 
^' W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 11 November 1924, QSA HOM/J539 25/434. 
32 Rynne, 'Looking Back: 1935-1970,' 3. 
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camp than to the white staff. They did not renounce their identity simply because they 
lived in a European style dwelling. 
Changes to the settlement landscape continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s 
(see figure 8.3). Between 1924 and 1930, an intensive building program saw the 
construction of a new school, girls' dormitory, boys' dormitory, dormitory for mothers, 
office, store, isolation hospital, nurses' quarters, residences for the Superintendent, teacher 
and clerk, and the hall. Also, an additional twenty-two cottages for the inmates were 
erected. These developments served to accentuate the divisions on the settlement. For 
example, the new residence for the Superintendent erected in 1926 was a large colonial 
style timber building with verandas on three sides. When contrasted with the cottages 
for inmates - the floor area was approximately four times that of a standard cottage -
the building symbolised the power and authority of the Superintendent (see figure 8.5 and 
8.6). In turn, the inmates' cottages reflected their subservient status. An ongoing 
program of cottage construction saw the gradual expansion of the 'village'. By the late 
1930s, a total of forty cottages had been erected. The majority were sited in two blocks, 
each with two rows of cottages. To create a village atmosphere, picket fences were 
erected around each cottage. As well, an avenue of trees was planted in the main 
•J-I 
thoroughfare. Despite these improvements, the village still remained at the intersec-
tion of the two domains. 
By the 1930s, the parapenal and institutional aspects of the settlement were 
clearly evident. The buildings within the administrative domain were arranged in a 
formal and orderly manner. The rows of almost identical cottages gave the settlement 
an unmistakable institutional aura. At the epicentre of the administrative domain were 
^^  Brisbane Courier, 16 October 1926. 
319 
Figure 83 Barambah Aboriginal Settlement - 1930s 
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the three dormitories, office, store and jail. These buildings highlighted the priority given 
to discipline, reform and control. In particular, the design of the girls' dormitory testified 
to the importance given to the training and 'civilising' of young girls. It was the largest 
and the only two storied building on the settlement and was surrounded by a six foot 
high barbed wire fence. The only building to be named after a politician, when opened 
in 1924 it was called the 'Stopford Home for Aboriginal Girls' in honour of the 
incumbent Home Secretary. 
Within the Aboriginal domain, the changes that began in the early 1920s 
continued into the 1930s. The breakup of the large camps ba.sed on regional affiliation 
continued as inmates preferred to live in smaller clu.sters of one or two families. Indeed, 
by the late 1930s, the demise of camps distinguished by regional affiliation was almost 
complete. Inmates either lived in cottages or in family camps scattered around the settle-
ment. There were several factors that led to the dissolution of the large camps. First, 
the development of the village and dormitory system had a significant effect on the 
sociocultural dynamics of the settlement. By the late 1930s, approximately one quarter 
of the population were living in the 'village' and another quarter were resident in the dor-
35 
mitories. The dormitories, of course, were designed specifically to break down 
traditional values and customs. Those inmates who cho.se to live in the village placed 
the attraction of better living conditions ahead of their obligations to reside with other 
kin. The second factor influencing the breakup of the large camps was the gradual 
increase in the number of different tribal groups represented on the settlement. In 1934 
Tennant Kelly recorded a total of twenty-eight tribal groups but this number did 
^ QPP (1926) 1: 1018. 
^^  O. Shimmin to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 10 October 1934, QSA A/31710 34/11056. 
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Figure 8.4 Superintendent's house 
Figure 8.5 Inmates' cottage 
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not include any groups from north of a line from Bowen and Cloncurry. Koepping 
37 later identified at least eight tribal groups from this region. By the late 1930s, the 
settlement had become a truly heterogeneous community with at least thirty-six different 
tribal groups represented among the 900 inmates (see figure 8.4). A third factor 
contributing to the breakup of the larger groups was the changing self-perceptions of the 
inmates. As will be discu.ssed more fully below, the 1930s saw the emergence of a 
distinctive Barambah or Cherbourg identity. Although the inmates did not totally discard 
or forget their regional affiliation, through their shared experiences on the settlement they 
developed a sense of togetherness and began to identify also as 'one big mob' or as 
Kathy Fisher said, 'one big tribe'. 
Apart from the demise of the large camps, the other major change to the domain 
was in the establishment of camps further away from the main settlement. By the 1930s, 
the area of the domain had expanded to approximately three square miles, three times the 
original area. A number of families were attracted to the Bralbion creek area while there 
was a scattering of camps around the southern perimeter of the domain. Several families, 
however, moved well away from the main settlement. In 1925, the department obtained 
a special lease over the State Forest reserve that adjoined the southern boundary of the 
reserve. This reserve totalled 12700 acres and was intended as extra grazing land for 
the settlement herd. Some inmates took advantage of this extra land to distance 
^ Tennant Kelly, 'Tribes on Cherbourg settlement' 462. 
Peter Koepping, 'How to remain human in an asylum - some field-notes from Cherbourg 
Aboriginal settlement in Queensland,' Occasional Papers in Anthropology No 6, ed. P. Lauer (St 
Lucia: Anthropology Museum, 1976), 35. Also Peter Koepping, The Limitations of Network Analysis 
for the Study of Value Systems: The Case of an Aboriginal Community in Queensland,' Sociologus 
33 (1983): 104. Koepping suggests sixteen new tribes arrived on the settlement between 1935 and 
1974, mostly from the north. He failed to note however, that Tennant Kelly did not list any north-
ern tribes. She was only interested in the groups south of the Bowen-Cloncurry line because they 
all possessed the same 'four-section marriage rule with exogamous moities and matrilineal descent' 
(Tennant Kelly, 'Tribes on Cherbourg settlement,' 463). Northerners were present on the settlement 
when she did her research. Indeed, most of the inmates from the far north arrived prior to 1915. 
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Figure 8.6 Linguistic groups represented on Barambah 
themselves for the main settlement. According to Darcy Cummins, his family lived for 
a period in a 'bark humpy about eight miles in the bush from the Mission' before they 
38 
were enticed into the settlement with the offer of a cottage. Also a small group' es-
tablished a camp on the border of the reserve at what was known locally as the 'Wondai 
camp' (.see figures 8.7 and 8.8). Another camp was established approximately two 
miles to the north-east of the main settlement by Minnie Green and Elsie Edwards. 
Undoubtedly, the movement away from the main settlement was partly a reaction to the 
increase in the population. Some inmates found the main camping area too crowded and 
moved further out to maintain a sense of space. Yet equally importantly, inmates were 
prompted to move away from the main settlement to remove themselves as much as 
possible from the control of the Superintendent and the other staff. They sought to 
counter the growing domination and surveillance of their lives as the disciplinary 
apparatus became more sophisticated and settlement activities more regimented. The most 
celebrated example of inmate resistance and defiance was the camp established by the 
'melody ranch mob' during the 1930s. This group consisted of male inmates who were 
colloquially known as 'drones' and they established a camp near the goatyard to the 
south-east of the main settlement. The drones did as little work as possible. As Jimmy 
Edwards explained: 
They would go and knock off a beast to feed their whole mob. They 
wouldn't work. If they wanted any sugar they used to rip it off. That was 
no sweat that. They wouldn't work. They were living high . . . A lot of 
them were living up in what they call the goat yard . . . They used to be 
always up there with a guitar. 
The dispersal of camps away from the main settlement created a dilemma for the 
Superintendent On the one hand, it had the potential of lessening conflict and tension. 
•^  Darcy Cummins, interview, 1 August 1988. 
^^  Our Aim, October 1922 and March 1923; Barambah Cherbourg 1904-1979 (1979), 15. 
^ Jimmy Edwards, interview, 24 October 1984. 
41 ibid. 
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Figure 8.7 Barambah Aboriginal Settlement and surrounding district (1930s) 
42 Some inmates preferred a quieter lifestyle away from the main settlement Indeed, 
Bertram Lipscombe encouraged a number of families to move to the Bralbion creek area 
43 in the early 1920. But the dispersal of camps created other problems. As more and 
AO 
This movement although obviously on a much more modest scale, has parallels with the 
outstation or homeland movement which developed on Aboriginal communities in the Northern 
Territory during the 1970s (Report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Affairs, Retum to Country: The Aboriginal Homelands Movement in Australia, March 
1987). 
'^^ Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. W.P. Semple also encouraged some families to 
move to the Bralbion creek area. Some inmates were supplied with timber from the sawmill and were 
able to build substantial dwellings (interview, Doris Brown, 22 April 1983). 
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more inmates moved further away from the main settlement, it became increasing difficult 
to monitor their behaviour. In moving away, the inmates exercised one of the few 
'rights' they had. Under the Act, they were confined permanently to the reserve but 
neither the Act nor the regulations proscribed where inmates had to live within the 
reserve. Therefore, the Superintendent could not prevent inmates living wherever they 
wished provided their camp was within the bounds of the reserve. Much to his 
annoyance, he had no control over who moved away from the main settlement. Although 
the Superintendent could trust some of these inmates, there were others he could not. 
Besides groups such as the melody ranch mob, the Superintendent was particularly wary 
of some of the inmates who camped on the settlement border near Wondai. Apart from 
engaging in prohibitive activities such as prostitution and drinking alcohol, inmates were 
able to venture easily into Wondai without being detected. But inmates did not always 
have to leave the settlement to obtain supplies of alcohol. On one occasion when two 
inmates were caught near the Wondai camp intoxicated with alcohol, the Superinten-
dent intended to have them deported to another settlement for absconding. The offenders 
claimed, however, that they 'got the drink from a white man' at the boundary of the 
settlement and did not leave the reserve. Much to his frustration, the Superintendent 
could 'get no evidence of them having been in town'. The inmates avoided deportation 
to Palm Island although they were jailed for two weeks for consuming alcohol. 
The demise of distinctive tribal groups which bore the imprint of more traditional 
forms of social organisation did not mean that regional affiliation and kinship ties were 
no longer important. Although inmates no longer always lived in extended family 
'^ CD. O'Brien, Report on Cherbourg Aboriginal Settlement, January 1934, QSA A/31710. 
'•^  W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 19 September 1939, QSA Transfer 1227/Box 
10 39/2305. The border of the settlement also went close to the Murgon township and one occasion 
two female inmates were caught by Murgon police engaging in prostitution on the boundary (CD. 
O'Brien, Report on Cherbourg Aboriginal Settlement January 1934, QSA A/31710). 
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Figure 8.8 Wondai camp during the 1930s 
groupings, they retained an acute awareness of which 'mob' they belonged to and who 
were their relations. Kinship ties were assiduously maintained through regular and 
constant social contact. For example, relatives of children in dormitories utilised every 
opportunity to take them out for visits on weekends in order to 'keep up the connec-
tion'. As Val Clements remarked: 'we knew who every person was. Whether they 
were Batjala, Kabi Kabi or Wakka Wakka or whatever the case may be. I knew where 
they came from'. The utmost significance was attached to knowing to whom one was 
related and the nature of that relationship. The existence of a distinctive Aboriginal 
domain enabled inmates to resist the vigorous attempts to inculcate white bourgeois values 
46 Jimmy Edwards, interview, 24 October 1984; Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988; Carmen 
Chapman, interview, 12 February 1990. 
47 Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
AQ 
Without exception, all informants interviewed revealed an extensive genealogical knowledge 
of the settlement 
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of the nuclear family, privacy and domesticity. Instead, the inmates were able to main-
tain, in a modified form, a lifestyle which was communally based and was distinguished 
by a high degree of social interaction. For Barambah inmates, being able to determine 
where they lived and with whom they lived was vital in maintaining their sense of 
'otherness' and cultural distinctiveness. 
The emergence of a distinctive Aboriginal domain not only allowed inmates to 
maintain a degree of control over their social organisation. Other cultural and .social 
activities occurred within the domain that formed a critical part of the strategies which 
inmates adopted to resist the annihilation of their identity and distinctiveness. Clearly, 
a thorough examination of the social and cultural dynamics of the Aboriginal domain 
would require more attention than is possible here. Instead, three key features of the 
domain - the corroboree grounds, the penny ring and sports ground - are examined to 
illustrate the varied strategies inmates employed to maintain their identity. 
From the perspective of the inmates, one of the most prominent features of the 
'blackfella domain' was the corroboree grounds. In discussing the layout and character-
istics of the settlement with former inmates, they did not fail to refer to the corroboree 
ground. It was firmly imprinted on their mental map of the settlement and they readily 
recalled where it was located. The corroboree ground was in a sense the agora of the 
settlement. It was the centre of cultural activity and the one place where all the inmates 
gathered voluntarily. Corroborees were a regular feature of settlement life and the 
Superintendent made no attempt to suppress them. Although other traditional customs 
and practices such as 'boning'and 'witchcraft'were regarded as dangerous and degrading, 
corroborees were seen as a harmless pastime. The administration presumably believed 
'*^  J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Department, 6 December 1922, QSA A/31708 
22/9880. 
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they were just some quaint customs from the past which would eventually die out. 
Indeed, corroborees were regarded as so harmless that even the dormitory children were 
allowed to attend. The Chief Protector also supported and encouraged corroborees. 
He noted in the Annual Report for 1935 that 'in keeping with the policy of the depart-
ment, the native corroboree always takes a prominent place in any programme of 
entertainment'. He regarded such activities as 'healthy amusement' and did not see it 
52 
as hindering the civilising process. 
Both the Chief Protector and Superintendent, however, failed to understand the 
significance the inmates attached to the corroborees. Although the inmates learnt and 
enjoyed European style dancing and songs, the activities which occurred within the 
corroboree ground were something that was distinctively their own. They were 
'blackfella' dances and songs which reinforced their sense of 'otherness'. Importantly, 
corroborees were one of the few avenues where inmates could, without fear of recrimina-
tion, express their cultural distinctiveness. As Bowman Johnson observed: 
The old people . . . didn't bother to teach us their language, only bits here 
and there . . . The old people just gave things up, didn't bother to hang onto 
their tradition, once they got sent to the Cherbourg Aboriginal settlement. 
But they used to have a lot of corroborees, pretty well every week, and we 
used to go and see them. The Superintendent didn't try to stop them. 
While languages were dying and other customs fading, the corroborees were one of the 
few tangible links with the past. For many inmates, it became their only exposure to 
°^ Darcy Cummins, interview, 1 August 1988; Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, 
interview, 15 August 1988. 
^^  QPP (1935) 1: 994. 
2^ QPP (1922) 2: 476. 
Bowman Johnson, 'Growing up in Queensland,'y46ongz>ia/ History, 11 (1987): 78. 
Given the importance of language to identity, it seems at first strange that traditional 
languages quickly fell into disuse. Undoubtedly, the polyglot nature of the settlement contributed to 
the decline of the possibly more than forty languages that would have been known by the inmates 
as they needed a common language to communicate. However, the other problem was that the 
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traditional practices. For example, Ettie Meredith was only three years old when she 
arrived on the settlement in 1905, She had no experience of 'tribal ways' and learnt to 
speak only English on the settlement. Yet, through regularly attending corroborees she 
did learn a number of songs 'in language' which she could still sings fifty years later. 
For Ettie Meredith and other inmates with similar experiences, even being able to sing 
a few songs 'in language' was vital in maintaining their identity. Although it was only 
a meagre expression of the culture of her forebears, such knowledge did serve as a link 
with the past. 
Initially, corroborees were held two or three times per week with a different 
group responsible for an evening's performance. The groups who came to the 
settlement with their traditions most intact were from western and northern tribes. 
Consequently, they performed more frequently than other groups such as the Burnett 
57 blacks who had experienced a longer history of disruption to their culture. But even 
for groups whose traditions were not as flourishing or had died out, they were able to 
learn and to adopt the songs and dances from other regions. Apart from dances with 
traditional themes, such as collecting bunya nuts, corroborees were created in response 
to particular circumstances. For example when the first aeroplane landed on the 
languages died quite unwittingly. As Peter Read commented about the decline of the Wiradjuri 
language: 
The most likely explanation is that the old people did not intend to destroy the 
language. Yet the language acquired by children is of the home and hearth. By failure to 
use Wiradjuri consistently as a matter of daily communication, the older people 
unwittingly caused its destruction. The death of a language was a phenomenon totally 
outside their experience (Peter Read, 'A History of the Wiradjuri People of New South 
Wales 1883-1%9,' [PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1983], 99). 
^^  Ettie Meredith, interview, 8 April 1984. 
^^  QPP (1917) 1: 1679; Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
"^^  Queenslander, 27 June 1907. 
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settlement, a corroboree was performed to celebrate the event.^^ Also, when a major 
train accident occurred at Gympie, the inmates re-enacted the disaster in a corroboree. 
Gradually, a corpus of songs and dances developed that belonged to all the inmates and 
not just a particular group. They became known as the songs and dances of the 'Bara-
mbah'tribe rather than of, for example, the Kunggari Koko-Yclangi or Kullilli. Although 
European style dancing became increasingly popular on the settlement, corroborees were 
still held regularly on the settlement in the late 1930s. They remained popular because 
they were more than just light entertainment or recreation. Corroborees were impor-
tant because they provided a bridge to the past when so many other links had been 
severed, and helped to forge a common identity among the inmates. 
Within the Aboriginal domain, another focal point of .social interaction was the 
'penny ring'. But unlike the corroboree grounds, successive Superintendents neither 
welcomed nor encouraged the activities that took place there. From the beginning, 
gambling was a popular pastime among the inmates, Albert Tronson was on the 
settlement less than five months before he was complaining to the Chief Protector about 
the 'blacks gambling'.^^ He felt powerless to prevent the inmates from 'either playing 
cards or pitch penny . . . at every opportunity', Tron.son complained that some inmates 
gambled to the point where they would 'lose their clothes, rations, money etc, and also 
gamble the clothes of their children',^^ A visitor to the settlement in 1906 gained the 
*^ Ettie Meredith, interview, 8 April 1984. 
^' E.W. Brainwood, interview, 9 September 1982. 
^ QPP (1938) 2: 1115. Although regular performances of corroborees ceased in 1940s, the 
knowledge was not totally lost. The recent formation of the Wakka Wakka dance group, which now 
performs regularly in south-east Queensland, indicates that the knowledge of the songs and dances 
still exists. 
^^  Tronson, diary, 17 August 1905. 
2^ J.M. Costin to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 5 May 1906, QSA HOM/J17 06/5768. 
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impression that the inmates were 'addicted to gambling' as they hung around the camps 
'amusing them.selves at card-playing and pitch-and-toss'. Bertram Lipscombe felt 
equally frustrated at being unable to deal effectively with the 'evil' of gambling. He 
believed the more intelligent inmates tended to remain on the settlement rather than go 
out to work becau.se they preferred 'to gamble the money from those not so intelligent 
as themselves'. It an attempt to 'minimise the evil', a retail store was opened in 1909. 
Lipscombe believed that by providing 'the native with a legitimate and healthy channel 
for the circulation of the money,' it would 'reduce the gambling evil'. But to his 
disappointment, although inmates did use the store, gambling on the settlement continued 
unabated. Five years after the store had opened, Lipscombe reported that gambling was 
'largely practised in spite of efforts to suppress it'. 
In attempting to deal with inmates who were constantly gambling, the 
Superintendent certainly did not lack the authority to discipline offenders. Under section 
five of the Regulations for Maintaining Discipline and Good order upon a Reserve, he 
could inflict summary punishment upon any inmate guilty of 'any crime, serious 
misconduct, neglect of duty, gross insubordination'. The difficulty he faced, however, 
was to catch inmates committing the 'offence'. Unlike alcohol - it was more difficult 
to hide either a bottle or the effects of intoxication - a pack of cards could be hidden 
quickly from an approaching Superintendent. Furthermore, whenever attempts were made 
to eliminate gambling, as Lipscombe himself admitted, it only 'seemed to result in driving 
Mathew, Two Representative Tribes of Queensland 80. 
^ QPP (1909) 2: 1011, (1912) 2: 1015. 
^^  QPP (1912) 2: 1015; J.W. Bleakley, to Under Secretary, Home Department 4 July 1912, 
QSA A/31708 12/8471. Combating the evils of gambling was not the only rea.son the store was 
opened but it was a catalyst for the move. 
^ QPP (1915) 3: 1691. 
^"^ QGG 85 (1905): 1037. 
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the natives to practice it slyly in the bush or with whites in the town'. Consequently, 
Lipscombe eventually came to the conclusion that it was futile trying to prohibit such 
activities on the settlement. Instead of outright opposition, he adopted a containment 
policy. It was preferable, if inmates were going to gamble, that they did so where at 
least he could monitor such activity, and not clandestinely. Thus gambling on the 
settlement became tolerated although not encouraged. Indeed, according to former inmate 
Val Clements, in the latter period of his superintendency, Lipscombe 'didn't worry about 
it at all. He didn't bother with it one bit'.^^ 
This change of attitude prompted inmates to be less discrete about their 
gambling. There were several locations where inmates gambled publicly, but by the early 
1920s a well defined area began to emerge as the centre for gambling which was known 
70 
variously as the 'gambling ground', 'two-up ground' or 'penny ring'. Situated on a 
slight ridge approximately one hundred yards to the south-west of the corroboree 
grounds, the penny ring was clearly observable from most quarters of the settlement. 
According to Merle Cantle, a missionary who visited the settlement regularly between 
1924 and 1927, 'there was a group of at least 200 Aborigines sitting all day at this 
71 
ring'. As the total adult population during this period averaged between 350 and 380 
persons, this figure was probably an over estimation. But regardless of the preci.se 
number of inmates who attended, the penny ring was unquestionably well patronised and 
a focal point for social interaction within the 'blackfella' domain. 
^ QPP (1914) 3: 1029. 
^' Val Clements, interview, 18 October 1984. 
ibid; Jimmy Edwards, interview, 24 October 1984; June Bond, interview, 5 December 1984. 
71 
Merle Cantle, Jewels of Gold: An autobiography of a Missionary Pioneer among the 
Aboriginal peoples of Australia (Sydney: Outreach Books, 1980), 17-19. 
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Given that gambling was unknown in traditional Aboriginal society, why was 
gambling so popular on Barambah? To the Chief Protector and others, the rea.son was 
straightforward. Because Aborigines were intrinsically morally weak, they were prone 
to succumb to such a vice as gambling. Gambling was an evil equated with drinking, 
72 fighting and immorality. But from the inmates' perspective, they gambled for quite 
different reasons. Their motives for spending so much time playing cards or two-up at 
73 the penny ring were varied and complex and cannot be fully explored here. Like 
aficionados in any culture, inmates were attracted by the thrill and excitement associated 
with the toss of the coin or fall of the cards. Certainly, inmates were not primarily 
motivated to gamble as a means of obtaining sudden wealth. They gambled regardless 
of whether money was involved or not. According to Cornilea Rynne, who was 
appointed hospital Matron in 1937, 'bobby and safety pins' as well as 'aspirin tablets' 
HA 
were frequently used as gambling tokens. But within the context of the settlement, 
gambling was more than just a leisurely pursuit or panacea for idleness. For the 
Barambah inmates, gambling was one of the few avenues available through which they 
could overtly express their defiance of the settlement regimen. They were confined to 
the settlement to be inculcated with the values of capitalist society: hard work, discipline, 
thrift, private property and individualism. The antithesis of such a value system was 
embodied in gambling. It was an intensely group, rather than individual, experience. 
2^ J.W. Bleakley to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Department 6 December 1922, QSA 
A/31708 22/9880. 
Despite the popularity of gambling among aboriginal groups throughout Australia, until 
recently the issue had been almost entirely ignored by both historians or anthropologists. Altman has 
shown how gambling is used as a means of redistributing wealth (John Altman, 'Gambling as a Mode 
of Redistributing and Accumulating Cash Among Aborigines: A Case Study from Arnhem Land,' 
Gambling in Australia, eds. G. Caldwell et al. [London: Croom Helm, 1985], 50-77). Another 
perspective is offered by Jane Goodale in a study of gambling among the Tiwi who argues that 
gambling is seen as akin to hunting and foraging and is seen as a alternative means of providing daily 
subsistence (Jane Goodale, 'Gambling is Hard Work: Card Playing in Tiwi Society,' Oceania 58 
[1987]: 6-21). 
74 Rynne, 'Looking Back: 1935-70,' 9. 
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Gambling ,was a means of sharing, rather than acquiring, wealth. Furthermore, gambling 
focused attention on the present instead of the future. Notions of thrift and 'saving for 
the morrow' had little place in the gambler's world view. 
In gambling, the inmates expressed their rejection of the values upon which the 
settlement had been structured. The inmates' propensity to gamble was, to use Sidcr's 
term, a 'counter-hegemonic strategy'. As he explains: 
Counter-hegemonic cultural forms often use an arsenal of symbols which are 
borrowed from the existing hegemony (and inverted, mocked, etc) in order to 
express experiences and claims different from the elite's; the use of these 
symbols implies limits and constraints to the thoroughness of the opposition. 
Thus the inmates took the importance placed on money by the dominant culture, made 
it the focus of much of their everyday world but for decidedly different purposes. By 
gambling, inmates showed their scorn for the values that were being thrust upon them. 
Another significant function of gambling on the settlement was that it was u.sed 
by the inmates as a means of indicating the limits of the Superintendent's authority. For 
the first fifteen years of the settlement, successive Superintendents had attempted either 
to eradicate or curtail gambling. But it was a battle they lost. Gambling was one 
activity that the administration made vigorous attempts to control but was unable to do 
so. As the Superintendent conducted his daily inspection of the settlement, the ceaseless 
activity at the penny ring was a constant and irritating reminder that his authority over 
the inmates was not absolute. By gambling in public, inmates declared to the ad-
ministration: 'you do not approve of what we were are doing, yet you are powerless to 
stop us'. The penny ring made mockery of the department's ambitions to control com-
pletely the lives of the inmates. It was a symbol of inmates' resistance and the most 
^^  Gerald M. Sider, The ties that bind: culture and agriculture, property and propriety in the 
Newfoundland village fishery,' Social History, 5 (1980): 26. 
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tangible evidence that the domination of the inmates was not complete. Yet as Morris 
has observed in his study of the Dhan-gadi of the Macleay River district in New South 
Wales, there was an ambiguity about the inmates' gambling behaviour. Like other acts 
of opposition such as 'drinking to excess, wasting money, neglecting homes', gambling 
was nevertheless an admission of their status as the dominated. He comments: 
The apparently anti-social behaviour involved in such inversions of bourgeois 
values ensured that Aborigines were confined by such values. In effect, such 
acts of resistance were incapable of transforming the most immediate effects 
of their oppression, yet they were a clear refusal to submit to European 
domination and did provide the basis for a distinct group identity. 
The activities within the penny ring, like those within the corroboree grounds, helped to 
engender a sense of solidarity among the inmates. The defiance of the Superintendent's 
authority in the penny ring was a group rather than an individual action. A common 
bond developed among inmates by engaging in activities that were condemned by the 
administration. The greater the number of participants in the penny ring, and the more 
public their activities, the more forcefully did they mock his authority and highlight the 
limitations of his power. Such collective defiance only served to accentuate the divisions 
on the settlement between the white staff and the inmates and forge a sense of solidarity 
among the latter. But even apart from its political implications, gambling helped to unite 
the inmates through the social intercourse it facilitated. As Hazel McKellar remarked 
about gambling in Aboriginal camps in south-west Queensland: 'there was nothing like 
77 
a pack of cards and a blanket to bring together a mob of blackfellas'. Gambling was 
enjoyed universally on the settlement and it was a 'language' that allowed the inmates, 
regardless of their tribal affiliations or status, to communicate with each other. It was 
an activity that allowed 'players of any age, sex, kinship or clan relationship to play with 
Barry Morris, 'Dhan-gadi resistance to assimilation,' Being Black: Aboriginal cultures in 
'settled' Australia, ed. Ian Keen (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988), 53. 
'^ Hazel McKellar, interview, 20 March 1984. 
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any other person'or person.s. Batjala, Bidjera, and Birngabba people participated and 
interacted with one another on an equal basis. In this process, new bonds were formed 
and regional and tribal differences became less significant. Within the context of the 
settlement, gambling was not just an innocuous pastime. Gambling became an integral 
part of the settlement culture and contributed, like corroborees, to the forging of a 
Barambah identity. It broke down social and cultural barriers and helped inmates to 
perceive of themselves as 'one big tribe'. 
The third major focal point of social interaction within the aboriginal domain was 
the sports ground. It was the venue for cricket during the summer and rugby league in 
winter. From inception, cricket and football were the most popular 'European style' 
sports played by the inmates. As with corroborees, the administration actively encouraged 
the playing of sport as a counter to idleness and vices such as gambling. Initially, 
inmates were restricted to playing between themselves. During the Christmas period of 
1911 for example. Superintendent Lipscombe reported that 'cricket matches, football, and 
7Q 
Other games and races helped to fill in the whole holiday pleasantly'. The policy of 
keeping inmates 'strictly isolated' prevented any competition with local white teams. 
Also, local white teams were probably reluctant to play against blacks, particularly in 
contact sports such as football, for fear of being 'contaminated'. By the early 1920s 
however, a gradual change in attitudes resulted in Barambah teams being allowed to 
compete outside the settlement. On the one hand, the department realised the policy of 
isolation was a charade. While it actively encouraged inmates to leave the settlement to 
work in the district, it was difficult to justify preventing them leaving for a few hours 
to play sport. From the perspective of the white inhabitants, their attitudes gradually 
^^  Laura Zimmer, 'Card Playing among the Gende: A system for keeping money and social 
relationships alive,' Oceania 56 (1986): 262. 
79 QPP (1912) 2: 1016. 
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mellowed as they came into contact with inmates working outside. They realised, perhaps 
grudgingly, that their fears about being contaminated were unfounded. If they were 
prepared to employ Barambah inmates on their farms, it was difficult to refuse to meet 
them on the cricket field or football ground. 
In 1922, inmates began playing cricket against local teams on a regular basis and 
80 
met with immediate success. The matches were not part of any organised competi-
tion, but informally arranged social matches. The settlement teams played on this basis 
81 
for several years and 'proved successful in many of the contests'. In 1929, under the 
guidance of the head teacher, Robert Crawford, the Barambah team joined the Kilkivan-
Murgon District Cricket Association, The superiority of the team was evident before the 
season was even half completed. After only four matches the team had compiled over 
82 1100 runs while their opponents could manage an aggregate of only 300 runs. This 
success was the beginning of a decade in which the Barambah side was rarely beaten by 
local teams. They won the premiership in the 1931-32 season and then again in five 
83 
consecutive seasons from 1933-4 to 1938-9, The accomplishments of the team were 
a source of great pride for the inmates. While the 1930s team contained a number of 
gifted players, including Frank Fisher, Jack Daylight, and Stanley Alberts, and later Jack 
Malone, the undisputed hero was Eddie Gilbert, Ironically Gilbert began playing 
^ QPP (1922) 1: 1073. 
*1 QPP (1928) 1: 842. 
*2 W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 1 November 1929, QSA HOM/J748 29/9739. 
3^ South Bumett Times, 12 February 1932; QPP (1937) 2: 1207, (1939) 2: 1343. 
^ Both Jack Daylight and Jack Malone were considered by some observers as capable of 
playing for the state team. Indeed, in 1939, Jack Malone was being seriously considered for selection. 
In discussing the matter with the Chief Protector in 1939, Semple thought that Malone would fit into 
the Queensland team better than Gilbert did because he 'did not slouch along' and was 'very quick 
and active and a half-caste' (W.P. Semple to Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 14 March 1939, QSA 
Transfer 1227/194). 
339 
competitive cricket, not for Barambah, but for a team from the Rcdgate area when he 
was fifteen years old. Rcdgate was a farming community approximately fifteen miles 
from the settlement and Gilbert was chosen to play for the team while working for a 
85 
local farmer. On his return to Barambah, he began to play for the settlement side and 
made a major contribution to the team's success. It was Gilbert's achievements outside 
the district, however, that brought the greatest sense of pride to Barambah inmates. In 
1930, following his outstanding performances in the local competition, Gilbert was 
brought to Brisbane to demonstrate his abilities before officials of the Queensland Cricket 
Association. He was soon included in the state team and made an impressive debut for 
the state, taking fifteen wickets in five matches during the 1930-31 season. He played 
a total of twenty-three matches between 1930 and 1936, taking eighty-seven wickets at 
an average of just over twenty-nine runs per wicket. 
Like other Aboriginal cricketers such as Albert Henry and Jack Marsh who 
played at a state level, Gilbert's career was marked by controversy. Although 
considered by some observers as worthy of inclusion in the Australian side, he was 
87 denied such an opportunity for a variety of reasons. For his fellow inmates, there was 
85 Ken Edwards, personal communication, 12 March 1990. 
^ Maxwell L Howell and R.A. Howell, The Effects of Acculturation on the Aborigine: A ca.se 
study of the sport of cricket,' Sport, Culture, Society: International historical and sociological 
perspectives, eds. J.A. Mangan and R.B. Small (London: E. and F.N. Spon, 1986), 14-19. 
*^  Gilbert's career remains shrouded in a controversy and is the focus of a PhD dissertation 
by Ken Edwards (Department of Human Movement Studies, University of Queensland). Undoubtedly, 
the question of race was a significant factor that determined the course of his career. But was not 
the only issue. One asf)ect of Gilbert's bowling that has largely been overlooked was the nature of 
his action. Gilbert had a most unusual action for a fast bowler. His speed came almost solely from 
his arm and wrist action rather than from any body action as normally associated with fast bowling. 
Consequently, he placed enormous strain on his shoulder with this 'whipping' action. Not surpris-
ingly, the injuries that plagued him throughout his career were related to his shoulder. During the 
1932-33 season, he suffered a puzzling loss of form which was later 'attributed to severe inflammation 
of the shoulder socket' (Kevin Kelly, That other demon bowler' Courier Mail, 6 March 1978). Thus, 
it may been the case that even if Gilbert could have avoided all the other problems that plagued his 
career, the nature of his bowling action would have prevented him for playing for an extended period 
of time (see also Ray Evans, 'Gilbert, Edward' Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 8: 1891-
1939, eds. B. Nairn and G. Serle, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1981), 3-4. 
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no question that he was prevented from playing because of the 'colour-bar'. But any 
sense of regret or injustice they may have felt over Gilbert's treatment was overshadowed 
by his one great achievement, the bowling of Bradman for a duck. The incident occurred 
during a Sheffield Shield match in November 1931 and it was the first time Bradman had 
faced Gilbert. In a remarkable bowling performance, Gilbert managed to knock the bat 
out of Bradman's hands before dismissing him, caught behind, with the fifth delivery of 
their encounter. Later, Bradman 'classed this short burst as faster than anything seen 
oo 
from Larwood or anyone else'. Although Bradman was still only twenty-three years 
89 
at the time, he was already being feted as 'a genius, in a class of his own'. He was 
adulated by the Australian public for his prodigious feats. In fourteen test matches he 
had averaged 94 runs per innings and held the record of 334 for the highest score in a 
test match. Gilbert's triumph over the world's greatest batsman was to have an im-
measurable effect on the settlement. Probably no single ball bowled in the history of 
cricket has had such important sociocultural ramifications and been the subject of such 
endless discussio.n and folklore. Other incidents have been controversial and other 
bowling performances engendered debate and argument, but this single delivery was to 
be immortalised and imbued with significance in a manner quite different from other 
90 
momentous occasions in the history of cricket. 
From the perspective of the Barambah inmates, the incident was not remem-
bered and cherished simply as a remarkable cricketing feat. The occasion demonstrated 
that black could triumph over white. Living on the settlement, inmates were constantly 
^ Ray Robinson, 'Eddie Gilbert: Death of a Legend,' Cricketer February 1978, 19. 
*' Irving Rosenwater, Sir Donald Bradman: A biography (London: B.T. Batsford, 1978), 365. 
^ Of course, even outside the settlement, the incident has been somewhat immortalised. See, 
for example, the short story by David Forrest which centres on what type of delivery actually was 
bowled (David Forrest, That Barambah Mob,' A Century of Australian Stories, eds. Cecil Hadgraft 
and Richard Wilson [Melbourne: Heinemann, 1%3], 268-76). 
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reminded of their inferior status as blacks. They were 'under the Act' because they could 
not manage their own lives. But after thirty years of daily humiliation, Gilbert showed 
convincingly that blacks were not necessarily inferior to whites. Indeed, it was a black 
man who succeeded where few others did. Bradman was dismissed for a duck only 
fifteen times in his career and at the time it was just his third failure of this kind. 
Furthermore, Gilbert was reputedly the only bowler to knock the bat from his hands. In 
the midst of the despondency and despair generated by the settlement regimen, Bradman's 
dismissal gave inmates a sense of hope and pride. For the inmates, Gilbert's exploits 
were concrete evidence that they were just as good as, if not better than, whitefellas. 
As inmates struggled to resist being labelled and stereotyped as well as the constant .sense 
of inferiority engendered by the settlement regime, Gilbert's achievements reassured them 
that their inferior status was undeserved. It countered the usual stereotypes of Aboriginal 
people as lazy, useless primitives, 
Gilbert's success in cricket at a state level and particularly his triumph over 
Bradman also contributed to the making of the 'one big tribe'. His accomplishments 
became part of Barambah folklore and were something all inmates were proud of 
regardless of their tribal affiliation. Gilbert belonged to the 'northern mob' but such a 
factor was of no consequence as all the settlement claimed him as their own. Just as 
white Australia came to identify with and 'own' Bradman - he was 'our Don' - so 
Gilbert became for the inmates, 'our Eddie'. Indeed, inmates adapted the popular song 
'^ It is important to make the point that Gilbert was not interested in becoming a whitefella. 
Gilbert did not play cricket as a means of being accepted in white society or as a way of escaping 
settlement life. Colin Tatz contends that in the case of Eddie Gilbert as well as other Aboriginal 
sportsmen, 'sport was not just an avenue to something better, but was, literally, a ticket out of the 
institution' (Colin Tatz, Aborigines in Sport [Bedford Park: Australian Society for Sports History, 
1987], 122). This clearly was not so with Gilbert For any Barambah inmate in the early 1930s, it 
would have been unthinkable to believe that simply by excelling at sport one would have been able 
to escape being 'under the Act'. 
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that referred to 'our Don Bradman' to 'our Eddie Gilbert'. There was a vicarious aspect 
to Gilbert's career, as his triumphs became their triumphs. But while Gilbert was an 
inspiration to the inmates, his career was also a reminder of the racism and intolerance 
with which they had to contend. Regardless of how well he played, he was still 
subjected to humiliation and prejudice because of the colour of his skin. Furthermore, 
the rapid demise in his personal life, once his career had finished, highlighted that 
'success' in the outside world was no guarantee of being able to withstand the pressures 
and trauma of settlement life. 
Football, like cricket, was encouraged by the administration because it was a 
'healthy outdoor sport'. Settlement teams began playing outside teams on an irregular 
93 basis in the mid 1920s. But just as the head teacher Robert Crawford, who arrived on 
the settlement in late 1928, was a catalyst for the entry of the cricket team in local 
competition, so football matches became more regular and frequent under his guidance. 
In 1929, the Barambah team played against a Brisbane side which attracted 6000 
spectators. The team was beaten 52-30 but in the judgement of the local sports paper 
The Referee, the players demonstrated that with coaching, they 'would develop into a 
highly spectacular side'. Such an assessment proved to be correct as the Barambah 
team quickly developed a reputation for its skilful and entertaining play. Apart from 
playing against local teams from the South Burnett, the team played against provincial 
sides such as Gympie, Nambour, Toowoomba, Maryborough and Bundaberg. As well 
they played several more matches against Brisbane sides. Throughout the 1930s, the 
team was rarely defeated. In the 1937 season, for example, the team played fourteen 
^ Rita Huggins, interview. Ken Edwards, 19 April 1988. 
'^ QPP (1925) 1: 1095, (1927) 1: 1125. 
^^ The Referee, 19 June 1929. 
^^  South Bumett Times, 24 June 1932; Daily Mail, 24 July 1933; Courier Mail, 3 April 1937. 
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matches and suffered just one loss. In local competition, the settlement side was 
consistently too strong for teams such as Murgon and Wondai and had to be content with 
97 playing a combined Lower South Burnett side which they regularly outplayed. 
Barambah also played occasionally against teams from the other government .settlements 
at Woorabinda and Palm Island. In 1933, Barambah played Woorabinda in a game billed 
as the 'Aboriginal championship of the Rugby League game'. The match which was held 
at the Brisbane Cricket ground and attracted 5000 spectators, was won by the Barambah 
side 37-26, ^ ^ 
The team's success did not come without commitment and discipline. Players 
took their training 'very seriously'. They developed their own code of behaviour and the 
penalty for missing a training session was to be dropped from the following match. Even 
QQ 
the 'great' Frank Fisher was dropped from a game becau.se he mis.sed a training session. 
During the season, the team trained each morning for an hour before work and for a 
• 100 
similar period in the afternoon. Throughout the 1930s the team was captained by 
Frank Fisher and he would 'develop a new move for every game'. There was keen 
competition among inmates for selection in the team. As Henry Collins remarked: 'you 
102 
fought to wear that Cherbourg guernsey and to keep your place in the team'. Like 
cricket, football helped to develop a Barambah identity, to create the sense of belonging 
to 'one big tribe'. The team was not selected on any criteria other that ability. Tribal 
^ South Bumett Times, 20 August 1937. 
^ South Bumett Times, 10 August 1934, 14 May 1937 and 3 June 1938. 
^^  Daily Mad, 24 July 1933. 
^ Barambah Cherbourg 1904-1979, 18. 
^^ Courier Mail, 3 April 1937. 
101 Livingstone Chambers, quoted in After 200 Years, 192. 
'°2 Henry Collins, interview, 12 October 1989. 
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or regional affiliations were of no consequence in team selection. The players were 
acutely aware that they were playing for the settlement. According to Livingstone 
Chambers, who began regularly playing for the Barambah team in 1928, Frank Fisher 
would give the following advice before each match: 'He used to tell us that we weren't 
103 playing for ourselves but playing for Cherbourg. Former inmates recollect the pride 
the settlement had in their team. Whenever the team returned from a match, the players 
were greeted enthusiastically by the other inmates. Songs such as the following became 
part of Barambah folklore: 
Cheer boys cheer we are from Barambah 
Every game we play we try to win, try to win 
We will play them all around 
On our own or any ground 
If they only give the Barambah boys a chance 
Another song popular on the settlement was 'Good 01' Barambah': 
Good OV Barambah has gone to play the game once more 
We '11 make Murgon sit up like they 've never sat up before 
We '11 show them how to tackle 
We '11 show them how to score 
Now then boys let that ball come out 
Frankie Fisher is on the lookout 
He's going to play and it's all in the game 
Barambah boys may win 
The name is the 'Gold and Green' 
It's the colour don't you see 
It's the regiment for old Barambah 
And the good old Barambah boys 
Other songs that were variant of traditional lyrics such as 'I belong to Cherbourg, good 
old Cherbourg town' were sung by the footballers when returning from a match. The 
creation of a corpus of songs focusing on the football team indicate the importance it had 
in developing a collective identity among the inmates. During the 1930s, Barambah 
inmates were probably even more proud of the football team than the cricket team. Both 
°^^  Chambers, After 200 Years, 192. 
^^ Rita Huggins, interview. Ken Edwards, 19 April 1988. 
105 ibid. 
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teams were most successful but the footballers as a team were more successful on a 
regional level. They had a reputation throughout south-east Queensland for their skill 
and approach to the game. ALso football, more so than cricket, helped to develop 'bonds 
of similitude' among the players. It gave the players an 'opportunity to escape their 
107 
subordinate and outca.st status, if only temporarily'. In turn, the inmates identified 
with the 'Barambah boys' and thei'r success. As with Eddie Gilbert, the footballers' 
triumphs became their triumphs. Their achievements helped inmates to retain a sen.se of 
dignity and self-worth in the midst of a regimen that denied their humanity. 
The administration encouraged the playing of cricket and football. Both sports 
were regarded as healthy activities and a counter to idle pursuits such a gambling. But 
importantly, cricket and football were regarded as part of the civilising process. In par-
ticular, the 'game of the Empire', cricket, was seen as a means of transmitting 'the 
108 
British value system'. But for the inmates, cricket and football became an avenue 
for resisting white values and domination. The inmates utilised these pastimes as a 
means of asserting their 'otherness' and as a subtle form of resistance. Inmates did not 
play either cricket or football as a means of personal glory or individual advancement. 
On one level, inmates participated because they genuinely enjoyed playing. But inmates 
were also motivated because sport provided a 'legitimate' means of demonstrating their 
lOQ 
superiority over the whitefella. The successes of both the cricket and football teams 
were as important to inmates off the field as those playing and became an integral part 
^^ Colin Tatz, Aborigines in Sport, 84. 
1°'^  Bain Attwood, The Making of the Aborigines (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989), 119. 
Howell and Howell, 'The Effects of Acculturation on the Aborigine,' 15. 
1 no 
This attitude was similar to the reasons Aborigines took up boxing. Broome notes that 
'boxing as ritualised conflict provided a 'safe' outlet for these aggressions without overturning 
established relations' (Richard Broome, 'Professional Aboriginal Boxers in Eastern Australia 1930-
79,' Aboriginal History, 4 (1980): 67). 
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Figure 8.9 Barambah cricket team - 1930s 
Figure 8.10 Barambah football team - 1930s 
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of the settlement culture and traditions. The importance of football and cricket to the 
inmates was reflected in the location of the sports ground. Whereas the tennis court was 
situated in the 'whitefella' domain, the sports ground was located in the 'blackfella' 
domain. It was a significant feature of the domain. To the inmates, it was 'their' sports 
ground and home games invariably attracted a large crowd. By contrast, the tennis 
court was rarely used by the inmates. 
This chapter has focused on the development of the 'blackfella' domain and some 
of its features that signified how inmates maintained their cultural distinctiveness. We 
cannot however, overlook those inmates who were confined to the dormitories which 
were located firmly within the 'whitefella' domain. As discussed in chapter four, the 
dormitories were institutions within institution. It was within the dormitories that the 
administration made the most intensive efforts to crush the cultural ties and identity of 
inmates. The dormitory inmates were subjected to an existence that was highly 
regimented and their contact with the other inmates was strictly monitored. In such a 
situation, their capacity for developing 'counter-hegemonic strategies' was more limited 
than in the 'blackfella' domain. Yet despite the pres.sures to conform and to deny their 
aboriginality, the dormitory inmates did resist and maintain a distinctive identity. They 
did not meekly accept the status and values that were imposed upon them. Indeed, the 
dormitory system failed to convince the inmates to imitate the values and behaviour of 
white society. 
Ironically, the very harshness of the conditions they were forced to endure helped 
inmates to maintain their 'otherness'. Denied frequent access to their families, the dor-
mitory inmates developed their own sense of family and community. In reflecting on 
110 Jack Fisher, interview. Ken Edwards, 25 September 1988; Rita Huggins, interview, Ken 
Edwards, 19 April 1988. 
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her childhood in the dormitory, Ruth Hegarty commented on her relationship with two 
other inmates, Nellie O'Chin and Viola Hill: 
It drew us together. We became sisters. We are all sisters -always have 
been. We looked about for one another. Even when we were married, we 
i l l kept together . . . We had a bond. You couldn't say anything against us. 
Within the dormitories a distinctive sub-culture developed. The dormitory children were 
conscious they were different from the children from the camp. They had they own 
patterns of behaviour, rituals and significantly, even developed their own language, 'Dor-
mitory talk' was a means of communicating which was used by older girls in the late 
1930s, It was based on 'putting different sounds to the alphabet' as follows: 
a aa CL. e ee / 
b bub t>Ab i fuf /A-1^ 
c cue k/\K g gug ^A^ 
d dud c / W k huh hAh 
Words were then pronounced by stringing together the sounds for each letter of that 
word. Thus 'smoke'would be pronounced 'sus-mum-oo-kuk-ay' (£/iS njAin oV ht^Ji 
and milk was 'mum-u-lul-kuk'(/ji/\M A /A! /bsk./ ). The words in themselves sufficed 
as a sentence. For example, when a boy walked past and one of the inmates wanted to 
indicate that she liked him, she simply used the code for 'I like': 'a-lul-a-kuk-ay' 
(A /A/ gjy^  ^AI< e-i )• Similarly, when the dormitory supervisor Nancy Chambers was 
approaching, the code was 'nan-aa-nan-cuc-y' (/7A>i S nAyi si u/<2/). 
Ill Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. Their experience 
parallels that of Connie EUement who grew up in an orphanage in Western Australia. In her 
autobiography. The Divided Kingdom, she wrote: 
I realise now that my biggest gain was to experience the powerful and fine force of love 
between children collected together over such a long period of time and in such large 
numbers. This is a relationship which has been undervalued by welfare workers, writers and 
almost everyone else . . . This love and caring between children which pulled us through 
together is also what enabled me to survive (quoted in Sydney Moming Herald, 21 February 
1988). 
112 Ruth Hegarty, Nellie O'Chin, Viola Hill, interview, 15 August 1988. 
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In the dormitories, there was very little that the inmates could claim as their 
'own'. As one inmate said: 'you owned nothing . . . it became company property'. All 
clothing was pooled and there was little space or opportunity to keep personal items. 
In such an environment, 'dormitory talk' was more than just a novelty. It was significant 
as something that the inmates 'owned'. As Ruth Hegarty commented: 'It was marvellous, 
113 It was something we had - nobody could take that away from us'. Furthermore, it 
was a means of asserting a limited degree of control over their social relations. Not only 
did they exclude other inmates, but importantly the dormitory staff. Indeed, dormitory 
talk was part of a domain that the inmates created within the dormitory system. Unable 
to create a domain with physical space, the inmates created a domain that occupied 
psychological space. Within this domain, the dormitory inmates sought to resist the 
domination of their lives and the unremitting attempts to crush their identity. It was a 
haven where inmates could express their 'otherness' and group distinctiveness, albeit in 
a fragmented form. 
It is evident that despite forty years of institutionalisation, the inmates were 
neither without identity nor cultureless. Despite the pervasiveness of control exercised 
over their lives, they were not a dispirited or defeated people. They had not succumbed 
to a 'despairing inertia' nor could they be described as having a 'dispossessed resigna-
tion'. Although they were confronted with radically different circumstances from those 
of their forebears, their own patterns of behaviour and world view were still distinctly 
different from the outside world of anglo-Australians. Even if they did not always feel 
self confident about their identity as 'blackfellas' or 'dark folk', they did not in any sense 
see themselves as 'whitefellas'. Rather than being hapless victims of the reserve system, 
the inmates responded to their changed circumstances by not only maintaining some 
113 ibid. 
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previous practices and rejecting others, but also by developing new cultural forms and 
expressions. 
The evolution of a distinctive settlement culture was a complex and multifaccted 
process. Recent studies of the cultural forms of oppressed and minority groups have 
employed the term 'oppositional culture' or 'culture of resistance'. In his survey of 
the Queensland reserve system, CD. Rowley suggested that there was *the tendency of 
the inmates to make 'secondary adjustments', using its facilities for their own ends, not 
the purposes of the administration'. As has been shown in this chapter, the inmates 
did resist vigorously the attempts to control and subjugate their lives and did subvert 
the system. Sometimes this jesistance was overt, such as in gambling, but more often 
the defiance was covert and subtle. But the Barambah culture was not limited to reaction 
and resistance. Other forms of behaviour were more proactive or adaptive. For example, 
inmates were not forced to play sport. Of the choices available, cricket and football 
rather than tennis became popular because the inmates could adapt those cultural forms 
for their own purposes. Yet other forms of inmate behaviour were governed by factors 
unrelated to their state of incarceration. The smoking of newly born children, which was 
still commonly observed in the 1930s, was practised because it was a traditional 
custom. The sociocultural dynamics of the settlement therefore cannot be categorised 
simply. Some of the formative elements were resistive and oppositional, others revealed 
the ability of inmates to adapt to their environment and manipulate it for their own 
purposes, while other aspects reflected the resilience of traditional beliefs and customs. 
11'* Colinshaw, Black White or Brindle: Race in Rural Australia, 283; Morris, 'Dhan-gadi 
resistance to assimilation,' 44. 
115 "Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia, 126. 
11^  Ruby Ray, interview, 8 April 1984. 
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One of the primary functions of the settlement was to inculcate the inmates with 
'civilised' values by destroying their cultural roots. It was hoped that with a 'limited 
amount of civilisation' they might, in time, become incorporated into European society, 
albeit at the lowest level. But instead of stripping the inmates of their identity and extin-
guishing their cultural distinctiveness, the reserve system only served to reinforce their 
'otherness'. The reserve system undoubtedly destroyed many traditional cultural expres-
117 
sions, but from it evolved other cultural forms. As Hope Neill said: 'out of oppres-
sion evolved an additional kinship, an additional culture, an additional language.' The 
inmates of Barambah became 'one big tribe'. 
1 In a recent article on the encounter between European and native cultures, William 
Simmons has shown how 'dominated peoples have maintained distinct identities even while changing 
radically in response to externally dictated events' (William S. Simmons, 'Culture Theory in Contem-
porary Ethnohistory,' Ethnohistory, 35 (1988): 8). Gerald Sider, in aLso discussing this issue, aptly 
described the processes that occurred on Barambah when he wrote: 
the process of domination imposes a dialogue between dominators and dominated. Each 
must speak to the other for political transactions to occur. In speaking to each other, they 
seem often to incorporate the other . . . This attempted incorjxiration both defines and 
denies the dialogue, returning to the basic form of contradiction of this form of domination 
- that it cannot both create and incorporate the other as other - thus opening a space for 
continuing resistance and distancing (Gerald Sider, 'When Parrots learn to Talk, and why 
they can't: Domination, Self-Deception in Indian-White Relations,'/ouma//or Comparative 
Study of Society and History, 29 [1987]: 22). 
118 Neill, 'The Beating heart of Australian culture,' 7. 
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CONCLUSION 
By 1940 Barambah, or Cherbourg as it was then called, had grown to a 
settlement with almost 1000 inmates under the control and guidance of fourteen staff. 
It contained a school with 250 children enrolled, a hall for social activities, football and 
cricket ground, two churches, three substantial dormitories, hospital, store, gaol, 
accommodation for staff, and more than forty cottages. Also on the settlement was a 
sawmill, dairy, paddocks with beef cattle and areas under cultivation. If the settlement 
could have been regarded as a 'most successful undertaking' in 1910, by 1940 it seemed 
even more so. Cherbourg was triumphed as a model Aboriginal settlement and was 
admired by administrators and politicians in other states. The apparent success of 
Cherbourg dispelled any doubts or misapprehensions about the viability of the reserve 
system. From the government's perspective, the survival and development of the 
settlement vindicated the appropriateness and durability of its policy. Proponents of the 
reserve system defended it on humanitarian grounds. It was a 'duty we owe', 'for their 
own good'. Even critics of the system such as CD. Rowley, while acknowledging the 
inadequacies and infringements on civil liberties, considered the intention of the policy 
was motivated by genuine humanitarian concerns. Likewise, Gordon Reid in his analysis 
of 'Queensland and The Aboriginal problem 1838-1901' claims that 'Meston's scheme 
was a positive attempt to help Aborigines'. 
1 CD. Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1971), 108, 118. 
2 Gordon Reid, 'Queensland and the Aboriginal Problem: 1838-1901,' PhD thesis, Australian 
National University, 1985, 251. 
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This thesis rebuts such a view. Reserves such as Barambah were not sustained 
by benevolent or altruistic motives. One of the principal aims of the settlement was the 
exclusion of Aborigines from white society. It was a mechanism for social distancing, 
a dumping ground for the socially unacceptable. But in being removed to the settlement. 
Aborigines were not free to retain their previous lifestyle and belief system. They 
became inmates in an institution which attempted to control, regulate and reform every 
facet of their lives. Another critical role that the settlement fulfilled was the exploitation 
of labour. Inmates were inculcated with the capitalist values of work and time and the 
settlement became a source of cheap and dependable labour. By the 1930s, the 
Barambah inmates were controlled and regulated to an extent that had not been achieved 
previously on reserves. 
One factor contributing to the increase in effectiveness of the reserve system was 
the direct involvement of the state. When Archibald Meston outlined his scheme for the 
improvement and preservation of Queensland Aboriginals in 1895, one of the more 
significant elements was that the state should be directly involved rather than mission 
societies or benevolent associations. It is doubtful whether Meston fully understood the 
implications of this proposal but it became one of the most significant aspects of the 
1897 policy. By making the protection of blacks directly a state matter, all the resources 
of the state could be coordinated to those ends. The decision to participate actively in 
managing the welfare of Aborigines, and not leave it in the hands of a Protection Board 
as occurred in New South Wales and Victoria, was a significant change from previous 
practice. The removals program, for example, was only possible with close and active 
cooperation from the police. In Queensland, the development of state administered 
settlements paralleled the growth in other state run institutions of social control including 
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prisons, asylums, lazarets, inebriates' institutes and lock hospitals. Also contributing to 
the development of the reserve system was the greater understanding and application of 
technologies of control. Barambah was a model in the economy of power relations. 
With a minimum of staff, and without the need for physical barriers, 1000 inmates were 
able to be contained within the reserve. The emergence of Queensland's reserve system 
coincided with a 'veritable technological take-off in the productivity of power'. The 
management of Barambah encapsulated the changing technologies of power. Control was 
effected, not through corporal punishment, the lash, or overt violence but through the 
application of subtle forms of violence and terror. 
From the outside, the sense of tranquillity and orderliness betrayed the underlying 
violent nature of the settlement. Previous analysis of the reserve system has almost 
totally ignored or made scant reference to its violent nature. Yet, the operation of 
Barambah settlement centred on the use of passive violence and the threat of violence. 
The issue has been overlooked partly because violence is often interpreted in a narrow 
sense. But as Wilden notes: 
There is another form of violence, a covert form which is perhaps the most 
devastating of all those subjected to it. This is the passive violence of the 
refusal to recognise covert or real violence. 
The covert and passive violence which permeated the settlement was as real for those to 
whom it was directed as any overt or naked violence would have been. The removal of 
Aborigines from their land and kin was a process that can only be described as violent. 
On the settlement inmates lived with the constant threat of removal to another settlement 
and further displacement. The removals process was an highly effective means of 
^ see Ray Evans, 'The hidden colonists: deviance and social control in colonial Queensland,' 
Social Policy in Australia, ed. Jill Roe (Sydney: Cassell, 1976), 74-100. 
^ R. Harland, Post Stmcturalism (London: Methuen, 1987), 164. 
A. Wilden, System and Stmcture: Essays in Communication and Exchange (London: Tavistock, 
1980), 482. 
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maintaining control and order by inducing a 'state of terror' in inmates. The violent 
nature of the settlement regime was aLso evident in the concerted attempts to destroy the 
inmates' culture and identity. The placement of young children-in dormitories, the 
suppression of languages, the condemnation of customs, the imposition of European 
methods of learning and knowledge, the inculcating of capitalist values of time and work, 
were all part of a process of cultural genocide, Pa.ssive violence was manifest in the 
disregard of the inmates' health, A combination of factors including forcing a large 
number of Aborigines onto the reserve, inadequate facilities and poor diet, contributed to 
the high rates of mortality, particularly infant mortality. Inmates died as the result of 
official policies and administrative neglect. 
The violence which permeated Barambah was not an aberration. The same 
methods of control were used on the other govemment settlements at Woorabinda and 
n 
Palm Island and to a lesser extent on missions such as Yarrabah. Although the reserve 
system in Queensland was not duplicated exactly in other states, the es.sential features 
were present elsewhere, Anna Haebich's account of settlements in Western Australia 
o 
reveals parallels with the Queensland system. Similar dynamics were also present in 
The international Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
which was developed during the Nuremburg trials, defines genocide as 'acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group'. Acts which constitute genocide 
include those 'causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group' and 'forcibly transfering 
children of the group to another group' (quoted in H. J. Wootten, Report of the Inquiry into the Death 
of Malcolm Charles Smith [Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989], 76). 
^ For an account of Palm Island in the 1930s see Dawn May, 'Punishment Place' The 
Australians: 1938, eds. P. Spearitt and B. Gammage (Sydney: Fairfax, Syme & Weldon, 1987), 95-
103; also Marie Kennedy, Bom a half-caste (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 
1985). On Woorabinda see E.W. Kolijn-Vink, 'Aboriginal Identity and Art as the material expression 
of identity in Woorabinda, Central Queensland, Australia,' MA thesis. University of Leiden, 1986. 
On Yarrabah see Paul Smith, 'Yarrabah, 1892-1910,' BA thesis, James Cook University, 1981; Daniel 
Craig, The social impact of the State on an Aboriginal reserve in Queensland, Australia,' Ph.D 
thesis. University of California, Berkeley, 1979; Judy Thompson, ed.. Reaching Back: Queensland 
Aboriginal People recall early days at Yarrabah Mission (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1989). 
Anna Haebich, For Their Own Good: Aborigines and Govemment in the Southwest of Westem 
Australia (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 1988). 
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New South Wales as Heather Goodall, Peter Read and Barry Morris have shown.^ The 
emphasis on the essentially violent nature of the reserve system runs counter to recent 
trends in the historiography of race relations where the focus of debate has shifted from 
issues of conflict and violence to those of collusion, cooperation, collaboration and 
accommodation. Although varying in methodology, geographical context and time, a 
common element in Ann McGrath's 5orAi in the Cattle, Bain Attwood's 7//e Making of 
the Aborigines, and Marie Fels' Good Men and True; the Aboriginal Police of the Port 
Philip District 1837-1853, is the emphasis on these latter themes in the encounter 
between colonisers and coloni.scd. These works mark a retreat from the view that 
violent conflict was a critical determinant in shaping Aboriginal-European relations on 
the frontier and in subsequent periods. Attwood, for example, devotes considerable 
attention to the deliberate and conscious attempts by missionaries on Ramahycuk mission 
in the Gippsland region to reformulate the inmates' understanding of time and space. He 
demonstrates the extent to which these measures of reform and remaking succeeded but 
concedes that the missionaries dominion was 'not absolute'. While acknowledging that 
physical coercion was at times used on the mission, Attwood fails to recognise that the 
process of social reconstruction was an intrinsically violent process. The attempted 
reordering of Aboriginal society in the Gippsland was not a benign activity but involved 
the destruction of a culture, A fundamental problem with Attwood's work is his failure 
' Heather Goodall, 'A History of Aboriginal Communities in NSW 1909-1939,' PhD thesis. 
University of Sydney, 1982; Peter Read, 'A History of the Wiradjuri People of New South Wales 
1883-1%9,' PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1983; Barry Morris, 'Cultural domination 
and domestic dependence: the Dhan-Gadi of New South Wales and the protection of the state,' 
Canberra Anthropology 8 (1985): 87-115. 
1° Bain Attwood, The Making of the Aborigines (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989); Ann McGrath, 
Bom in the cattle; Aborigines in Cattle Country (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Marie Fels Good 
Men and True: the Aboriginal Police of the Port Philip District 1837-1853 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1988). See also Bob Reece, 'Inventing Aborigines,' Aboriginal History 11 (1987): 
14-23; Malcolm Prentis, 'Prelude to Dispossession? First contacts between Aborigines and Europeans 
in the Northern Rivers region of New South Wales, 1770-1840s,' Joumal of the Royal Australian 
Historical Society 70 (1984): 3-18. For a critique of Prentis' paper see Bill Thorpe, 'A Social History 
of Colonial Queensland: Towards a Marxist Perspective,' PhD thesis. University of Queensland, 1985, 
1-44. 
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to acknowledge the passive violence which permeated the missions such as Ramahycuk. 
Ann McGrath's analysis of Aboriginal workers in the Northern Territory pastoral industry 
similarly fails to recognise the presence of pa.ssive violence. Although recognising that 
force was employed in the initial years of contact, she maintains that in the later period 
when Aborigines resided on properties, relations were characterised by accommodation 
and mutual dependency. McGrath argues that Aborigines 'made the cattle industry their 
own' and that 'generations of Aboriginal station dwellers were never truly colonised'. 
Certainly, this is a conclusion not to be disputed and supports the argument in chapter 
eight that the Barambah inmates were not totally colonised but developed new cultural 
forms and maintained a sense of otherness. Yet in focusing on the dynamics of 
Aboriginal adaptation and strategies of survival, she neglects the critical i.ssue of power 
relations. While Aboriginal station dwellers had a degree of freedom that was not 
enjoyed by settlement inmates, the boundaries in which they were able to operate were 
controlled by Europeans. This control was maintained, again through subtle forms of 
violence. Various instruments of terror were U5>ed to intimidate the Aboriginal population 
and produce a docile and obsequious workforce. Although removals were not carried out 
as extensively in the Northern Territory as in Queensland, removals did occur and were 
12 
used to control and subjugate. 
Attwood claims that his work, along with those of Fels and McGrath, indicate 
13 • • 
a new development in historiography of Aboriginal-European relations. He maintains 
they represent a new approach that contrasts with the writings of historians such as 
Evans, Loos, Christie and Reynolds who saw violence and conflict as the dominant 
11 McGrath, Bom in the Cattle, viii, 174-5. 
12 See Barbara Cummings, Take this Child: from Kahlin Compound to the Retta Dixon 
Children's Home (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1990). 
1^  Bain Attwood, 'Aborigines and Academic Historians: some recent encounters,' Australian 
Historical Studies 24 (1990): 123-35. 
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themes. '^^  Yet this analysis of the Barambah settlement indicates that in Aboriginal: 
European relations, violence was not a peripheral issue but at the centre. Violence was 
not an occasional or spasmodic occurrence but was embedded in the reserve system. The 
importance of terror in establishing hegemony cannot be underestimated as Michael 
Taussig has shown in an study of the use of terror in the South American context. He 
comments: 
Whatever conclusions we draw as to how that hegemony was so speedily 
effected, we would be most unwise to overlook or underestimate the role of 
terror. And by this I mean us to think through terror, which as well as being 
a physiological state is also a social fact and a cultural construction whose 
baroque dimensions allow it to serve as the mediator par excellence of white 
hegemony. 
The use of terror to dominate was not limited to early encounters on the frontier but 
continued through into the era of reserves. The 1897 policy is frequently regarded as a 
watershed in Aboriginal-European relations. Yet when the practice of that policy is 
examined, violence and terror remained as the dominant means of control. It changed 
from being overt and unstructured, to a covert and institutionalised form. 
This understanding of the intrinsically violent nature of the reserve system has 
implications that extends beyond an understanding of race relations. The issue of 
violence in Australian society is one that has largely been ignored by historians. The 
paradigm of 'unity, tranquillity and consensus' has dominated much of Australian 
historiography. Yet as Lewis and Evans observe, the themes of conflict, struggle and 
1'* Ray Evans, '"The Nigger shall disappear . ." Aborigines and Europeans in colonial 
Queensland,' Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in colonial Queensland, eds. 
R. Evans, K. Saunders & K Cronin (Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1975); Noel 
Loos, Invasion and Resistance: Aboriginal-European relations on the North Queensland Frontier 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982); Michael Christie, Aborigines in Colonial 
Victoria (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1979); Henry Reynolds, The Other Side of the Frontier 
(Townsville: James Cook University, 1981). 
1^  Michael Taussig, 'Culture of Terror - Space of Death. Roger Casement's Putumayo Report 
and the Explanation of Torture,' Joumal for Comparative Study of Society and History 26 (1984): 468. 
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violence need to be more carefully considered by historians.' Australian history, Lewis 
declares is probably as 'violent as that of many other countries and perhaps more 
bitter'.^^ The issue of violence has been ignored partly becau.sc its existence on any 
extensive scale is seen as incompatible with a civili.sed society. In an important analysis 
of the role of terror and violence, E.V. Walter has analysed the dynamics of terrorism, 
not in its usual manifestation where a minority seeks to gain certain rights, but by a 
'properly constituted government' that would not seem to need to employ systems of 
terror and violence to maintain its authority. Walter examines the enigma of governments 
18 that claim to uphold civilised values while using systems of terror to subjugate others. 
He writes: 
Our conventions of political thought have shut out the realities of terroristic 
systems for our imaginations cannot grasp the paradox of a regime or terror -
a government that destroys part of the community in order to control the rest. 
We think of proper governments, moreover as instruments to protect the 
community against violence . . . we refuse to image a durable government 
based on consent that u.ses continual violence as a regular technique - not as 
a last resort - on its own people . . . With terror the regime does not 
eliminate the group that falls in the zone of terror, but controls it through 
violence and fear. 
Walter aptly describes the nature of the reserve system in Queensland and confirms that 
the systematic use of violence was not atypical. Walter's analysis reveals how an 
otherwise proper and democratic government can engage in the sustained application of 
violence and terror. The behaviour of modern industrial states from Nazi Germany to the 
United States of America demonstrate that beneath a veneer of 'civilisation' lies a barbaric 
disposition. As Tennes.se Williams observed: 'We are all civili.sed people which means 
1^  Glen Lewis, 'Violence in Australian History; the Queensland experience', Meanjin September 
1974, 313-319; Ray Evans, 'Blood dries quickly: conflict study and Australian historiography,' 
unpublished paper, 1991. 
Lewis, Violence in Australian history, 318. 
1^  E.V. Walter, Terror and Resistance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
1^  ibid., 29, 17. 
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that we are all savages at heart but observing a few amenities of civilised behaviour'. 
Having exposed the underlying violent nature of the settlement and a.ssociatcd 
activities, the question still remains, why were such actions engaged in by a so called 
civilised society? What were the forces that created and sustained the reserve system? 
The dynamics of domination were complex and operated in three principal dimensions -
economic, cultural and metaphysical. The economic dimension was the most transparent. 
Aborigines were removed from their land in order that Europeans could exploit it 
unencumbered. They were deported whenever they were perceived to threaten the 
expansion of agrarian capitalism in the state. Yet while segregating Aborigines on 
reserves, capital also had demand for their labour. A primary function of the settlement 
was to provide a servile and cheap workforce. Furthermore, the reserve system helped 
to entrench the status of Aborigines as a permanent undercla.ss. It al.so served to 
perpetuate their landless condition. 
The cultural dimension that shaped and propelled the reserve system included 
elements of nationalism, social Darwinism and at a basic level, the belief in the 
supremacy of British civilisation. The reserve system emerged in a social and political 
environment that focused on issues of national identity and consciousness. Intimately 
related to these issues was the question of race as Stephen Alomes has noted: 
The primary definition of Australian nationality was racial. It was expressed 
in future P,M. Alfred Deakin's belief that the 'unity of Australia is nothing, if 
that does not imply a united race'. That united 'race' was white, Australian 
and British, a reflection of the ruling racism of Western ideology. 
The relationship between race and national identity was epitomised by the altering of the 
20 Tennesse Williams, Sweet Bird of Youth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959), 9. 
Stephen Alomes, A Nation at Last: the changing character of Australian Nationalism 1880-
1988 (North Ryde: Angus and Robertson, 1988), 40. 
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Bulletin's masthead from 'Australia for Australians' to 'Australia for the white man'. 
Although the development of the white Australia policy was a response to the concerns 
about Asian immigration, the indigenous inhabitants also presented a threat to 'national 
efficiency'. The influence of social Darwinism and the eugenies movement stressed the 
importance of preventing white blood becoming tainted with inferior strains. A nation 
could only be effectively developed if the blood of its people was kept pure and not 
fouled by 'an infusion of the sluggish fluid of a petrified and animalised race'. The 
ideas of racial purity certainly dominated the thinking of J.W. Bleakley when he served 
as Chief Protector, Bleakley was an ardent believer in keeping the races apart and had 
an abhorrence of mLscegenation. Thus a primary function of the reserve system was to 
keep the white race pure. The growing sense of nationalism, did not however, diminish 
the anglo- Australian's attachment to Britain and the Empire. For them 'Empire was the 
fount of pride. Empire was the panacea . . . and domination was their destiny'. White 
Australians were imbued with this sense of cultural superiority. British civilisation stood 
at the apex of all cultures and civilisations. The reserve system was a product of this 
Weltanschauung. It was the duty of the newcomers in the land to inculcate the 
indigenous inhabitants with at least a limited degree of civilisation and make every 
attempt to turn them from their primitive and heathen lifestyle. Yet ironically, the 
methods and techniques employed in cementing cultural hegemony were anything but 
civilised. 
The third dimension of the dynamics of domination was metaphysical. The 
nineteenth century American novelist Herman Melville, in The Confidence Man: His 
Masquerade, entitled a chapter, 'the Metaphysics of Indian Hating' in which he exposed 
297. 
22 D. Cole quoted in Alomes, A Nation at Last, 31. 
2^  James Morris, Heaven's Command: an Imperial Progress (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 
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and condemned the 'perversion of American and civilised values to justify extraordinary 
violence'. As with the Indian, the hatred and despising of Aboriginal peoples was 
prompted by more than a dislike or misunderstanding of their customs and lifestyle. For 
whites. Aborigines represented the colour of evil and were dark reminders of the 
wilderness they had set out to conquer in themselves and the world. They were 
unwelcome inventions of their own mortality. Aborigines reflected back to the white 
colonists the 'vast and baroque projections of human wildness that the colonists needed 
to establish their reality as civilised people'. Aborigines were a source of discomfort 
and a disturbing presence in the cultural land.scape. For white Australians, in their quest 
to tame the wilderness, the continuing survival of the first inhabitants of land was a 
reminder that the conquest was not complete. Aboriginal people were also a reminder 
27 
to Europeans that they were intruders and aliens in the land. The metaphysical 
dimension helps to explain why violence was endemic in the reserve system. Other 
means of control and subjugation were possible. If economic considerations was the sole 
reasons for the reserve system, less costly methods could had been used to exploit 
Aboriginal labour. Cultural forces alone do not account for the institutionalisation of 
violence and the obvious desire to terrori.se beyond what was necessary in order to 
establish cultural hegemony. Rather it was those metaphysical aspects of European-
OA 
Robert Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus 
to the Present (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1978), 95; see also Robert Drinnon, Facing West: The 
metaphysics of Indian Hating and Empire Building (New York: Meredin, 1980). 
2^  Drinnon, Facing West, xi-xviii. 
2^  Taussig, 'Culture of Terror,' 483. 
2^  In recent analysis of the images of indigenous people in Canadian society, T. Goldie's 
comments: 
The white Canadian looks at the Indian. The Indian is Other and therefore alien. But the 
Indian is indigenous and therefore cannot be alien. So the Canadian must be alien. But 
how can the Canadian be alien within Canada (quoted in Sydney Moming Herald, 5 August 
1989). 
This equally applies to white and Aboriginal Australians. 
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Aboriginal relations that led to the removal of people from their country and sources of 
identity, the needless separation of elderly from their family and kin, the separation of 
children from their families in dormitories, and the disregard for elementary justice and 
human dignity. 
The reserve system had a profound impact on Aboriginal people. Yet it did not 
leave them hapless victims, cultureless or bereft of identity. Despite the fragmentation 
of kinship networks, dislocation, and suppression of cultural traditions, Barambah inmates 
retained a distinctive identity and sense of otherness. The encounter between black and 
white in the context of the reserve system was a dialectical process. While attempting 
to create and incorporate Aborigines, it only served to reinforce their sense of otherness. 
In attempting to destroy cultural forms, the reserve system instead prompted greater 
resilience as inmates struggled to retain their identity. The resurgence and development 
of a Barambah identity, particularly during the 1930s, mirrored changes elsewhere in 
28 Australia. The place that was 'a dumping ground for the lame, the halt and 
29 incorngable' also became a place of resistance and survival. 
2* Perhaps one issue that needs further examination is why it did not manifest itself in political 
action as in other states. The quite vigorous political movements that developed in the 1930s under 
the leadership of people such as William Cooper, Jack Patten in NSW and William Harris in Western 
Australia did not develop in Queensland. A possible explanation for a lack of concerted overt 
political action in Queensland was that an dissent was quickly crushed. In 1939, two inmates, Jacob 
Chirnside and Martha Sandow started holding meetings on the settlement But the Superintendent 
moved quickly to stop these activities. The Superintendent described Chirnside to Chief Protector: 
He is an agitator and an insolent one at that. He is a disciple of that man Paton down in 
NSW. The Aboriginal Freedom League or whatever they call themselves. He together with 
Martha Sandow hold meetings or did hold meetings on the settlement. I have advised that 
I would dLsperse these meetings and if necessary lock up the speakers. (W. Semple to Chief 
Protector, 2 December 1939 QSA Transfer 1227/Box 10 39/2585). 
29 QPP (1914) 1: 1028. 
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